Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber6/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 1 Hic ostendit de quibus entibus principaliter haec scientia tractare intendit; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo repetit modos quibus aliquid dicitur ens. Secundo determinat naturam entis secundum duos modos de quibus principaliter non intendit, ibi, quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens. Tertio ostendit quod de his modis entis principaliter non intendit, ibi, quoniam autem complexio. Dicit ergo primo, quod ens simpliciter, idest universaliter dictum, dicitur multipliciter, ut in quinto est habitum. Uno modo dicitur aliquid ens secundum accidens. Alio modo dicitur ens, idem quod verum propositionis; et non ens, idem quod falsum. Tertio modo dicitur ens quod continet sub se figuras praedicamentorum, ut quid, quale, quantum et cetera. Quarto modo praeter praedictos omnes, quod dividitur per potentiam et actum.	1171. Here Aristotle indicates with what beings this science chiefly intends to deal; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he recalls the ways in which things are said to be; second (1172), he establishes the nature of the two kinds of being with which he is not chiefly concerned (“Since being”); and third (1241), he shows that it is not his chief aim to consider these two kinds of being (“But since combination”). Accordingly he says, first, that being in an unqualified sense, i.e., in a universal sense, is predicated of many things, as has been stated in Book V (885). In one sense being means what is accidental; and in another sense it means the same thing as the truth of a proposition (and non-being the same as the falseness of a proposition); and in a third sense being is predicated of the things contained under the categorical figures, for example, the what, of what sort, how much, and so on; and in a fourth sense, in addition to all of the above, being applies to what is divided by potentiality and actuality [modes].
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit quoniam itaque determinat de modis entis quos praetermittere intendit. Et primo de ente per accidens. Secundo de ente quod est idem quod verum, ibi, quod autem ut verum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod de ente per accidens non potest esse aliqua scientia. Secundo determinat ea quae sunt consideranda circa ens per accidens, ibi, attamen dicendum est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod, cum ens multipliciter dicatur, ut dictum est, primo dicendum est de ente per accidens; ut quod minus habet de ratione entis, primo a consideratione huius scientiae excludatur. Hoc autem dicendum est de eo, quod nulla speculatio cuiuscumque scientiae potest esse circa ipsum. Et hoc probat dupliciter.	1172. Since being (544). Here he deals with the senses of being which he intends to exclude from this science. First (1172), he deals with accidental being; and second (1223), with being which is, identical with the true [logical]. In regard to the first he does two things. First he shows that there can be no science of the accidental. Second (1180), he establishes the things that must be considered about accidental being (“Yet concerning the accidental”). He says, first, that since being is used in many senses, as has been stated (1170), it is necessary first of all to speak of accidental being, so that anything which has the character of being in a lesser degree may first be excluded from the study of this science. And with regard to this kind of being it must be said that no speculation of any science can be concerned with it; and he proves this in two ways.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 3 Primo per signum; dicens, signum esse huius quod de ente per accidens non possit esse speculatio, quia nulla scientia quantumcumque sit studiosa aut meditativa, ut alia translatio habet, idest diligenter inquisitiva eorum quae ad ipsam pertinent, invenitur esse de ente per accidens. Sed nec etiam practica quae dividitur per activam et factivam, ut supra dictum est, neque scientia theorica.	1173. He does this first by giving a concrete indication. He says that the impossibility of there being any speculation about accidental being is indicated by the fact that no science, howsoever “investigative” it may be, or “thoughtful” as another translation says, i.e. no matter how carefully it investigates the objects which come within its scope, is found to deal with accidental being. No practical science (and this is divided into the science of action and productive science, as was said above [1152]) is concerned with it, nor even any speculative science.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 4 Et hoc manifestat primo in practicis scientiis, quia ille qui facit domum, si facit eam, non facit ea quae insunt domui factae, nisi per accidens, cum illa sint infinita, et sic non possunt cadere sub arte. Nihil enim prohibet domum factam esse istis voluptuosam, idest delectabilem, illis scilicet qui in ea prospere vivunt: aliis autem nocivam qui scilicet occasione domus aliquod detrimentum incurrunt. Et aliis utilem qui in domo aliquod emolumentum conquirunt, et etiam esse alteram et dissimilem omnibus entibus. Nullius autem eorum, quae per accidens insunt domui, factiva est ars aedificativa; sed solum est factiva domus, et eorum quae per se insunt domui.	