Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect10

Lecture 10

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 1 Quia solutio superius posita non erat usquequaque manifesta, nondum enim ostenderat quomodo partes sunt priores et posteriores, nec iterum distinxerat compositum universale a particulari, nec etiam speciem a forma: ideo hic solutionem superius positam explanat. Dividitur autem in partes duas. In prima explanat solutionem superius positam. In secunda docet qualiter sit ad quaestionem applicanda, ibi, interrogationi vero obviare. Prima dividitur in duas. Primo solvit quaestionem quantum ad hoc, quod quaesitum fuit de prioritate partium. Secundo quantum ad hoc, quod quaesitum fuit, utrum partes definiti intrent definitionem, ibi, sed rationis partes. Prima dividitur in duas. Primo ostendit quomodo partes sunt priores toto. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, quoniam vero. Dicit ergo primo, quod id quod superius est dictum in solutione proposita, verum quidem est in se, tamen repetendum est ut amplius fiat manifestum, quantum ad hoc quod dictum est. Oportet enim, quod omnes partes rationis, et in quas ratio dividitur, sint priores definito, vel omnes, vel quaedam. Et hoc dicitur propter hoc, quod partes formae quandoque non sunt de necessitate speciei, sed de perfectione; sicut visus et auditus, quae sunt partes animae sensibilis, non sunt de integritate vel necessitate animalis. Potest enim esse animal sine his sensibus. Sunt tamen de perfectione animalis, quia animal perfectum hos etiam sensus habet. Et sic universaliter est verum, quod illae partes quae ponuntur in definitione alicuius sunt universaliter priores eo.	1482. Since the foregoing solution was not always clear, for he had not yet shown how parts are prior, and subsequent or even distinguished the universal composite from the particular or the species from the form, he therefore now explains the foregoing solution. This is divided into two parts. In the first (625)C 1482) he explains the foregoing solution. In the second (628:C 1498) he tells us how the solution should be applied to this question (“But when anyone”). The first part is divided into two sections. First, he answers the question about the priority of parts; and second (627:C 1492), the question whether the parts of the thing defined enter into its definition (“But only”). The first part is again divided into two sections. First, he shows how parts are prior to wholes. Second (626:C 1484), he clarifies this by an example (“And since the soul”). He accordingly says, first (625), that while the explanation given above in the solution advanced is true in itself, it is still necessary to go over it again so that it may become more evident in reference to the present discussion. For all parts of a thing’s intelligible expression, i.e., those into which the intelligible expression is divided, must be prior to the thing defined, either all or some of them. This is said because sometimes the parts of the form are not necessarily parts of the species, but relate to the perfection of a thing; for example, sight and hearing, which are parts of the sentient soul, are not integral or necessary parts of an animal, inasmuch as there can exist an animal which does not have these senses. They nevertheless belong to the perfection of animal, because perfect animals do have these senses. Thus it is universally true that those parts which are given in the definition of anything are universally prior to it.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 2 Sed acutus angulus, quamvis sit pars recti, non tamen ponitur in definitione eius, sed e converso; non enim ratio recti anguli resolvitur in definitionem acuti, sed e converso. Qui enim definit acutum, utitur recto definiendo. Angulus enim acutus est angulus minor recto. Et similiter est de circulo et semicirculo, qui definitur per circulum. Est enim media pars circuli. Similiter est de digito et homine, qui ponitur in definitione digiti: definitur enim digitus, quod est talis pars hominis. Dictum est enim supra, quod partes formae sunt partes rationis, non autem partes materiae. Si igitur solae partes rationis sunt priores, non autem materiae, sequitur quod quaecumque sint partes definiti, sicut materia, in quam scilicet resolvitur definitum ut compositum in materialia principia, sunt posteriora. Quaecumque vero sunt partes rationis et substantiae quae est secundum rationem, idest partes formae secundum quam sumitur ratio rei, sunt priora toto, aut omnia, aut quaedam, ratione superius dicta.	1483. But even though an acute angle is part of a right angle, it is still not given in its definition; but the opposite is true, for the intelligible expression of a right angle is not dissolved into the definition of an acute angle, but the reverse. For he who defines an acute angle uses right angle in its definition, because an acute angle is less than a right angle. The same is true of a circle and a semicircle, which is defined by means of a circle, because it is a half of a circle. And the same thing holds true of a finger and a man, who is given in the definition of a finger; for a finger is defined as such and such a part of man. For it was stated above that the parts of the form are parts of the intelligible expression but not those of the matter. Therefore, if only the parts of the intelligible expression are prior and not those of the matter, it follows that all things which are material parts of the thing defined, into which it is dissolved in the same way that a composite is dissolved into its material principles, are subsequent. “But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression,” i.e., the parts of the form according to which the intelligible expression of the thing is understood, are prior to the whole, either all or some of them, according to the argument given above.