Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect9

Lecture 9

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quid est quod quid erat esse, et quorum est, et quomodo se habet ad ea quorum est, et quod non oportet ponere quidditates rerum separatas propter generationem, hic intendit ostendere ex quibus constituitur quod quid erat esse; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima ostendit ex quibus quod quid erat esse constituitur. In secunda ostendit quomodo ex illis fiat unum, ibi, nunc autem dicamus primum. Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima movet dubitationem. In secunda solvit eam, ibi, aut multipliciter dicitur pars. Prima pars dividitur in duas dubitationes, quas movet, ad idem pertinentes; secundam ibi, amplius autem si priores sunt partes. Dicit ergo primo, quod omnis definitio est quaedam ratio, idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata. Unum enim nomen non potest esse definitio, quia definitio oportet quod distincte notificet principia rerum quae concurrunt ad essentiam rei constituendam; alias autem definitio non sufficienter manifestaret essentiam rei. Et propter hoc dicitur in primo physicorum, quod definitio dividit definitum in singulare, idest exprimit distincte singula principia definiti. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per plures dictiones: unde una dictio non potest esse definitio, sed potest esse manifestativa eo modo, quo nomen minus notum manifestatur per magis notum. Omnis autem ratio partes habet, quia est quaedam oratio composita, et non simplex nomen. Et ideo videtur quod sicut se habet ratio rei ad rem, ita se habent partes rationis ad partes rei. Et propter hoc dubitatur, utrum oporteat rationem partium ponere in ratione totius, aut non.	1460. Having shown what the quiddity (or essence) of a thing is, and to what things it belongs, and how it is related to the things to which it belongs, and that it is not necessary to posit separate quiddities in order to account for the generation of things, here the Philosopher’s aim is to expose the principles of which a thing’s quiddity is composed. This is divided into two parts. In the first (622:C 1460) he describes the principles of which a thing’s quiddity is composed; and in the second (640:C 1537) he explains how the thing which comes into being from these principles is one (“And now”). The first part is divided into two. In the first he raises a difficulty. In the second (624:C 1467) he solves it (“Or perhaps”). The first part is divided into two insofar as he raises two difficulties about the same point. The second (623:C 1464) is treated where he says, “Further, if parts.” He accordingly says, first (622), that every “definition is the intelligible expression of a thing,” i.e., a certain combination of words arranged by reason. For one word cannot constitute a definition, because a definition must convey a distinct knowledge of the real principles which come together to constitute a thing’s essence; otherwise a definition would not adequately expose a thing’s essence. And for this reason it is said in Book I of the Physics that a definition divides “the thing defined into its separate elements,” i.e., it expresses distinctly each of the principles of the thing defined, and this can be done only by means of several words. Hence one word cannot be a definition, but it can give us information about something in the same way that a word which is better known can give us information about a word which is less well known. Now every intelligible expression has parts, because it is a composite utterance and not a simple word. Therefore it seems that, just as the intelligible expression of a thing is related to the thing, so also are the parts of the intelligible expression related to the parts of the thing. And for this reason the problem arises whether the intelligible expression of the parts must be given in that of the whole or not.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 2 Et haec dubitatio exinde confirmatur: quia in quibusdam rationibus totorum, videntur esse rationes partium, et in quibusdam non. In definitione enim circuli non ponitur definitio incisionum circuli, idest partium ex circulo separatarum, sicut semicirculi et quartae partis circuli. Sed definitio syllabae continet in se definitionem elementorum, idest literarum. Si enim definitur syllaba, oportet quod dicatur esse aliqua vox composita ex literis. Et sic in definitione syllabae ponitur litera, et per consequens definitio eius, quia semper uti possumus definitione pro nomine. Et tamen circulus dividitur in incisiones ut in partes, sicut syllaba in elementa, idest in literas.	