Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect12

Lecture 12

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quae partes in definitione ponantur, hic inquirit quomodo definitio ex partibus existens, possit esse una: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad utramque partem, ibi, in hoc namque homo. Tertio solvit quaestionem, ibi, oportet autem intendere et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod nunc primum debet dicere de definitione id quod non est de ea dictum in analyticis, idest in libro posteriorum. Ibi enim mota est quaedam dubitatio de definitione, et non soluta, quam oportet hic solvere, quia est praeopere rationibus de substantia, idest quia solutio huius quaestionis est pernecessaria ad ea quae sunt de substantia determinanda, de qua est principalis intentio huius scientiae. Est autem ista dubitatio, quare illud, cuius definitio est ratio, est unum, scilicet quod quid est. Definitio enim ratio est significans quod quid est, sicut definitio hominis est animal bipes. Ponatur enim quod haec sit eius definitio: quare igitur hoc, quod dicitur animal bipes, est unum, et non multa?	1537. After having shown what parts are given in definitions, here the Philosopher inquires how a definition, being composed of parts, can be one thing; and in regard to this he does three things. First (640)C 1537), he raises a question. Second (641:C 1538), he argues on one side (“For man”). Third (644:C 1542), he answers the question (“Now it is necessary”). He accordingly says that with regard to definition we should speak now for the first time of the things which have not been stated about it “in the Analytics,” i.e., in the Posterior Analytics. For in that work a certain difficulty was raised about definition and left unsolved, and this must be answered here “because it constitutes a preamble to the arguments about substance,” i.e., because the answer to this question is a prerequisite for establishing certain things about substance, which is the chief concern of this science. This difficulty is why the thing of which the intelligible expression, namely, the quiddity, is a definition, “is one thing.” For a definition is an intelligible expression signifying a quiddity; for example, the definition of man is “two-footed animal,” for let us assume that this is his definition. Therefore the question is: why is this thing which is called two-footed animal one thing and not many?
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit in hoc namque obiicit pro utraque parte: et primo ad ostendendum quod ex eis non fiat unum. Secundo ad contrarium, ibi, oportet autem unum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ex genere et differentia non fit unum. Secundo quod nec ex pluribus differentiis, ibi, si vero et participat. Dicit ergo primo, quod in hoc quod est homo et album, ista duo sunt multa, quando alterum eorum non inest alteri. Si enim album non insit homini, tunc homo et album nullo modo sunt unum. Unum vero sunt, quando alterum eorum inest alteri, et subiectum, quod est homo patitur alterum, idest suscipit hanc passionem, quae est album. Tunc autem ex his duobus fit unum per accidens quod est albus homo. Ex his accipitur, quod ex duobus, quorum unum non inest alteri, non fit unum. Sed hic, scilicet cum dicitur animal bipes, alterum eorum, scilicet animal, non participat altero, scilicet bipede, sicut homo albus participat albo. Et hoc ideo, quia animal est genus, bipes vero differentia. Genus vero non videtur participare differentiis. Sequeretur enim quod idem participaret simul contrariis. Differentiae enim sunt contrariae quibus genus differt, idest per quas genus dividitur; et pari ratione per quam participaret unam, participaret aliam. Si autem est impossibile quod idem participet contraria, impossibile erit, quod ex genere et differentia fiat unum.	1538. For man (641). Then he raises arguments on both sides of the question; and he does this, first (641:C 1538), in order to show that one thing is not produced from them; and second (643:C 1540, to show that the contrary is true (“But all the elements”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that one thing is not produced from a genus and a difference. Second (642:C 1539), he shows that one thing is not produced from many differences (“And even if”). He accordingly says, first (641), that these two things, man and white, are many when one of them is not present in the other; for, if white does not belong to man, then man and white are one in no way. But they are one when one of them is present in the other, and when the subject, man, “is the recipient of the other,” i.e., when it receives the modification, white; and then something accidentally one is produced from these two things, namely, a white man. Now from these remarks it is understood that one thing is not produced from two things when one does not exist in the other. But “in this case,” namely, when one speaks of two-footed animal, “one,” i.e., animal, does not participate “in the other,” namely, in two-footed, as white man participates in white. And this is so because animal is a genus and two-footed is a difference. But a genus does not seem to participate in differences, for it would follow that the same thing would participate in contraries at the same time; for differences are the contraries “by which a genus is distinguished,” i.e., by which a genus is divided; and for the same reason that it participates in one it will participate in the other. But if it is impossible for the same thing to participate in contraries, it will be impossible for one thing to be produced from a genus and a difference.