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero exponit quod dixerat per exempla; dicens, quod anima animalium cum sit substantia animati secundum rationem, idest forma animati, a qua animatum habet propriam rationem, est substantia, idest forma et species, et quod quid erat esse tali corpori, scilicet organico. Corpus enim organicum non potest definiri nisi per animam. Et secundum hoc anima dicitur quod quid erat esse tali corpori.	1484. And since (626). Here he explains what he has said, by using an example. He says that since the soul of living things is their substance according to its intelligible expression, i.e., the form from which they derive their intelligible expression, then the soul of an animal “is the substance,” i.e., the form or specifying principle or essence “of such a body,” namely, of an organic body; for an organic body can be defined only by means of a soul. And from this point of view a soul is said to be the essence of such a body.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 4 Et quod hoc sit verum, patet per hoc quod si aliquis bene definiat cuiuscumque animalis partem, non potest eam bene definire nisi per propriam operationem. Sicut si dicatur quod oculus est pars animalis per quam videt. Ipsa autem operatio partium non existit sine sensu vel motu vel aliis operationibus partium animae. Et sic oportet quod definiens aliquam partem corporis, utatur anima.	1485. The truth of this is shown by the fact that, if anyone properly defines a part of any animal at all, he can define it properly only by means of its proper operation, as, for example, if someone were to say that an eye is that part of an animal by which it sees. But the operation itself of the parts does not exist without sensation or motion or the other operations of the soul’s parts; and thus one who defines some part of the body must use the soul.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 5 Et quia ita est, oportet quod partes eius, scilicet animae, sint priores - vel omnes, sicut in perfectis animalibus, vel quaedam, sicut in imperfectis animalibus, simul toto, idest eo quod est compositum ex anima et corpore. Et similiter est secundum unumquodque aliud, quia semper oportet quod partes formales sint priores quolibet composito.	1486. And since this is so, its parts, i.e., those of the soul, must be prior (either all of them, as happens in the case of perfect animals, or some of them, as happens in the case of imperfect animals) “to the concrete whole,” i.e., to the composite of body and soul. The same thing is true of every other individual thing, because the formal parts must always be prior to any composite.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 6 Sed corpus et partes corporis sunt posteriores hac substantia, scilicet forma, quae est anima, cum oporteat animam in eius definitione poni, ut iam dictum est. Et id quod dividitur in partes corporis, ut in materiam, non est ipsa substantia, idest forma, sed simul totum, idest compositum. Patet igitur quod partes corporis sunt priores simul toto, idest composito quodammodo, et quodammodo non.	1487. But the body and its parts are subsequent “to this substance,” i.e., to the form, which is the soul, since the soul must be given in the definition of the body, as has already been stated (C 1485); and what is divided into the parts of the body as its matter is not “the substance itself,” but “the concrete whole,” i.e., the composite. It is clear, then, that in a sense the parts of the body are prior to “the concrete whole,” i.e., to the composite, and in a sense they are not.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 7 Sunt quidem priores sicut simplex composito, inquantum animal compositum ex eis constituitur. Sunt autem non priores secundum modum quo dicitur esse prius id quod potest esse sine alio; non enim partes corporis possunt esse separatae ab animali; non enim digitus quocumque modo se habens est digitus. Ille enim qui est decisus, vel mortuus, non dicitur digitus nisi aequivoce, sicut digitus sculptus vel depictus. Sed secundum hanc considerationem huiusmodi partes sunt posteriores composito animali, quia animal sine digito esse potest.	1488. In fact they are prior in the way in which the simple is prior to the complex, inasmuch as the composite animal is constituted of them. However, they are not prior in the sense in which prior means something that can exist without something else; for the parts of the body cannot exist apart from the animal. Thus a finger is not a finger under all conditions, because one that is severed or dead is called such only equivocally, for example, the finger of a statue or that in a painting. But from this point of view parts of this kind are subsequent to the composite animal, because an animal can exist without a finger.