Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect7

Lecture 7

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 1 Praemisit superius philosophus quaedam de generationibus rerum, quasi necessaria ad suum propositum ostendendum; scilicet ad ostendendum, quod causae generationis rerum non sunt ponendae species separatae. Ex quibus duo sunt iam manifestata per praemissa: scilicet quod omnis generatio est ex aliqua materia, et quod unumquodque quod generatur, generatur a suo simili. Nunc autem intendit ostendere propositum ex his quae supra investigata sunt. Et dividitur in partes tres. In prima ostendit quid sit illud quod generatur. In secunda ostendit, quod causa generationis non est species separata, ibi, utrum igitur est ne quaedam. In tertia determinat quaedam quae possent esse dubia circa praedeterminata, ibi, dubitabit autem aliquis. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod forma non generatur nisi per accidens. Secundo ostendit quod compositum generatur, ibi, aeream vero sphaeram. Dicit ergo primo, quod ea quae sunt ostensa supra vera sunt. Quorum unum est, quod omne quod fit, fit ab aliquo, et hoc est agens vel generans, a quo est principium generationis. Et aliud est, quod omne quod generatur, generatur ex aliquo, ut intelligatur id ex quo est generatio, non privatio, sed materia. Dictum est enim superius, quod aliter fit aliquid ex materia, et aliter ex privatione. Et tertium est quod in omni generatione oportet esse aliquid quod fit. Et hoc est vel sphaera, vel circulus, vel quodcumque aliorum.	1417. The Philosopher posited above certain points about processes of generation in the world as prerequisites for proving his thesis, namely, to show that the causes of the generation of things must not be held to be separate Forms. And since two of these have already been made clear in the foregoing discussion, i.e., that every process of generation is from matter, and that everything which is generated is generated by something similar to itself, he now aims to prove his thesis from the questions which were investigated above. This is divided into two parts. In the first (611)C 1417) he shows what things are generated. In the second (613:C 1427) he shows that the cause of generation is not a separate Form (“The problem, then”). In the third (615:C 1436) he clears up certain things which could be considered as problems pertaining to the points already established (“However, someone”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (611), he shows that a form is generated only accidentally; and second (612:C 1424), that it is a composite thing which is generated (“But he does make”). He accordingly says, first (611), that the points explained above are true. The first of these is that everything which comes to be, comes to be by something, and this is the agent or generator, which is the principle of generation; and the second is that everything which comes to be, comes to be from something, and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation. For it was said above that something comes to be from matter in a different way than it does from a privation. The third point is that in every process of generation there must be something which comes to be; and this is either a sphere or a circle or something else.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 2 Ex istis suppositis debet esse manifestum, quod sicut agens generando non facit materiam, vel subiectum generationis, quae est aes, ita etiam non facit formam, scilicet hoc ipsum quod est sphaera, nisi forte per accidens. Facit enim aeream sphaeram quod est compositum. Et quia aerea sphaera, est sphaera, ideo per accidens facit sphaeram.	1418. From the things which have been posited it ought to be evident that, just as an agent does not produce the matter or subject of generation, for example, the bronze, when he generates something, so too “neither does he produce the form,” namely, the thing itself which is a sphere, except perhaps accidentally; for he makes a brazen sphere, which is a composite. And since a brazen sphere is also a sphere, he therefore accidentally produces a sphere.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 3 Quod autem agens non faciat materiam, per se est manifestum, eo quod materia praeexistit factioni: unde non oportuit eum probare quod materia non fieret. Sed de formis poterat esse dubium, eo quod forma non invenitur nisi in termino actionis. Et ideo oportuit eum probare quod forma non fieret nisi per accidens. Et hoc ideo est, quia formae non proprie habent esse, sed magis sunt quibus aliqua habent esse. Unde si fieri est via in esse, illa tantum per se fiunt, quae per formas habent esse. Formae autem incipiunt esse, eo modo quo sunt in illis factis, quae per formas esse habent.	