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit si vero ostendit quod ex pluribus differentiis non potest fieri unum; dicens, quod si detur genus participare aliquo modo differentia, prout scilicet animal non accipitur in sua communitate, sed contrahitur per differentiam ad speciem, et sic per consequens ex genere et differentia fieri unum, tamen adhuc erit eadem ratio ad ostendendum quod definitio non significat unum, si sunt plures differentiae in definitione positae. Sicut si ponantur in definitione hominis istae tres differentiae, quarum prima sit gressibile vel habens pedes, secunda sit bipes, tertia vero non alatum. Non enim poterit dici quare ista sunt unum et non multa.	1539. And even if (642). Then he shows that one thing cannot be produced from many differences. He says that, even if it is admitted that a genus participates in some way in a difference (as, for example, animal is not taken under its common aspect but insofar as it is restricted to a species by a difference, and then one thing is produced from a genus and a difference), the same argument can still be used to show that a definition does not signify one thing, if many differences are given in the definition; for example, if in the definition of man these three differences are given: first, capable of walking or having feet, second, two-footed, and third, wingless; for it cannot be said why these things are one and not many.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 4 Non enim est sufficiens ad hoc ratio quia insunt uni, utputa animali, quod est homo; sic enim sequeretur, quod omnia essent unum. Sequeretur enim quod omnia accidentia, quae insunt alicui subiecto, essent unum per se. Sic enim loquimur de uno et adinvicem et ad subiectum. Et cum ea quae accidunt uni subiecto accidant etiam alteri, sequeretur, quod illa duo subiecta etiam essent unum, puta nix et cygnus quibus inest albedo. Et sic deducendo sequeretur, quod omnia essent unum. Non ergo potest dici quod ex pluribus differentiis fiat unum, etiam dato quod ex genere et differentia fiat unum. Et sic ex duabus partibus videtur quod definitio non significet unum.	1540. For to explain this it is not enough to give as a reason that they exist in one thing (as in the animal, man), because in this way it would follow that all accidents which inhere in any subject would be essentially one thing; for we do speak of one accident in relation to another accident as well as to the subject. And since those things which are accidents of one subject may also be accidents of another subject, it would follow that those two subjects would be one, for example, snow and a swan, in both of which whiteness is found. And thus by inference it would follow that all things would be one. Hence it cannot be said that one thing is produced from many differences, even though one thing is produced from a genus and a difference. Hence it seems that a definition does not signify one thing composed of two parts.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit oportet autem obiicit in contrarium; ostendens quod definitio significet unum; dicens, quod oportet quaecumque in definitione ponuntur esse unum. Et hoc ideo, quia definitio est una ratio; et id quod significatur per ipsam, est substantia rei. Unde oportet quod definitio sit ratio significativa unius alicuius; quia substantia rei, quam definitio significat, est unum quid. Et etiam supra dictum est, quod definitio significat hoc aliquid, ubi ostensum est quod definitio est proprie substantiarum.	1541. But all the elements (643). Here he argues one side of the question, showing that a definition does signify one thing. He says that all the attributes which are given in a definition must be one. And this is so because a definition is one intelligible expression, and what it signifies is the substance of a thing. Hence a definition must be an intelligible expression signifying one thing, because the substance of a thing, which the definition signifies, is one quiddity. And it was also stated above (582:C 1330, where definition was shown to belong properly to substances, that a definition signifies a particular thing.