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 8 Sed quaedam partes sunt, quae licet non sint priores toto animali hoc modo prioritatis, quia non possunt esse sine eo, sunt tamen secundum hanc considerationem simul; quia sicut ipsae partes non possunt esse sine integro animali, ita nec integrum animal sine eis. Huiusmodi autem sunt partes principales corporis, in quibus primo consistit forma, scilicet anima; scilicet cor, vel cerebrum. Nec ad propositum differt quicquid tale sit.	1489. But there are certain parts which, even though they are not prior to the whole animal with this sort of priority, are nevertheless simultaneous with the whole, from this point of view; because, just as the parts themselves cannot exist without the entire body, neither can the entire animal exist without them. And parts of this kind are the principal parts of the body in which “the form,” i.e., the soul, first exists, namely, the heart or the brain. Nor does it make any difference to his thesis what things may be such.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 9 Sciendum tamen, quod hoc compositum, quod est animal vel homo, potest dupliciter sumi: vel sicut universale, vel sicut singulare. Sicut universale quidem, sicut homo et animal. Sicut singulare, ut Socrates et Callias. Et ideo dicit, quod homo, et equus et quae ita sunt in singularibus, sed universaliter dicta, sicut homo et equus non sunt substantia, idest non sunt solum forma, sed sunt simul totum quoddam compositum ex determinata materia et determinata forma; non quidem ut singulariter, sed universaliter. Homo enim dicit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, non autem ex hac anima et hoc corpore. Sed singulare dicit aliquid compositum ex ultima materia, idest materia individuali. Est enim Socrates aliquid compositum ex hac anima et hoc corpore. Et similiter est in aliis singularibus.	1490. Yet it must be borne in mind that this composite, animal or man, can be taken in two ways: either as a universal or as a singular. An example of a universal composite would be animal and man, and of a singular composite, Socrates and Callias. Hence he says that man and horse and those predicates which are used in this way in reference to singular things but are taken universally, as man and horse, “are not substance,” i.e., they are not just form alone, but are concrete wholes composed of a determinate matter and a determinate form (i.e., insofar as these are taken not individually but universally). For man means something composed of body and soul, but not of this body and this soul, whereas a singular man means something composed of “ultimate matter,” i.e., individual matter: for Socrates is something composed of this body and this soul, and the same is true of other singular things.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 10 Sic igitur patet quod materia est pars speciei. Speciem autem hic intelligimus non formam tantum, sed quod quid erat esse. Et patet etiam quod materia est pars eius totius, quod est ex specie et materia, idest singularis, quod significat naturam speciei in hac materia determinata. Est enim materia pars compositi. Compositum autem est tam universale quam singulare.	1491. Hence it is clear that matter is a part of the species. But by species here we mean not just the form but the essence of the thing. And it is also clear that matter is a part of this whole which “is composed of species and matter,” i.e., the singular, which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate matter. For matter is part of a composite, and a composite is both universal and singular.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit sed rationis ostendit quae partes debeant poni in definitione. Cum enim ostensum sit quae partes sunt speciei et quae partes individui, quia materia communiter sumpta est pars speciei, haec autem materia determinata est pars individui: manifestum est, quod solum illae partes sunt partes rationis, quae sunt partes speciei; non autem quae sunt partes individui. In definitione enim hominis ponitur caro et os, sed non haec caro et hoc os. Et hoc ideo, quia ratio definitiva non assignatur nisi universaliter.	1492. But only the parts (627). Here he explains what parts should be given in a definition. For since it was shown (622:C 1463) which parts are parts of the species as well as which are parts of the individual (because matter taken commonly is part of the species, whereas this definite matter is part of the individual), it is evident that only those parts which are parts of the species are parts of the intelligible expression, and not those which are parts of the individual; for flesh and bones, and not this flesh and these bones, are given in the definition of man; and the reason is that the definitive expression is applied only universally.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 12 Cum enim quod quid erat esse sit idem cum eo cuius est, ut supra ostensum est, illius tantum erit definitio, quae est ratio significans quod quid erat esse, quod est idem cum suo quod quid erat esse. Huiusmodi autem sunt universalia et non singularia. Circulus enim, et id quod est circulo esse, sunt idem; et similiter anima, et id quod est animae esse. Sed ipsorum, quae sunt composita ex specie et materia individuali, sicut circuli huius, aut alicuius aliorum singularium: horum non est definitio.	