Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber3/lect8

Lecture 8

Latin	English
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 1 Postquam philosophus disputavit de quaestionibus motis de substantiis, hic disputat de quaestionibus motis de principiis. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima disputat de quaestionibus, quibus quaerebatur quae sunt principia. Secundo de quaestionibus quibus quaerebatur qualia sint principia, et hoc ibi, adhuc autem utrum substantia. Circa primum disputat de duabus quaestionibus. Primo utrum universalia sint principia. Secundo utrum sint aliqua principia a materia separata, ibi, est autem habita de his disputatio et cetera. Circa primum disputat duas quaestiones: quarum prima est, utrum genera sint principia; secunda, quae genera, utrum scilicet prima genera, vel alia, ibi, ad hoc autem si maxime principia sunt genera et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo disputat. Secunda ibi, ut vocis elementa et cetera. Est ergo quaestio prima de principiis, utrum oportet recipere vel opinari quod ipsa genera, quae de pluribus praedicantur, sint elementa et principia rerum, vel magis sint dicenda principia et elementa ea, ex quibus unumquodque est, sicut ex partibus. Sed addit duas conditiones: quarum una est cum insint, quod ponitur ad differentiam contrarii et privationis. Dicitur enim album fieri ex nigro, vel non albo, quae tamen non insunt albo. Unde non sunt eius elementa. Alia conditio est qua dicit primis, quod ponitur ad differentiam secundorum componentium. Sunt enim corpora animalium ex carnibus et nervis quae insunt animali non tamen dicuntur animalis elementa, quia non sunt haec prima ex quibus animal componitur, sed magis ignis, aer, aqua et terra, ex quibus etiam existunt carnes et nervi.	423. Having debated the questions which were raised about substances, the Philosopher now treats dialectically the questions which were raised about principles. This is divided into two parts. In the first he discusses the questions which asked what the principles of things are; and in the second (456), the questions which asked what kind of things the principles are (“Again, there is the problem”). In the first part of this division he discusses two questions: first, whether universals are the principles of things; and second (443), whether any principles are separate from matter (“But there is a problem”). In regard to the first he discusses two questions, of which the first is whether genera are the principles of things. The second (431) asks which genera these are, whether the first genera or the others (“Again, if genera”). In regard to the first he does two things: first, he raises the question; and second (424), he treats it dialectically (“Just as the elements”). The first question has to do with the principles of things: whether it is necessary to accept or believe that those genera which are predicated of many things are the elements and principles of things, or rather that those parts of which every single thing is composed must be called the elements and principles of things. But he adds two conditions, one of which is “inasmuch as they are intrinsic,” which is given in order to distinguish these parts from a contrary and a privation. For white is said to come from black, or the non-white, although these are not intrinsic to white. Hence they are not its elements. The other condition is what he calls “the first things,” which is given in order to distinguish them from secondary components. For the bodies of animals are composed of flesh and nerves, which exist within the animal; yet these are not called the elements of animals, because they are not the first things of which an animal is composed, but rather fire, air, water and earth, from which flesh and nerves derive their being.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit ut vocis disputat ad hanc quaestionem: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit, quod ea, ex quibus primis aliquid componitur, sint principia et elementa. Secundo obiicit ad partem contrariam, ibi, inquantum autem cognoscimus unumquodque et cetera. Tertio excludit quamdam responsionem qua posset dici, quod utraque sunt principia et elementa, ibi, at vero nec utrobique et cetera. Circa primum primo ponit tres rationes: quarum prima procedit ex naturalibus, in quibus manifestat propositum secundum duo exempla: quorum primum est de voce dearticulata, cuius principium et elementum non dicitur esse commune, quod est vox, sed magis illa, ex quibus primis componuntur omnes voces, quae dicuntur literae. Secundum exemplum ponit in diagrammatibus idest in demonstrativis descriptionibus figurarum geometricarum. Dicuntur enim horum diagrammatum esse elementa non hoc commune quod est diagramma, sed magis illa theoremata, quorum demonstrationes insunt demonstrationibus aliorum theorematum geometralium, aut omnium, aut plurimorum; quia scilicet aliae demonstrationes procedunt ex suppositione primarum demonstrationum. Unde et liber Euclidis dicitur liber elementorum, quia scilicet in eo demonstrantur prima geometriae theoremata, ex quibus aliae demonstrationes procedunt.	