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit oportet autem solvit praemissam quaestionem; ostendens quod definitio significet unum: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo ex genere et differentia fit unum. Secundo quomodo ex pluribus differentiis fiat unum, ibi, at vero oportet dividi. Dicit ergo primo, quod ad investigandum unitatem definitionum oportet primum intendere de definitionibus quae dantur secundum divisionem generis in differentias. Istae enim sunt definitiones verae, in quibus non est aliud quam primum genus et differentiae. Dantur enim et quaedam definitiones per aliqua accidentia, vel per aliquas proprietates, vel etiam per aliquas causas extrinsecas, quae non significant substantiam rei. Et ideo huiusmodi definitiones non sunt ad propositum, cum hic agatur de definitionibus ad substantias rerum investigandas.	1542. Now it is necessary (644). He answers the foregoing question by showing that a definition signifies one thing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (644), he shows how one thing is produced from a genus and a difference; and second (645:C 1551), how one thing is produced from many differences (“Again, it is”). He accordingly says, first (644), that in order to investigate the unity of definitions it is necessary, first, to examine definitions which are based on the division of genus into differences. For those are true definitions which contain nothing but the primary genus and differences, because some definitions are based on certain accidents, or on certain properties, or also on certain extrinsic causes, which do not signify the substance of a thing. Hence such definitions are not to the point, since here he is treating of definitions with a view to investigating the substances of things.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 7 Ideo autem dico quod in definitione est primum genus cum differentiis, quia etsi aliquando in definitionibus ponantur aliqua genera intermedia inter genus primum quod est generalissimum, et species ultimas quae definiuntur, tamen illa genera media nihil aliud sunt quam genus primum, et differentiae comprehensae in intellectu generis medii cum hoc, idest cum genere primo. Sicut si in definitione hominis ponatur animal, quod est genus intermedium, patet quod animal nihil aliud est quam substantia, quae est genus primum, cum aliquibus differentiis. Est enim animal substantia animata sensibilis. Et similiter si intelligamus primum genus esse animal, habitum bipes; et iterum tertium genus, animal bipes non alatum. Et similiter si aliquod genus per plures differentias determinatur. Semper enim posterius genus comprehendit prius cum aliqua differentia. Et sic patet quod omnis definitio resolvitur in primum genus et aliquas differentias.	1543. Therefore I say that in a definition there is a primary genus with differences, because, even if one sometimes gives in definitions certain intermediate genera between the primary genus, which is the most general, and the last species which are defined, nevertheless those intermediate genera are nothing but the primary genus and the differences included in the understanding of the intermediate genus “along with this,” i.e., along with the primary genus; as when animal, which is an intermediate genus, is given in the definition of man, it is evident that animal is nothing but substance, which is the primary genus, along with certain differences; for an animal is a living sensible substance. And the case is the same when we understand the primary genus to be animal “having feet”; and again when we understand the third genus to be “two-footed animal without wings.” And the same thing is true when any genus is limited by many differences; for a subsequent genus always includes a prior genus along with some difference. Hence it is evident that every definition is dissolved into a primary genus and certain differences.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 8 Omnino autem non differt, utrum per plura aut per pauca definiatur aliquod definitum. Quare non differt, utrum per pauca, vel per duo, ita quod illorum duorum unum sit genus et aliud differentia. Sicut eius quod est animal bipes, animal est genus; et alterum, scilicet bipes, est differentia. Ostendendum est ergo primo, quomodo ex istis duobus fiat unum. Quod sic patet.	1544. And in general it makes no difference whether the thing defined is defined by many terms or by few. Hence it makes no difference whether it is defined by few or by two, so long as one of these is a genus and the other a difference; for animal is the genus of two-footed animal, and the other term, namely, two-footed, is the difference. Therefore it must shown, first, how one thing is produced from these. This becomes clear as follows.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 9 Genus enim non est praeter ea quae sunt species generis. Non enim invenitur animal, quod non sit nec homo, nec bos, nec aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Aut si inveniatur aliquid quod est genus praeter species, sic acceptum ut est praeter species, non accipitur ut genus, sed ut materia. Contingit enim aliquod et esse genus aliquorum, et materiam. Sicut vox est genus literarum, et est materia. Et quod sit genus, patet per hoc quod differentiae additae voci faciunt species vocum literatarum. Et quod etiam sit materia, patet; quia ex hac, scilicet ex voce faciunt elementa, idest literas, sicut aliquid fit ex materia.	