Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber3/lect10

Lecture 10

Latin	English
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 1 Postquam philosophus inquisivit quae sunt principia, et utrum sint aliqua a materia separata, hic inquirit qualia sint principia. Et primo inquirit de unitate et multitudine ipsorum. Secundo inquirit, utrum sint in potentia vel in actu, ibi, his autem affine est quaerere et cetera. Tertio utrum principia sint universalia vel singularia, ibi, et utrum universalia sint et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit qualiter principia se habeant ad unitatem. Secundo qualiter ipsum unum se habeat ad rationem principii, ibi, omnium autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo inquirit specialiter de principio formali, utrum sit unum omnium existentium in una specie. Secundo inquirit idem de omnibus generaliter principiis, ibi, amplius autem et cetera. Tertio inquirit, utrum eadem sint principia aut diversa corruptibilium et incorruptibilium, ibi, non minor autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad quaestionem, ibi, sed impossibile est. Est ergo dubitatio, utrum sit una substantia, idest forma omnium existentium in una specie, puta hominum.	456. Having asked what the principles are, and whether some are separate from matter, the Philosopher now asks what the principles are like. First (245:C 456), he asks whether the principles are one or many; second (287:C 519), whether they exist potentially or actually (“And connected with these problems”); and third (290:C 523), whether they are universals or singular things (“And there is also the problem”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (245:C 456), he inquires how the principles stand with respect to unity; and second (266:C 488), what relationship unity has to the notion of principle (“But the most difficult”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he inquires specially about the formal principle: whether all things that are specifically the same have a single form. Second (248:C 46o), he asks the same question of all principles in general (“And again one might”). Third (250:C 466), he asks whether corruptible and incorruptible things have the same principles or different ones (“Again there is the problem”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he introduces the problem. Second (246:C 457), he debates it (“But this is absurd”). The problem (245), then, is whether all things that belong to the same species, for example, all men, have a single substance or form.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit sed impossibile obiicit ad unam partem quaestionis: scilicet ad ostendendum quod non sit una forma omnium existentium in una specie: et hoc duabus rationibus, quarum prima talis est. Ea quae sunt in una specie, sunt multa et differentia: si igitur omnium in una specie existentium sit una substantia, sequetur quod ea quorum substantia est una, sint multa et differentia: quod est irrationabile.	457. But this is absurd (246). Then he advances arguments on one side of the question, to show that all things belonging to one species do not have a single form. He does this by means of two arguments, the first of which runs thus. Things that belong to one species are many and different. Therefore, if all things that belong to one species have a single substance, it follows that those which have a single substance are many and different. But this is unreasonable.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit simul autem hic ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Illud, quod est in se unum et indivisum, non componitur cum aliquo diviso ad constitutionem multorum. Sed manifestum est quod materia dividitur in diversis singularibus. Si igitur substantia formalis esset una et eadem, non esset assignare quomodo singulum horum singularium sit materia habens talem substantiam, quae est una et indivisa, ita quod singulariter sit simul totum habens haec duo, scilicet materia et formam substantialem, quae est una et indivisa.	458. And at the same time (247) Then he gives the second argument , which runs thus. That which is one and undivided in itself is not combined with something divided in order to constitute many things. But it is evident that matter is divided into different singular things. Hence, if substance in the sense of form is one and the same for all things, it will be impossible to explain how each of these singular things is a matter having a substance of the kind that is one and undivided, so that as a singular thing it is a concrete whole having two parts: a matter and a substantial form which is one and undivided.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 4 In contrarium autem non obiicit, quia rationes, quae ad sequentem quaestionem proponuntur ad oppositum praedictarum rationum, sunt etiam illae quae sunt propositae supra de separatione universalium. Nam si sit universale separatum, necesse est ponere unam numero substantiam eorum quae conveniunt in specie, quia universale est substantia singularium. Huius autem quaestionis veritas determinatur in septimo huius, ubi ostendetur, quod quid est, idest essentiam cuiuslibet rei non esse aliud quam rem ipsam, nisi per accidens, ut ibi dicetur.	459. Now he does not argue the other side of the question, because the very same arguments which were advanced above regarding the separateness of universals are applicable in the inquiry which follows it against the arguments just given. For if a separate universal exists, it must be held that things having the same species have a single substance numerically, because a universal is the substance of singular things. Now the truth of this question will be established in Book VII (588:C 1356) of this work, where it is shown that the whatness or essence of a thing is not other than the thing itself, except in an accidental way, as will be explained in that place.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem movet dubitationem de unitate principiorum in communi. Utrum scilicet principia rerum sint eadem numero, vel eadem specie et numero diversa: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationes ad ostendendum, quod sint eadem numero. Secundo ad oppositum, ibi, at vero et cetera. Circa primum, ponit tres rationes et praemittit dubitationem, dicens, quod idem potest quaeri universaliter de principiis rerum, quod quaesitum est de substantia, utrum scilicet principia rerum sint eadem numero.	460. And again one might (248). Here he raises a difficulty concerning the unity of principles in general: whether the principles of things are numerically the same, or only specifically the same and numerically distinct. And in regard to this he does two things. First, he advances arguments to show that they are numerically the same. Second (249:C 464), he argues on the other side of the question (“But, on the other hand”). In regard to the first (248) he gives three arguments; and he introduces the problem, saying that the same question which was raised about substance can be raised about principles in general, i.e., whether the principles of things are numerically the same.