1174. He makes this evident, first, in the case of the practical sciences; for one who builds a house, granted that he builds it, is only an accidental cause of those things which are accidental to the completed house, since these are infinite in number and thus cannot come within the scope of art. For nothing prevents the completed house from being “pleasant,” or delightful, to those who dwell there happily; “harmful” to those who suffer some misfortune occasioned by it; “useful” to those who acquire some profit from it; and also “different” from and unlike all other things. But the art of building does not produce any of the things which are accidental to a house, but only produces a house and the things which are essential to it.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 5 Et deinde ostendit idem in scientiis speculativis: quia simili modo nec geometria speculatur ea quae sunt accidentia figuris sic, idest per accidens, sed solum illa quae accidunt figuris per se. Speculatur enim hoc quod triangulus est habens duos rectos, idest tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; sed non speculatur, si aliquid alterum, utputa lignum vel aliquid huiusmodi, est trigonum. Haec enim per accidens conveniunt triangulo.	1175. Then he shows that the same thing is true in the case of the speculative sciences, because similarly neither does geometry speculate about those things which are accidents “of figures in this way,” i.e., accidentally, but only about those attributes which belong essentially to figures. For it speculates about a triangle being a figure having “two right angles,” i.e., having its three angles equal to two right angles; but it does not speculate whether a triangle is anything else, such as wood or something of the sort, because these things pertain to a triangle accidentally.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 6 Secundo ibi, et hoc probat idem per rationem; dicens, quod rationabiliter hoc accidit quod scientia non speculatur de ente per accidens; quia scientia speculatur de his quae sunt entia secundum rem; ens autem secundum accidens est ens quasi solo nomine, inquantum unum de alio praedicatur. Sic enim unumquodque est ens inquantum unum est. Ex duobus autem, quorum unum accidit alteri, non fit unum nisi secundum nomen; prout scilicet unum de altero praedicatur, ut cum musicum dicitur esse album, aut e converso. Non autem ita, quod aliqua res una constituatur ex albedine et musico.	1176. And this is understandable (545) Second, he proves the same thing by means of an argument. He says it is reasonable that no science should speculate about accidental being, because a science studies those things which are being in a (+) real sense, but (~) accidental being is in a sense being only in name, inasmuch as one thing is predicated of another. For each thing is a being insofar as it is one. But from any two things which are accidentally related to each other there comes to be something that is one only in name, i.e., inasmuch as one is predicated of the other, for example, when the musical is said to be white, or the converse. But this does not happen in such a way that some one thing is constituted from whiteness and the musical.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 7 Unde Plato quod autem ens per accidens sit quasi solo nomine ens, probat dupliciter. Primo per auctoritatem Platonis. Secundo per rationem. Secunda ibi, palam autem et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod propter hoc quod ens per accidens quodammodo est ens solo nomine, ideo Plato quodammodo non male fecit cum ordinando diversas scientias circa diversa substantia, ordinavit scientiam sophisticam circa non ens. Rationes enim sophisticorum maxime sunt circa accidens. Secundum enim fallaciam accidentis fiunt maxime latentes paralogismi.	1177. Hence in a way (546). He proves in two ways that accidental being is in a sense being only in name. He does this, first, on the authority of Plato; and second (1179), by an argument. He says that since accidental being is in a sense being only in name, Plato in a way was not wrong when, in allotting different sciences to different kinds of substance, he assigned sophistical science to the realm of non-being. For the arguments of the sophists are concerned chiefly with the accidental, since hidden paralogisms have the fallacy of accident as their principal basis.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 8 Et ideo dicitur in primo elenchorum, quod secundum accidens faciunt syllogismos contra sapientes; ut patet in istis paralogismis, in quibus dubitatur utrum diversum an idem sit musicum et grammaticum. Ut fiat talis paralogismus. Musicum est aliud a grammatico; musicum autem est grammaticum, ergo musicum est alterum a se. Musicum enim est aliud a grammatico, per se loquendo; sed musicus est grammaticus per accidens. Unde non est mirum si sequitur inconveniens, non distincto quod est per accidens ab eo quod est per se. Et similiter si sic dicatur: Coriscus est alterum a Corisco musico: sed Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; ergo Coriscus est aliud a se. Hic etiam non distinguitur quod est per accidens ab eo quod est per se. Et similiter si dicatur: omne quod est et non fuit semper, est factum: sed musicus ens est grammaticus et non fuit semper: ergo sequitur quod musicus ens grammaticus sit factus, et grammaticus ens musicus. Quod quidem est falsum; quia nulla generatio terminatur ad hoc quod est grammaticum esse musicum; sed una ad hoc quod est grammaticum esse, alia ad hoc quod est musicum esse. Patet etiam, quod in hac ratione, prima est vera de eo quod est per se, sed in secunda assumitur quod est ens per accidens. Et similiter est in omnibus talibus rationibus, quae sunt secundum fallaciam accidentis. Videtur enim ens per accidens, esse propinquum non enti. Et ideo sophistica, quae est circa apparens et non existens, est praecipue circa ens per accidens.	