1545. A genus does not exist apart from the things which are its species, for no animal is found which is not a man or an ox or some other animal of this kind. Or if there is something which is a genus apart from its species, taken in the sense that it exists apart from its species, it is not a genus but matter, because it is possible for something to be both the genus and matter of certain things, as the vocal sound is both the genus of letters and their matter. That it is a genus is evident from the fact that differences added to the vocal sound make the species of articulate sounds; and that it is matter is evident because the differences “make the elements,” i.e., the letters, “out of this,” namely, out of the vocal sound, as something is made out of matter.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 10 Sciendum est autem quod, licet idem secundum nomen possit esse genus et materia, non tamen idem eodem modo acceptum. Materia enim est pars integralis rei, et ideo de re praedicari non potest. Non enim potest dici quod homo sit caro et os. Genus autem praedicatur de specie. Unde oportet quod significet aliquo modo totum. Sicut enim propter hoc quod est innominata privatio, aliquando simplici nomine materiae significatur materia cum privatione, ut supra dictum est, quod aes accipitur pro aere infigurato, cum dicimus quod ex aere fit statua; ita etiam quando forma est innominata, simplici nomine materiae intelligitur compositum ex materia et forma, non quidem determinata, sed communi; et sic accipitur ut genus. Sicut enim compositum ex materia et forma determinata est species, ita compositum ex materia et forma communi est genus.	1546. Moreover, it must be understood that while genus and matter can be the same in name, they nevertheless do not mean the same thing; for matter is an integral part of a thing, and thus cannot be predicated of a thing, for it cannot be said that man is flesh and bones. But a genus is predicated of its species, and therefore it must in some way signify the whole thing, just as matter along with its privation is sometimes designated by the simple name of the matter in view of the namelessness of privations, as it was said above (610)C 1416) that bronze is taken for formless bronze when we say that a statue is made of bronze; and in a similar fashion when the form is nameless, the composite of matter and form is designated by the simple name of the matter-not common matter, but some determinate matter. And in this way it is taken as a genus; for just as a species is a composite of matter and a determinate form, so too a genus is a composite of matter and a common form.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 11 Et hoc in pluribus patet. Corpus enim potest accipi, et ut materia animalis, et ut genus. Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, et species eius erunt substantiae perfectae per has ultimas formas determinatas, sicut per formam auri, vel argenti, aut olivae, aut hominis. Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia.	1547. This becomes evident in many ways. For body can be taken both as the matter and as the genus of animal, because, if we understand in the notion of body a substance completed by its ultimate form, having in itself three dimensions, then body is a genus and its species arc the complete substances determined by these ultimate forms, as that of gold, of silver, of olive, or of man. But if one considers in the notion of body only that it is a thing having three dimensions with an aptitude for an ultimate form, then body is matter.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 12 Et similiter est de voce. Si enim in intellectu vocis includatur ipsa vocis formatio in communi secundum formam quae distinguitur in diversas formas literarum et syllabarum, sic vox est genus. Si autem in intellectu vocis accipitur solum substantia soni, cui possibile est advenire praedictam formationem, sic vox erit materia literarum. Ex quo etiam patet quod vox, secundum quod est genus, non potest esse sine speciebus. Non enim potest esse sonus formatus, quin aliquam determinatam formam habeat huius vel illius literae. Sed si omnino careret forma literali prout est materia, sic inveniretur sine literis, sicut aes invenitur absque his quae fiunt ex aere.	1548. And the same thing applies in the case of a vocal sound; for if in the intelligible expression of vocal sound one includes the formation of sound in common according to the form which is subdivided into the different forms of the letters and syllables, then vocal sound is a genus. But if in the intelligible expression of vocal sound one understands only the substance of sound, to which the foregoing formation can accrue, then vocal sound will be the matter of the letters. From this it is also evident that vocal sound, which is a genus, cannot exist without species; for a sound can be formed only if it has the definite form of this or that letter. But if it lacked altogether the form of a letter insofar as it is matter, then it would be found without letters, just as bronze is found without the things which are produced from it.