1419. Now the fact that the agent does not produce the matter is evident of itself, because matter is prior to the act of making. Hence it was not necessary for Aristotle to prove that matter is not generated. However, regarding forms there could be a difficulty, because a form is found only at the termination of an activity; and therefore it was necessary for him to prove that a form is produced only accidentally. And the reason is that forms do not have being, properly speaking, but are rather the principles by which things have being. Hence if the, process of coming to be is the way to being, only those things properly come to be which have being by their forms; and forms begin to be in the sense that they exist in the things generated, which have being by these forms.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 4 Et quod forma non fiat, sic probat. Facere enim hoc aliquid, est facere hoc ex aliquo subiecto, quod est totaliter, idest universaliter verum in omni generatione. Facere enim hoc quod est aes rotundum, non est facere hoc ipsum quod est rotundum, scilicet rotunditatem; aut hoc ipsum quod est facere sphaeram, scilicet formam sphaerae; sed est facere aliquid alterum, scilicet speciem, non qualitercumque, sed in alio, scilicet in materia: quod est facere compositum. Quod sic patet. Si enim agens facit aliquid, oportet quod faciat ex aliquo alio sicut ex materia. Hoc enim superius subiiciebatur, scilicet quod omnis generatio ex materia fit, propter probationem superius inductam. Sicut agens dicitur facere sphaeram aeream. Et hoc ideo, quia facit hoc quod est sphaera aerea, ex hoc quod est aes. Si igitur etiam ipsam formam faciat, palam erit quod faciet eam similiter, scilicet ex aliqua materia. Et ita sicut sphaera aerea erit composita ex materia et forma, sic et forma sphaerae aereae erit composita ex materia et forma: et redibit eadem quaestio de forma formae, et sic in infinitum: et ita generationes procedent in infinitum, quia omne generatum habet materiam et formam. Palam igitur est quod non fit species rei generatae, nec aliquid aliud quodcumque fit, quod oporteat vocare formam in rebus sensibilibus, sicut ordo et compositio et figura quae in aliquibus tenet locum formae, maxime in artificialibus.	1420. The proof that forms are not generated is as follows. To make this particular thing is to make it from a subject, and this is “totally,” i.e., universally, true of every generation. For to make what is bronze round is not to make “round” itself, i.e., roundness, or “sphere” itself, namely, the form of a sphere, but to make “something else,” namely, a form, not in any way whatever, “but in something else,” namely, in matter; and this is to make the composite. This is made evident as follows. If an agent makes something, he must make it from something else as its matter. And “this was assumed above,” namely, that every process of generation is from matter, because of the proof adduced above; as an agent, for example, is said to make a brazen sphere. And this is true because he makes the thing which is a brazen sphere from bronze. Hence, if he also makes the form itself, it is clear that he will make it in the same way, namely, from some matter. And thus just as a brazen sphere will be composed of matter and form, so also will the form of brazen sphere be composed of matter and form; and the same question will be raised in turn about the form of this form, and so on to infinity; and in this way processes of generation will proceed to infinity, because everything generated has matter and form. It is evident, then, that the form of the thing generated does not come to be; and neither does any other thing, whatever it may be, which must be called a form in sensible things, for example, order, combination and shape, which has the character of a form in some things, especially in those made by art.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 5 Et quia generatio est eius quod fit, palam est quod nec generatio est formae, sed compositi. Nec iterum quod quid erat esse rei generatae generatur, nisi per accidens. Sed forma et quod quid erat esse, est quod fit in alio, idest in materia, non per se. Et dico quod fit, vel ab arte, vel a natura, vel potestate, idest a quocumque agente per violentiam.	1421. And since generation pertains to the thing generated, it is evident that it is not the form that is generated but the composite. And so too the essence of the thing generated is not itself generated, except accidentally; for the form or essence “is what comes to be in something else,” i.e., in matter, but not of itself. And I say that it comes to be either by art, by nature “or by power,” i.e., by anything that acts by violence (C 841).