1178. Therefore in the first book of the Sophistical Refutations it is said that in arguing against wise men the sophists construct syllogisms that are based on the accidental. This is evident, for example, in these paralogisms in which the question is raised whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or different. Let us construct such a paralogism. The musical differs from the grammatical; but the musical is the grammatical; hence the musical differs from itself. For the musical differs from the grammatical essentially speaking, but the musical is the grammatical by accident. Little wonder then that an absurd conclusion follows, for what is accidental is not distinguished from what is essential. And it would be similar if we were to speak thus: Coriscus differs from musical Coriscus; but Coriscus is musical Coriscus; therefore Coriscus differs from himself. Here too no distinction is drawn between what is accidental and what is essential. And it would be the same if we were to say: everything which is and has not always been, has come to be; but the musical is grammatical and has not always been so; therefore it follows that the musical has become grammatical and that the grammatical has become musical. But this is false, because no process of generation terminates in the grammatical being musical, but one process of generation terminates in a man being grammatical and another in a man being musical. It is also evident that in this argument the first statement is true of something that has being essentially, whereas in the second something is assumed that has being only by accident. And it is similar in all such argument based on the fallacy of accident. For accidental being seems to be close to non-being; and therefore sophistics, which is concerned with the apparent and nonexistent, deals chiefly with the accidental.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 9 Palam autem secundo probat idem per rationem, dicens, quod etiam ex his rationibus, quibus utuntur sophistae, palam est, quod ens per accidens est propinquum non enti. Nam eorum, quae sunt entia alio modo quam per accidens, est generatio et corruptio: sed entis per accidens non est neque generatio neque corruptio. Musicum enim una generatione fit, et grammaticum alia. Non est autem una generatio grammatici musici, sicut animalis bipedis, vel sicut hominis risibilis. Unde patet, quod ens per accidens non vere dicitur ens.	1179. How this is also clear (547). Second, he proves the same thing by an argument. He says that it is also evident, from these arguments which the sophists use, that the accidental is close to non-being; for there is generation and corruption of those things which are beings in a different way than the accidental is, but there is neither generation nor corruption of the accidental. For the musical comes to be by one process of generation and the grammatical by another, but there is not one process of generation of the grammatical musical as there is of two-footed animal or of risible man. Hence it is evident that accidental being is not called being in any true sense.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit attamen dicendum determinat de ente per accidens secundum quod est possibilis de eo determinatio. Quamvis enim ea, quibus convenit esse per accidens, non cadant sub consideratione alicuius scientiae, tamen ratio huius quod est esse per accidens, per aliquam scientiam considerari potest. Sicut etiam licet id quod est infinitum, secundum quod est infinitum, sit ignotum, tamen de infinito secundum quod infinitum aliqua scientia tractat. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo determinat ea, quae sunt consideranda circa ens per accidens. Secundo excludit quamdam opinionem, per quam removetur ens per accidens, ibi, quod autem sint principia et esse et cetera.	1180. Yet concerning te accidental (548). He now establishes the truth about accidental being insofar as it is possible to do so. For even though those things which are properly accidental do not come within the scope of any science, still the nature of the accidental can be considered by some science. This is also what happens in the case of the infinite; for even though the infinite as infinite remains unknown, still some science treats of the infinite as infinite. In regard to this he does two things. First, he settles the issue regarding those points which should be investigated about accidental being. Second (1191), he rejects an opinion that, would abolish accidental being (“Now it is evident”).
