Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber2/lect3

Lecture 3

Latin	English
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam philosophus praemisit quod causae entium non sunt infinitae, hic probat propositum. Et primo, quod non sint infinitae in directum. Secundo, quod non sint infinitae secundum speciem, ibi, sed si infinitae essent et cetera. Circa primum quatuor facit. Primo ostendit propositum in causis efficientibus vel moventibus. Secundo in causis materialibus, ibi, at vero nec in deorsum. Tertio in causis finalibus, ibi, amplius autem quod est cuius causa et cetera. Quarto in causis formalibus, ibi, sed nec quod quid erat esse et cetera. Circa primum sic procedit. Primo proponit quamdam propositionem: scilicet, quod in omnibus his, quae sunt media inter duo extrema, quorum unum est ultimum, et aliud primum, necesse est quod illud quod est primum, sit causa posteriorum, scilicet medii et ultimi.	301. Having assumed above that the causes of beings are not infinite in number, the Philosopher now proves this. First (153:C 300, he proves that there are not an infinite number of causes in a series; and second (170:C 330), that the classes of causes are not infinite in number (“Again, if the classes of causes”). In regard to the first he does four things. First, he proves his assumption in the case of efficient or moving causes; second (154:C 305), in the case of material causes (“Neither is it possible”); third (160:C 316), in the case of final causes (“Again, that for the sake of which”); and fourth (164:C 320), in the case of formal causes (“Nor can the quiddity”). In regard to the first he proceeds as follows. First, he lays down this premise: in the case of all those things which lie between two extremes, one of which is last and the other first, the first is necessarily the cause of those which come after it, namely, what is intermediate and what is last.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 2 Et hanc propositionem manifestat per divisionem: quia, si oporteat nos dicere quid sit causa inter aliqua tria, quae sunt primum, medium et ultimum, ex necessitate dicemus causam esse id quod est primum. Non enim possumus dicere id quod est ultimum, esse causam omnium, quia nullius est causa; alioquin non est ultimum, cum effectus sit posterior causa. Sed nec possumus dicere quod medium sit causa omnium; quia nec est causa nisi unius tantum, scilicet ultimi.	302. Then he proves this premise by a process of elimination. For if we had to say which of the three, i.e., the first, the intermediate, or the last, is the cause of the others, we would have to say that the first is the cause. We could not say that what is last is the cause of all the others, because it is not a cause of anything; for in other respects what is last is not a cause, since an effect follows a cause. Nor could we say that the intermediate is the cause of all the others, because it is the cause of only one of them, namely, what is last.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 3 Et ne aliquis intelligat, quod medium nunquam habeat post se nisi unum, quod est ultimum, quod tunc solum contingit, quando inter duo extrema est unum medium tantum, ideo ad hoc excludendum concludit quod nihil ad propositum differt, utrum sit unum tantum medium, vel plura: quia omnia plura media accipiuntur loco unius, inquantum conveniunt in ratione medii. Et similiter non differt utrum sint media finita vel infinita; quia dummodo habeant rationem medii, non possunt esse prima causa movens. Et quia ante omnem secundam causam moventem requiritur prima causa movens, requiritur quod ante omnem causam mediam sit causa prima, quae nullo modo sit media, quasi habens aliam causam ante se. Sed, si praedicto modo ponantur causae moventes procedere in infinitum, sequitur, quod omnes causae sunt mediae. Et sic universaliter oportet dicere, quod cuiuslibet infiniti, sive in ordine causae, sive in ordine magnitudinis, omnes partes sint mediae: si enim esset aliqua pars quae non esset media, oporteret, quod vel esset prima vel ultima: et utrumque repugnat rationi infiniti, quod excludit omnem terminum et principium et finem.	303. And lest someone should think that an intermediate is followed by only one thing, i.e., what is last (for this occurs only when there is a single thing between two extremes), in order to exclude this interpretation he adds that it makes no difference to the premise given above whether there is only one intermediate or several, because all intermediates are taken together as one insofar as they have in common the character of an intermediate. Nor again does it make any difference whether there are a finite or infinite number of intermediates, because so long as they have the nature of an intermediate they cannot be the first cause of motion. Further, since there must be a first cause of motion prior to every secondary cause of motion, then there must be a first cause prior to every intermediate cause, which is not an intermediate in any sense, as though it had a cause prior to itself. But if we were to hold that there is an infinite series of moving causes in the above way, then all causes would be intermediate ones. Thus we would have to say without qualification that all parts of any infinite thing, whether of a series of causes or of continuous quantities, are intermediate ones; for if there were a part that was not an intermediate one, it would have to be either a first or a last; and both of these are opposed to the nature of the infinite, which excludes every limit, whether it be a starting-point or a terminus.