424. Just as the elements (221). Here he treats this question dialectically; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that the first things of which anything is composed are its principles and elements. Second (224:C 427), he argues the opposite side of the question (“But if we know”). Third (227:C 430), he rejects one answer by which it could be said that both of these [i.e., genera and constituent parts] are the principles and elements of things (“But it is not”). In regard to the first he gives three arguments. The first of these proceeds from natural phenomena, in which he makes his thesis evident by two examples. The first example which he gives if that of a word, whose principle and element is not said to be the common term word but rather the first constituents of which all words are composed, which are called letters. He gives as a second example, diagrams, i.e., the demonstrative descriptions of geometrical figures. For the elements of these diagrams are not said to be the common term diagram but rather those theorems whose demonstrations are found in the demonstrations of other geometrical theorems, either of all or of most of them, because the other demonstrations proceed from the supposition of the first demonstrations. Hence the book of Euclid is called The Book of Elements, because the first theorems of geometry, from which the other demonstrations proceed, are demonstrated therein.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 3 Secundam rationem ponit ibi amplius autem quae procedit in rebus naturalibus. Et dicit quod illi, qui ponunt elementa corporum vel plura vel unum, illa dicunt esse principia et elementa corporum, ex quibus componuntur et constant tamquam in eis existentibus. Sicut Empedocles dicit, elementa corporum naturalium esse ignem et aquam, et alia huiusmodi, quae simul cum his elementa rerum dicit, ex quibus primis cum insint corpora naturalia constituuntur. Ponebant autem praeter haec duo, alia quatuor principia, scilicet aerem et terram, litem et amicitiam, ut in primo dictum est. Non autem dicebat, nec Empedocles nec alii naturales philosophi, quod genera rerum essent earum principia et elementa.	425. Furthermore, those who (222). Here he gives the second argument which also employs certain examples drawn from nature. He says that those who hold that the elements of bodies are either one or many, say that the principles and elements of bodies are those things of which bodies are composed and made up as intrinsic constituents. Thus Empedocles says~ that the elements of natural bodies are fire and water and other things of this kind, which along with these he calls the elements of things; and natural bodies are constituted of these first things inasmuch as they are intrinsic. Moreover, they [i.e., the philosophers of nature] held that in addition to these two principles there are four others—air, earth, strife and friendship—as was stated in Book I (50:C 104). But neither Empedocles nor the other philosophers of nature said that the genera of things are the principles and elements of these natural bodies.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 4 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi adhuc autem quae procedit in artificialibus: et dicit quod siquis velit speculari naturam, idest definitionem indicantem essentiam aliorum corporum a corporibus naturalibus, scilicet artificialium, puta si vult cognoscere lectum, oportet considerare ex quibus partibus componitur et modum compositionis earum, et sic cognoscet naturam lecti. Et post hoc concludit quod genera non sunt principia entium.	426. And again if anyone (223). Here he gives the third argument, which involves things made by art. He says that if someone wished to “speculate about their nature,” i.e., about the definition which indicates the essence of other bodies than natural ones, namely, of bodies made by human art, for example, if one wished to know a bed, it would be necessary to consider of what parts it is made and how they are put together; and in this way he would know the nature of a bed. And after this he concludes that genera are not the principles of existing things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit quod si cognoscimus obiicit ad partem contrariam: et ponit tres rationes, quarum prima talis est. Unumquodque cognoscitur per suam definitionem. Si igitur idem est principium essendi et cognoscendi, videtur, quod id quod est principium definitionis sit principium rei definitae. Sed genera sunt principia definitionum, quia ex eis primo definitiones constituuntur: ergo genera sunt principia rerum quae definiuntur.	427. But if we know (224). Here he argues the other side of the question. He gives three arguments, the first of which is as follows. Each thing is known through its definition. Therefore, if a principle of being is the same as a principle of knowing, it seems that anything which is a principle of definition is also a principle of the thing defined. But genera are principles of definitions, because definitions are first composed of them. Hence genera are the principles of the things defined.