Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber3/lect15

Lecture 15

Latin	English
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 1 Postquam philosophus inquisivit quae sunt principia, hic inquirit quomodo sunt. Et primo utrum sint in potentia vel in actu. Secundo utrum sint universalia vel singularia, ibi, et utrum universalia et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad unam partem, ibi, nam si aliter et cetera. Tertio obiicit in contrarium, ibi, si vero potestate et cetera. Quaerit ergo primo, utrum prima principia sint in potentia, vel aliquo alio modo, idest in actu. Et haec dubitatio inducitur propter antiquos naturales, qui ponebant sola principia materialia, quae sunt in potentia. Platonici autem ponentes species quasi principia formalia, ponebant eas esse in actu.	519. Having inquired what the principles are, the Philosopher now asks how they exist. First, he asks whether they exist potentially or actually; and second (523), whether they are universals or singulars (“And there is also the problem”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question. Second (520), he argues one side (“If they exist”). Third (501), he argues the opposite side (“But if the elements”). His first question (287), then, is whether first principles exist potentially or “in some other way,” i.e., actually. This problem is introduced because of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that there are only material principles, which are in potency. But the Platonists, who posited separate Forms as formal principles, claimed that they exist actually.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit nam si aliter probat quod principia sint in potentia. Si enim essent aliter, scilicet in actu, sequeretur quod aliquid esset prius principiis; potentia enim actu prius est. Quod patet ex hoc, quod prius est a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi: sequitur autem si est, quod possit esse; non autem ex necessitate sequitur, si est possibile, quod sit actu. Hoc autem est inconveniens quod aliquid sit prius primo principio; ergo impossibile quod primum principium sit aliter quam in potentia.	520. If they exist (288). He proves that principles exist potentially. For if they were to exist “in some other way,” i.e., actually, it would follow that there would be something prior to principles; for potentiality is prior to actuality. This is clear from the fact that one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed; for if a thing exists, it follows that it can be, but it does not necessarily follow that, if a thing is possible, it will exist actually. But it is impossible for anything to be prior to a first principle. Therefore it is impossible for a first principle to exist in any other way than potentially.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit si vero obiicit in contrarium; quia si principia rerum sint in potentia, sequitur quod nihil sit entium in actu; nam illud quod est possibile esse, nondum est ens. Et hoc probat per hoc quod id quod fit, non est ens; quod enim est, non fit. Sed nihil fit nisi quod possibile est esse; ergo omne quod est possibile esse, est non ens. Si igitur principia sint tantum in potentia, erunt non entia. Si autem principia non sint, nec effectus sunt: sequitur ergo quod contingit nihil esse in entibus. Et concludit epilogando quod secundum praedicta necessarium est dubitare de principiis propter praemissas rationes.	521. But if the elements (289). Here he argues the other side of the question. If the principles of things exist potentially, it follows that no beings exist actually; for that which exists potentially does not yet exist actually. He proves this on the grounds that that which is coming to be is not a being. For that which exists is not coming to be; but only that comes to be which exists potentially. Therefore everything that exists potentially is nonbeing. Hence if principles exist only potentially, beings will not exist. But if principles do not exist, neither will their effects. It follows, then, that it is possible for nothing to exist in the order of being. And in summing this tip he concludes that according to what has been said it is necessary to inquire about the principles of things for the reasons given.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 4 Haec autem quaestio determinabitur in nono huius, ubi ostendetur quod actus est simpliciter prior potentia, sed potentia est prior actu tempore in eo quod movetur de potentia ad actum. Et sic oportet primum principium esse in actu et non in potentia ut ostendit in duodecimo huius.	522. This question will be answered in Book IX (1844) of this work, where it is shown that actuality is prior to potentiality in an unqualified sense, but that in anything moved from potentiality to actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time. Hence it is necessary that the first principle exist actually and not potentially, as is shown in Book XII (2500) of this work.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit et utrum inquirit utrum principia sint per modum universalium aut per modum singularium: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad unam partem, ibi, nam si universalia et cetera. Tertio obiicit ad aliam, ibi, si autem non universalia et cetera. Est ergo dubitatio, utrum principia sint universalia, vel existant per modum quorumdam singularium.	523. And here is also the problem (290). Here he asks whether the principles of things exist as universals or as singular things; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he presents the question. Second (524), he argues one side (“For if they are universals”). Third (527), he argues the other side (“However, if they are not universals”). The problem (290), then, is whether principles are universals or exist in the manner of singular things.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit nam si probat quod principia non sunt universalia tali ratione. Nullum communiter praedicatum de multis significat hoc aliquid, sed significat tale sive quale; non quidem secundum qualitatem accidentalem, sed secundum qualitatem substantialem; est enim quaedam substantialis qualitas, ut infra in quinto huius dicetur. Et ratio huius est quia hoc aliquid dicitur secundum quod in se subsistit; quod autem in se subsistit, non potest esse in multis ens, quod est de ratione communis. Quod enim in multis est, in se subsistens non est; nisi et ipsum esset multa, quod est contra rationem communis. Nam commune est, quod est unum in multis. Sic igitur patet, quod nullum communium significat hoc aliquid, sed significat formam in multis existentem.	