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 11 Circa primum duo facit. Primo dicit, quod est dicendum de ente per accidens inquantum contingit de ipso tractare, tria; scilicet quae est eius natura, et quae est eius causa; et ex his erit tertium manifestum, quare eius non potest esse scientia.	1181. In regard to the first he does two things. First (548), he says that there are three points which must be discussed about accidental being, insofar as it is possible to treat of it, namely, (1) what its nature is, and (2) what causes it; and from this the third will become evident, (3) why there can be no science of it.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit quoniam igitur prosequitur tria praedicta. Et primo quae sit causa entis per accidens; dicens, quod quia in entibus quaedam sunt semper similiter se habentia ex necessitate (non quidem secundum quod necessitas ponitur pro violentia, sed prout necessitas dicitur secundum quam non contingit aliter se habere, ut hominem esse animal); quaedam vero non sunt ex necessitate, nec semper, sed sunt secundum magis, idest ut in pluribus. Et hoc, scilicet ens ut in pluribus, est causa et principium quod aliquid sit per accidens. In rebus enim quae sunt semper, non potest esse aliquid per accidens; quia solum quod est per se potest esse necessarium et sempiternum, ut etiam in quinto habitum est. Unde relinquitur, quod solum in contingentibus potest esse ens per accidens.	1182. Therefore, since there are (549). He discusses these three points. (2) First, he shows what the cause of the accidental is. He says that there are some beings which always are in the same way and of necessity (not in the sense in which necessity is taken to mean compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise than it is, as “Man is an animal”); and there are other beings which are neither always nor of necessity, but for the most part, i.e., in the majority of cases, and “this,” i.e., what occurs in the majority of cases, is the principle and the cause of the accidental. For in the case of those things which always are there can be nothing accidental, because only that which exists of itself can be necessary and eternal, as is also stated in Book V (839). Hence it follows that accidental being can be found only in the realm of contingent things.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 13 Contingens autem ad utrumlibet, non potest esse causa alicuius inquantum huiusmodi. Secundum enim quod est ad utrumlibet, habet dispositionem materiae, quae est in potentia ad duo opposita: nihil enim agit secundum quod est in potentia. Unde oportet quod causa, quae est ad utrumlibet, ut voluntas, ad hoc quod agat, inclinetur magis ad unam partem, per hoc quod movetur ab appetibili, et sic sit causa ut in pluribus. Contingens autem ut in paucioribus est ens per accidens cuius causa quaeritur. Unde relinquitur, quod causa entis per accidens sit contingens ut in pluribus, quia eius defectus est ut in paucioribus. Et hoc est ens per accidens.	1183. But that which is contingent, or open to opposites, cannot as such be the cause of anything. For insofar as it is open to opposites it has the character of matter, which is in potency to two opposites; for nothing acts insofar as it is in potency. Hence a cause which is open to opposites in the way that the will is, in order that it may act, must be inclined more to one side than to the other by being moved by the appetible object, and thus be a cause in the majority of cases. But that which takes place in only a few instances is the accidental, and it is this whose cause we seek. Hence it follows that the cause of the accidental is what occurs in the majority of cases, because this fails to occur in only a few instances. And this is what is accidental.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 14 Secundo ibi, quod enim ostendit naturam entis per accidens, dicens: ideo dico quod id quod est in pluribus est causa entis per accidens, quia quod non est semper neque secundum magis, hoc dicimus esse per accidens. Et hoc est defectus eius quod est in pluribus, ut si fuerit hiems idest tempus pluviosum et frigus sub cane, idest in diebus canicularibus, hoc dicimus esse per accidens. Non tamen si tunc fuerit aestuatio, idest siccitas et calor. Hoc enim est semper vel ut in pluribus, sed illud non. Et similiter dicimus hominem esse album per accidens, quia hoc non est semper nec in pluribus. Hominem vero per se dicimus esse animal, non per accidens, quia hoc est semper. Et similiter aedificator facit sanitatem per accidens, quia aedificator non est aptus natus facere sanitatem inquantum huiusmodi, sed solus medicus. Aedificator autem facit sanitatem inquantum accidit eum esse medicum; et similiter opsopios, idest cocus coniectans, idest intendens facere voluptatem, idest delectationem in cibo, faciendo aliquem cibum bene saporatum, facit aliquid salubre. Cibus enim bonus et delectabilis quandoque est utilis ad sanitatem. Sed hoc non est secundum artem opsopoieticam, idest pulmentariam, quod faciat salubre, sed quod faciat delectabile. Et propter hoc dicimus hoc accidere.	