Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber5/lect6

Lecture 6

Latin	English
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit nomina, quae significant causas, hic distinguit nomen quod significat aliquid pertinens ad orationem causae; scilicet necessarium. Causa enim est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo distinguit modos necessarii. Secundo reducit omnes ad unum primum, ibi, et secundum hoc necessarium. Ponit autem in prima parte quatuor modos necessarii. Primus est, secundum quod dicitur aliquid necessarium, sine quo non potest aliquid vivere aut esse; quod licet non sit principalis causa rei, est tamen quaedam concausa. Sicut respirare est necessarium animali respiranti, quia sine respiratione vivere non potest. Ipsa enim respiratio, etsi non sit causa vitae, est tamen concausa, inquantum cooperatur ad contemperamentum caloris, sine quo non est vita. Et similiter est de cibo, sine quo animal vivere non potest, inquantum cooperatur ad restaurationem deperditi, et impedit totalem consumptionem humidi radicalis, quod est causa vitae. Igitur huiusmodi dicuntur necessaria, quia sine eis impossibile est esse.	827. Having distinguished the different senses of the terms which signify causes, the Philosopher now gives the different senses of a term which designates something pertaining to the notion of cause, i.e., the term necessary; for a cause is that from which something else follows of necessity. In regard to this he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different senses of the term necessary. Second (836), he reduces all of these to one primary sense (“And from this sense”). In the first part he gives four senses in which the term necessary is used: First, it means that without which a thing cannot be or live; and even when this is not the principal cause of a thing, it is still a contributing cause. Breathing, for example, is necessary to an animal which breathes, because it cannot live without this. And while breathing is not the [principal] cause of life, nonetheless it is still a contributing cause inasmuch as it helps to restore what is lost and prevents the total consumption of moisture, which is a cause of life. Hence things of this kind are said to be necessary because it is impossible for things to exist without them.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 2 Secundum modum ponit ibi, et sine dicit, quod secundo modo dicuntur necessaria, sine quibus non potest esse vel fieri bonum aliquod, vel vitari aliquod malum, vel expelli; sicut bibere pharmacum, idest medicinam laxativam, dicimus esse necessarium, non quia sine hoc vivere animal non possit; sed ad expellendum, scilicet hoc malum quod est infirmitas, vel etiam vitandum. Est enim hoc necessarium ut non laboret, idest ut non infirmetur aliquis. Similiter navigare ad Aeginam, scilicet ad illum locum, est necessarium, non quia sine hoc non possit homo esse; sed quia sine hoc non potest acquirere aliquod bonum, idest pecuniam. Unde dicitur, quod necessaria est talis navigatio, ut aliquis pecuniam recipiat.	828. And it also means (417). Then he gives a second sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that in a second way those things are said to be necessary without which some good cannot be or come about, or some evil be avoided or expelled. For example, we say that “the drinking of some drug,” i.e., a laxative medicine, is necessary, not because an animal cannot live without it, but because it is required to expel something, namely, an evil, illness, or even to avoid it. For this is necessary “in order that one may not be in distress,” i.e., to avoid being ill. And similarly “sailing to Aegina,” i.e., to a definite place, is necessary, not because a man cannot exist without this, but because he cannot acquire some good, i.e., money, without doing this. Hence, such a voyage is said to be necessary in order to collect a sum of money.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 3 Tertium modum ponit ibi, amplius enim dicit quod id quod infert violentiam, et etiam ipsa violentia necessarii nomen accepit; nam violentia necessaria dicitur, et qui vim patitur dicitur de necessitate id facere ad quod cogitur. Quid autem sit faciens vim, manifestat in naturalibus, et in voluntariis. In naturalibus quidem est impetus, sive inclinatio ad aliquem finem, cui respondet voluntas in natura rationali; unde et ipsa naturalis inclinatio appetitus dicitur. Utrumque autem, scilicet et impetum naturalis inclinationis, et propositum voluntatis, contingit impediri et prohiberi. Impediri quidem, in prosecutione motus iam incepti. Prohiberi autem, ne etiam motus incipiat. Illud ergo dicitur esse violentum, quod est praeter impetum, idest praeter inclinationem rei naturalis, et est impediens praevoluntatem, idest propositum in prosecutione motus voluntarii iam incepti, et prohibens etiam ne incipiat. Alia litera habet et hoc est secundum ormin, idest secundum impetum. Violentia enim est cum aliquid agit secundum impetum exterioris agentis, contra voluntatem vim passi. Violentum autem est secundum impetum vim faciens.	