1461. This difficulty is confirmed by the fact that in some intelligible expressions of wholes the intelligible expressions of the parts seem to be present, and in some not; for in the definition of a circle the definition “of the segments of a circle” is not present, i.e., the definition of the parts which are separated from the circle, as the semicircle and quarter circle; but in the definition of a syllable the definition “of its elements,” i.e., its letters, is present. For if a syllable is defined it is necessary to say that it is a sound composed of letters; and so we give in the definition of a syllable the letter and, consequently, its definition, because we can always substitute the definition for the word. Yet a circle is divided into segments as its parts, just as a syllable is divided “into its elements,” or letters.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 3 Quod autem hic dicitur, quod sicut se habet definitio ad rem, ita se habet pars definitionis ad partem rei, videtur habere dubitationem. Definitio enim est idem rei. Unde videtur sequi quod partes definitionis sint idem partibus rei; quod patet esse falsum. Nam partes definitionis praedicantur de definitio, sicut de homine, animal et rationale; nulla autem pars integralis praedicatur de toto.	1462. Now his statement here that a part of the definition of a thing is related to a part of the thing as the definition is related to the thing, seems to involve a difficulty; for the definition is the same as the thing. Hence it seems to follow that the parts of the definition are the same as the parts of the thing; and this seems to be false. For the parts of the definition are predicated of the thing defined, as animal and rational are predicated of man, but no integral part is predicated of a whole.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 4 Sed dicendum est, quod partes definitionis significant partes rei, inquantum a partibus rei sumuntur partes definitionis; non ita quod partes definitionis sint partes rei. Non enim animal est pars hominis, neque rationale; sed animal sumitur ab una parte, et rationale ab alia. Animal enim est quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet rationem. Natura autem sensitiva est ut materialis respectu rationis. Et inde est quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia a forma, species autem a forma et materia simul. Nam homo est, quod habet rationem in natura sensitiva.	1463. But it must be remarked that the parts of a definition signify the parts of a thing inasmuch as the parts of a definition are derived from the parts of a thing, yet not so that the parts of a definition are the parts of a thing. For neither animal nor rational are parts of man, but animal is taken from one part and rational from another; for an animal is a thing having a sentient nature, and a rational being is one having reason. Now sentient nature has the character of matter in relation to reason. And this is why genus is taken from matter and difference from form, and species from both matter and form together; for man is a thing having reason in a sentient nature.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit secundam dubitationem, quae est de prioritate partium. Omnes enim partes videntur esse priores toto, sicut simplex composito. Acutus enim angulus est pars recti anguli. Dividitur enim rectus angulus in duos vel plures angulos acutos. Et similiter digitus est pars hominis. Unde videtur, quod acutus angulus sit naturaliter prior recto, et digitus prior homine.	1464. Further, if parts (623). Then he gives the second difficulty; and this has to do with the priority of parts. For all parts seem to be prior to a whole as simple things are prior to what is composite, because an acute angle is prior to a right angle, since a right angle is divided into two or more acute angles, and in the same way a finger is prior to a man. Hence it seems that an acute angle is naturally prior to a right angle, and a finger prior to a man.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 6 Sed e contra videntur illa esse priora, scilicet rectus acuto, et homo digito. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem secundum rationem. Per huic enim modum illa dicuntur esse priora, quae in eorum rationibus ponuntur, et non e contrario. Acutus enim et digitus dicuntur esse secundum rationem, idest definiuntur ex illis, scilicet homine et recto, ut dictum est. Unde videtur, quod homo et rectus angulus sint priores digito et acuto angulo.	1465. But, on the other hand, the latter seem to be prior; namely, a right angle seems to be prior to an acute angle, and a man to a finger, and this seems to be so for two reasons. First, they are prior in meaning; for in this way those things which are given in the intelligible expression of other things are said to be prior to them, and not the other way around; “For in their intelligible expression an acute angle and a finger are explained from these,” i.e., they are defined in reference to these, namely, to man and to right angle, as we have stated. Hence it seems that a man and a right angle are prior to a finger and to an acute angle.