Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber2/lect5

Lecture 5

Latin	English
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit, quod consideratio veritatis partim est difficilis et partim facilis, et quod maxime pertinet ad primum philosophum, hic ostendit, quis sit modus conveniens ad considerandum veritatem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ponit diversos modos, quos homines sequuntur in consideratione veritatis. Secundo ostendit quis sit modus conveniens, ibi, propter quod oportet erudiri et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit efficaciam consuetudinis in consideratione veritatis. Secundo concludit diversos modos, quibus homines utuntur in consideratione, propter diversas consuetudines, ibi, alii vero si non mathematicae et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit virtutem consuetudinis in consideratione veritatis. Secundo manifestat per signum, ibi, quantam vero vim habeat et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod auditiones contingunt in hominibus de his quae sunt secundum consuetudines. Ea enim, quae sunt consueta, libentius audiuntur et facilius recipiuntur. Dignum enim videtur nobis, ut ita dicatur de quocumque, sicut consuevimus audire. Et si qua dicantur nobis praeter ea quae consuevimus audire, non videntur nobis similia in veritate his quae consuevimus audire. Sed videntur nobis minus nota et magis extranea a ratione, propter hoc quod sunt inconsueta. Illud enim quod est consuetum, est nobis magis notum.	331. Having shown that the study of truth is in one sense difficult and in another easy, and that it belongs preeminently to first philosophy, the Philosopher now exposes the proper method of investigating the truth. In regard to this he does two things. First (171:C 331), he gives the different methods which men follow in the study of truth. Second (335), he shows which method is the proper one (“For this reason one must”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how powerful custom is in the study of truth. Second (172:C 333), he makes this clear by an example (“The great force”). He says, first, that the way in which people are affected by what they hear depends upon the things to which they are accustomed, because such things are more willingly heard and more easily understood. For things spoken of in a manner to which we are accustomed seem to us to be acceptable; and if any things are said to us over and above what we have been accustomed to hear, these do not seem to have the same degree of truth. As a matter of fact they seem less intelligible to us and further removed from reason just because we are not accustomed to them; for it is the things which we are accustomed to hear that we know best of all.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 2 Cuius ratio est, quia consuetudo vertitur in naturam; unde et habitus ex consuetudine generatur, qui inclinat per modum naturae. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis habet talem naturam vel talem habitum, habet proportionem determinatam ad hoc vel illud. Requiritur autem ad quamlibet cognitionem determinata proportio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile. Et ideo secundum diversitatem naturarum et habituum accidit diversitas circa cognitionem. Videmus enim, quod hominibus secundum humanam naturam sunt innata prima principia; et secundum habitum virtutis apparet unicuique bonum, quod convenit illi virtuti: sicut et gustui videtur aliquid conveniens, secundum eius dispositionem. Sic igitur, quia consuetudo causat habitum consimilem naturae, contingit quod ea quae sunt consueta sint notiora.	332. Now the reason for this is that things which are customary become natural. Hence a habit, which disposes us in a way similar to nature, is also acquired by customary activity. And from the fact that someone has some special sort of nature or special kind of habit, he has a definite relationship to one thing or another. But in every kind of cognition there must be a definite relationship between the knower and the object of cognition. Therefore, to the extent that natures and habits differ, there are diverse kinds of cognition. For we see that there are innate first principles in men because of their human nature, and that what is proper to some special virtue appears good to one who has this habit of virtue; and, again, that something appears palatable to the sense of taste because of its disposition. Therefore, since custom produces a habit which is similar to nature, it follows that what is customary is better known.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit quantam vero manifestat quod dixerat per quoddam signum; ostendens, quod leges ab hominibus positae ostendunt per experientiam, quantam vim habeat consuetudo: in quibus quidem legibus propter consuetudinem magis valent fabulariter et pueriliter dicta, ad hoc quod eis assentiatur, quam cognitio veritatis. Loquitur autem hic philosophus de legibus ab hominibus adinventis, quae ad conservationem civilem sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur; et ideo quicumque invenerunt eas, aliqua quibus hominum animi retraherentur a malis et provocarentur ad bona secundum diversitatem gentium et nationum in suis legibus tradiderunt, quamvis multa eorum essent vana et frivola, quae homines a pueritia audientes magis approbabant quam veritatis cognitionem. Sed lex divinitus data ordinat hominem ad veram felicitatem cui omnis falsitas repugnat. Unde in lege Dei nulla falsitas continetur.	