1493. For since the essence of a thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence, as was shown above (591)C 1362), there will be a definition which is the intelligible expression or essence only of that which is the same as its own essence. Now things of this kind are universal and not singular; for a circle and the being of a circle are the same, and it is similar in the case of a soul and the being of a soul. But there is no definition of those things which are composed of a form and individual matter, as of this circle or of any other singular thing.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 13 Nec differt utrum singularia sint sensibilia vel intelligibilia. Singularia quidem sensibilia sunt sicut circuli aerei et lignei. Intelligibilia singularia sunt sicut circuli mathematici. Quod autem in mathematicis considerentur aliqua singularia, ex hoc patet, quia considerantur ibi plura unius speciei, sicut plures lineae aequales, et plures figurae similes. Dicuntur autem intelligibilia, huiusmodi singularia, secundum quod absque sensu comprehenduntur per solam phantasiam, quae quandoque intellectus vocatur secundum illud in tertio de anima: intellectus passivus corruptibilis est.	1494. Nor does it make any difference whether the singulars are sensible or intelligible; sensible singulars being such things as brazen and wooden circles, and intelligible singulars being such as mathematical circles. Now that some singulars are considered among the objects of mathematics is clear from the fact that in this order many things of the same species are observed~ as many equal lines and many similar figures. And such singulars are said to be intelligible insofar as they are grasped without the senses by means of imagination alone, which is sometimes referred to as an intellect, according to the statement in Book III of The Soul: “The passive intellect is corruptible.”
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 14 Ideo autem singularium circulorum non est definitio, quia illa, quorum est definitio, cognoscuntur per suam definitionem; sed singularia non cognoscuntur nisi dum sunt sub sensu vel imaginatione, quae hic intelligentia dicitur, quia res considerat sine sensu, sicut intellectus. Sed huiusmodi singulares circuli abeuntes ab actu, idest recedentes ab actuali inspectione sensus, quantum ad sensibiles, aut imaginationis, quantum ad mathematicos, non est manifestum, utrum sint inquantum sunt singulares; sed tamen semper dicuntur et cognoscuntur per rationem universalis. Cognoscuntur enim hi circuli sensibiles, etiam quando non actu videntur, inquantum sunt circuli, non inquantum sunt hi circuli.	1495. Therefore there is no definition of singular circles, because those things of which there is definition are known by their own definition. But singulars are known only as long as they come under the senses or imagination, which is called an intellect here because it considers things without the senses just as the intellect does. But “when” singular circles of this kind “are removed from a state of actuality,” i.e., when they are no longer considered by the senses (in reference to sensible circles) and by imagination (in reference to mathematical circles), it is not evident whether they exist as singulars; yet they are always referred to and known by their universal formula. For even when they are not actually being perceived, these sensible circles are known inasmuch as they are circles, but not inasmuch as they are these circles.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 15 Ratio autem huius est, quia materia, quae principium est individuationis, est secundum se ignota, et non cognoscitur nisi per formam, a qua sumitur ratio universalis. Et ideo singularia non cognoscuntur in sua absentia nisi per universalia. Materia autem non solum est principium individuationis in singularibus sensibilibus, sed etiam in mathematicis. Materia enim alia est sensibilis, alia intelligibilis. Sensibilis quidem ut aes et lignum, vel etiam quaelibet materia mobilis, ut ignis et aqua, et huiusmodi omnia; et a tali materia individuantur singularia sensibilia. Intelligibilis vero materia est, quae est in sensibilibus, non inquantum sunt sensibilia, sicut mathematica sunt. Sicut enim forma hominis est in tali materia, quae est corpus organicum, ita forma circuli vel trianguli est in hac materia quae est continuum vel superficies vel corpus.	1496. The reason for this is that matter, which is the principle of individuation, is unknowable in itself and is known only by means of the form, from which the universal formula is derived. Therefore when singular things are absent, they are known only by their universals. Now matter is the principle of individuation not only in singular things but also in the objects of mathematics; for there are two kinds of matter, one sensible and the other intelligible. And by sensible matter is meant such things as bronze and wood, or any changeable matter, such as fire and water and all things of this sort; and singular sensible things are individuated by such matter. But by intelligible matter is meant what exists in things which are sensible but are not viewed as sensible, as the objects of mathematics. For just as the form of man exists in such and such Matter, which is an organic body, in a similar way the form of a circle or of a triangle exists in this matter, which is a continuum, whether surface or solid.