Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber9/lect1

Lecture 1

Latin	English
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 1 Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente secundum quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, hic intendit determinare de ente secundum quod dividitur per potentiam et actum. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad praecedentia, et manifestat suam intentionem in hoc libro. In secunda prosequitur quod intendit, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet de substantia. Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. Et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi.	1768. Having established the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out his announced plan. He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings— quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of Book VII (1347).
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 2 Sed quia ens dividitur uno modo secundum quod dicitur quid, scilicet substantia, aut quantitas, aut qualitas, quod est dividere ens per decem praedicamenta: alio modo secundum quod dividitur per potentiam et actum vel operationem, a qua derivatum est nomen actus, ut postea dicetur; oportet nunc determinare de potentia et actu.	1769. But being is variously divided. (1) One division is based on its designation as whatness (i.e., substance), quantity or quality, which is its division into the ten categories. (2) Another is its division into potency and actuality or activity, from which the word actuality [or act] is derived, as is explained later on (1805). And for this reason it is now necessary to deal with potency and actuality.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 3 Et primo de potentia quae maxime dicitur proprie, non tamen utile est ad praesentem intentionem. Potentia enim et actus, ut plurimum, dicuntur in his quae sunt in motu, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Sed principalis intentio huius doctrinae non est de potentia et actu secundum quod sunt in rebus mobilibus solum, sed secundum quod sequuntur ens commune. Unde et in rebus immobilibus invenitur potentia et actus, sicut in rebus intellectualibus.	1770. It is first necessary to speak of potency in its most proper sense, although not the one which is most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality are referred in most cases to things in motion, because motion is the actuality of a being in potency. But the principal aim of this branch of science is to consider potency and actuality, not insofar as they are found in mobile beings, but insofar as they accompany being in general. Hence potency and actuality are also found in immobile beings, for example, in intellectual ones.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 4 Sed cum dixerimus de potentia, quae est in rebus mobilibus, et de actu, ei correspondente, ostendere poterimus et de potentia et actu secundum quod sunt in rebus intelligibilibus, quae pertinent ad substantias separatas, de quibus postea agetur. Et hic est ordo conveniens, cum sensibilia quae sunt in motu sint nobis magis manifesta. Et ideo per ea devenimus in cognitionem substantiarum rerum immobilium.	1771. And when we shall have spoken about the potency found in mobile things, and about its corresponding actuality, we will also be able to explain potency and actuality insofar as they are found in the intelligible things classed as separate substances, which are treated later on (1867). This order is a fitting one, since sensible things, which are in motion, are more evident to us, and therefore by means of them we may attain a knowledge of the substances of immobile things.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 5 Ex quo etiam apparet sensus alterius literae quae sic habet, et quidem potentia quae dicitur proprie, non solum utilis est ad quod volumus nunc: quia licet potentia quae est in rebus mobilibus maxime proprie dicatur, non tamen hoc solum dicitur potentia, ut dictum est. Et utilis est ad praesentem intentionem, non quasi de ea principaliter intendatur, sed quia per eam in alias potentias devenimus.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit quod quidem determinat de potentia et actu; et dividitur in partes tres. In prima determinat de potentia. In secunda de actu, ibi, quoniam autem de potentia secundum motum. In tertia de comparatione actus ad potentiam, ibi, quoniam autem ipsum prius determinatum est. Prima dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinavit de potentia secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad ea in quibus est, ibi, quoniam autem haec quidem in inanimatis. Prima in duas. In prima determinat de potentia. In secunda de impotentia, ibi, et impotentia et impossibile. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quot modis dicitur potentia. Secundo manifestat quamdam veritatem ex praemissis circa potentiam, ibi, palam igitur quia est quidem, ut una. Dicit ergo primo, quod determinatum est in aliis, scilicet quinto huius, quod multipliciter dicitur potentia et posse. Sed ista multiplicitas quantum ad quosdam modos est multiplicitas aequivocationis, sed quantum ad quosdam analogiae. Quaedam enim dicuntur possibilia vel impossibilia, eo quod habent aliquod principium in seipsis; et hoc secundum quosdam modos, secundum quos omnes dicuntur potentiae non aequivoce, sed analogice. Aliqua vero dicuntur possibilia vel potentia, non propter aliquod principium quod in seipsis habeant; et in illis dicitur potentia aequivoce.	1773. That the terms (743). Then he deals with potency and actuality; and this is divided into three parts. In the first he discusses potency; and in the second (1823), actuality; and in the third (1844), the relationship of actuality to potency. The first is divided into two parts. In the first of these he discusses potency itself. In the second (1787) he discusses potency in relation to the things in which it is found. The first is divided into two parts. In the first he deals with potency; and in the second (1784), with incapacity. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains the different senses of potency. Second (1781), he makes evident a truth about potency from the things previously laid down. He accordingly says, first, that it has been shown elsewhere, i.e., in Book V of this work (954) that the words potency and can have a multiplicity of meanings. But in some cases this multiplicity is a multiplicity of equivocation, and in others it is a multiplicity of analogy. For (1) some things are said to be capable or incapable because they have some principle (+) within themselves, and this refers to those senses in which all potencies are said to be such not equivocally but analogously. (2) But other things are not said to be capable or able because of some principle which they have (~) within themselves; and in their case the term potency is used equivocally.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 7 Dicit ergo quod de modis potentiae illi praetermittendi sunt ad praesens, secundum quod potentia dicitur aequivoce. In quibusdam enim dicitur potentia non propter aliquod principium habitum, sed propter similitudinem quamdam, sicut in geometricis. Dicitur enim potentia alicuius lineae esse quadratum eius; et dicitur quod linea potest in suum quadratum. Et simili modo potest dici in numeris, quod ternarius potest in novenarium quod est quadratum eius, eo quod ex ductu eius in seipsum facit novenarium. Ter enim tria novem faciunt. Ex linea etiam, quae est radix quadrati, ducta in seipsam fit quadratum. Et similiter est in numeris. Unde radix quadrati habet aliquam similitudinem cum materia, ex qua fit res. Et propter hoc per quamdam similitudinem dicitur potens in quadratum, sicut dicitur materia potens in rem.	1774. Therefore, with regard to those senses in which the term potency is used equivocally, he says that these must be dismissed for the present. For the term potency is referred to some things, not because of some principle which they have, but in a figurative sense, (1) as is done in geometry; for the square of a line is called its power (potentia), and a line is said to be capable of becoming its square. (2) And similarly in the case of numbers it can be said that the number three is capable of becoming the number nine, which is its square; because when the number three is multiplied by itself the number nine results, for three times three makes nine; and when a line, which is the root of a square, is multiplied by itself, a square results. And the same thing applies in the case of numbers. Hence the root of a square bears some likeness to the matter from which a thing is made; and for this reason the root is said to be capable of becoming its square as matter is capable of becoming a thing.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 8 Similiter in logicis dicimus aliqua esse possibilia et impossibilia, non propter aliquam potentiam, sed eo quod aliquo modo sunt aut non sunt. Possibilia enim dicuntur, quorum opposita contingit esse vera. Impossibilia vero, quorum opposita non contingit esse vera. Et haec diversitas est propter habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum, quod quandoque est repugnans subiecto, sicut in impossibilibus; quandoque vero non, sicut in possibilibus.	1775. And (3) similarly in the considerations of logic we say that some things are possible or impossible, not because of some potency, but because they either are or are not in some way; for those things are called possible whose opposites can be true, whereas those are called impossible whose opposites cannot be true. This difference depends on the relationship of predicate to subject, because sometimes the predicate is repugnant to the subject, as in the case of impossible things, and sometimes it is not, as in the case of possible things.