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 13 Si ergo praedicta sunt vera, palam est quod definitio est quaedam ratio ex differentiis unitatem habens; ita quod tota essentia definitionis, in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur. Ex hoc enim animal, quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia formae specierum quae sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma generis, sed sunt formae generis cum determinatione. Sicut patet quod animal est quod habet animam sensitivam. Homo autem est qui habet animam sensitivam talem, scilicet cum ratione. Leo vero qui habet talem, scilicet cum abundantia audaciae. Et sic de aliis. Unde cum differentia additur generi, non additur quasi aliqua diversa essentia a genere, sed quasi in genere implicite contenta, sicut determinatum continetur in indeterminato, ut album in colorato.	1549. If the foregoing statements are true, then, it is evident that a definition is an intelligible expression having unity from its differences in such a way that the whole essence of the definition is included in a certain way in the difference. For animal, which is a genus, cannot exist without species, because the forms of the species, the differences, are not different forms from the form of the genus but are the forms of the genus lacking determination; for example, it is evident that an animal is a thing having a sentient soul, that man is one having “such and such” a sentient soul, viz., with reason, and that a lion is one having “such and such” a soul, namely, with an abundance of daring. And it is the same in other cases. Hence, when a difference is added to a genus it is not added as though it were an essence distinct from the genus, but as though it were contained implicitly in the genus, as the determinate is contained in the indeterminate, for example, white in the thing colored.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 14 Per quod etiam solvitur ratio superius inducta; quia nihil prohibet idem genus in se continere diversas differentias, sicut indeterminatum continet in se diversa determinata. Et etiam propter hoc solvitur, quia non hoc modo advenit differentia generi, ut diversa essentia ab eo existens, sicut advenit album homini.	1550. And in the light of this the problem raised above (640)C 1537) is solved, since nothing prevents one and the same genus from containing within itself various differences, as the indeterminate contains within itself various determinate things. And in addition it is solved by reason of the fact that a difference does not accrue to a genus as constituting an essence distinct from it, as white accrues to man.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit quod nec etiam multitudo differentiarum impedit unitatem definitionis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter debeant sumi in definitione multae differentiae. Secundo ostendit quod si differentiae debito modo sumantur, non impediet multitudo differentiarum unitatem definitionis, ibi, si itaque. Dicit ergo primo, quod in definitionibus in quibus sunt multae differentiae, oportet non solum dividi genus in differentiam, sed etiam dividi differentiam primam in differentiam secundam. Sicut animalis differentia est pedalitas, secundum quam animal dicitur habens pedes, vel gressibile. Sed quia etiam haec differentia multipliciter invenitur, iterum oportet scire differentiam animalis habentis pedes, quae sit differentia eius, inquantum est habens pedes, scilicet per se et non per accidens.	1551. Again, it is (645). He next shows that a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in what way a multitude of differences should be taken in a definition. Second (646:C 1555), he shows that, if differences are taken in the right way, a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one (“If these things”). He accordingly says, first (645), that in the case of those definitions which include many differences not only should the genus be divided by a difference but the first difference should also be divided by the second difference; for example, footed is the difference of animal according to which animal is said to have feet or to be capable of walking; but since this difference is also found to have many forms, it is again necessary to know the difference of such an animal, i.e., what its difference is, “inasmuch as it has feet,” i.e., inasmuch as it is considered essentially and not accidentally.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 16 Et ideo, quia habenti pedes accidit habere alas, non est dicendum, dividendo differentiam, quod habentis pedes aliud est alatum, aliud non alatum, si homo bene velit dicere divisionem differentiarum. Sed tamen quandoque aliquis dividens differentias facit hoc ut scilicet dividat per ea quae sunt secundum accidens, propter hoc quod non potest invenire proprias et per se differentias. Aliquando enim necessitas cogit, ut utamur, loco per se differentiarum, differentiis per accidens, inquantum sunt signa quaedam differentiarum essentialium nobis ignotarum.	