829. Again, it means (418). Here he gives a third sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that anything which exerts force, and even force itself, is termed necessary. For force is said to be necessary, and one who is forced is said to do of necessity whatever he is compelled to do. He shows what is meant by something that exerts force both in the case of natural beings and in that of beings endowed with will. In natural beings there is a desire for or an inclination toward some end or goal, to which the will of a rational nature corresponds; and for this reason a natural inclination is itself called an appetite. For both of these, i.e., both the desire of a natural inclination and the intention of the will, can be hindered and prevented—hindered in carrying out a motion already begun, and prevented from initiating motion. Therefore, that is said to be forced “which is done in opposition to desire,” ‘ i.e., against the inclination of a natural being; and it is “something that hinders choice,” i.e., the end intended in executing a voluntary motion already begun, and also something that prevents it from beginning. Another text says, “and this is according to impetuousness,” i.e., according to impulse. For force is found when something is done through the impulse of an external agent and is opposed to the will and power of the subject. And that is forced which is done as a result of an impulse applying force.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 4 Ex hac autem violenti definitione duas conclusiones inducit. Quarum prima est, quod omne violentum est triste sive flebile. Quod probat per cuiusdam poetae sive doctoris dictum; dicens, quod omnis res necessaria sive violenta est tristis sive lamentabilis: necessitas enim est quaedam violentia; sicut Sophocles poeta dicit: violentia me facere coegit ea, idest necessitas. Dictum est enim, quod violentia est impediens voluntatem. Ea autem, qua voluntati sunt contraria, contristant. Tristitia enim est de his quae nobis nolentibus accidunt.	830. Now from this definition of the forced he draws two conclusions. The first is that everything forced is sad or mournful. He proves this by using the statement of a certain poet or teacher, saying that everything which is necessary or forced is sad or lamentable; for force is a kind of necessity, as the poet Sophodes says: “Force,” i.e., necessity, “compelled me to do this.” For it has been said that force is something which hinders the will; and things which are opposed to the will cause sorrow, because sorrow has to do with things which happen to us against our will.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 5 Secunda conclusio est, quod necessitas recte dicitur, quod est inculpabilis et irreprehensibilis. Dicitur enim quod necessitas magis meretur veniam quam increpationem. Et hoc ideo, quia non inculpamur nisi de his quae voluntarie facimus, de quibus etiam rationabiliter increpamur. Necessitas autem violentiae est contraria voluntati et excogitationi, ut dictum est; et ideo rationabilius dicitur, quod violenta non sunt culpabilia.	831. The second conclusion is that anything which is necessary is rightly said to be without blame or reproach. For it is said that necessity deserves forgiveness rather than blame; and this is true because we deserve to be blamed only for the things which we do voluntarily and for which we may also be reasonably rebuked. But the kind of necessity which pertains to force is opposed to the will and to reason, as has been stated (829); and thus it is more reasonable to say that things done by force are not subject to blame.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 6 Quartum modum ponit ibi, amplius quod dicit, quod necessarium etiam dicimus sic se habere, quod non contingit aliter se habere: et hoc est necessarium absolute. Prima autem necessaria sunt secundum quid.	832. Again, we say (419). He gives a fourth sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that being in such a state that it cannot be otherwise we also call necessary, and this is what is necessary in an absolute sense. Things necessary in the first senses, however, are necessary in a relative sense.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 7 Differt autem necessarium absolute ab aliis necessariis: quia necessitas absoluta competit rei secundum id quod est intimum et proximum ei; sive sit forma, sive materia, sive ipsa rei essentia; sicut dicimus animal necesse esse corruptibile, quia hoc consequitur eius materiam inquantum ex contrariis componitur. Dicimus etiam animal necessario esse sensibile, quia consequitur eius formam: et animal necessario esse substantiam animatam sensibilem, quia est eius essentia.	833. Now whatever is absolutely necessary differs from the other types of necessity, because absolute necessity belongs to a thing by reason of something that is intimately and closely connected with it, whether it be the form or the matter or the very essence of a thing. For example, we say that an animal is necessarily corruptible because this is a natural result of its matter inasmuch as it is composed of contraries; and we say that an animal is necessarily capable of sensing because this is a result of its form; and we also say that an animal is necessarily a living sensible substance because this is its essence.