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 16 Concludit igitur quod dictum est, quomodo se habet de toto et parte, et de priori et de posteriori, idest cuius pars sit pars, et quomodo sit prior et quomodo posterior. Partes enim materiae individuae sunt partes compositi singularis, non autem speciei, nec formae. Partes autem materiae universalis, sunt partes speciei, sed non formae. Et quia universale definitur et non singulare, ideo partes materiae individualis non ponuntur in definitione, sed solum partes materiae communis, simul cum forma vel partibus formae.	1497. He therefore concludes that he has explained the relationship of whole and part, and the sense in which there is priority and posteriority, i.e., how a part is a part of the whole, and how it is prior and how subsequent. For the parts of individual matter are parts of the singular composite but not of the species or form, whereas the parts of universal matter are parts of the species but not of the form. And since universals and not singulars are defined, the parts of individual matter are therefore not given in a thing’s definition, but only the parts of common matter together with the form or parts of the form.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit interrogationi vero adaptat solutionem propositam quaestioni prius notae; dicens, quod necesse est obviare per praedictam solutionem interrogationi quando quis interrogat, utrum rectus angulus et circulus et animal sint priora partibus; aut e converso partes in quas huiusmodi dividuntur, et ex quibus componuntur, sunt priores. Dicendum quod non est simpliciter respondendum. Est enim duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod idem est tota species et forma, sicut anima quod homo. Quidam autem quod non, quia homo est compositum ex anima et corpore. Et secundum utramque opinionem est diversimode respondendum.	1498. But when anyone (628). He now adapts the proposed solution to the question previously noted. He says that when someone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to their parts, or the reverse: whether the parts into which these things are divided and of which they are composed are prior, we must meet this question by using the foregoing solution. Now in reply to this an un qualified answer cannot be given; for there are two opinions on this point. Some say that the whole species is the same as the form so that man is the same as his soul, and others say that they are not, but that man is a composite of body and soul. And it is necessary to answer each opinion in a different way.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 18 Si enim idem est anima quod animal vel animatum, aut similiter unumquodque est idem cum forma uniuscuiusque, ut circulus idem cum forma circuli, et rectus angulus idem cum forma recti, dicendum est determinando quid sit posterius, et quo sit posterius; quia secundum hoc partes materiae sunt posteriores his, quae sunt in ratione, et sunt etiam posteriores aliquo recto, scilicet recto communi, sed sunt priores recto singulari. Hic enim rectus qui est aereus, est cum materia sensibili. Et hic rectus qui est cum lineis singularibus, est cum materia intelligibili. Sed ille rectus qui est sine materia, idest communis, erit posterior partibus formae quae sunt in ratione, sed erit prior partibus materiae quae sunt partes singularium. Nec erit secundum hanc opinionem distinguere inter materiam communem et individualem. Sed tamen simpliciter non erit respondendum, quia erit distinguendum inter partes materiae et partes formae.	1499. For if a soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or in a similar way, if each thing is the same as its form (for example, a circle is the same as the form of a circle, and a right angle the same as the form of a right angle), we must answer by establishing which is subsequent and in what way it is subsequent; because from this point of view the parts of the matter are subsequent to those in the intelligible expression, and to those “in some right angle,” i.e., in the universal right angle, but they are prior to those in a particular right angle. For this right angle which is bronze has sensible matter, and this right angle which is contained in singular lines has intelligible matter; but that right angle which is “immaterial,” i.e., common, will be subsequent to the parts of the form present in the intelligible expression, and it will be prior to the parts of the matter which are the parts of singular things. And according to this opinion it will not be possible to distinguish between common matter and individual matter. Yet an unqualified answer must not be given to this question, because it will be necessary to distinguish between the parts of the matter and those of the form.
lib. 7 l. 10 n. 19 Si autem alia opinio sit vera, scilicet quod anima sit aliud quam animal, sic erit dicendum et non dicendum partes esse priores toto, sicut determinatum est prius. Secundum enim hanc opinionem docuit superius distinguere non solum inter materiam et formam, sed inter materiam communem quae est pars speciei, et inter materiam individualem quae est pars individui.	1500. If, however, the other opinion is true, namely, that the soul is different from the animal, it will be necessary both to say and not to say that the parts are prior to the whole, as was previously established; because with regard to this opinion he instructed us above to distinguish not only between matter and form, but also between common matter, which is part of the species, and individual matter, which is part of the individual.