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 7 Secundo vero prout dicuntur esse aliqua priora ex eo, quod est esse sine invicem. Quae enim possunt esse sine aliis, et non e contrario, dicuntur esse priora, ut in quinto est habitum, sicut unum duobus. Homo autem potest esse sine digito. Digitus autem non potest esse sine homine, quia digitus abscisus non est digitus, ut infra dicetur. Unde videtur, quod homo sit prior digito. Et eadem ratio est de recto et acuto.	1466. Second, some things are said to he prior because they can exist without others, for those things which can exist without others, and not the reverse, are said to be prior, as is stated in Book V (465:C 950); for example, the number one can exist without the number two. Now a man can exist without a finger, but not a finger without a man, because a finger which has been severed from the body is not a finger, as is stated below (626:C 1488). Hence it seems that a man is prior to a finger; and the same reasoning applies to a right angle and to an acute angle.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit aut multipliciter solvit propositas quaestiones; et dividitur in tres partes. In prima ponit solutionem. In secunda exponit eam, ibi, dictum est igitur nunc ipsum. Tertio determinat quamdam dubitationem, quae ex praedicta solutione oriri potest, ibi, dubitatur autem merito. Ad evidentiam autem horum, quae in hoc capitulo dicuntur, sciendum est, quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt, quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt, quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorumdam sequentium eum.	1467. Or perhaps (624). Then he solves the difficulties which were raised; and this is divided into two parts. In the first he gives the solution. In the second (625:C 1482) he explains it (“The truth, then”). In the third (629:C 1501), he settles a problem that could arise from the foregoing solution (“Now the problem”). In support of what has been said in this chapter it should be noted that there are two opinions about the definitions of things and their essences. Some say that the whole essence of a species is the form; for example, the whole essence of man is his soul. And for this reason they say thaf in reality the form of the whole, which is signified by the word humanity, is the same as the form of the part, which is signified by the word soul, but that they differ only in definition; for the form of the part is so designated inasmuch as it perfects the matter and makes it to be actual, but the form of the whole is so designated inasmuch as the whole which is constituted by it is placed in its species. And for this reason they think that no material parts are given in the definition which designates the species, but only the formal principles of the species. This appears to be the opinion of Averroes and of certain of his followers.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 9 Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim superius in sexto, quod res naturales habent in sui definitione materiam sensibilem, et in hoc differunt a mathematicis. Non autem potest dici, quod substantiae naturales definiantur per id quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. Unde relinquitur quod materia sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de individuis, sed de speciebus.	1468. But this seems to be opposed to the opinion of Aristotle; for he says above, in Book VI (535:C 1158), that natural things have sensible matter in their definition, and in this respect they differ from the objects of mathematics. Now it cannot be said that natural substances are defined by something that does not pertain to their being; for substances are not defined by addition but only accidents, as was stated above (587:C 1352). Hence it follows that sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, and not only of individuals but also of species themselves; for it is not individuals that are defined but species.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 10 Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam quidditas speciei, est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias. Et haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo, quam introducit ad excludendum opinionem Platonis de ideis. Dicebat enim species rerum naturalium esse per se existentes sine materia sensibili, quasi materia sensibilis non esset aliquo modo pars speciei. Ostenso ergo, quod materia sensibilis sit pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, ostenditur quod impossibile est esse species rerum naturalium sine materia sensibili, sicut hominem sine carnibus et ossibus, et sic de aliis.	