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 8 Necessarium autem secundum quid et non absolute est, cuius necessitas dependet ex causa extrinseca. Causa autem extrinseca est duplex; scilicet finis et efficiens. Finis autem est, vel ipsum esse absolutum, et ab hoc fine necessitas sumpta pertinet ad primum modum; vel bene esse, sive aliquod bonum habere, et ab hoc fine sumitur necessitas secundi modi.	834. However, the necessity of something which is necessary in a relative sense and not absolutely depends on an extrinsic cause. And there are two kinds of extrinsic causes—the end and the agent. The end is either existence taken absolutely, and the necessity taken from this end pertains to the first kind; or it is well disposed existence or the possession of some good, and necessity of the second kind is taken from this end.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 9 Necessitas autem quae est a movente exteriori, pertinet ad tertium modum. Nam violentia est quando aliquid movetur ab exteriori agente ad aliud ad quod ex propria natura aptitudinem non habet. Si enim secundum suam naturam ordinetur ad hoc quod recipiat motum ab exteriori agente, tunc motus non erit violentus, sed naturalis. Sicut patet de motu caelestium orbium a substantiis separatis, et de motu inferiorum corporum a superioribus.	835. Again, the necessity which comes from an external agent pertains to the third kind of necessity. For force exists when a thing is moved by an external agent to something which it has no aptitude for by its own nature. For if something is disposed by its own nature to receive motion from an external agent, such motion will not be forced but natural. This is evident in the motion of the celestial bodies by separate substances, and in that of lower bodies by higher ones.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit et secundum reducit omnes modos ad unum: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod omnes modi necessitatis, qui in rebus inveniuntur ad hunc ultimum modum pertinent. Secundo ostendit, quod secundum ultimum modum accipitur necessarium in demonstrativis, ibi, amplius demonstratio. Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex praemissis, ibi, horum quidem itaque. Dicit ergo primo, quod secundum istum ultimum modum necessarii, omnes alii modi aliqualiter dicuntur. Quod primo ostendit in tertio modo. Illud enim quod vim patitur, de necessitate dicitur aliquid facere vel pati, propter hoc quod non contingit secundum proprium impetum aliquid agere propter violentiam agentis, quae est quaedam necessitas propter quam non contingit aliter se habere.	836. And from this (420). Here he reduces all of the senses in which things are necessary to one; and in regard to this he does three things. First (836), he shows that all the types of necessity found in reality pertain to this last type. Second (838), he shows that necessity in matters of demonstration is taken in this last sense (“Further, demonstration”). Third (839), he draws a corollary from what has been set down above (“Now of necessary things”). He accordingly says, first, that all the other senses of the term necessary are somehow referred to this last sense. He makes this clear, first, with reference to the third way in which things are said to be necessary. For whatever is forced is said to do or to undergo something of necessity on the grounds that it cannot act through its own power because of the force exerted on it by an agent; and this is a kind of necessity by which it cannot be otherwise than it is.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 11 Et similiter ostendit hoc in primo et secundo modo, in quibus necessitas sumitur ex causis vivendi vel essendi simpliciter, quantum ad primum modum: vel ex causis boni, quantum ad secundum modum. Sic enim in aliis modis necessarium dicebatur, sine quo non poterat esse ex una parte bonum, et ex alia parte vivere et esse. Et sic illa causa, sine qua non contingit vivere vel esse, vel bonum habere, vel malo carere, necessitas dicitur; quasi ex hoc sit prima ratio necessarii, quia impossibile est aliter se habere.	837. Then he shows that the same thing is true of the first and second ways in which things are said to be necessary: in the first way with reference to the causes of living and being absolutely, and in the second with reference to the causes of good. For the term necessary was so used in these other ways: in one way to designate that without which a thing cannot be well off, and in the other to designate that without which a thing cannot live or exist. Hence that cause without which a thing cannot live or exist or possess a good or avoid an evil is said to be necessary; the supposition being that the primary notion of the necessary derives from the fact that something cannot be otherwise.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit amplius demonstratio ostendit quod secundum ultimum modum accipitur necessarium in demonstrativis, et quantum ad conclusiones, et quantum ad principia. Demonstratio enim dicitur esse necessariorum, et dicitur esse ex necessariis. Necessariorum quidem esse dicitur, quia illud, quod simpliciter demonstratur, non contingit aliter se habere. Dicitur autem simpliciter demonstratum ad eius differentiam quod demonstratur in demonstratione quae est ad aliquem, et non simpliciter; quod in quarto libro dixit demonstrare ad hominem arguentem. In talibus enim demonstrationibus, quae sunt ad aliquem, contingit etiam impossibile concludi ex aliquibus impossibilibus positis. Sed, quia causae conclusionis in demonstrationibus sunt praemissae, cum demonstratio simpliciter scire faciat, quod non est nisi per causam, oportet etiam principia, ex quibus est syllogismus, esse necessaria quae impossibile sint aliter se habere. Nam ex causa non necessaria non potest sequi effectus necessarius.	