Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect14

Lecture 14

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit universalia non esse substantias absolute, hic ostendit, quod non sunt substantiae a sensibilibus separatae: et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit, quod universalia non sunt substantiae separatae. In secunda manifestat quoddam, quod in superioribus dubium reliquerat, ibi, manifestum autem est quod substantiarum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit universalia non esse substantias separatas. Secundo ostendit quod si sunt separatae, non sunt definibiles, ibi, quoniam vero substantia altera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit inconvenientia, quae sequuntur ponentibus universalia esse substantias separatas, comparando genus ad species. Secundo comparando genus ad individua, ibi, amplius autem in sensibilibus. Circa primum tria facit. Primo proponit quamdam divisionem. Secundo prosequitur primum membrum divisionis, ibi, ratione namque palam. Tertio secundum, ibi, sed si alterum in unoquoque. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex praedictis etiam manifestum esse potest quid accidat de inconvenientibus, dicentibus ideas esse substantias et separabiles, quae dicuntur esse species universales, et simul cum hoc ponentibus speciem esse ex genere et differentiis. Hae enim duae positiones simul coniunctae, scilicet quod species componantur ex genere et differentia, et quod species universales sunt substantiae separatae, quae dicuntur ideae, ducunt ad inconvenientia. Si enim ponantur species esse separatae, constat quod unum genus est in pluribus speciebus simul, sicut animal in homine et equo. Aut ergo hoc ipsum quod est animal in homine et equo existens, est unum et idem numero; aut alterum in homine, et alterum in equo. Inducit autem hanc divisionem, quia Plato ponebat ideas specierum, non autem generum, cum tamen poneret communiter universalia esse substantias.	1592. Having shown that universals are not substances in an unqualified sense, here the Philosopher shows that they are not substances existing apart from sensible things. This is divided into two parts. In the first (659)C 1592) he shows that universals are not substances existing apart from sensible things. In the second (677:C 1630 he clears up a point which had remained a problem in the above discussion (“It is also”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that universals are not separate substances. Second (669:C 1606), he shows that if they are separate they are not definable (“But since there are”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows the absurd consequences facing those who claim that universals are separate substances, by comparing genus with species; and second (668:C 1605), by comparing genus with individuals (“Again, these are”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he presents a division. Second (660:C 1593), he proceeds to treat the first member of this division (“For it is evident”). Third (664:C 1600), he proceeds to treat the second member (“But what will happen”). He therefore says, first (659), that from what has been said above it is also possible to indicate the absurd conclusions facing those who say that the Ideas, which are said to be universal forms, are substances and are separable, and at the same time claim that a specific form is composed of genus and difference; for these two positions, when taken together, i.e., that forms are composed of genus and difference, and that universal forms are separate substances, called Ideas, lead to absurd consequences. For if forms are assumed to be separate, it follows that one genus exists in many species at the same time, as animal in man and in horse. Therefore, either this animal present in man and in horse is one and the same thing numerically, or there is one animal present in man and a different one present in horse. And he introduces this division because Plato claimed that there are Ideas of species but not of genera, even though he made the general claim that universals are substances.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit ratione namque prosequitur primum membrum divisionis. Et primo ostendit, quod sit unum et idem animal. Secundo ostendit inconvenientia, quae sequuntur hoc posito, ibi, si quidem ergo. Dicit ergo, quod manifestum est, quod animal est unum et idem in homine et equo secundum rationem. Si enim assignetur ratio animalis secundum quod dicitur de utrolibet, scilicet homine vel equo, eadem ratio assignabitur, quae est substantia animata sensibilis: univoce enim praedicatur genus de speciebus, sicut et species de individuis. Si ergo propter hoc, quod species praedicatur secundum unam rationem de omnibus individuis, est aliquis homo communis, qui est ipsum quod est homo secundum se existens, et est hoc aliquid, idest quoddam demonstrabile subsistens et separatum a sensibilibus, sicut Platonici ponunt; necesse est pari ratione et ea, ex quibus species constat, scilicet genus et differentiam, ut animal et bipes, significare similiter hoc aliquid, et esse separabilia a suis inferioribus, et esse substantias per se existentes. Quare sequitur quod animal erit unum numero per se existens, quod praedicatur de homine et equo.	1593. For it is evident (660). He proceeds to treat the first member of this division. First, he shows that the animal present in man and that present in horse are one and the same. Second (661:C 1594), he explains the absurdities which follow from this position (“If, then”). He accordingly says, first (660), that it is evident that the animal present in man and that present in horse are one and the same in their intelligible