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 4 Est autem et ad aliud attendendum: quod, si alicuius finiti sint plures partes mediae, non omnes partes simili ratione sunt mediae. Nam quaedam magis appropinquant primo, quaedam magis appropinquant ultimo. Sed in infinito quod non habet primum et ultimum, nulla pars potest magis appropinquare vel minus principio aut ultimo. Et ideo usque ad quamcumque partem, quam modo signaveris, omnes partes similiter sunt mediae. Sic igitur, si causae moventes procedant in infinitum, nulla erit causa prima: sed causa prima erat causa omnium: ergo sequeretur, quod totaliter omnes causae tollerentur: sublata enim causa tolluntur ea quorum est causa.	304. Now there is another point that must be noted, i.e., that if there are several intermediate parts in any finite thing, not all parts are intermediate to the same degree; for some are closer to what is first, and some to what is last. But in the case of some infinite thing in which there is neither a first nor last part, no part can be closer to or farther away from either what is first or what is last. Therefore all parts are intermediates to the same degree right down to the one you designate now. Consequently, if the causes of motion proceed to infinity in this way, there will be no first cause. But a first cause is the cause of all things. Therefore it will follow that all causes are eliminated; for when a cause is removed the things of which it is the cause are also removed.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit, quod non est possibile procedere in infinitum in causis materialibus. Et primo proponit quod intendit. Secundo probat propositum, ibi, dupliciter enim fit hoc ex hoc et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est, quod patiens subiicitur agenti: unde procedere in agentibus est sursum ire, procedere autem in patientibus est in deorsum ire. Sicut autem agere attribuitur causae moventi, ita pati attribuitur materiae. Unde processus causarum moventium est in sursum, processus autem causarum materialium est in deorsum. Quia ergo ostenderat, quod non est in infinitum procedere in causis moventibus quasi in sursum procedendo, subiungit, quod nec possibile est ire in infinitum in deorsum, secundum scilicet processum causarum materialium, supposito, quod sursum ex parte causarum moventium inveniatur aliquod principium.	305. Neither is it possible (154) He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of material causes. First (154:C 300, he states what he intends to prove. Second (155:C 308), he proceeds with his proof (“Now there are two ways”). In regard to the first it must be noted that a patient is subjected to the action of an agent. Therefore to pass from agent to agent is to proceed in an upward direction, whereas to pass from patient to patient is to proceed in a downward direction. Now just as action is attributed to the cause of motion, so is undergoing action attributed to matter. Therefore among the causes of motion the process is in an upward direction, whereas amon’,g material causes the process is in a downward direction. Consequently, since he showed among moving causes that it is impossible to proceed to infinity, as it were, in an upward direction, he adds that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in a downward direction, i.e., in the process of material causes, granted that there is a starting-point in an upward direction among the causes of motion.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 6 Et exemplificat de processu naturalium, qui est in deorsum: ut si dicamus quod ex igne fit aqua, et ex aqua terra, et sic in infinitum. Et utitur hoc exemplo secundum opinionem antiquorum naturalium, qui posuerunt unum aliquod elementorum esse principium aliorum quodam ordine.	306. He illustrates this by way of the process of natural bodies, which proceeds in a downward direction, as if we were to say that water comes from fire, earth from water, and so on to infinity. He uses this example in accordance with the opinion of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that one of these elements is the source of the others in a certain order.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 7 Potest autem et aliter exponi, ut intelligamus, quod in causis moventibus manifesti sunt ad sensum ultimi effectus, qui non movent: et ideo non quaeritur, si procedatur in infinitum in inferius secundum illud genus, sed si procedatur in superius. Sed in genere causarum materialium e converso supponitur unum primum, quod sit fundamentum et basis aliorum; et dubitatur utrum in infinitum procedatur in deorsum secundum processum eorum quae generantur ex materia. Et hoc sonat exemplum propositum: non enim dicit ut ignis ex aqua, et hoc ex alio, sed e converso, ex igne aqua et ex hoc aliud: unde supponitur prima materia, et quaeritur, an sit processus in infinitum in his quae generantur ex materia.	