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 6 Secundam rationem ponit ibi et si est quae talis est. Per hoc accipitur scientia de unaquaque re, quod scitur species eius secundum quam res est: non enim potest cognosci Socrates nisi per hoc quod scitur quod est homo. Sed genera sunt principia specierum, quia species constituuntur ex genere et differentia: ergo genera sunt principia eorum quae sunt.	428. And if in order to (225) Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus. Scientific knowledge of each thing is acquired by knowing the species from which it gets its being, for Socrates can be known only by understanding that he is man. But genera are principles of species, because the species of things are composed of genera and differences. Therefore genera are the principles of existing things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 7 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi videntur autem et sumitur ex auctoritate Platonicorum, qui posuerunt unum et ens esse principia, et magnum et parvum, quibus utuntur ut generibus: ergo genera sunt principia.	429. Moreover, some of those (226). Here he gives a third argument, which is based on the authority of the Platonists, who held that the one and being are the principles of things, and also the great and small, which are used as genera. Therefore genera are the principles of things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit sed non possibile excludit quamdam responsionem, qua posset dici quod utraque sunt principia; dicens quod non est possibile dicere utrobique esse principia, ut elementa, id est partes ex quibus componitur aliquid, et genera. Et hoc probat tali ratione. Unius rei una est ratio definitiva manifestans eius substantiam, sicut et una est substantia uniuscuiusque: sed non est eadem ratio definitiva quae datur per genera et quae datur per partes ex quibus aliquid componitur: ergo non potest esse utraque definitio indicans substantiam rei. Ex principiis autem rei potest sumi ratio definitiva significans substantiam eius. Impossibile est ergo quod principia rerum sint simul genera, et ea ex quibus res componuntur.	430. But it is not possible (227) Here he excludes one answer which would say that both of these are principles. He says that it is impossible to say that both of these are “principles,” i.e., both the elements, or the parts of which something is composed, and genera. He proves this by the following argument. Of each thing there is one definite concept which exposes its substance, just as there is also one substance of each thing. But the definitive concept which involves genera is not the same as the one which involves the parts of which a thing is composed. Hence it cannot be true that each definition indicates a thing’s substance. But the definitive concept which indicates a thing’s substance cannot be taken from its principles. Therefore it is impossible that both genera and the parts of which things are composed should be simultaneously and being cannot be genera of all the principles of things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem disputat secundam quaestionem. Et primo movet eam. Secundo ad eam rationes inducit ibi, nam siquidem universalia et cetera. Dicit ergo quod si ponamus quod genera sint maxime principia, quae oportet existimare magis esse principia? Utrum prima de numero generum, scilicet communissima, aut etiam infima, quae proxima praedicantur de individuis, scilicet species specialissimas. Hoc enim habet dubitationem, sicut ex sequentibus patet.	431. Again, if genera (228). Then he treats the second question dialectically. First, he raises the question; and second (432), he brings up arguments relative to this question (“For if universals”). Accordingly, he says that if we hold that genera are the principles of things in the fullest sense which of these genera should be considered to be the principles of things to a greater degree? Must we consider those “genera” which are first in number, namely, the most common, or also the lowest genera, which are proximately predicated of the individual, i.e., the lowest species. For this is open to question, as is clear from what follows.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit nam siquidem obiicit ad propositam quaestionem: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim inducit rationes ad ostendendum quod prima genera non possunt esse principia. Secundo inducit rationes ad ostendendum, quod species ultimae magis debent dici principia, ibi, at vero et si magis. Tertio obiicit ad propositum, ibi, iterum autem et cetera. Circa primum ponit tres rationes: quarum prima talis est. Si genera sunt magis principia quanto sunt universalia oportet quod illa quae sunt maxime universalia, quae scilicet dicuntur de omnibus, sint prima inter genera et maxime principia. Tot ergo erunt rerum principia, quod sunt huiusmodi genera communissima. Sed communissima omnium sunt unum et ens, quae de omnibus praedicantur: ergo unum et ens erunt principia et substantiae omnium rerum. Sed hoc est impossibile; quia non possunt omnium rerum esse genus, unum et ens: quia, cum ens et unum universalissima sint, si unum et ens essent principia generum, sequeretur quod principia non essent genera. Sic ergo positio, qua ponitur communissima generum esse principia, est impossibilis, quia sequitur ex ea oppositum positi, scilicet quod principia non sunt genera.	