expression; for if one states the intelligible expression of animal insofar as it is predicated of each, namely, of man and of horse, the same intelligible expression—living sensible substance—will be assigned to each of them; for a genus is predicated univocally of a species just as a species is also predicated univocally of individuals. Hence, if, because of the fact that species are predicated of all individuals according to one intelligible expression, there is a common man, who is man-in-himself, existing by himself, “and who is a particular thing,” i.e., something subsistent which can be pointed to and is separable from sensible things, as the Platonists maintained, then for a similar reason the things of which a species consists, namely, genus and difference, such as animal and two-footed, must also signify particular things and be separable from their own inferiors, and be substances existing by themselves. Hence it follows that animal will be one individual and subsistent thing, which is predicated of man and of horse.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit si quidem ostendit inconvenientia, quae sequuntur ex hoc posito: quae sunt tria. Primum est, quia cum genus sit in specie sicut substantiam rei significans, sic erit animal in equo, sicut tu es in teipso, qui es substantia tuiipsius. Sic autem non est possibile aliquod unum esse in pluribus separatim existentibus. Non enim tu es nisi in teipso. Es enim in pluribus non separatim existentibus, sicut in carnibus et ossibus, quae sunt tui partes. Animal igitur si sit unum et idem, non poterit esse in pluribus speciebus, ut in homine et equo; cum species separatae secundum Platonicos sint quaedam substantiae adinvicem diversae.	1594. If, then, the animal (661). Then he points out the absurdities which follow from this position; and there are three of them. The first is that since a genus is present in a species as something signifying the substance of a thing, then animal will be present in horse as you are in yourself, who are your own substance. Now in this way it is not possible for some one thing to be present in many things which exist separately. For you are present only in yourself, since you are not in many things which exist separately, as in flesh and bones, which are your parts. Therefore, if animal is one and the same, it will be incapable of existing in many species, as in man and in horse, since the separate Forms, according to the Platonists, are substances which are distinct from each other.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 4 Secundum ponit ibi, et quare homo enim, quia est unum de multis praedicatum secundum Platonicos, non ponitur in particularibus, sed extra ea. Si ergo sit unum animal, quod praedicatur de omnibus speciebus; quare hoc ipsum quod est animal universale non est sine ipso, scilicet sine equo vel quacumque alia specie, ut per se separatum existens? Non potest ratio conveniens assignari ab eis.	1595. And why will (662). Then he gives the second absurdity. For since man is one thing predicated of many, according to the Platonists, man is assumed not to be present in particular things but to exist outside of them. Hence, if there is one animal which is predicated of all species of animals, why will this universal animal-in-itself not exist apart from itself, namely, apart from horse or any other species of animal, as something existing separately by itself? No suitable explanation of this can be given by them.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 5 Tertium ponit ibi, deinde si dicens: constat, quod species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Aut igitur hoc est per hoc, quod genus participat differentiam sicut subiectum participat accidens, ut hoc modo intelligamus ex animali et bipede fieri hominem, sicut ex albo et homine fit homo albus; aut per aliquem alium modum.	1596. Again, if it participates (663). He gives the third absurdity. He says that it is evident that a species is constituted of a genus and a difference. Therefore this is explained by the fact that a genus participates in a difference just as a subject participates in an accident. Thus we understand that man is made up of animal and two-footed in the same way that white man is made up of white and man. Or it is explained in some other way.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 6 Et si quidem species fiat per hoc, quod genus participat differentiam, sicut quod animal per participationem bipedis fit homo, et per participationem multipedis fit equus, vel polypus, accidit aliquid impossibile. Cum enim genus, quod praedicatur de diversis speciebus, ponatur esse una substantia, sequitur quod contraria simul insunt ipsi animali, quod in se est unum et hoc ens, scilicet demonstrabile. Differentiae enim, quibus dividitur genus, sunt contrariae.	1597. And if a species comes to be because a genus participates in a difference, so that animal by participating in two-footed becomes a man, and by participating in many-footed becomes a horse or an octopus, an impossible conclusion follows. For when a genus which is predicated of different species is held to be one substance, it follows that contrary attributes will be present at the same time in the same animal, which is one thing in itself and a particular being, namely, something capable of being pointed to; for the differences by which a genus is divided are contraries.