307. However, this can also be explained in another way, inasmuch as we understand that in the case of moving causes there are evident to the senses certain ultimate effects which do not move anything else. Therefore we do not ask if there is an infinite regress in the lower members of that class, but if there is an infinite regress in the higher ones. But in regard to the class of material causes, he assumes that there is one first cause which is the foundation and basis of the others; and he inquires whether there is an infinite regress in a downward direction in the process of those things which are generated from matter. The example which he gives illustrates this, because he does not say that fire comes from water and this in turn from something else, but the converse, i.e., that water comes from fire, and something else again from this. For this reason first matter is held to exist; and he asks whether the things that are generated from matter proceed to infinity.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit dupliciter autem probat propositum: et circa hoc quatuor facit. Primo distinguit duos modos, quibus fit aliquid ex aliquo. Secundo ostendit duplicem differentiam inter illos duos modos, ibi, ergo sic ex puero. Tertio ostendit quod secundum neutrum eorum contingit procedere in infinitum, ibi, utroque autem modo impossibile est et cetera. Quarto ostendit secundum quem illorum modorum ex primo materiali principio alia fiant, ibi, simul autem impossibile et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod duobus modis fit aliquid ex aliquo proprie et per se. Et utitur isto modo loquendi, ut excludat illum modum, quo dicitur improprie aliquid fieri ex aliquo ex hoc solo, quod fit post illud: ut si dicamus, quod quaedam festa Graecorum, quae dicebantur Olympia, fiunt ex quibusdam aliis festis, quae dicebantur Isthmia, puta si nos diceremus quod festum Epiphaniae fit ex festo natalis. Hoc autem non proprie dicitur, quia fieri est quoddam mutari: in mutatione autem non solum requiritur ordo duorum terminorum, sed etiam subiectum idem utriusque: quod quidem non contingit in praedicto exemplo: sed hoc dicimus, secundum quod imaginamur tempus esse ut subiectum diversorum festorum.	308. Now there are two ways in which (155) He proves his original thesis. Concerning this he does four things. First (155:C 308), he distinguishes between the two ways in which one thing comes from something else. Second (156:C 31o), he shows that these two ways differ in two respects (“We say, then, that a man”). Third (158:C 312), he shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either of these ways (“Now in neither way”). Fourth (159:C 314), he shows in which of these ways other things come from the first material principle (“At the same time”). He says, first, that one thing “comes from” another properly and essentially in two ways. He speaks thus in order to exclude that way in which something is said in an improper sense to come from something else only by reason of the fact that it comes after it as when it is said that certain feasts of the Greeks called the Olympian come from those called the Isthmian, or as we were to say that the feast of Epiphany comes from the the Nativity. But this is an improper use of the word, because the process of coming to be is a change, and in a change it is not only necessary that an order exist between the two limits of the change but also that both limits have the same subject. Now this is not the case in the above example, but we speak in this way insofar as we think of time as the subject of different feasts.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 9 Sed oportet proprie dicere aliquid fieri ex aliquo, quando aliquod subiectum mutatur de hoc in illud. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo sicut dicimus, quod ex puero fit vir, inquantum scilicet puer mutatur de statu puerili in statum virilem: alio modo sicut dicimus, quod ex aqua fit aer per aliquam transmutationem.	309. Now properly speaking it is necessary to say that one thing comes from something else when some subject is changed from this into that. This occurs in two ways: first, as when we say that a man comes from a boy in the sense that a boy is changed from boyhood to manhood; second, as when we say that air comes from water as a result of substantial change.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit ergo sic ostendit duas differentias inter praedictos modos. Quarum prima est, quia dicimus ex puero fieri virum, sicut ex eo quod est in fieri, fit illud quod iam est factum; aut ex eo quod est in perfici, fit illud quod iam est perfectum. Illud enim quod est in fieri et in perfici, est medium inter ens et non ens, sicut generatio est medium inter esse et non esse. Et ideo, quia per medium venitur ad extremum, dicimus, quod ex eo quod generatur fit illud quod generatum est, et ex eo quod perficitur, fit illud quod perfectum est. Et sic dicimus, quod ex puero fit vir, vel quod ex addiscente fit sciens, quia addiscens se habet ut in fieri ad scientem. In alio autem modo, quo dicimus ex aere fieri aquam, unum extremorum non se habet ut via vel medium ad alterum, sicut fieri ad factum esse; sed magis ut terminus a quo recedit, ut ad alium terminum perveniatur. Et ideo ex uno corrupto fit alterum.	