838. Further, demonstration (421). Then he shows that the necessary in matters of demonstration is taken from this last sense, and this applied both to principles and to conclusions. For demonstration is said to be about necessary things, and to proceed from necessary things. At is said to be about necessary things because what is demonstrated in the strict sense cannot be otherwise. He says “demonstrated in the strict sense” in order to distinguish this from what is demonstrated by the kind of demonstration which refutes an opponent, and does not strictly demonstrate. In the fourth book (609) he called this an ad hominem argument. In demonstrations of this kind which refute an opponent we conclude to the impossible from certain impossible premises. But since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion, for demonstrations in the strict sense are productive of science and this is had only by way of a cause, the principles from which a syllogism proceeds must also be necessary and thus cannot be otherwise than they are. For a necessary effect cannot come from a non-necessary cause.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit horum quidem concludit ex praemissis tres conclusiones se invicem sequentes: quarum prima est, quod ex quo in demonstrationibus praemissae sunt causae conclusionis, et utraque sunt necessaria, sequitur quod aliqua sunt necessaria dupliciter. Quaedam quidem quorum altera sit causa necessitatis; quaedam vero quorum nulla sit causa necessitatis; et talia sunt necessaria propter seipsa. Et hoc est contra Democritum, qui dicebat quod necessariorum non sunt quaerendae causae, ut habetur in octavo physicorum.	839. Now of necessary things (422). Here he draws three conclusions from the points set down above, one of which follows from the other. The first is that, since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion and both of these are necessary, it follows that some things are necessary in one of two ways. For there are (1) some things whose necessity is caused by something else, and there are (2) others whose necessity has no cause; and such things are necessary of themselves. This is said against Democritus, who claimed that we must not look for the causes of necessary things, as is stated in Book VIII of the Physics.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 14 Secunda conclusio, quia, cum oporteat esse unum primum necessarium, a quo alia necessitatem habent, quia in causis non est procedere in infinitum, ut in secundo ostensum est, oportet hoc primum necessarium, quod etiam maxime proprie est necessarium, quia est omnibus modis necessarium, quod ipsum sit simplex. Ea enim, quae sunt composita, sunt mutabilia, et ita pluribus modis se possunt habere: quae autem pluribus modis habere se possunt, possunt se habere aliter et aliter; quod est contra rationem necessarii. Nam necessarium est, quod est impossibile aliter se habere. Unde oportet, quod primum necessarium non aliter et aliter se habeat, et per consequens nec pluribus modis. Et ita oportet ipsum esse simplex.	840. The second conclusion is that, since there must be one first necessary being from which other beings derive their necessity (for there cannot be an infinite regress in causes, as was shown in the second book (301), this first necessary being, which is also necessary in the most proper sense because it is necessary in all ways, must be simple. For composite things are changeable and thus can be in more ways than one. But things which can be in more ways than one can be now in one way and now in another, and this is opposed to the notion of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot be otherwise. Hence the first necessary being must not be now in one way and now in another, and consequently cannot be in more ways than one. Thus he must be simple.
lib. 5 l. 6 n. 15 Tertia conclusio est, quod, cum violentum sit quod movetur ab aliquo exteriori agente praeter naturam propriam, principia autem necessaria sunt simplicia et immobilia, ut ostensum est, necessarium est ut si sunt aliqua sempiterna et immobilia sicut sunt substantiae separatae, quod in illis non sit aliquid violentum nec praeter naturam. Et hoc dicit, ne deceptio accidat in nomine necessitatis, cum dicitur de substantiis immaterialibus, nec per hoc intelligitur aliqua violentia in eis esse.	841. The third conclusion is that, since the forced is something which is moved by an external agent in opposition to its own nature, and necessary principles are simple and unchangeable, as has been shown (422)C 840), therefore if there are certain eternal and unchangeable beings, as the separate substances are, in them there must be nothing forced or contrary to their nature. He says this lest a mistake should be made in the case of the term necessity, since it is predicated of immaterial substances without implying on this account that anything forced is found in them.