1184. For that which (550). Second (1), he exposes the nature of accidental being; and he speaks thus: that which exists for the most part is the cause of the accidental, because we call that accidental which is neither always nor for the most part. And this is the absence of what occurs for the most part; so that “if there should be wintry weather,” i.e., a period of rain and cold, “during the dog days,” i.e., in the days of the dog star, we say that this is accidental. But we do not say this “if the weather is sultry” during that time, i.e., if there is a period of drought and heat; for the latter occurs always or almost always, but the former does not. Similarly we say that it is accidental for a man to be white, because this is so neither always nor for the most part. But we say that man is an animal essentially, not accidentally, because this is so always. And similarly a builder causes health accidentally, because a builder inasmuch is he is a builder is not naturally fitted to cause health, but only a physician can do this. However, a builder may cause health inasmuch as he happens to be a physician. Similarly a confectioner, or cook is “aiming,” i.e., intending, to prepare something palatable,” or delightful in the line of food, may make something health-giving when he prepares a tasty dish. For food which is good and delightful sometimes promotes health. But it is not according to the “confectioner’s art,” i.e., the culinary art, that he produces something health-giving, but something delightful. And for this reason we say that this is accidental.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 15 Et notandum quod in primo exemplo fuit ens per accidens secundum concursum in eodem tempore. In secundo per concursum in eodem subiecto, sicut album cum homine. In tertio secundum concursum in eadem causa agente, sicut aedificator et medicus. In quarto secundum concursum in eodem effectu, sicut in pulmento salubre et delectabile. Quamvis autem cocus faciat pulmentum delectabile, tamen hoc fit per accidens salubre. Cocus quidem facit modo quodam salubre secundum quid; sed simpliciter non facit, quia ars operatur per intentionem. Unde quod est praeter intentionem artis, non fit ab arte per se loquendo. Et ideo ens per accidens, quod est praeter intentionem artis, non fit ab arte. Aliorum enim entium, quae sunt per se, sunt quandoque aliquae potentiae factivae determinatae; sed entium per accidens nulla ars neque potentia determinata est factiva. Eorum enim quae sunt aut fiunt secundum accidens, oportet esse causam secundum accidens, et non determinatam. Effectus enim et causa proportionantur adinvicem; et ideo effectus per accidens habet causam per accidens, sicut effectus per se causam per se.	1185. And it should be noted that in the (1) first example the accidental came about insofar as two things happen to occur at the same time; in the second, (2) insofar as two things happen to be present in the same subject, as white and man; in the third, (3) insofar as the same efficient cause happens to be a twofold agent, as a builder and a physician; and in the fourth, insofar as the effect happens to be twofold, as health and pleasure in the case of food; for while a cook prepares a pleasing dish, nevertheless this happens to be health-giving by accident. In fact a cook prepares something health-giving only in a secondary sense but not in a primary and proper sense, because an art operates through knowledge. Hence whatever lies outside the knowledge of an art is not produced primarily and properly by that art. Therefore the accidental, which lies outside the knowledge of an art, is not produced by art. For there are certain determinate powers which sometimes are productive of other beings which have being in the proper sense of the term, but there is no art or determinate power which is productive of beings in an accidental sense. Now the cause of those things which are or come to be by accident must be an accidental cause and not a proper cause. For effect and cause are proportionate to each other; and therefore whatever is an accidental effect has only an accidental cause, just as an effect in the proper sense has a cause in the proper sense.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 16 Et quia supra dixerat quod ens ut in pluribus est causa entis per accidens, consequenter cum dicit quare quoniam ostendit qualiter ex eo quod est in pluribus, est ens per accidens; dicens, quod, quia non omnia ex necessitate et semper existunt et fiunt, sed plurima sunt secundum magis, idest ut in pluribus, ideo necesse est esse quod est secundum accidens, quod neque est semper neque secundum magis, ut hoc quod dico, albus est musicus. Quia tamen aliquando fit, licet non semper nec ut in pluribus, sequitur quod fit per accidens. Si enim non fieret aliquando id quod est in paucioribus, tunc id quod est in pluribus nunquam deficeret, sed esset semper et ex necessitate, et ita omnia essent sempiterna et necessaria; quod est falsum. Et, quia defectus eius quod est ut in pluribus, est propter materiam, quae non subditur perfecte virtuti agenti ut in pluribus, ideo materia est causa accidentis aliter quam ut in pluribus, scilicet accidentis ut in paucioribus: causa inquam non necessaria, sed contingens.	1186. And since he had said above (1182) that the cause of the accidental is what occurs for the most part, therefore when he says “Hence, since not all,” he shows how the accidental exists as a result of what occurs for the most part. He says that, since not all things are or come to be always and of necessity, “but most things happen for the most part,” i.e., in the majority of cases, therefore (#) the accidental must exist; and this is what does not occur always or for the most part, as when I say “The white man is musical.” Yet because this sometimes happens, although not always or in the majority of cases, it follows that this comes about by accident. For if that which occurs only occasionally were never to occur, then that which occurs in the majority of cases would never fail to occur but would be always and of necessity. Thus all things would be eternal and necessary. But this is false. And since that which occurs in the majority of cases fails to occur because of matter (which is not completely subject to the active power of the agent, as happens in the majority of cases), then matter is the cause of that which happens to be otherwise “than usually occurs,” i.e., of what happens only occasionally. This cause, I say, is not a necessary cause but a contingent one.