310. We say, then, that a man (156). He explains the twofold sense in which these two ways differ. First, we say that a man comes from a boy in the sense that what has already come into being comes from what is coming into being, or in the sense that what has already been completed comes from what is being completed. For anything in a state of becoming and of being completed is midway between being and non-being, just as generation is midway between existence and nonexistence. Therefore, since we reach an extreme through an intermediate, we say that what has been generated comes from what is being generated, and that what has been completed comes from what is being completed. Now this is the sense in which we say that a man comes from a boy, or a man of science from a learner, because a learner is one who is becoming a man of science. But in the other sense, i.e., the one in which we say that water comes from fire, one of the limits of the change is not related to the other as a passage or intermediate, as generation is to being, but rather as the limit from which a thing starts in order to reach another limit. Therefore one comes from the other when the other is corrupted.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit propter quod concludit ex praemissa differentia, aliam differentiam. Quia enim in primo modo unum se habet ad alterum ut fieri ad factum esse, et medium ad terminum, patet, quod habent ordinem naturaliter adinvicem. Et ideo non reflectuntur adinvicem, ut indifferenter unum fiat ex altero. Unde non dicimus quod ex viro fiat puer sicut dicimus e converso. Cuius ratio est, quia illa duo ex quorum uno secundum istum modum dicitur alterum fieri, non se habent adinvicem sicut duo termini mutationis alicuius; sed sicut ea, quorum unum est post alterum. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod illud quod fit, idest terminus generationis, scilicet esse, non fit ex generatione, quasi ipsa generatio mutetur in esse; sed est post generationem, quia naturali ordine consequitur ad generationem, sicut terminus est post viam, et ultimum post medium. Unde, si consideramus ista duo, scilicet generationem et esse, non differunt ab illo modo quem exclusimus, in quo consideratur ordo tantum; sicut cum dicimus, quod dies fit ex aurora, quia est post auroram. Et propter istum naturalem ordinem, non dicimus e converso, quod aurora fit ex die, idest post diem. Et ex eadem ratione non potest esse, quod puer fiat ex viro. Sed secundum alterum modum, quo aliquid fit ex altero, invenitur reflexio. Sicut enim aqua generatur ex aere corrupto, ita aer generatur ex aqua corrupta. Et hoc ideo, quia ista duo non se habent adinvicem secundum naturalem ordinem, scilicet ut medium ad terminum; sed sicut duo extrema quorum utrumque potest esse et primum et ultimum.	311. This is why changes (157) He infers another difference from the foregoing one. For since, in the first way, one thing is related to the other as generation is to being, and as an intermediate to a limit, it is evident that one is naturally ordained to the other. Therefore they are not reversible so that one comes from the other indifferently. Consequently we do not say that a boy comes from a man, but the reverse. The reason for this is that those two things, of which one is said to come from the other in this way, are not related to each other in the same way as the two limits of a change, but as two things one of which comes after the other in sequence. And this is what he means when he says that “what has come into being” (i.e., the terminus of generation or being) does not come from generation as though generation itself were changed into being, but is that which exists after generation, because it follows generation in a natural sequence; just as one’s destination comes after a journey, and as what is last comes after what is intermediate. Therefore, if we consider these two things, i.e., generation and being, the way in which they are related does not differ from the one we have excluded, in which sequence alone is considered, as when we say that the day comes from the dawn because it comes after the dawn. Moreover, this natural sequence prevents us from saying in an opposite way that the dawn comes “from the day,” i.e., after the day; and for the same reason a boy cannot come from a man. But in the other sense in which one thing comes from another, the process is reversible; for just as water is generated by reason of air being corrupted, in a similar way air is generated by reason of water being corrupted. The reason is that these two are not related to each other in a natural sequence, i.e., as an intermediate to a limit, but as two limits, either one of which can be first or last.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit utroque autem ostendit quod non sit procedere in infinitum secundum utrumque istorum modorum. Et primo secundum primum, prout dicimus ex puero fieri virum. Illud enim ex quo dicimus aliquid fieri, sicut ex puero virum, se habet ut medium inter duo extrema, scilicet inter esse et non esse: sed positis extremis impossibile est esse infinita media: quia extremum infinitati repugnat: ergo secundum istum modum non convenit procedere in infinitum.	