Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber3/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 1 Secundum ea quae praedixit philosophus, incipit praemittere dubitationes determinationi veritatis; et dividit in duas partes. In prima ponit dubitationes. In secunda causas dubitationum, inducendo rationes ad singulas dubitationes, ibi, primum ergo de quibus in primis dicimus et cetera. Dictum est autem in secundo libro, quod prius oportet quaerere modum scientiae, quam ipsam scientiam. Et ideo primo ponit dubitationes pertinentes ad modum considerationis huius scientiae. Secundo ponit dubitationes pertinentes ad prima principia, de quibus est ista scientia, ut in primo libro dictum est; et hoc ibi, et utrum principia et elementa et cetera. Ad modum autem scientiae huius duo pertinent, ut in secundo dictum est: scilicet consideratio causarum, ex quibus scientia demonstrat; et iterum res de quibus scientia considerat. Unde circa primum duo facit. Primo movet dubitationem pertinentem ad considerationem causarum. Secundo movet multas dubitationes pertinentes ad ea de quibus est scientia, ibi, et utrum substantiae principia et cetera. Dicit ergo quod prima dubitatio est quam dubitando proposuimus in fine secundi libri, qui est quasi prooemium ad totam scientiam, scilicet utrum consideratio causarum quatuor, secundum quatuor genera, pertineat ad unam scientiam, vel ad multas et diversas. Et hoc est quaerere utrum unius scientiae, et praecipue huius, sit demonstrare ex omnibus causis, vel magis diversae scientiae ex diversis demonstrent.	346. Following out his announced plan, the Philosopher begins to set down the problems which are encountered in establishing the truth; and he divides this into two parts. In the first, he gives these problems; and in the second (369), he gives the reasons for these problems, by indicating the arguments on either side of the question (“Therefore let us discuss”). Now it was stated in Book II (335) that it is necessary to seek the method of a science before seeking the science itself. Therefore he gives, first, the problems which pertain to this science’s method of investigation. Second (355), he gives the problems which pertain to the first principles with which this science deals, as has been stated in Book I (36) (“And we must inquire”). Now a science is concerned with two things, as was said in Book II (336), namely, a study of the causes by which it demonstrates and the things with which it deals. Hence in regard to the first point he does two things. First, he presents a problem concerning the investigation of causes. Second (347), he presents several problems concerning the things with which this science deals (“And there is also the problem”) He says, then, that the first problem is one which we proposed in the issues raised at the end of Book II (336), which is, so to speak, the prologue to the whole of science, i.e., whether a study of the four causes in their four classes belongs to one science or to many different sciences And this is to ask whether it belongs to one science, and especially to this science, to demonstrate by means of all the causes, or rather whether some sciences demonstrate by one cause and some by another.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit et utrum movet dubitationes de his, de quibus considerat ista scientia. Et primo inquirit de quibus considerat ista scientia sicut de substantiis. Secundo de quibus considerat ista scientia sicut de accidentibus, ibi, et utrum circa substantias et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo multiplicat, quaestiones ex parte ipsius scientiae, quae est de substantia. Secundo ex parte substantiarum ipsarum, ibi, et hoc idem quoque et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres quaestiones. Supposito enim ex his quae in primo libro dicta sunt, quod ista scientia consideret principia prima, prima quaestio hic erit utrum ad hanc scientiam solum pertineat cognoscere prima principia substantiae, aut etiam ad hanc scientiam pertineat considerare de primis principiis demonstrationis, ex quibus omnes scientiae demonstrant; ut puta quod haec scientia consideret utrum contingat unum et idem simul affirmare et negare, vel non: et similiter de aliis demonstrationis principiis primis et per se notis.	347. And there is also the problem (182). Here he raises problems about the things which this science considers. First, he inquires about the things which this science considers about substances; and second (350), about substances themselves (“It is also necessary”). In regard to the first he raises three questions. For if it is supposed, from what was said in Book I (35), that this science considers first principles, the first question here will be whether it belongs to this science to know only the first principles of substances, or also to consider the first principles of demonstration, by means of which all sciences demonstrate. For example, should this science consider whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing at the same time or not? And the same thing applies to the other first and self-evident principles of demonstration.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 3 Secunda quaestio est, si ista scientia est considerativa substantiae sicut primi entis, utrum sit una scientia considerans omnes substantias, vel sint plures scientiae de diversis substantiis. Videtur enim quod de pluribus substantiis debeant esse plures scientiae.	348. And if this science considers substance as the primary kind of being, the second question is whether there is one science which considers all substances, or whether there are many sciences which consider different substances. For it seems that there should be many sciences which consider many substances.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 4 Tertia quaestio est, si sint plures scientiae de pluribus substantiis, utrum omnes sint cognatae, idest unius generis, sicut geometria et arithmetica sunt in genere mathematicae scientiae, vel non sint unius generis, sed quaedam earum sint in genere sapientiae, quaedam vero in aliquo alio genere, puta in genere scientiae naturalis, vel mathematicae. Videtur enim secundum primum aspectum, quod non sint unius generis, cum substantiae materiales et immateriales non eodem modo cognoscantur.	