1469. And from this arises the other opinion, which Avicenna entertains. According to this opinion the form of the whole, which is the quiddity of the species, differs from the form of the part as a whole differs from a part; for the quiddity of a species is composed of matter and form, although not of this individual matter and this individual form; for it is an individual, such as Socrates or Callias, that is composed of these. This is the view which Aristotle introduces in this chapter in order to reject Plato’s opinion about the Ideas; for Plato said that the forms of natural things have being of themselves without sensible matter, as though sensible matter were in no way a part of their species. Therefore, having shown that sensible matter is a part of the species of natural things, he now shows that there cannot be species of natural things without sensible matter; for example, the species man cannot exist without flesh and bones; and the same is true in other cases.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 11 Et hic erit tertius modus destruendi ideas. Nam primo destruxit per hoc quod quod quid erat esse non est separatum ab eo cuius est. Secundo per hoc, quod species separatae a materia non sunt causae generationis, neque per modum generantis, neque per modum exemplaris. Nunc autem tertio improbat eam per hoc quod materia sensibilis in communi est ratio speciei.	1470. Now this will constitute the third method by which the Ideas are rejected; for Aristotle rejected them, first, on the grounds that the essence of a thing does not exist apart from the thing to which it belongs; second, on the grounds that forms existing apart from matter are not causes of generation either in the manner of a generator or in that of an exemplar. And now in this third way he rejects Plato’s thesis on the grounds that the intelligible expression of a species includes common sensible matter.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 12 Dicit ergo solvendo, quod multipliciter dicitur pars, sicut in quinto est habitum. Et uno modo dicitur pars quantitativa, hoc scilicet quod mensurat totum secundum quantitatem, sicut bicubitum est pars cubiti, et binarius senarii. Sed hic modus partium praetermittatur ad praesens; non enim intendimus hic inquirere partes quantitatis; sed intendimus inquirere de partibus definitionis, quae significant substantiam rei. Unde perscrutandum est de illis partibus ex quibus substantia rei componitur.	1471. Hence in solving this difficulty (624) he says that the word part is used in several senses, as was explained in Book V (515:C 1093); for example, in one sense it means a quantitative part, i.e., one which measures a whole quantitatively, as half a cubit is part of a cubit, and the number two is part of the number six. But this type of part is at present omitted, because it is not his aim here to investigate the parts of quantity, but those of a definition, which signifies a thing’s substance. Hence it is necessary to investigate the parts of which a thing’s substance is composed.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 13 Pars autem substantiae est et materia, et forma, et ex quibus est aliquid compositum. Et quodlibet istorum trium, scilicet materia et forma et compositum ex his, est substantia, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo materia est quidem quodam modo pars alicuius, quodam modo non est, sed solum illa, ex quibus est ratio speciei, idest formae. Intelligimus enim concavitatem quasi formam, et nasum materiam, et simum quasi compositum. Et secundum hoc caro, quae est materia vel pars materiae, non est pars concavitatis, quae est forma vel species; nam caro est materia, in qua fit species. Sed tamen caro est aliqua pars simitatis, si tamen simitas intelligitur esse quoddam compositum, et non solum forma. Et similiter totius quidem statuae, quae est composita ex materia et forma, pars est aes; non autem est pars statuae secundum quod statua accipitur solum pro specie, idest pro forma.	1472. Now the parts of substance are matter and form and the composite of these; and any one of these three—matter, form and the composite—is substance, as was stated above (569)C 1276). Therefore in one sense matter is part of a thing, and in another sense it is not, but this is true “of those things of which the intelligible expression or specifying principle consists,” i.e., the form; for we understand concavity as form and nose as matter, and snub as the composite. And according to this, flesh, which is the matter or a part of the matter, is not a part of concavity, which is the form or specifying principle; for flesh is the matter in which the form is produced. Yet flesh is some part of snub, provided that snub is understood to be a composite and not merely a form. Similarly, bronze is a part of the whole statue, which is composed of matter and form; but it is not a part of’ the statue insofar as statue is taken here in the sense of the specifying principle, or form.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 14 Et ut sciatur quid est species, et quid est materia, dicendum est illud ad speciem pertinere, quod convenit unicuique inquantum speciem habet. Sicuti inquantum habet speciem statuae, convenit alicui quod sit figuratum, vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Sed id quod est materiale ad speciem, nunquam dicendum est secundum se de specie. Sciendum tamen est, quod nulla materia, nec communis, nec individuata secundum se se habet ad speciem prout sumitur pro forma. Sed secundum quod species sumitur pro universali, sicut hominem dicimus esse speciem, sic materia communis per se pertinet ad speciem, non autem materia individualis, in qua natura speciei accipitur.	