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 7 Si autem non sit ex animali et bipede homo per modum participationis, quis modus erit cum aliquis dixerit animal esse bipes vel gressibile, constituens ex his duobus unum? Quasi dicat: de facili non potest assignari. Et ideo subiungit, sed forsan componitur, quasi dicat: numquid poterit dici, quod ex his duobus fiat unum per compositionem sicut domus fit ex lapidibus; aut per copulationem, sicut arca fit ex lignis conclavatis; aut per mixtionem, sicut electuarium fit ex speciebus alteratis? His enim modis invenitur ex duabus vel pluribus substantiis per se existentibus aliquid unum fieri.	1598. However, if man is not composed of animal and two-footed by way of participation, then when someone says that animal is two-footed or capable of walking, what will be the way in which one thing is constituted from these two? The implication is that the reason cannot be easily given. Therefore he adds “But perhaps they are combined,” which is equivalent to saying: will it be possible to affirm that one thing arises from these two as a result of their combination, as a house arises from stones; or by being joined together, as a chest comes from pieces of wood being fitted together; or by being mixed, as a lozenge comes from the alteration of different kinds of medications? For these are the three ways in which one thing is found to come from two or more things which exist as independent substances.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 8 Sed omnes isti modi sunt inconvenientes. Non enim possent genus et differentiae praedicari de specie, sicut nec partes compositae vel copulatae vel mixtae praedicantur de suis totis. Et praeterea unum non venit in compositionem diversorum totaliter; sed partes divisim sunt, ita quod una pars eius sit in compositione huius et alia in compositione alterius, sicut una pars ligni venit in compositione domus, et alia in compositione arcae. Unde, si ex animali et bipede fieret homo et avis, modis praedictis, sequeretur quod non tota natura animalis esset in homine nec in ave, sed alia et alia pars. Et sic iterum non esset idem animal in utroque.	1599. But all of these ways are unacceptable. For genus and difference could not be predicated of species, as parts which are combined, joined together and mixed are not predicated of their wholes. Furthermore, one thing does not enter as a whole into the composition of different things, but its parts exist separately, so that one part of it enters into the composition of this thing and another into the composition of something else, as one part of wood enters into the composition of a house and another into the composition of a chest. Hence if man and bird were to come from animal and from two-footed in the foregoing ways, it would follow that the whole nature of animal would not be present in man and in bird, but different parts would be present in each. And so, again, animal would not be the same in each.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit sed si alterum prosequitur secundum membrum divisionis; dicens, quod inconveniens sequitur si ponatur non unum animal esse in omnibus speciebus. Ducit autem ad quatuor inconvenientia: quorum primum ponit sic dicens. Ostensum est quid sequatur ponentibus universalia esse substantias, si ponatur unum animal esse in omnibus speciebus. Sed propter hoc potest aliquis dicere, quod sit alterum animal in unaquaque specie: ergo erunt infinita quorum substantia est animal, ut est consequens dicere ad praedictam positionem. Est enim animal substantia cuiuslibet speciei contentae sub animali. Non enim potest dici quod homo fiat ex animali secundum accidens, sed per se: et ita animal ad substantiam equi pertinet, et bovis, et aliarum specierum, quae sunt fere infinitae. Quod autem aliquod unum cedat in substantia infinitorum, videtur esse inconveniens.	1600. But what will happen (664). He now treats the second member of the division. He says that an absurdity follows if animal is not assumed to be one in all species of animals; and this leads to four impossible consequences. He gives the first by speaking as follows: the consequences facing those who claim that universals are substances when animal is assumed to be one in all species of animals, has been made clear. But because of this someone can say that there is a different animal in each species of animal; hence there will be an infinite number of things whose substance is animal, inasmuch as this follows from the statement of the foregoing position; for animal is the substance of any species contained under animal, since it cannot be said that man comes from animal accidentally but essentially. And thus animal pertains to the substance of horse and of ox and to that of the other species, which arc almost infinite in number. But that some one thing should be present in the substance of an infinite number of things seems absurd.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 10 Secundum inconveniens ponit ibi, amplius multa dicit, quod sequitur etiam quod ipsum animal, idest substantia animalis universalis, erit multa, quia animal, quod est in unaquaque specie, est substantia illius speciei, de qua praedicatur. Non enim praedicatur de specie sicut de quodam alio diverso a se in substantia. Si autem non praedicatur animal de homine sicut de diverso poterit dici convenienter, quod homo erit ex illo, scilicet ex animali, sicut ex sua substantia; et quod illud, scilicet animal, sit etiam genus eius, praedicatum de eo in eo quod quid est. Relinquitur ergo, quod sicut illa de quibus praedicatur animal, sunt multa, ita ipsum animal universale esse multa.	