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 6 Et inducit primam rationem, ad ostendendum, quod sint eadem numero. Non enim invenitur in principiatis nisi quod ex principiis habent: si igitur in principiis non inveniatur unum numero, sed solum unum specie, nihil erit in principiatis unum numero, sed solum unum specie.	461. He introduces the first argument to show that they are numerically the same. For things composed of principles merely contain what they receive from these principles. Therefore, if principles are not found to be one numerically but only specifically, the things composed of these principles will not be one numerically but only specifically.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 7 Secunda ratio talis est: quia illud quod est ipsum unum vel ipsum ens, oportet quod sit unum numero. Dicit autem ipsum unum vel ipsum ens, unitatem aut ens abstractum. Si igitur principium rerum non sit unum numero, sed solum unum specie, sequetur, quod nihil sit ipsum unum et etiam ipsum ens, idest quod ens et unum non per se subsistant.	462. The second argument runs thus: unity itself or being itself must be numerically one. And by unity itself or being itself he means unity or being in the abstract. Hence, if the principles of things are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that neither unity itself or being itself will subsist of themselves.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 8 Tertia ratio est, quia scientia habetur de rebus per hoc, quod unum invenitur in multis, sicut homo communis invenitur in omnibus hominibus; non enim est scientia de singularibus, sed de uno quod invenitur in eis. Omnis autem scientia vel cognitio principiatorum dependet ex cognitione principiorum. Si igitur principia non sunt unum numero, sed solum unum specie, sequitur, quod scientia non sit de rebus.	463. The third argument is this: science is had of things because there is found to be a one-in-many, as man in common is found in all men; for there is no science of singular things but of the unity [i.e., common attribute] found in them. Moreover, all science or cognition of things which are composed of principles depends on a knowledge of these principles. If, then, principles are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that there is no science of beings.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit at vero si obiicit in contrarium tali ratione. Si principia sunt unum numero, ita quod quodlibet principiorum in se consideratum sit unum, non erit dicere de principiis existentium, quod hoc modo se habent sicut principia sensibilium. Videmus enim in sensibilibus, quod diversorum sunt diversa principia secundum numerum, sed eadem secundum speciem; sicut et eorum quorum sunt principia, sunt diversa secundum numerum, sed eadem secundum speciem. Sicut videmus quod diversarum syllabarum secundum numerum, quae conveniunt in specie, sunt principia eaedem literae secundum speciem, sed non secundum numerum. Si quis autem dicat quod non est ita in principiis entium, sed omnium entium principia sunt unum numero; sequetur quod nihil sit in rebus praeter elementa; quia quod est unum numero, est singulare. Sic enim appellamus singulare quod est unum numero, sicut universale quod est in multis. Quod autem est singulare, non multiplicatur nec invenitur nisi singulariter. Si igitur ponatur quod omnium syllabarum essent principia eaedem literae numero, sequeretur quod illae literae nunquam possent multiplicari, ut scilicet essent duo aut plura: et sic non posset seorsum inveniri in syllaba ista ba, vel da. Et eadem ratio est de aliis literis. Pari igitur ratione si omnium entium sint principia eadem numero, sequetur quod nihil sit praeter principia: quod videtur inconveniens: quia cum principium alicuius sit, non erit principium nisi sit aliquid praeter ipsum.	464. But, on the other hand (249). Here he argues the opposite side of the question in the following fashion. If principles are numerically one so that each of the principles considered in itself is one, it will be impossible to say that the principles of beings exist in the same way as the principles of sensible things. For we see that the principles of different sensible things are numerically different but specifically the same, just as the things of which they are the principles are numerically different but specifically the same. We see, for example, that syllables which are numerically distinct but agree in species have as their principles letters which are the same specifically though not numerically. And if anyone were to say that this is not true of the principles of beings, but that the principles of all beings are the same numerically, it would follow that nothing exists in the world except the elements, because what is numerically one is a singular thing. For what is numerically one we call singular, just as we call universal what is in many. But what is singular is incapable of being multiplied, and is encountered only as a singular. Therefore, if it is held that numerically the same letters are the principles of all syllables, it will fd1low that those letters could never be multiplied so that there could be two of them or more than two. Thus a could not be found in these two different syllables ba or da. And the argument is the same in the case of other letters. Therefore, by the same reasoning, if the principles of all beings are numerically the same, it will follow that there is nothing besides these principles. But this seems to be untenable; because when a principle of anything exists it will not be a principle unless there is something else besides itself.
lib. 3 l. 10 n. 10 Haec autem quaestio solvetur in duodecimo. Ibi enim ostendetur quod principia quae sunt intrinseca rebus, scilicet materia et forma, vel privatio, non sunt eadem numero omnium, sed analogia sive proportione. Principia autem separata, scilicet substantiae intellectuales, quarum suprema est Deus, sunt unum numero unaquaeque secundum seipsam. Id autem quod est ipsum unum et ens, Deus est; et ab ipso derivatur unitas secundum numerum in rebus omnibus. Scientia autem est de his, non quia sint unum numero in omnibus, sed quia est unum in multis secundum rationem. Ratio autem quae est ad oppositum verificatur in principiis essentialibus, non autem in principiis separatis, cuiusmodi sunt agens et finis. Multa enim possunt produci ab uno agente vel movente et ordinari in unum finem.	465. Now this question will be solved in Book XII (2464); for it will be shown there that the principles which things have, namely, matter and form or privation, are not numerically the same for all things but analogically or proportionally the same. But those principles which are separate, i.e., the intellectual substances, of which the highest is God, are each numerically one in themselves. Now that which is one in itself and being is God; and from Him is derived the numerical unity found in all things. And there is science of these, not because they are numerically one in all, but because in our conception there is a one in many. Moreover, the argument which is proposed in support of the opposite side of the question is true in the case of essential principles but not in that of separate ones, which is the class to which the agent and final cause belong. For many things can be produced by one agent or efficient cause, and can be directed to one end.