312. Now in neither way (158). He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either of these ways. First, in the way in which we say that a man comes from a boy; for the thing from which we say something else comes as a man comes from a boy has the position of an intermediary between two limits, i.e., between being and non-being. But an infinite number of intermediates cannot exist when certain limits are held to exist, since limits are opposed to infinity. Therefore, it is impossible to have an infinite series in this way.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 13 Similiter etiam nec secundum alium; quia in alio modo invenitur reflexio extremorum adinvicem, propter hoc quod alterius corruptio est alterius generatio, ut dictum est. Ubicumque autem est reflexio, reditur ad primum, ita scilicet quod id quod fuit primo principium, postea sit terminus. Quod in infinitis non potest contingere, in quibus non est principium et finis. Ergo nullo modo ex aliquo potest aliquid fieri in infinitum.	313. In like manner it is impossible to have an infinite series in the other way; for in that way one limit is con; verted into the other, because the corruption of one is the generation of the other, as has been explained. Now wherever a reversible process exists there is a return to some first thing in the sense that what was av first a starting-point is afterwards a terminus. This cannot occur in the case of things that are infinite, in which there is neither a starting-point nor a terminus. Consequently, there is no way in which one thing can come from another in an infinite regress.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit simul autem ostendit quod praedictorum modorum ex prima materia aliquid fiat. Ubi considerandum est, quod Aristoteles utitur hic duabus communibus suppositionibus, in quibus omnes antiqui naturales conveniebant: quarum una est, quod sit aliquod primum principium materiale, ita scilicet quod in generationibus rerum non procedatur in infinitum ex parte superiori, scilicet eius ex quo generatur. Secunda suppositio est, quod prima materia est sempiterna. Ex hac igitur secunda suppositione statim concludit, quod ex prima materia non fit aliquid secundo modo, scilicet sicut ex aere corrupto fit aqua, quia scilicet illud quod est sempiternum, non potest corrumpi.	314. At the same time it is impossible (159). He shows in which of these ways something comes from first matter. Now it must be noted that in this place Aristotle uses two common suppositions accepted by all of the ancient philosophers: first, that there is a primary material principle, and therefore that in the process of generation there is no infinite regress on the part of the higher, i.e., of that from which a thing is generated; second, that matter is eternal. Therefore, from this second supposition he immediately concludes that nothing comes from first matter in the second way, i.e., in the way in which water comes from air as a result of the latter’s corruption, because what is eternal cannot be corrupted.
lib. 2 l. 3 n. 15 Sed quia posset aliquis dicere, quod primum principium materiale non ponitur a philosophis sempiternum, propter hoc quod unum numero manens sit sempiternum, sed quia est sempiternum per successionem, sicut si ponatur humanum genus sempiternum: hoc excludit ex prima suppositione, dicens, quod, quia generatio non est infinita in sursum, sed devenitur ad aliquod primum principium materiale, necesse est quod, si aliquid sit primum materiale principium, ex quo fiunt alia per eius corruptionem, quod non sit illud sempiternum de quo philosophi dicunt. Non enim posset esse illud primum materiale principium sempiternum, si eo corrupto alia generarentur, et iterum ipsum ex alio corrupto generaretur. Unde manifestum est, quod ex primo materiali principio fit aliquid, sicut ex imperfecto et in potentia existente, quod est medium inter purum non ens et ens actu; non autem sicut aqua ex aere fit corrupto.	315. But since someone could say that the philosophers did not hold that the first material principle is eternal because it remains numerically one eternally but because it is eternal by succession (as if the human race were held to be eternal), he therefore excludes this from the first supposition. He says that since generation is not infinite in an upward direction but stops at a first material principle, then if there is a first material principle by reason of whose corruption other things come into being, it must not be the eternal principle of which the philosophers speak. The reason is that the first material principle cannot be eternal if other things are generated by reason of its corruption, and it in turn is generated by the corruption of something else. It is evident, then, that a thing comes from this first material principle as something imperfect and potential which is midway between pure nonbeing and actual being, but not as water comes from air by reason of the latter’s corruption.