1552. Therefore, since it is accidental to a thing having feet to have wings, it must not be said, in dividing the difference, that among those things which have feet, one kind is winged and another wingless, if a man wants to express correctly the division of the differences. Yet when someone in dividing differences “does this,” in such a way that he divides it by means of those attributes which are accidental, this is why he cannot find proper and essential differences. For sometimes necessity compels us to use accidental differences in place of essential differences inasmuch as accidental differences are the signs of certain essential differences unknown to us.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 17 Sed hoc modo est haec differentia dividenda habens pedes: scilicet: huiusmodi animalium, aliud est habens pedes scissos, et aliud non scissos. Istae enim sunt differentiae pedis, scilicet scissum et non scissum. Et ideo habens pedes scissos, per se dividet hanc differentiam quae est habens pedes. Scissio enim pedis est quaedam pedalitas: idest haec differentia quae est habere pedes scissos, est quoddam contentum sub hoc quod est habere pedes; et habent se adinvicem sicut determinatum et indeterminatum, sicut diximus de genere et differentia.	1553. But this difference “having feet” must be divided in this way, namely, so that among animals of this kind one kind has cloven feet and another has not; for these, namely, cloven and uncloven, “are the differences of foot.” Therefore having cloven feet divides essentially the difference having feet; for a cloven foot “is a certain kind of foot,” i.e., the difference having cloven feet is something contained under the difference having feet; and they are related to each other as the determinate to the indeterminate, as we said of genus and difference.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 18 Et ita semper procedendum est in divisione differentiarum, donec dividens veniat ad non differentia, idest ad ultimas differentias, quae non dividuntur ulterius in alias differentias; et tunc tot erunt species pedis quot differentiae: et species animalium habentium pedes aequales differentiis. Quaelibet enim individualis differentia constituet unam speciem specialissimam.	1554. And it is always necessary to proceed in this way in the division of differences until the one making the division “comes to the species which have no difference,” i.e., to ultimate differences, which are not divided further into other differences; and then there will be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the species of animals having feet will be equal in number to the differences; for any individual difference constitutes one ultimate species.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit si itaque ostendit ex suppositis, quod multitudo differentiarum non impedit unitatem definitionis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo inducit conclusionem intentam, ibi, quare palam et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo ex multis differentiis fit unum, si differentiae per se sumuntur. Secundo, quod hoc non potest esse si sumantur per accidens, ibi, si vero secundum accidens. Dicit ergo primo, quod si sic se habent differentiae acceptae in definitione sicut dictum est, scilicet quod semper sumantur per se differentiae et non per accidens, palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas.	1555. If these things (646). He shows here, from the things which have been set down, that a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one. And in regard to this he does two things. First (646:C 1555), he proves his thesis. Second (648:C 1561), he draws the conclusion at which he aims (“Hence, it is evident”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proves how one thing is produced from many differences, if differences are understood essentially. Second (647:C 1560), he shows that this cannot be the case if the differences are understood accidentally (“But if the division”). He accordingly says, first (646), that if the differences taken in a definition are such “as has been indicated,” i.e., so that differences are always taken essentially and not accidentally, it is obvious that the ultimate difference will constitute the whole substance of the thing and its entire definition; for it includes in itself all preceding parts.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 20 Quod enim in differentia includatur genus, ostensum est, ex hoc quod genus non est sine differentiis. Sed quod ultima includat omnes praecedentes, palam est ex hoc quod nisi hoc dicatur, sequitur quod oporteat in terminis, idest definitionibus, multoties eadem dicere. Et hoc erit superfluum et nugatorium.	1556. For on the grounds that a genus does not exist without differences it has been shown that a genus is included in its differences. But that the ultimate difference includes all preceding differences is evident from the fact that unless this were affirmed to be so, it would follow that “in the definitive expressions of things,” i.e., in their definitions, the same thing would have to be expressed many times. This would be superfluous and meaningless.