432. For if universals (229). Here he argues about the question which was proposed; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he introduces arguments to show that the first genera cannot be principles. Second (231:C 436), he introduces arguments to show that the last species should rather be called the principles of things (“But, on the other hand”). Third (234:C 441), he debates the proposed question (“But again it is”). In regard to the first (229) he gives three arguments, of which the first runs thus: if genera are principles to the extent that they are more universal, then those which are most universal, i.e., those which are predicated of all things, must be the first genera and the principles of things in the highest degree. Hence there will be as many principles of things as there are most common genera of this kind. But the most common of all genera are unity and being, which are predicated of all things. Therefore unity and being will be the principles and substances of all things. But this is impossible, because unity and being cannot be genera of all things. For, since unity and being are most universal, if they were principles of genera, it would follow that genera would not be the principles of things. Hence the position which maintains that the most common genera are principles is an impossible one, because from it there follows the opposite of what was held, namely, that genera are not principles.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 11 Quod autem ens et unum non possint esse genera, probat tali ratione. Quia cum differentia addita generi constituat speciem, de differentia praedicari non poterit nec species sine genere, nec genus sine speciebus. Quod autem species de differentia praedicari non possit, patet ex duobus. Primo quidem, quia differentia in plus est quam species, ut Porphyrius tradit. Secundo, quia cum differentia ponatur in definitione speciei, non posset species praedicari per se de differentia, nisi intelligeretur quod differentia esset subiectum speciei, sicut numerus est subiectum paris, in cuius definitione ponitur. Hoc autem non sic se habet; sed magis differentia est quaedam forma speciei. Non ergo posset species praedicari de differentia, nisi forte per accidens. Similiter etiam nec genus per se sumptum, potest praedicari de differentia praedicatione per se. Non enim genus ponitur in definitione differentiae, quia differentia non participat genus, ut dicitur in quarto topicorum. Nec etiam differentia ponitur in definitione generis: ergo nullo modo per se genus praedicatur de differentia. Praedicatur tamen de eo quod habet differentiam, idest de specie, quae habet differentiam in actu. Et ideo dicit, quod de propriis differentiis generis non praedicatur species, nec genus sine speciebus, quia scilicet genus praedicatur de differentiis secundum quod sunt in speciebus. Nulla autem differentia potest accipi de qua non praedicetur ens et unum, quia quaelibet differentia cuiuslibet generis est ens et est una, alioquin non posset constituere unam aliquam speciem entis. Ergo impossibile est quod unum et ens sint genera.	433. That being and unity cannot be genera he proves by this argument: since a difference added to a genus constitutes a species, a species cannot be predicated of a difference without a genus, or a genus without a species. That it is impossible to predicate a species of a difference is clear for two reasons. First, because a difference applies to more things than a species, as Porphyry says; ‘ and second, because, since a difference is given in the definition of a species, a species can be predicated essentially of a difference only if a difference is understood to be the subject of a species, as number is the subject of evenness in whose definition it is given. This, however, is not the case; but a difference is rather a formal principle of a species. Therefore a species cannot be predicated of a difference except, perhaps, in an incidental way. Similarly too neither can a genus, taken in itself, be predicated of a difference by essential predication. For a genus is not given in the definition of a difference, because a difference does not share in a genus, as is stated in Book IV of The Topics; nor again is a difference given in the definition of a genus. Therefore a genus is not predicated essentially of a difference in any way. Yet it is predicated of that which “has a difference,” i.e., of a species, which actually contains a difference. Hence he says that a species is not predicated of the proper differences of a genus, nor is a genus independently of its species, because a genus is predicated of its differences inasmuch as they inhere in a species. But no difference can be conceived of which unity and being are not predicated, because any difference of any genus is a one and a being, otherwise it could not constitute any one species of being. It is impossible, then, that unity and being should be genera.