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 6 Dicit autem quod quid erat esse non fieri, quamvis sit idem rei factae. Supra enim ostensum est unamquamque rem esse idem cum suo quod quid erat esse. Sed tamen quod quid erat esse est quod per se pertinet ad speciem. Unde ab eo excluduntur conditiones individuales, quae per accidens sunt speciei. Species autem et alia universalia non generantur nisi per accidens, singularibus generatis.	1422. Now he says that the essence of a thing is not generated, even though it is the same as the thing generated; for it was shown above (591)C 1362) that each thing is the same as its own essence. But the essence of a thing refers properly to its form. Hence individual conditions, which pertain to a form accidentally, are excluded from it. And species and other universals are generated only accidentally when singular things are generated.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 7 Sciendum tamen quod licet in litera dicatur, quod forma fit in materia, non tamen proprie dicitur. Forma enim proprie non fit, sed compositum. Sicut enim dicitur forma esse in materia, licet forma non sit, sed compositum per formam: ita etiam proprius modus loquendi est, ut dicamus compositum generari ex materia in talem formam. Formae enim proprie non fiunt, sed educuntur de potentia materiae, inquantum materia quae est in potentia ad formam fit actu sub forma, quod est facere compositum.	1423. Yet it must be noted that even though it is said in the text that form comes to be in matter, this is not a proper way of speaking; for it is not a form that comes to be, but a composite. For a form is said to exist in matter, although a form does not [properly] exist, but a composite exists by its form. Thus the proper way of speaking is to say that a composite is generated from matter according to such and such a form. For forms are not generated, properly speaking, but are brought from the potency of matter, inasmuch as matter, which is in potentiality to form, becomes actual under some form; and this is to produce a composite.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit aeream vero ostendit, quod composita fiant, dicens, quod generans facit esse sphaeram aeream. Facit enim eam ex aere quod est materia, sicut ex principio generationis, et ex sphaera, quae est formae et generationis terminus. Facit enim hanc speciem, idest figuram sphaerae in hoc, idest in hac materia, inquantum scilicet transmutat hoc aes in sphaeram: et hoc est sphaera aerea, scilicet forma sphaerae in aere.	1424. But he does make (612). Here he shows that it is composite things which are generated. He says that an agent does make a sphere to be; for he makes it from bronze, which is the matter, as the principle of generation, and from sphere, which is the form and terminus of generation. For he causes “this form,” i.e., the figure of a sphere, “in this,” i.e., in the matter, in the sense that he changes this bronze into a sphere, and this is a brazen sphere, or the form of a sphere in bronze.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 9 Sed hoc, scilicet figura sphaerae est esse sphaerae, idest quod quid est sphaerae. Eius autem quod est esse sphaerae, idest ipsius quod quid est formae, non est omnino generatio; quia si esset eius generatio, oporteret quod esset ex aliquo sicut ex materia. Omne enim quod fit oportet esse divisibile, ita scilicet quod eius hoc sit hoc, idest una pars sit hoc, et hoc sit hoc, idest alia pars sit hoc. Et hoc exponit, scilicet quod una pars eius sit materia, et alia pars eius sit species. Si igitur quid est sphaerae quantum ad ipsam formam est quod sit figura aequalis ex medio, idest quod sit quaedam figura solida a cuius medio ad extremitates omnes lineae ductae sint aequales, oportet quod huius, scilicet sphaerae aereae hoc quidem, scilicet materia, sit in quo erat id quod facit generans, scilicet forma; et hoc sit in illo, scilicet forma, quae scilicet est figura ex medio aequalis, et hoc sit omne, idest totum quod factum est, scilicet aerea sphaera.	1425. “But this,” namely, the figure of a sphere, “is the being of a sphere,” i.e., the whatness of a sphere. “But of the being of sphere in general,” i.e., of the whatness of the form, there is no generation whatever, because if it were generated it would have to be generated from something as its matter. For everything which comes to be must be divisible, so that “this is this,” i.e., one part of it is this, “and that is that,” i.e., another part is that. He explains this by saying that one part of it is matter and the other, form. Hence, if the whatness of a sphere in reference to the form itself is “that it is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center,” i.e., that it is a certain solid figure of which all lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, then “one part,” i.e., the matter “of this,” namely, of a brazen sphere, must be that in which “the thing produced will exist,” namely, the matter, and the other will be what exists in this, namely, the form, which is the figure everywhere equidistant from a center, and “this is all,” i.e., the whole, “that has been produced,” namely, a brazen sphere.