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 21 Hoc autem inconveniens ideo accidit, quia si aliquis dicat in definiendo animal habens pedes bipes, quod oportebit eum dicere si bipes sit alia differentia ab habente pedes, non includens eam, nihil aliud dixit sic definiens, quam animal habens pedes, duos pedes habens. Bipes enim nihil aliud est quam duos pedes habens; in quo manifeste includitur, pedes habens. Unde patet quod, si utraque apponatur differentia, est nugatio.	1557. And this absurd conclusion follows because, if someone were to define an animal by saying “two-footed having feet” (as he must do if two-footed is a difference distinct from having feet and does not include it), when he defines it in this way he has said nothing but animal having feet having two feet; for two-footed is nothing but having two feet, in which the difference having feet is obviously included. Hence it is evident that, if both are used, we get nonsense.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 22 Et iterum si hoc quod est bipes dividat aliquis propria divisione, idest per ea quae sunt per se et non per accidens, sequetur ulterius multoties dici idem, et toties quot sumuntur differentiae. Ut si dicam quod animalis bipedis, aliud est habens pedes scissos in quinque digitos, aliud in quatuor: si quis vellet, definiens hominem, ponere omnes differentias intermedias, toties repeteret idem, quot differentias apponeret. Diceret enim quod homo est animal pedes habens, duos pedes habens, scissos in quinque digitos.	1558. Moreover, if someone divides two-footed “by its proper difference,” i.e., by those things which are essential and not accidental, it follows further that the same thing is expressed many times, and as many times is the number of differences used, so that, if I say that one kind of two-footed animal is one which has a foot divided into five toes, and another kind is one which has a foot divided into four toes, anyone wishing to give all intermediate differences in defining man would express the same thing many times, and as often as he added differences; for he would say that man is an animal having feet, having two feet, having feet divided into five toes.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 23 Et quia ista sunt inconvenientia, igitur manifestum est quod si in definitione accipiantur differentiae, una erit ultima, scilicet quae est species et substantia, idest quae substantiam et speciem definiti comprehendet, et ab eius unitate definitio erit una.	1559. Now since these things are unacceptable, it is evident that, if differences are taken in a definition there will be one ultimate difference, namely, the one “which will be the specific form and substance,” i.e., which comprises the substance and specific form of the thing defined; and as a result of the unity of this difference the definition will be one.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 24 Deinde cum dicit si vero ostendit, quod hoc non potest dici si differentiae per accidens sumantur; dicens, quod si aliquis in dividendo et definiendo accipiat differentiam secundum accidens, sicut si dividatur quod habentium pedes, aliud est album, aliud est nigrum, tot erunt ultimae differentiae, quot factae sunt divisiones; quia una earum alteram non includet. Et de differentiis sic sumptis, procedebat ratio superius inducta contra unitatem definitionis. Huiusmodi enim differentiae sic per accidens acceptae non essent unum nisi subiecto; quod non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis.	1560. But if the division (647). Here he shows that the definition cannot be said to be one if the differences which are taken are accidental. He says that, if someone in dividing and defining were to take an accidental difference (for example, if things having feet were divided, one into black and another into white), there would be as many ultimate differences as the divisions which have been made, because one of them would not include another. And concerning differences taken in this way the argument introduced above was directed against the unity of the definition; for differences of this kind taken accidentally in this way would be one only in their subject, and this is not enough to account for the unity of the definition.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 25 Deinde cum dicit quare palam concludit propositum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit conclusionem; dicens, quod palam est ex praedictis quod quamvis in definitione ponatur genus et differentia, tamen definitio est ratio ex differentiis tantum, quia genus non est praeter differentias, ut supra dictum est. Et quamvis ponantur multae differentiae in definitione, tamen tota definitio dependet et constituitur ex ultima, quando fit divisio secundum rectum, idest a communiori ad minus commune descendendo secundum per se differentias, et non accipiendo quasi a latere differentias per accidens.	