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 17 Habito autem, quod non omnia sunt necessaria, sed aliquid est nec semper nec secundum magis, principium hoc oportet hic sumere, utrum nihil sit nec semper, nec secundum magis. Sed hoc patet esse impossibile; quia, cum id quod est ut in pluribus, sit causa entis per accidens, oportet esse et id quod est semper, et id quod est ut in pluribus. Igitur quod est praeter utrumque dictorum, est ens secundum accidens.	1187. Granted that not all things are necessary but that there is something which is neither always nor for the most part, then we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. But obviously this is impossible; for since that which occurs for the most part is the cause of the accidental, then both that which always is and that which is for the most part must exist. Hence anything besides the things just mentioned is an accidental being.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 18 Sed utrum iterum id quod est ut in pluribus inest alicui, quod autem est semper nulli inest, aut etiam sunt aliqua sempiterna, considerandum est posterius in duodecimo; ubi ostendet quasdam substantias esse sempiternas. Sic igitur per primam quaestionem quaeritur, utrum omnia sint per accidens. Per secundam vero, utrum omnia possibilia, et nihil sempiternum.	1188. However, the question whether that which occurs for the most part is found in some being, and whether that which occurs always is not found in any being, or whether there are some things which are eternal, must be dealt with later in Book XII (2488), where he will show that there are some substances which are eternal. Hence in the first question he asks whether all things are accidental; and in the second, whether all things are contingent and nothing is eternal.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit quod autem ostendit tertium praemissorum; scilicet quod scientia non sit de ente per accidens. Quod quidem dicit esse palam ex hoc, quod omnis scientia est aut eius quod est semper, aut eius quod est in pluribus. Unde cum ens per accidens nec sit semper, nec sit in pluribus, de eo non poterit esse scientia. Primam sic probat. Non enim potest aliquis doceri ab alio, vel docere alium, de eo quod nec est semper, nec ut frequenter. Hoc enim de quo est doctrina oportet esse definitum aut per hoc quod est semper, aut per hoc quod est in pluribus. Sicut quod melicratum, idest mixtum ex aqua et melle, utile est febricitantibus, determinatum est ut in pluribus.	1189. Here he establishes the third point, namely, that there is no science of the accidental. He says that this is evident from the fact that every science is concerned with what is either always or for the most part. Therefore, since the accidental occurs neither always nor for the most part, there will be no science of it. He proves the first thus: one cannot be taught by another or teach another about something which does not occur either always or for the most part; for anything that may be taught must be defined on the grounds that it is so either always or for the most part; for example, that “honey-water” (a mixture of honey and water) is beneficial to those with a fever, is defined as something that occurs for the most part.
lib. 6 l. 2 n. 20 Sed quod est praeter hoc, idest praeter id quod est semper et magis, non potest dici quando fiat, sicut quod fiat in tempore novilunii. Quia quod determinatur fieri in tempore novilunii, vel est semper, vel ut in pluribus. Vel potest esse hoc quod dicitur de nova luna aliud exemplum, eius scilicet quod determinatur semper; et quod addit, aut in pluribus fit, addit, propter differentiam eius per accidens, quod nec sic nec sic est. Unde subdit quod accidens sit praeter hoc, scilicet praeter ens semper et ens ut magis. Et haec minor est rationis principalis superius positae. Ulterius autem epilogando dicit quod dictum est, quid est ens per accidens, et quae est causa eius, et quod de eo non potest esse scientia.	1190. But with regard to “what happens in the other cases,” i.e., in the case of things which are neither always nor for the most part, it cannot he said when they will occur, for example, at the time of the new moon; for whatever is destined to happen at that time also happens either always or for the most part. Or his statement about the new moon can be another example of something that is defined as occurring always; and he adds the phrase “or for the most part” because of the way in which the accidental differs, because it does not occur in either of these ways. Hence he adds that “the accidental is contrary to this,” i.e., contrary to what occurs always or for the most part. And this is the minor premise of the principal argument used above. In bringing his discussion to a close he mentions the points which have been explained, namely, what the accidental is, and what its cause is, and that there can be no science of it.