333. The great force (172). Here he makes his previous statement clear by giving a concrete case. He says that the laws which men pass are positive evidence of the force of custom; for the legendary and childish elements in these laws are more effective in winning assent than is knowledge of the truth. Now the Philosopher is speaking here of the laws devised by men, which have as their ultimate end the preservation of the political community. Therefore the men who have established these laws have handed down in them, in keeping with the diversity of peoples and nations involved, certain directives by which human souls might be drawn away from evil and persuaded to do good, although many of them, which men had heard from childhood and of which they approved more readily than of what they knew to be true, were empty and foolish. But the law given by God directs men to that true happiness to which everything false is opposed. Therefore there is nothing false in the divine law.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit alii vero hic ostendit quomodo homines in consideratione veritatis propter consuetudinem diversos modos acceptant: et dicit, quod quidam non recipiunt quod eis dicitur, nisi dicatur eis per modum mathematicum. Et hoc quidem convenit propter consuetudinem his, qui in mathematicis sunt nutriti. Et quia consuetudo est similis naturae, potest etiam hoc quibusdam contingere propter indispositionem: illis scilicet, qui sunt fortis imaginationis, non habentes intellectum multum elevatum. Alii vero sunt, qui nihil volunt recipere nisi proponatur eis aliquod exemplum sensibile, vel propter consuetudinem, vel propter dominium sensitivae virtutis in eis et debilitatem intellectus. Quidam vero sunt qui nihil reputent esse dignum ut aliquid eis inducatur absque testimonio poetae, vel alicuius auctoris. Et hoc etiam est vel propter consuetudinem, vel propter defectum iudicii, quia non possunt diiudicare utrum ratio per certitudinem concludat; et ideo quasi non credentes suo iudicio requirunt iudicium alicuius noti. Sunt etiam aliqui qui omnia volunt sibi dici per certitudinem, idest per diligentem inquisitionem rationis. Et hoc contingit propter bonitatem intellectus iudicantis, et rationes inquirentis; dummodo non quaeratur certitudo in his, in quibus certitudo esse non potest. Quidam vero sunt qui tristantur, si quid per certitudinem cum diligenti discussione inquiratur. Quod quidem potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo propter impotentiam complectendi: habent enim debilem rationem, unde non sufficiunt ad considerandum ordinem complexionis priorum et posteriorum. Alio modo propter micrologiam, idest parvorum ratiocinationem. Cuius similitudo quaedam est in certitudinali inquisitione, quae nihil indiscussum relinquit usque ad minima. Imaginantur autem quidam, quod sicut in symbolis conviviorum non pertinet ad liberalitatem, quod debeant etiam minima computari in ratiocinio, ita etiam sit quaedam importunitas et illiberalitas, si homo velit circa cognitionem veritatis etiam minima discutere.	334. Now some men (173). Here he shows how men as a result of custom use different methods in the study of truth. He says that some men listen to what is said to them only if it is mathematical in character; and this is acceptable to those who have been educated in mathematics because of the habits which they have. Now since custom is like nature, the same thing can also happen to certain men (1) because they are poorly disposed in some respect, e.g., those who have a strong imagination but little intelligence. (2) Then there are others who do not wish to accept anything unless they are given a concrete example, either because they are accustomed to this or because their sensory powers dominate and their intellect is weak. (3) Again, there are some who think that nothing is convincing enough unless a poet or some authority is cited. This is also a result either of custom or of poor judgment, because they cannot decide for themselves whether the conclusion of an argument is certain; and therefore, having no faith in their own judgment, as it were, they require the judgment of some recognized authority. (4) Again there are others who want everything said to them with certitude, i.e., by way of careful rational investigation. This occurs because of the superior intelligence of the one making the judgment and the arguments of the one conducting the investigation, provided that one does not look for certitude where it cannot be had. (5) On the other hand there are some who are annoyed if some matter is investigated in an exact way by means of a careful discussion. This can occur for two reasons. (a) First, they lack the ability to comprehend anything; for since their reasoning power is poor they are unable to understand the order in which premises are related to conclusions. (b) Second, it occurs because of quibbling, i.e., reasoning about the smallest matters, which bears some resemblance to the search for certitude since it leaves nothing undiscussed down to the smallest detail. (c) Then there are some who think that, just as liberality is lacking when the smallest details are taken into account in estimating the fee for a banquet, in a similar way there is a lack of civility and liberality when a man also wishes to discuss the smallest details in the search for truth.