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Si genera dicuntur principia quia sunt communia et praedicantur de pluribus, oportebit quod omnia quae pari ratione erunt principia, quia sunt communia, et praedicata de pluribus, sint genera. Sed omnia quae sunt media inter prima genera et individua, quae scilicet sunt coaccepta cum differentiis aliquibus, sunt communia praedicata de pluribus: ergo sunt principia et sunt genera: quod patet esse falsum. Quaedam enim eorum sunt genera, sicut species subalternae; quaedam vero non sunt genera, sicut species specialissimae. Non ergo verum est, quod prima genera sive communia sint principia prima.	434. Further, those things (230) Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if genera are called principles because they are common and predicated of many things, then for a like reason all those things which are principles because they are common and predicated of many will have to be genera. But all things which are intermediate between the first genera and individuals, namely, those which are considered together with some differences, are common predicates of many things. Hence they are both principles and genera. But this is evidently false. For some of them are genera, as subaltern species, whereas others are not, as the lowest species. It is not true, then, that the first or common genera are the principles of things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 13 Praeterea. Si prima genera sunt principia, quia sunt principia cognitionis specierum, multo magis differentiae sunt principia, quia differentiae sunt principia formalia specierum. Forma autem et actus est maxime principium cognoscendi. Sed differentias esse principia rerum est inconveniens, quia secundum hoc erunt quasi infinita principia. Sunt enim, ut ita dicatur, infinitae rerum differentiae; non quidem infinitae secundum rerum naturam, sed quoad nos. Et quod sint infinitae, patet dupliciter. Uno modo siquis consideret multitudinem ipsam differentiarum secundum se. Alio modo siquis accipiat primum genus quasi primum principium. Manifestum enim est quod sub eo continentur innumerabiles differentiae. Non ergo prima genera sunt principia.	435. Further, if the first genera are principles, because they are the principles by which we know species, then differences will be principles to a greater degree, because differences are the formal principles of species; and form or actuality is chiefly the principle of knowing. But it is unfitting that differences should be the principles of things, because in that case there would be an infinite number of principles, so to speak; for the differences of things are infinite, so to speak; not infinite in reality but to us. That they are infinite in number is revealed in two ways: in one way if we consider the multitude of differences in themselves; in another way if we consider the first genus as a first principle, for evidently innumerable differences are contained under it. The first genera, then, are not the principles of things.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit, quod species specialissimae sunt magis principia quam genera; et ponit tres rationes, quarum prima talis est. Unum secundum Platonicos maxime videtur habere speciem, idest rationem principii. Unum vero habet rationem indivisibilitatis, quia unum nihil est aliud quam ens indivisum. Dupliciter est autem aliquid indivisibile: scilicet secundum quantitatem, et secundum speciem. Secundum quantitatem, quidem, sicut punctus et unitas: et hoc indivisibile opponitur divisioni quantitatis. Secundum speciem autem, sicut quod non dividitur in multas species. Sed inter haec duo indivisibilia prius et principalius est quod est indivisibile secundum speciem, sicut et species rei est prior quam quantitas eius; ergo illud quod est indivisibile secundum speciem, est magis principium eo quod est indivisibile secundum quantitatem. Et quidem secundum quantitatis numeralis divisionem videtur esse magis indivisibile genus, quia multarum specierum est unum genus: sed secundum divisionem speciei magis est indivisibilis una species. Et sic ultimum praedicatum de pluribus quod non est genus plurium specierum, scilicet species specialissima, est magis unum secundum speciem quam genus. Sicut homo et quaelibet alia species specialissima, non est genus aliquorum hominum. Est ergo magis principium species quam genus.	