1473. And to insure an understanding of what the specifying principle is and what the matter is, it is necessary to point out that anything which belongs to a thing inasmuch as it has a specific form belongs to its specific form; for example, inasmuch as a thing has the form of a statue, it is proper for it to have a shape or some such quality. But what is related to a form as its matter must never be predicated essentially of a form. Yet it must be noted that no kind of matter, be it common or individual, is related essentially to a species insofar as species is taken in the sense of a form, but insofar as it is taken in the sense of a universal; for example, when we say that man is a species, common matter then pertains essentially to the species, but not individual matter, in which the nature of the form is included.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 15 Et ideo dicendum est, quod definitio circuli non continet in se definitionem incisionum, idest partium ex circulo incisarum, vel semicirculi vel quartae partis circuli. Sed definitio, quae est syllabae, comprehendit in se definitionem, quae est elementorum, idest litterarum. Et huius ratio est, quia elementa, idest literae, sunt partes syllabae quantum ad speciem suam, et non secundum materiam. Ipsa enim forma syllabae in hoc consistit, quod ex literis componatur. Sed incisiones circuli sunt partes non circuli secundum speciem accepti, sed huius circuli particularis, vel horum circulorum, sicut materia in qua fit species circuli.	1474. Hence it must be said that the definition of a circle is not included in “the definition of its segments,” i.e., the parts divided from a circle, whether they be semicircles or quarter circles. But the definition of a syllable includes that “of its elements,” or letters; and the reason is that “the elements,” or letters, are parts of a syllable with reference to its form, but not to its matter; for the form of a syllable consists in being composed of letters. The divisions of a circle, however, are not parts of a circle taken formally, but of this part of a circle, or of these circles, as the matter in which the form of a circle is produced.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 16 Et hoc accipi potest ex regula superius posita. Hoc enim dixit ad speciem pertinere, quod secundum se inest unicuique speciem habenti; ad materiam vero quod accidit speciei. Per se autem inest syllabae, quod ex literis componatur. Quod autem circulus sit actu divisus in semicirculos, hoc accidit circulo, non inquantum est circulus, sed inquantum est hic circulus, cuius haec linea dividitur quae est pars eius ut materia. Unde patet, quod semicirculus est pars circuli secundum materiam individualem. Unde ista materia, quae est haec linea, est propinquior speciei quam aes, quod est materia sensibilis, quando rotunditas quae est forma circuli, fit in aere. Quia species circuli nunquam est praeter lineam, est autem praeter aes. Et sicut partes circuli, quae sunt secundum materiam individualem, non ponuntur in eius definitione, ita etiam nec omnes literae ponuntur in definitione syllabae, quae scilicet sunt partes cum materia, ut literae descriptae in cera, vel prolatae in aere. Hae enim iam sunt partes syllabae, sicut materia sensibilis.	1475. This can be understood from the rule laid down above; for he had said that what belongs essentially to each thing having a form pertains to the form, and that what belongs to the matter is accidental to the specific form; but it belongs essentially to a syllable, which is composed of letters. Now the fact that a circle may be actually divided into semicircles is accidental to a circle, not as a circle, but as this circle, of which this line, which is a material part of it, is a division. Hence it is clear that a semicircle is part of a circle in reference to individual matter. Therefore this matter, i.e., this line, is more akin to the form than bronze is, which is sensible matter, when roundness, which is the form of a circle, is produced in bronze; because the form of a circle never exists apart from a line, but it does exist apart from bronze. And just as the parts of a circle, which are accidents in reference to individual matter, are not given in its definition, in a similar fashion not all letters are given in the definition of a syllable, i.e., those which are parts along with matter, for example, those inscribed in wax or produced in the air, since these are already parts of a syllable as sensible matter.