1561. Hence it is evident (648). He now concludes to his thesis; and in regard to this he does two things. First he gives his conclusion. He says that it is evident from the above discussions that, even though a genus and a difference are given in a definition, still a definition is an intelligible expression composed only of differences, because a genus is not something apart from its differences, as was stated above (644:C 1549). And even though many differences are given in a definition, still the entire definition depends on and is constituted by the ultimate difference, when the division is made “correctly,” i.e., by descending from more common to less common essential differences, and not by bringing in accidental differences from the side, so to speak.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 26 Secundo ibi, palam autem manifestat conclusionem inductam per quoddam signum, dicens, palam autem erit, scilicet quod tota definitio constituatur ex ultima differentia, ex hoc quod, si quis transponat partes talium definitionum, sequetur inconveniens. Sicut si aliquis dicat definitionem hominis esse animal bipes, habens pedes. Ex quo enim dictum est bipes, superfluum est apponere, pedes habens. Sed si diceretur primo pedes habens, adhuc restaret inquirendum, utrum esset bipes, dividendo pedes habens.	1562. Moreover, this will be evident (649). Second, he clarifies by means of an example the conclusion which was drawn, saying “moreover this will be evident,” namely, that the entire definition consists in the ultimate difference, on the grounds that if anyone changes the parts of such definitions an absurdity results. Thus someone might say that the definition of man is a two-footed animal having feet. But as soon as two-footed has been expressed, it is superfluous to add having feet. But if one were to say first “having feet,” it would still be necessary to ask whether it was two-footed, by dividing the difference having feet.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 27 Ex hoc patet quod illae differentiae, secundum quod sunt multae, habent inter se ordinem determinatum. Non autem hoc potest intelligi quod in substantia rei sit aliquis ordo. Non enim potest dici, quod hoc substantiae sit prius, et illud posterius; quia substantia est tota simul et non per successionem, nisi in quibusdam defectivis, sicut sunt motus et tempus.	1563. From this it is evident that insofar as those differences are many they have a definite order among themselves. But this cannot mean that there is any order in the substance of a thing; for it cannot be said that this part of a substance is prior and another subsequent, because substance is complete all at once and not successively, except in the case of those things which are deficient in being, such as motion and time.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 28 Unde patet quod multae partes definitionis non significant multas partes essentiae ex quibus essentia constituatur sicut ex diversis; sed omnes significant unum quod determinatur ultima differentia. Patet etiam ex hoc, quod cuiuslibet speciei est una tantum forma substantialis; sicut leonis una est forma per quam est substantia, et corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal, et leo. Si enim essent plures formae secundum omnia praedicta, non possent omnes una differentia comprehendi, nec ex eis unum constitueretur.	1564. Hence it is evident that a multiplicity of parts in a definition does not signify a multiplicity of essential parts of which the essence is constituted as if they were distinct things; but all signify one thing which is made determinate by an ultimate difference. It is also evident from this that there is one substantial form for every species. Thus there is one form of lion by which it is a substance, a body, a living body, an animal, and a lion; for if there were many forms corresponding to all the differences mentioned above, all could not be included under one difference, nor could one thing be composed of them.
lib. 7 l. 12 n. 29 Concludit ergo finaliter recapitulando, quod nunc primo tot sint dicta de definitionibus quae accipiuntur secundum divisiones generis in differentias, et differentiae in differentias quales quaedam sunt, quia videlicet sunt ex his quae praedicantur per se, et continentes in se partes speciei, et etiam unaquaeque est unum. Haec enim in praecedentibus de definitionibus sunt ostensa. Dicit autem primum, quia in sequentibus de definitione et quod quid est, aliqua determinantur.	1565. Lastly he brings his discussion to a close with a summary. He says that with regard to definitions which are based on the divisions of genera into differences and of difference into differences, these points should constitute a preliminary statement “of the kinds of things they are”: they are composed of essential predicates, they contain in themselves the parts of the specific form, and each is also a unity. He says “preliminary” because in the following discussions certain points are established about definitions and quiddities.