349. And if there are many sciences which consider many substances, the third question is whether all are “cognate,” i.e., whether all belong to one class, as geometry and arithmetic belong to the class of mathematical science, or whether they do not, but some to the class of wisdom and some to another class, for example, to the class of natural philosophy or to that of mathematical science. For according to the first point of view it seems that they do not belong to one class, since material and immaterial substances are not known by the same method.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit et hoc idem multiplicat quaestiones ex parte substantiae; et ponit duas quaestiones: quarum prima est, utrum dicendum sit, quod sint solum substantiae sensibiles, ut antiqui naturales posuerunt, vel etiam praeter substantias sensibiles sint aliae substantiae immateriales et intelligibiles, ut posuit Plato.	350. It is also necessary (183). Here he adds to the number of questions about substance; and he does this by raising two questions. The first question is whether sensible substances alone must be held to exist, as the philosophers of nature claimed, or whether there are in addition to sensible substances other immaterial and intelligible substances, as Plato claimed.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 6 Secunda quaestio est, si sunt aliquae substantiae separatae a sensibilibus, utrum sint unicae, idest unius generis tantum, aut sint plura genera talium substantiarum, sicut quidam attendentes duplicem abstractionem, scilicet universalis a particulari, et formae mathematicae a materia sensibili, posuerunt utrumque genus subsistere. Et ita ponebant substantias separatas quae sunt universalia abstracta subsistentia, inter quae et substantias sensibiles particulares posuerunt mathematica subsistentia separata, scilicet numeros, magnitudines et figuras. De istis igitur quaestionibus sicut nunc moventur, perscrutandum est inferius; primo quidem disputative, secundo determinando veritatem.	351. And if there are some substances separate from sensible things, the second question is whether “they are unique,” i.e., whether they belong only to one class, or whether there are many classes of such substances. For certain men, understanding that there is a twofold abstraction, namely, of the universal from the particular, and of the mathematical form from sensible matter, held that each class is self-subsistent. Thus they held that there are separate substances which are subsisting abstract universals, and between these and particular sensible substances they placed the objects of mathematics—numbers, continuous quantities, and figures—which they regarded as separate subsisting things. Concerning the questions which have now been raised, then, it is necessary to investigate them below. He does this, first, by arguing both sides of the question, and, second, by determining its truth.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit et utrum circa inquirit utrum consideratio huius scientiae de accidentibus sit. Et ponit tres quaestiones. Quarum prima est, utrum speculatio huius scientiae sit solum circa substantias, propter hoc quod dicitur philosophia substantiae: aut etiam sit circa ea quae per se substantiis accidunt, eo quo ad eamdem scientiam pertinere videtur ut consideret subiectum et per se accidentia subiecti.	352. There is also the problem (184). Here he asks whether this science’s investigations extend to accidents; and he raises three questions. The first is whether this science, seeing that it is called the philosophy of substance, speculates about substance alone, or whether it also speculates about the proper accidents of substance; for it seems to be the office of the same science to consider a subject and the proper accidents of that subject. Q. 7: How does it differ from logic in considering these things?
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 8 Secunda quaestio est, utrum haec scientia consideret de quibusdam quae videntur esse per se accidentia entis, et consequi omnia entia: scilicet de eodem et diverso, simili et dissimili, et de contrarietate, et de priori et posteriori, et omnibus aliis huiusmodi, de quibus dialectici tractant, qui habent considerationem de omnibus. Sed tamen de huiusmodi perscrutantur, non ex necessariis, sed ex probabilibus. Ex una enim parte videtur quod cum sint communia, pertineant ad philosophum primum. Ex alia parte videtur quod ex quo dialectici ista considerant, quorum est ex probabilibus procedere, quod non pertineat ad considerationem ipsius philosophi cuius est demonstrare.	353. The second question is whether this science considers certain things which seem to be proper accidents of being and which belong to all beings, namely, sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, contrariety, priority, and posteriority, and all others of this kind which are treated by the dialecticians, who deal with all things. However, they do not examine such things according to necessary premises but according to probable ones. For from one point of view it seems that, since these accidents are common ones, they pertain to first-philosophy; but from another point of view it seems that, since they are considered by the dialecticians, whose office it is to argue from Probabilities, an examination of them does not belong to the consideration of the philosopher, whose office it is to demonstrate.
lib. 3 l. 2 n. 9 Tertia quaestio est, cum ad ista communia accidentia entis quaedam per se consequantur, utrum ad philosophum pertineat circa unumquodque horum solum considerare quid est, aut etiam illa quae consequuntur ad ipsa, puta utrum unum uni sit contrarium.	354. And since certain proper attributes naturally flow from these common accidents of being, the third question is whether it is the function of the philosopher to consider in regard to the common accidents only their quiddity or also their properties; for example, whether there is one opposite for each one.