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 17 Non enim oportet, quod omnes partes in quas res aliqua resoluta corrumpitur, sint partes substantiae. Non enim si linea divisa in duo dimidia corrumpitur, aut si homo resolutus in ossa et nervos et carnes corrumpitur, propter hoc sequitur quod linea sit ex dimidiis, et homo ex carnibus et ossibus, ita quod ista sint partes substantiae eius: sed sunt ex istis partibus sicut ex materia. Unde sunt partes eius quod est simul totum, idest compositum; sed speciei, idest formae, et cuius est ratio, idest eius quod definitur, non adhuc sunt partes. Quapropter nullae tales partes ponuntur in rationibus convenienter.	1476. For not all the parts into which a thing is corrupted, when it is dissolved must be parts of its substance; because even if a line when divided is dissolved into two parts, or a man into bones, sinews, and flesh, it does not therefore follow, if a line is thus composed of halves, or a man of flesh and bones, that these are parts of their substance; but these things are constituted of these parts as their matter. Hence these are parts of “the concrete whole,” or composite, “but not of the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, or “of that to which the intelligible expression belongs,” i.e., of the thing defined. Therefore no such parts are properly given in the intelligible expressions of these things.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 18 Sciendum tamen, quod ratio talium partium in quorumdam definitionibus ponitur; scilicet in definitionibus compositorum, quorum sunt partes. In quorumdam vero definitionibus non oportet poni, scilicet in definitione formarum; nisi sint tales formae, quae sint simul sumptae cum materia. Licet enim materia non sit pars formae, tamen materia sine qua non potest concipi intellectu forma, oportet quod ponatur in definitione formae; sicut corpus organicum ponitur in definitione animae. Sicut enim accidentia non habent esse perfectum nisi secundum quod sunt in subiecto, ita nec formae nisi secundum quod sunt in propriis materiis. Et propter hoc, sicuti accidentia definiuntur ex additione subiectorum, ita et forma ex additione propriae materiae. Cum igitur in definitione formae ponitur materia, est definitio ex additione; non autem cum ponitur in definitione compositi.	1477. Still it must be noted that in the definitions of some things the intelligible expressions of such parts are included, i.e., in the definitions of composite things, of which they are the parts. But in the definitions of other things this is not necessary, i.e., in the definitions of forms, unless such forms are taken along with matter. For even though matter is not part of a form, it must be given in the definition of a form, since the mind cannot conceive of a form without conceiving matter; for example, organic body is included in the definition of soul. For just as accidents have complete being only insofar as they belong to a subject, in a similar fashion forms have complete being only insofar as they belong to their proper matters. And for this reason, just as accidents are defined by adding their subjects, so too a form is defined by adding its proper matter. Hence when matter is included in the definition of a form, there is definition by addition, but not when it is included in the definition of a composite.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 19 Vel hoc quod dicit si non fuerint simul sumpta, est exemplificatio eius quod dixerat horum non oportet inesse. In illis enim partes materiae non oportet in definitionibus poni, quae scilicet non sumuntur simul cum materia, vel quae non significant aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Et hoc patet: quia propter hoc quod in quorumdam rationibus non ponitur materia, in quorumdam vero ponitur, contingit quod quaedam sint sicut ex principiis ex his in quae corrumpitur, idest ex partibus, in quas aliquid per corruptionem resolvitur. Et haec sunt illa, in quorum definitionibus ponuntur materiae. Quaedam vero non sunt ex praedictis partibus materialibus sicut ex principiis, sicut illa in quorum definitionibus non ponitur materia.	1478. Or his statement “unless taken together they constitute the intelligible expression of the thing” exemplifies his remark that “in other cases it need not include them.” For in such cases it is not necessary that the material parts should be included in the definition, i.e., in the case of those things which are not taken together with matter, or which do not signify something composed of matter and form. This is evident; for since matter is not included in the intelligible expression of some things but is included in that of others, there can be some things which “are composed of these as the principles into which they are dissolved,” i.e., the parts into which things are dissolved by corruption. And these are the things whose definitions include matter. But there are some things which are not composed of the foregoing material parts as principles, as those in whose definitions matter is not included.