436. But on the other hand (231). Then he shows that the lowest species are principles to a greater degree than genera. He gives three arguments, of which the first runs thus: according to the Platonists it is the one which seems to have “the nature,” 3 or character, of a principle to the greatest degree. Indeed, unity has the character of indivisibility, because a one is merely an undivided being. But a thing is indivisible in two ways, namely, in quantity and in species: in quantity, as the point and unit, and this is a sort of indivisibility opposed to the division of quantity; and in species, as what is not divided into many species. But of these two types of indivisibility the first and more important one is indivisibility in species, just as the species of a thing is prior to its quantity. Therefore that which is indivisible in species is more of a principle because it is indivisible in quantity. And in the division of quantity the genus seems to be more indivisible, because there is one genus of many species; but in the division of species one species is more indivisible. Hence the last term which is predicated of many, which is not a genus of many species, namely, the lowest species, is one to a greater degree in species than a genus; for example, man or any other lowest species is not the genus of particular men. Therefore a species is a principle to a greater degree than a genus.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit amplius in quibus secundam rationem ponit, quae procedit ex quadam positione Platonis; qui quando aliquid unum de pluribus praedicatur, non secundum prius et posterius, posuit illud unum separatum, sicut hominem praeter omnes homines. Quando vero aliquid praedicatur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius, non ponebat illud separatum. Et hoc est quod dicit quod in quibus prius et posterius est, scilicet quando unum eorum de quibus aliquod commune praedicatur est altero prius, non est possibile in his aliquid esse separatum, praeter haec multa de quibus praedicatur. Sicut si numeri se habent secundum ordinem, ita quod dualitas est prima species numerorum, non invenitur idea numeri praeter omnes species numerorum. Eadem ratione non invenitur figura separata, praeter omnes species figurarum.	437. Further, in the case of (232). Then he gives the second argument, which is based on a certain position of Plato; for at one time Plato held that there is some one thing which is predicated of many things without priority and posteriority, and that this is a separate unity, as man is separate from all men; and at another time he held that there is some one thing which is predicated of many things according to priority and posteriority, and that this is not a separate unity. This is what Aristotle means when he says “in the case of those things to which prior and subsequent apply,” i.e., that when one of the things of which a common term is predicated is prior to another, it is impossible in such cases that there should be anything separate from the many things of which this common term is predicated. For example, if numbers stand in such a sequence that two is the first species of number, no separate Idea of number will be found to exist apart from all species of numbers. And on the same grounds no separate figure will be found to exist apart from all species of figures.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 16 Et huius ratio esse potest, quia ideo aliquod commune ponitur separatum, ut sit quoddam primum quod omnia alia participent. Si igitur unum de multis sit primum, quod omnia alia participent, non oportet ponere aliquod separatum, quod omnia participant. Sed talia videntur omnia genera; quia omnes species generum inveniuntur differre secundum perfectius et minus perfectum. Et, per consequens, secundum prius et posterius secundum naturam. Si igitur eorum quorum unum est prius altero, non est accipere aliquod commune separatum, si genus praeter species inveniatur, erunt schola aliorum, idest erit eorum alia doctrina et regula, et non salvabitur in eis praedicta regula. Sed manifestum est quod inter individua unius speciei, non est unum primum et aliud posterius secundum naturam, sed solum tempore. Et ita species secundum scholam Platonis est aliquid separatum. Cum igitur communia sint principia inquantum sunt separata, sequitur quod sit magis principium species quam genus.	438. The reason for this can be that a common attribute is held to be separate so as to be some first entity in which all other things participate. If, then, this first entity is a one applicable to many in which all other things participate, it is not necessary to hold that there is some separate entity in which all things participate. But all genera seem to be things of this kind, because all types of genera are found to differ insofar as they are more or less perfect, and thus insofar as they are prior and subsequent in nature. Hence, if in those cases in which one thing is prior to another it is impossible to regard anything common as a separate entity, on the supposition that there is a genus apart from species, then “in the case of other things the teaching” will [differ], i.e., there will be another doctrine and rule concerning them, and the foregoing rule will not apply to them. But considering the individuals of one species, it is evident that one of these is not prior and another subsequent in nature but only in time. And thus according to Plato’s teaching a species is separate. Since, then, these common things are principles inasmuch as they are separate, it follows that a species is a principle to a greater degree than a genus.