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit propter quod ostendit quis sit modus conveniens ad inquirendum veritatem; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, quomodo homo possit cognoscere modum convenientem in inquisitione veritatis. Secundo ostendit, quod ille modus qui est simpliciter melior, non debet in omnibus quaeri, ibi, acribologia vero et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia diversi secundum diversos modos veritatem inquirunt; ideo oportet quod homo instruatur per quem modum in singulis scientiis sint recipienda ea quae dicuntur. Et quia non est facile quod homo simul duo capiat, sed dum ad duo attendit, neutrum capere potest; absurdum est, quod homo simul quaerat scientiam et modum qui convenit scientiae. Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis scientiis. Modus autem proprius singularum scientiarum, in scientiis singulis circa principium tradi debet.	335. For this reason one must be trained (174). He exposes the proper method of investigating the truth. Concerning this he does two things. First (335), he shows how a man can discover the proper method of investigating the truth. Second (336), he explains that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all matters (“But the exactness of mathematics”) . He says, first, that since different men use different methods in the search for truth, one must be trained in the method which the particular sciences must use to investigate their subject. And since it is not easy for a man to undertake two things at once (indeed, so long as he tries to do both he can succeed in neither), it is absurd for a man to try to acquire a science and at the same time to acquire the method proper to that science. This is why a man should learn logic before any of the other sciences, because logic considers the general method of procedure in all the other sciences. Moreover, the method appropriate to the particular sciences should be considered at the beginning of these sciences.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit acribologia vero ostendit quod ille modus, qui est simpliciter optimus, non debet in omnibus quaeri; dicens quod acribologia idest diligens et certa ratio, sicut est in mathematicis, non debet requiri in omnibus rebus, de quibus sunt scientiae; sed debet solum requiri in his, quae non habent materiam. Ea enim quae habent materiam, subiecta sunt motui et variationi: et ideo non potest in eis omnibus omnimoda certitudo haberi. Quaeritur enim in eis non quid semper sit et ex necessitate; sed quid sit ut in pluribus. Immaterialia vero secundum seipsa sunt certissima, quia sunt immobilia. Sed illa quae in sui natura sunt immaterialia, non sunt certa nobis propter defectum intellectus nostri, ut praedictum est. Huiusmodi autem sunt substantiae separatae. Sed mathematica sunt abstracta a materia, et tamen non sunt excedentia intellectum nostrum: et ideo in eis est requirenda certissima ratio. Et quia tota natura est circa materiam, ideo iste modus certissimae rationis non pertinet ad naturalem philosophum. Dicit autem forsan propter corpora caelestia, quia non habent eodem modo materiam sicut inferiora.	336. But the exactness of mathematics (175). He shows that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all the sciences. He says that the “exactness,” i.e., the careful and certain demonstrations, found in mathematics should not be demanded in the case of all things of which we have science, but only in the case of those things which have no matter; for things that have matter are subject to motion and change, and therefore in their case complete certitude cannot be had. For in the case of these things we do not look for what exists always and of necessity, but only for what exists in the majority of cases. Now immaterial things are most certain by their very nature because they are unchangeable, although they are not certain to us because our intellectual power is weak, as was stated above (279). The separate substances are things of this kind. But while the things with which mathematics deals are abstracted from matter, they do not surpass our understanding; and therefore in their case most certain reasoning is demanded. Again, because the whole of nature involves matter, this method of most certain reasoning does not belong to natural philosophy. However, he says “perhaps” because of the celestial bodies, since they do not have matter in the same sense that lower bodies do.
lib. 2 l. 5 n. 7 Et, quia in scientia naturali non convenit iste certissimus rationis modus, ideo in scientia naturali ad cognoscendum modum convenientem illi scientiae, primo perscrutandum est quid sit natura: sic enim manifestum erit de quibus sit scientia naturalis. Et iterum considerandum est, si unius scientiae, scilicet naturalis, sit omnes causas et principia considerare, aut sit diversarum scientiarum. Sic enim poterit scire quis modus demonstrandi conveniat naturali. Et hunc modum ipse observat in secundo physicorum, ut patet diligenter intuenti.	337. Now since this method of most certain reasoning is not the method proper to natural science, therefore in order to know which method is proper to that science we must investigate first what nature is; for in this way we will discover the things which natural philosophy studies. Further, we must investigate “whether it belongs to one science,” i.e., to natural philosophy, or to several sciences, to consider all causes and principles; for in this way we will be able to learn which method of demonstration is proper to natural philosophy. He deals with this method in Book II of the Physics, as is obvious to anyone who examines it carefully.