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 20 Et quia in istorum definitionibus ponitur materia, quae sunt simul accepta cum materia, non autem in aliis, ideo quaecumque sunt simul sumpta species cum materia, idest quaecumque significant aliquid compositum ex materia et forma, ut simum aut aereus circulus, huiusmodi corrumpuntur in partes materiales, et pars istorum est materia. Illa vero, quae non concipiuntur in intellectu cum materia, sed sunt omnino sine materia, sicut illa quae pertinent solum ad rationem speciei et formae, ista vel non corrumpuntur omnino, vel non corrumpuntur taliter, idest per resolutionem in aliquas partes materiales. Quaedam enim formae sunt quae nullo modo corrumpuntur, sicut substantiae intellectuales per se existentes. Quaedam vero formae non per se existentes, corrumpuntur per accidens, corrupto subiecto.	1479. And since matter is included in the definitions of those things which are taken together with matter but not in those of others, “hence all things which are matter and form taken together.” i.e., all things which signify something composed of matter and form, such as snub or brazen circle, such things are corrupted into material parts, and one of these is matter. But those things which are not conceived by the mind with matter but lack matter altogether, as those which belong to the notion of the species or form alone, these are not corrupted “in such a way as this,” i.e., by being dissolved into certain material parts. For some forms are corrupted in no way, as the intellectual substances, which exist of themselves, whereas others which do not exist of themselves are corrupted accidentally when their subject is corrupted.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 21 Quare patet, quod huiusmodi partes materiales sunt principia et partes eorum quae sunt sub ipsis, idest quae ab eis dependent, sicut dependet totum ex partibus ex quibus componitur; non autem sunt partes nec principia speciei. Et propter hoc, compositum, ut statua lutea, corrumpitur resoluta in materiam, idest in lutum, et sphaera aerea, in aes, et Callias, qui est homo particularis, in carnem et ossa. Et similiter circulus particularis constans ex his lineis divisis, corrumpitur in incisiones. Sicut enim Callias est aliquis homo qui concipitur cum materia individuali, ita circulus, cuius sunt partes istae incisiones, est aliquis circulus particularis, qui concipitur cum individuali materia. Hoc tamen differt quia singulares homines habent nomen proprium. Unde nomen speciei non aequivocatur ad individua: sed nomen circuli aequivoce dicitur de circulo qui simpliciter, idest universaliter dicitur, et de singulis particularibus circulis. Et hoc ideo quia singulis particularibus circulis non sunt nomina posita, sed nomina posita sunt singularium hominum.	1480. Hence it is evident that material parts of this kind are the principles and parts of those things “which come under these,” i.e., which depend on these, as a whole depends on its component parts; yet they are neither parts nor principles of the form. And for this reason when a composite, such as a statue made of clay, is corrupted, “it is dissolved into its matter,” i.e., into clay, as a brazen sphere is dissolved into bronze, and as Callias, who is a particular man, is dissolved into flesh and bones. Similarly a particular circle depending on these divided lines is corrupted into its segments; for just as Callias is a man conceived with individual matter, so too a circle whose parts are these particular segments is a particular circle conceived with individual matter. Yet there is this difference, that singular men have a proper name, and therefore the name of the species is not applied equivocally to the individual, but the term circle is applied equivocally to the circle “which is called such in an unqualified sense,” i.e., in a universal sense, and to singular particular circles. And the reason is that names are not given to several particular circles but they are given to particular men.
lib. 7 l. 9 n. 22 Attendendum est autem, quod nomen speciei non aequivoce praedicatur de individuo, secundum quod praedicat de eo communem naturam speciei: praedicaretur autem aequivoce de eo, si praedicaretur inquantum significaret hoc individuum prout huiusmodi. Si enim dicam, Socrates est homo, non aequivocatur nomen hominis. Sed si hoc nomen homo, imponatur alicui singulari homini ut proprium nomen, aequivoce significabit speciem, et hoc individuum. Et similiter de nomine circuli, quod aequivoce significat speciem et hunc circulum.	1481. Moreover it must be noted that the name of the species is not predicated of the individual in the sense that it refers the common nature of the species to it, but it is predicated of it equivocally, if it is predicated in such a way that it signifies this individual as such; for if I say “Socrates is a man,” the word man is not used equivocally. But if this word man is imposed as a proper name on some individual man, it will signify both the species and this individual equivocally. It is similar in the case of the word circle, which signifies the species and this particular circle equivocally.