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 10 Palam igitur est ex dictis, quod si omne quod fit oportet esse divisibile, quod id quod est ut species, aut quod est ut substantia, idest ut quod quid erat esse non fit. Sed synodus, idest compositum quod dicitur et denominatur a tali forma, vel quidditate vel quod quid est, fit. Et iterum manifestum est quod omni generato inest materia, et quod cuiuslibet generati hoc est hoc, et hoc est hoc, idest una pars est materia, et alia forma.	1426. Hence it is evident from our remarks that, if everything which comes to be must be divisible, the part which is called the form or “substance,” i.e., the essence, does not come to be; but it is “the concrete whole,” or the composite, which is spoken of and gets its name from such a form or quiddity or whatness which comes to be. Again, it is evident that matter is found in everything which is generated, and that of everything which is generated “this is this and that is that,” i.e., one part is matter and the other is form.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit utrum igitur ostendit quod ex quo formae non generantur sed composita, quod non oportet ponere species separatas esse causas generationis in istis inferioribus. Sciendum est autem, quod Platonici ponebant species esse causas generationis dupliciter. Uno modo per modum generantis, et alio modo per modum exemplaris. Primo ergo ostendit, quod species separatae non sunt causae generationis per modum generantis. Secundo, quod non per modum exemplaris, ibi, in quibusdam vero palam. Dicit ergo primo, quod considerandum est utrum sit aliqua forma universalis praeter huiusmodi singularia, scilicet quod sit quaedam sphaera a materia separata praeter has sphaeras quae sunt in materia. Aut etiam sit aliqua domus universalis sine materia, praeter lapides, ex quibus constituuntur istae domus particulares. Movet autem quaestionem in artificialibus propter naturalia, quorum species Plato separatas posuit a materia; ut intelligatur esse quaesitum, utrum sit homo universalis praeter carnes et ossa, ex quibus particulares homines constituuntur.	1427. The problem, then (613). Since it is not forms which are generated but composite things, he shows that it is not necessary to posit separate Forms as the causes of generation in these lower bodies. And it must be understood that the Platonists claimed that separate Forms cause generation in two ways: first, after the manner of a generator, and, second, after the manner of an exemplar. Hence he shows, first (613), that separate Forms are not causes of generation after the manner of a generator; and second (614:C 1432), that they are not causes after the manner of an exemplar (“And in some cases”). He accordingly says, first (613), that it is necessary to consider whether there is a form “which is universal’ and exists apart from singular forms of this kind,” i.e., whether there is a sphere without matter apart from these spheres found in matter; or again whether there is a universal house without matter apart from the bricks of which these particular houses are made. Now he raises the question with reference to artificial things in order to throw light on natural ones, whose forms the Platonists claimed to be separate from matter; so that the question is understood to be whether there is a universal man apart from the flesh and bones of which individual men are composed.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 12 Ad solutionem autem huius quaestionis, hic primo praemittit, quod si sit aliqua substantia hoc modo facta, nullo modo erit hoc aliquid, sed significabit tantum quale quid, quod non est determinatum. Socrates enim significat hoc aliquid et determinatum; homo vero significat quale quid, quia significat formam communem et indeterminatam, quia significat absque determinatione huius vel illius. Unde si sit homo praeter Socratem et Platonem et alios huiusmodi, non tamen erit hoc aliquid nec determinatum. Sed nos videmus quod in generationibus, semper illud quod facit et generat ex hoc, idest ex tali materia, est tale hoc, idest hoc determinatum, habens determinatam speciem. Oportet enim, sicut generatum est hoc aliquid, ita et generans esse hoc aliquid, cum generans sit simile genito, ut supra probatum est. Et quod genitum sit hoc aliquid, ex hoc patet: quia quod generatur est compositum. Sed hoc esse, scilicet compositum, quando est hoc, idest determinatum, est ut Callias, aut Socrates, sicut cum dicitur haec sphaera aerea. Sed homo et animal non significant hanc materiam ex qua est generatio, sicut nec sphaera aerea universaliter dicta. Si ergo compositum generatur, et non generatur nisi ex hac materia, per quam est hoc aliquid, oportet quod id quod generatur sit hoc aliquid. Et cum generatum sit simile generanti, oportet etiam, quod generans sit hoc aliquid. Et ita non sit species universalis, sine materia.	