1601. Again, animal-in-itself (665). Then he gives the second absurdity. He says that it also follows that “animal-in-itself,” i.e., the universal substance animal, will be many, because animal, which is present in each species of animal, is the substance of the species of which it is predicated; for it is not predicated of the species as of something else substantially different from itself. And if the term animal is not predicated of man as something different, it will be proper to say that man will be made up of it, i.e., have animal within himself as his own substance, and that the thing being predicated, i.e., animal, is also his genus, which is predicated of him quidditatively. Hence it follows that, just as those things of which animal is predicated are many, in a similar way the universal animal is itself many.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit et amplius ponit tertium inconveniens; dicens, quod ulterius ex praedictis sequitur, quod omnia illa, ex quibus est homo, scilicet superiora genera et differentiae, sint ideae; quod est contra positionem Platonicorum, qui ponebant solas species esse ideas particularium, genera vero et differentias non esse ideas specierum. Et hoc ideo, quia idea est proprie exemplar ideati secundum suam formam. Forma autem generis non est propria formis specierum, sicut forma speciei est propria individuis, quae conveniunt secundum formam, et differunt secundum materiam.	1602. Further, all the things (666). He gives the third absurdity. He says that it also follows, from the things said above, that all the things of which man consists, namely, the higher genera and species, are Ideas; and this is opposed to the position of the Platonists, who claimed that only species are Ideas of particular things, and that genera and differences are not Ideas of species. They did this because an Idea is the proper exemplar of the thing produced from the Idea so far as the form of the thing is concerned. Now the form of a genus is not proper to that of its species as the form of a species is proper to its individuals, which are formally the same and materially different.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 12 Sed, si sunt diversa animalia secundum diversas species, unicuique speciei respondebit aliquid in substantia sui generis, sicut propria idea; et ita etiam erunt genera ideae, et similiter differentiae. Non ergo alteri universalium erit quod sit idea, et alteri quod sit substantia, sicut Platonici ponebant, dicentes quidem genera esse substantias specierum, species vero ideas individuorum. Impossibile namque est ita esse, ut ostensum est. Sequitur igitur ex praedictis quod ipsum animal, idest substantia animalis universalis, sit unumquodque eorum quae sunt in animalibus idest quae continentur inter species animalis.	1603. But if there are different animals for the different species of animals, then something in the substance of the genus of each species will correspond to each as its proper Idea; and thus genera also will be Ideas, and so will differences. Therefore it will not be characteristic of one of the universals to be an Idea and of another to be a substance, as the Platonists claimed when they said that genera are the substances of species and species the Ideas of individuals; for it is impossible that this should be so, as has been shown. From what has been said above, then, it follows “that animal in-itself,” i.e., the universal substance animal, is each of these things “which are contained in animals,” i.e. which are contained among the species of animal.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 13 Quartum ponit ibi, amplius ex dicit quod iterum videtur esse dubium ex quo constituatur hoc quod est homo, et quomodo constituatur ex ipso animali scilicet universali, aut quomodo possibile est animal esse, quod substantia hoc ipsum praeter ipsum animal, idest quomodo potest esse ut homo sit aliquid praeter animal quasi quaedam substantia per se existens, et tamen animal sit hoc ipsum quod est homo? Haec enim videntur esse opposita, quod homo sit praeter animal, et tamen animal sit hoc ipsum quod est homo.	1604. Again from what (667). Here he gives the fourth absurdity. He says that there also seems to be a difficulty about the parts of which this thing, man, is composed; and how it is derived from “animal-in-itself,” namely, the universal animal; or “how is it possible that the animal which is a substance should exist apart from animal-in-itself,” i.e., how is it possible for man to be something apart from animal as a substance existing by itself and for it still to be true that animal is this very thing which is man? For these two views seem to be opposed, namely, that man exists apart from animal, and that animal is this very thing is man.
lib. 7 l. 14 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem improbat praedictam positionem per comparationem generum ad singularia; dicens quod haec eadem inconvenientia, quae accidunt ponentibus genera et universalia esse substantias in speciebus, accidunt et in sensibilibus singularibus, et etiam multa his absurdiora; inquantum natura generis magis remota est a singularibus sensibilibus et materialibus, quam a speciebus intelligibilibus et immaterialibus. Si itaque impossibile est sic esse, palam est quod idea non est ipsorum sensibilium, sicut Platonici dicunt.	1605. Again, these are (668). Then he rejects the foregoing position by comparing genera to singular things. He says that the same absurd conclusions which face those who claim that genera and universals are the substances of species, also face those who hold genera to be the substances of singular sensible things (and there are even more absurd conclusions than these). And their claim is absurd inasmuch as the nature of a genus is more removed from sensible, material singulars than from intelligible and immaterial species. Hence, if it is impossible that this should be the case, it is clear that there is no Idea of these sensible things, as the Platonists said.