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem tertiam rationem ponit quae sumitur ex meliori et peiori: quia in quibuscumque invenitur unum alio melius, semper illud quod est melius, est prius secundum naturam. Sed horum quae sic se habent non potest poni unum genus commune separatum: ergo eorum quorum unum est melius et aliud peius non potest poni unum genus separatum. Et sic redit in idem quod prius. Haec enim ratio inducitur quasi confirmatio praecedentis, ad ostendendum, quod in speciebus cuiuslibet generis invenitur prius et posterius.	439. Further, where one thing (233) Here he gives the third argument, which makes use of the notions “better or worse.” For in all those cases where one thing is better than another, that which is better is always prior in nature. But there cannot be held to be one common genus of those things which exist in this way. Hence there cannot be held to be one separate genus in the case of those things in which one is better and another worse; and thus the conclusion is the same as the above. For this argument is introduced to strengthen the preceding one, so to speak, i.e., with a view to showing that there is priority and posteriority among the species of any genus.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 18 Et ex tribus his rationibus concludit propositum; scilicet quod species specialissimae quae immediate de individuis praedicantur, magis videntur esse principia quam genera. Ponitur enim genitivus generum loco ablativi more Graecorum. Unde litera Boetii planior est, quae expresse concludit huiusmodi praedicata magis esse principia quam genera.	440. And from these three arguments he draws the conclusion in which he is chiefly interested, namely, that the lowest species, which are predicated immediately of individuals, seem to be the principles of things to a greater degree than genera.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit iterum autem obiicit in contrarium tali ratione. Principium et causa est praeter res quarum est principium et causa, et possibile est ab eis esse separatum. Et hoc ideo quia nihil est causa sui ipsius. Et loquitur hic de principiis et causis extrinsecis, quae sunt causae totius rei. Sed aliquid esse praeter singularia non ponitur, nisi quia est commune et universaliter de omnibus praedicatum: ergo quanto aliquid est magis universale, tanto magis est separatum, et magis debet poni principium. Sed genera prima sunt maxime universalia: ergo genera prima sunt maxime principia.	441. But again it is not (234). Here he argues the opposite side of the question, as follows: a principle and a cause are distinct from the things of which they are the principle and cause, and are capable of existing apart from them. And this is true, because nothing is its own cause. He is speaking here of extrinsic principles and causes, which are causes of a thing in its entirety. But the only thing that is held to exist apart from singular things is what is commonly and universally predicated of all things. Therefore the more universal a thing is, the more separate it is, and the more it should be held to be a principle. But the first genera are most universal. Therefore the first genera are the principles of things in the highest degree.
lib. 3 l. 8 n. 20 Harum autem quaestionum solutio innuitur ex hac ultima ratione. Secundum hoc enim genera vel species universalia principia ponebantur, inquantum ponebantur separata. Quod autem non sint separata et per se subsistentia ostendetur in septimo huius. Unde et Commentator in octavo ostendet quod principia rerum sunt materia et forma, ad quorum similitudinem se habent genus et species. Nam genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma, ut in eodem libro manifestabitur. Unde, cum forma sit magis principium quam materia, secundum hoc etiam erunt species magis principia quam genera. Quod vero contra obiicitur ex hoc quod genera sunt principia cognoscendi speciem et definitiones ipsius, eodem modo solvitur sicut et de separatione. Quia enim separatim accipitur a ratione genus sine speciebus, est principium in cognoscendo. Et eodem modo esset principium in essendo, si haberet esse separatum.	442. Now the solution to these questions is implied in this last argument. For according to this argument genera or species are held to be universal principles inasmuch as they are held to be separate. But the fact that they are not separate and self-subsistent is shown in Book VII (1592) of this work. Hence the Commentator also shows, in Book VIII, that the principles of things are matter and form, to which genus and species bear some likeness. For a genus is derived from matter and difference from form, as will be shown in the same book (720). Hence, since form is more of a principle than matter, species will consequently be principles more than genera. But the objection which is raised against this, on the grounds that genera are the principles of knowing a species and its definitions, is answered in the same way the objection raised about their separateness. For, since a genus is understood separately by the mind without understanding its species, it is a principle of knowing. And in the same way it would be a principle of being, supposing that it had a separate being.