1428. And for the purpose of answering this question he posits here that, if any substance is produced in this way, it will not be a particular thing in any sense, but will only signify such and such a thing, which is not a definite individual. For Socrates signifies this particular thing and a definite individual, but man signifies such and such a thing, because it signifies a common and indefinite form, since it signifies without the definiteness of a this or a that. Hence, if there should be a man separate from Socrates and Plato and other individuals of this kind, it will still be a particular or definite thing. But in processes of generation we see that the thing which makes and generates something “from this,” i.e., from some particular matter, is “such and such a particular thing,” i.e., this definite thing having a definite form; for just as the thing generated must be a particular thing, so also must the thing which generates it be a particular thing, since the thing generated is similar to the thing which generates it, as was proved above (603)C 1390. Now that the thing generated is a particular thing is clear from the fact that it is a composite. “And this being,” i.e., the composite, when it is “such and such a thing,” i.e., a definite thing, is like Callias or Socrates, just as when we speak of this brazen sphere. But man and animal do not signify this matter from which generation proceeds, and neither does brazen sphere, taken universally. Therefore, if the composite is generated, and it is generated only from this matter whereby it is this particular thing, then what is generated must be a particular thing. And since the thing generated is similar to the one generating it, the latter must also be a particular thing. Hence there is no universal form without matter.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 13 Manifestum est ergo ex dictis, quod si sunt aliquae species praeter singularia, nihil sunt utiles ad generationes et substantias rerum, sicut consueti sunt quidam dicere specierum causa, idest ad hoc quod ponant species. Haec enim erat una causa, quare Platonici species ponebant, ut essent causa generationis in rebus. Si igitur species separatae non possunt esse causa generationis, manifestum erit quod non erunt species quaedam substantiae secundum se existentes.	1429. It is therefore evident from what has been said that, if there are any forms separate from singular things, they are of no use for the generations and substances of things, just as some are accustomed to speak of “the cause which consists of the Forms,” intending thus to posit such forms. For one reason why the Platonists posited separate Forms was that they might be the cause of processes of generation in the world. Hence, if separate Forms cannot be the cause of generation, it is evident that forms will not be certain substances existing by themselves.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 14 Sciendum est autem, quod omnes, qui non consideraverunt hoc, quod philosophus supra ostendit, quod formae non fiunt, passi sunt difficultatem circa factionem formarum. Propter hoc namque quidam coacti sunt dicere, omnes formas esse ex creatione. Nam ponebant formas fieri, et non poterant ponere quod fierent ex materia, cum materia non sit pars formae: unde sequebatur quod fierent ex nihilo, et per consequens quod crearentur. E contrario autem quidam posuerunt propter hanc difficultatem, formas praeexistere in materia actu, quod est ponere latitationem formarum; sicut posuit Anaxagoras.	1430. And it must be noted that all those who have failed to consider what the Philosopher proved above-that forms do not come to be-face the same difficulty with regard to the production of forms, because it was for this reason that some men were compelled to say that all forms are created; for while they held that forms come to be, they could not hold that they come from matter since matter is not a part of form; and therefore they concluded that forms come from nothing, and, consequently, that they are created. But because of this difficulty, on the other hand, some men claimed that forms actually pre-exist in matter, and this is to suppose that forms are hidden, as Anaxagoras maintained.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 15 Sententia autem Aristotelis, qui ponit formas non fieri, sed compositum, utrumque excludit. Neque enim oportet dicere, quod formae sint causatae ab aliquo extrinseco agente, neque quod fuerint semper actu in materia, sed in potentia tantum. Et quod in generatione compositi sint eductae de potentia in actum.	1431. Now the view of Aristotle, who claimed that forms are not generated but only composite things, excludes both of these other opinions. For it is not necessary to say that forms are caused by some external agent, or that they will always be present in matter actually, but only potentially, and that in the generation of the composite they are brought from potentiality to actuality.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit in quibusdam ostendit, quod species separatae non possunt esse causa generationis per modum exemplaris; dicens, quod licet in aliquibus sit dubium utrum generans sit simile generato, tamen in quibusdam palam est quod generans sit quoddam tale, quale est generatum; non quidem idem numero, sed idem specie, ut patet in naturalibus. Homo enim generat hominem, similiter equus equum, et unaquaeque res naturalis aliam similem in specie sibi: nisi accidat aliquid praeter naturam, sicut est cum equus generat mulum. Et dicitur ista generatio praeter naturam, quia est praeter intentionem naturae particularis.	1432. And in some cases (614). He shows that separate Forms cannot be the cause of the generation of things after the manner of an exemplar. He says that even though in some cases one may encounter the problem whether the generator is similar to the thing generated, still in the case of some things it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as the thing generated: not numerically the same but specifically, as is clear in the case of natural beings; for man begets man, and similarly a horse begets a horse, and each natural thing produces something similar to itself in species, unless something beyond nature happens to result, as when a horse begets a mule. And this generation is beyond nature, because it is outside of the aim of a particular nature.