524. For if they are (291). Then he proves that principles are not universals, by the following argument. No predicate common to many things signifies a particular thing, but signifies such and such a thing or of what sort a thing is; and it does this not according to accidental quality but according to substantial quality, as is stated below in Book V (487:C 987) of this work. The reason for this is that a particular thing is said to be such insofar as it subsists of itself. But that which subsists of itself cannot be something that exists in many, as belongs to the notion of common. For that which exists in many will not subsist of itself unless it is itself many. But this is contrary to the notion of common, because what is common is what is onein-many. Hence it is clear that a particular thing does not signify anything common, but signifies a form existing in many things.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 7 Addit autem minorem, scilicet quod substantia significat hoc aliquid. Et hoc quidem verum est quantum ad primas substantias, quae maxime et proprie substantiae dicuntur, ut habetur in praedicamentis: huiusmodi enim substantiae sunt in se subsistentes. Relinquitur ergo quod principia, si sunt universalia, non sunt substantiae. Et ita vel substantiarum non erunt aliqua principia, vel oportebit dicere quod non sint substantiae substantiarum principia.	525. Further, he adds the minor premise, namely, that substance signifies a particular thing. And this is true of first substances, which are said to be substances in the full and proper sense, as is stated in the Categories; “ for substances of this kind are things which subsist of themselves. Thus it follows that, if principles are universals, they are not substances. Hence either there will be no principles of substances, or it will be necessary to say that the principles of substances are not substances.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 8 Sed quia aliquis posset concedere quod aliquid communiter praedicatum significet hoc aliquid, consequenter diluitur cum dicit sed si est. Ostendit quod inconveniens ex hoc sequitur. Si enim id quod communiter praedicatur sit hoc aliquid, sequeretur quod omne id de quo illud commune praedicatur, sit hoc aliquid quod est commune. Sed planum est, quod de Socrate praedicatur et homo et animal, quorum utrumque, scilicet homo et animal, est quoddam commune praedicatum. Unde si omne commune praedicatum sit hoc aliquid, sequitur quod Socrates sit tria hoc aliquid, quia Socrates est Socrates, quod est hoc aliquid: ipse etiam est homo, quod est secundum praedicta hoc aliquid: ipse etiam est animal, quod similiter est hoc aliquid. Erit ergo tria hoc aliquid. Et ulterius sequitur quod sit tria animalia: nam animal praedicatur de ipso et de homine et de Socrate. Cum ergo hoc sit inconveniens, inconveniens est quod aliquid communiter praedicatum sit hoc aliquid. Haec igitur sunt inconvenientia quae sequuntur, si universalia sunt principia.	526. But since it is possible for someone to affirm that some common predicate might signify this particular thing, he therefore criticizes this when he says “But if it is (292).” He explains the untenable consequence resulting from this. For if a common predicate were a particular thing, it would follow that everything to which that common predicate is applied would be this particular thing which is common. But it is clear that both animal and man are predicated of Socrates, and that each of these—animal and man—is a common predicate. Hence, if every common predicate were a particular thing, it would follow that Socrates would be three particular things; for Socrates is Socrates, which is a particular thing; and he is also a man, which is a particular thing according to the above; and he is also an animal, which is similarly a particular thing. Hence he would be three particular things. Further, it would follow that there would be three animals; for animal is predicated of itself, of man, and of Socrates. Therefore, since this is impossible, it is also impossible for a common predicate to be a particular thing. These, then, will be the impossible consequences which follow if principles are universals.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit si autem obiicit in contrarium. Cum enim omnes scientiae sint universales, non sunt singularium, sed universalium. Si igitur aliqua principia non sint universalia, sed singularia, non erunt scibilia secundum seipsa. Si ergo de eis debet aliqua scientia haberi, oportebit esse aliqua priora principia, quae sunt universalia. Sic igitur oportet prima principia esse universalia, ad hoc quod scientia habeatur de rebus; quia ignoratis principiis necesse est alia ignorare.	527. However, if they are not (293). He argues the other side of the question. Since all sciences are universal, they are not concerned with singulars but with universals. Therefore, if some principles were not universals but were singular things, they would not be knowable in themselves. Hence, if any science were to be had of them, there would have to be certain prior principles, which would be universals. It is necessary, then, that first principles be universals in order that science may be had of things; because if principles remain unknown, other things must remain unknown.
lib. 3 l. 15 n. 10 Haec autem quaestio determinatur in septimo huius; ubi ostenditur quod universalia non sunt substantiae, nec principia rerum. Non autem propter hoc sequitur, quod si principia et substantiae rerum sint singularia, quod eorum non possit esse scientia; tum quia res immateriales etsi sint singulariter subsistentes, sunt tamen etiam intelligibiles; tum etiam quia de singularibus est scientia secundum universales eorum rationes per intellectum apprehensas.	528. This question will be answered in Book VII (1584) of this work, where it is shown that universals are neither substances nor the principles of things. However, it does not follow for this reason that, if the principles and substances of things were singulars, there could be no science of them, both because immaterial things, even though they subsist as singulars, are nevertheless also intelligible, and also because there is science of singulars according to their universal concepts which are apprehended by the intellect.