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 17 Virtus enim formativa, quae est in spermate maris, naturaliter est ordinata ut producat omnino simile ei, a quo sperma est decisum; sed de secundaria intentione est, quod quando perfecta similitudo induci non potest, inducatur qualiscumque potest similis. Et, quia in generatione muli sperma equi non potest inducere speciem equi in materia, propter hoc quod non est proportionata ad suscipiendum speciem equi, inducit speciem propinquam. Unde etiam in generatione muli est aliquo modo generans simile generato. Est enim aliquod proximum genus, quod non est nominatum, commune equo et asino. Et sub illo genere continetur etiam mulus. Unde secundum illud genus potest dici quod simile generat simile. Ut si verbi gratia dicamus quod illud proximum genus sit iumentum, poterimus dicere, quod licet equus non generet equum, sed mulum, iumentum tamen generat iumentum.	1433. For the formative power, which is in the sperm of the male, is designed by nature to produce something completely the same as that from which the sperm has been separated; but its secondary aim, when it cannot induce a perfect likeness, is to induce any kind of likeness that it can. And since in the generation of a mule the sperm of a horse cannot induce the form of a horse in the matter, because it is not adapted to receive the form of a horse, it therefore induces a related form. Hence in the generation of a mule the generator is similar in a way to the thing generated; for there is a proximate genus, which lacks a name, common to horse and to ass; and mule is also contained under that genus. Hence in reference to that genus it can be said that like generates like; for example, if we might say that that proximate genus is beast of burden, we could say that, even though a horse does not generate a horse but a mule, still a beast of burden generates a beast of burden.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 18 Patet igitur, quod omnia generata consequuntur speciei similitudinem ex virtute generantis. Quare palam est, quod non oportet ponere aliquam speciem separatam, quasi exemplar rebus generatis, ex cuius imagine res generatae speciei similitudinem consequantur, ut Platonici ponebant. Maxime enim huiusmodi exemplaria requirerentur in praedictis substantiis naturalibus, quae sunt maxime substantiae respectu artificialium. Sufficiens autem est in praedictis generans ad faciendum similitudinem speciei; et est sufficiens ponere causam speciei in materia, idest quod illud quod facit hoc generatum consequi talem speciem non sit species extra materiam, sed species in materia.	1434. Hence it is evident that everything which is generated receives the likeness of its form from the power of the thing generating it. And for this reason it is obviously not necessary to posit some separate Form, as the exemplar of the things which are generated, from whose image the things generated receive a similar form, as the Platonists claimed. For exemplars of this kind are especially necessary in the case of the natural substances mentioned above, which are substances to a greater degree when compared with artificial things. Now in the case of the foregoing substances the generator is sufficient to cause a likeness of form; and it is enough to maintain that the generator causes the form in the matter, i.e., that the thing which causes the thing generated to receive such a form is not some form outside of matter but a form in matter.
lib. 7 l. 7 n. 19 Omnis autem species, quae est in materia, scilicet in his carnibus et in his ossibus, est aliquod singulare, ut Callias et Socrates. Et ista etiam species causans similitudinem speciei in generando est diversa a specie generati secundum numerum propter diversam materiam. Cuius diversitas est principium diversitatis individuorum in eadem specie. Diversa namque est materia, in qua est forma hominis generantis et hominis generati. Sed utraque forma est idem secundum speciem. Nam ipsa species est individua, idest non diversificatur in generante et generato. Relinquitur ergo, quod non oportet ponere aliquam speciem praeter singularia, quae sit causa speciei in generatis, ut Platonici ponebant.	1435. “And every form” which is in the matter, namely, “in this flesh and these bones,” is some singular thing, such as Callias or Socrates. And this form which causes a likeness in species in the process of generation, also differs numerically from the form of the thing generated because of difference in matter; for material diversity is the principle of diversity among individuals in the same species; for the matter containing the form of the man who begets and that of the man who is begotten are different. But both forms are the same in species; for the form itself is “indivisible,” i.e., it does not differ in the one who generates and in the one who is generated. Hence it follows that it is not necessary to posit a form apart from singular things, which causes the form in the things generated, as the Platonists claimed.