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 9 His ergo modis praetermissis, considerandum est de potentiis, quae reducuntur ad unam speciem, quia quaelibet earum est principium quoddam, et omnes potentiae sic dictae reducuntur ad aliquod principium ex quo omnes aliae dicuntur. Et hoc est principium activum, quod est principium transmutationis in alio inquantum est aliud. Et hoc dicit, quia possibile est quod principium activum simul sit in ipso mobili vel passo, sicut cum aliquid movet seipsum; non tamen secundum idem est movens et motum, agens et patiens. Et ideo dicitur quod principium quod dicitur potentia activa, est principium transmutationis in alio inquantum est aliud; quia etsi contingat principium activum esse in eodem cum passo, non tamen secundum quod est idem, sed secundum quod est aliud.	1776. Passing over these senses of potency, then, we must consider those potencies which are reduced to one species, because each of these is a principle. And all potencies spoken of in this sense are reduced to some principle from which all the others derive their meaning; and this is an active principle, which is the source of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other. He says this because it is possible for an active principle to be at the same time in the mobile or patient, as when something moves itself; although it is not mover and moved, or agent and patient, in the same respect. Hence the principle designated as active potency is said to be a principle of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other; because, even though an active principle can be found in the same thing as a passive principle, this still does not happen insofar as it is the same, but insofar as it is other.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 10 Et quod ad illud principium quod dicitur potentia activa, reducantur aliae potentiae, manifestum est. Nam alio modo dicitur potentia passiva, quae est principium quod aliquid moveatur ab alio, inquantum est aliud. Et hoc dicit, quia etsi idem patiatur a seipso, non tamen secundum idem, sed secundum aliud. Haec autem potentia reducitur ad primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur. Et propter hoc etiam potentia passiva reducitur ad activam.	1777. That the other potencies are reduced to this principle which is called active potency is evident; for in one sense passive potency means the principle by which one thing is moved by some other thing inasmuch as it is other. He says this because, even if the same thing might be acted upon by itself, this still does not happen insofar as it is the same, but insofar as it is other. Now this potency is reduced to a first active potency, because when anything undergoes change this is caused by an agent. And for this reason passive potency is also reduced to active potency.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 11 Alio modo dicitur potentia quidam habitus impassibilitatis eius quae est in deterius, idest dispositio quaedam ex qua aliquid habet quod non possit pati transmutationem in deterius, et hoc est quod non possit pati corruptionem ab alio inquantum est aliud, scilicet a principio transmutationis quod est principium activum.	1778. In another sense potency means a certain state of insusceptibility (or impossibility) “to change for the worse,” i.e., a disposition whereby a thing is such that it cannot undergo change for the worse; i.e., that it cannot undergo corruption as a result of some other thing “inasmuch as it is other,” namely, by a principle of change which is an active principle.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 12 Manifestum est autem quod uterque istorum modorum dicitur per comparationem alicuius existentis in nobis ad passionem. In quorum uno dicitur potentia propter principium ex quo aliquis potest non pati; in alio autem propter principium ex quo quis potest pati. Unde, cum passio ab actione dependeat, oportet quod in definitione utriusque illorum modorum ponatur definitio potentiae primae, scilicet activae. Et ita istae duae reducuntur ad primam, scilicet ad potentiam activam sicut ad priorem.	1779. Now it is evident that both of these senses of potency imply something within us which is referred to the undergoing of a change. For (1) in the one sense the term designates a principle by reason of which someone cannot be acted upon; and (2) in the other sense it designates a principle by reason of which someone can be acted upon. Hence, since the state of being acted upon depends on action, the definition “of the primary kind of potency,” namely, active potency, must be given in the definition of both senses of potency. Thus these two senses of potency are reduced to the first, namely, to active potency, as to something prior.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 13 Iterum alio modo dicuntur potentiae non solum per ordinem ad facere et pati, sed per ordinem ad hoc quod est bene in utroque; sicut dicimus aliquem potentem ambulare, non quod possit ambulare quoquo modo, sed eo quod possit bene ambulare. Et e converso dicimus esse de claudicante, quod non possit ambulare. Similiter dicimus ligna combustibilia eo quod comburi possint de facili. Ligna vero viridia, quae non de facili comburuntur, dicimus incombustibilia. Unde manifestum est quod in definitione harum potentiarum, quae dicuntur respectu bene agere vel pati, includuntur rationes primarum potentiarum, quae dicebantur simpliciter agere et pati: sicut in bene agere includitur agere; et pati, in eo quod est bene pati. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti modi potentiarum reducuntur ad unum primum, scilicet ad potentiam activam. Et inde patet quod haec multiplicitas non est secundum aequivocationem, sed secundum analogiam.	1780. Again, in another sense potencies are spoken of not only in relation to acting and being acted upon but in relation to what is done well in each case. For example, we say that someone is capable of walking, not because he can walk in any way at all, but because he can walk well; and in an opposite sense we say of one who limps that he cannot walk. Similarly, we say that wood is capable of being burned because it can be burned easily; but we say that green wood is incapable of being burned because it cannot be burned easily. Hence it is clear that in the definitions of those potencies which are described as potencies for acting and being acted upon well, there are included the concepts of those primary potencies which were described as potencies for acting and being acted upon without qualification; for example, to act is included in to act and to be acted upon is included in to be acted upon well. Hence it is obvious that all of these senses of potency are reduced to one primary sense, namely, to active potency; and therefore it is also evident that this multiplicity is not the multiplicity of equivocation but of analogy.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit palam igitur ex praedictis quamdam veritatem circa praedictas potentias manifestat; et dicit, quod potentia faciendi et patiendi est quodammodo una potentia, et quodammodo non. Una quidem est, si consideretur ordo unius ad aliam; una enim dicitur per respectum ad alteram. Potest enim dici aliquid habens potentiam patiendi, quia ipsum habet per se potentiam ut patiatur, vel eo quod habet potentiam ut aliud patiatur ab ipso. Et hoc secundo modo potentia activa est idem cum passiva: ex eo enim quod aliquid habet potentiam activam, habet potentiam ut patiatur aliud ab ipso.	1781. It is evident, then (744). From what has been said he now indicates something that is true about the foregoing potencies. He says that in one sense the potency for acting and that for being acted upon are one, and in another sense they are not. (1) They are one potency if the relationship of the one to the other is considered; for one is spoken of in reference to the other. For a thing can be said to have a potency for being acted upon, either because it has of itself a potency by which it may be acted upon, or because it has a potency by which something else may be acted upon by it. And in this second sense active potency is the same as passive potency; for by reason of the fact that a thing has active potency it has a power by which something else may be acted upon by it.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 15 Si autem considerentur hae duae potentiae, activa scilicet et passiva, secundum subiectum, in quibus sunt, sic est alia potentia activa et alia passiva. Potentia enim passiva est in patiente, quia patiens patitur propter aliquod principium in ipso existens, et huiusmodi est materia. Potentia autem passiva nihil aliud est quam principium patiendi ab alio. Sicut comburi quoddam pati est; et principium materiale propter quod aliquid est aptum combustioni, est pingue vel crassum. Unde ipsa potentia est in combustibili quasi passiva. Et similiter illud quod sic cedit tangenti ut impressionem quamdam recipiat, sicut cera vel aliquid huiusmodi, inquantum tale est frangibile. Vel suppositum, idest masculinum, est subiectum proprium huius passionis, quae est eunuchizari. Et similiter est in aliis, quae patiuntur, secundum quod in eis est principium quoddam patiendi, quod dicitur potentia passiva. Potentia vero activa est in agente, ut calor in calefactivo, et ars aedificativa in aedificante.	1782. (2) However, if these two potencies—active and passive—are taken in reference to the subject in which they are found, then in this sense active and passive potency are different; for passive potency exists in a patient, since a patient is acted upon by reason of some principle existing within itself; and matter is of this sort. Now passive potency is nothing but the principle by which one thing is acted upon by another; for example, to be burned is to undergo a change, and the material principle by reason of which a thing is capable of being burned is the oily or the fat. Hence the potency itself is present as a passive principle in the thing capable of being burned. And similarly what yields to the thing touching it so that it receives an impression from it, as wax or something of this sort, is capable of doing so inasmuch as it is impressionable. “And the supposit,” i.e., the male, is the proper subject of the modification resulting in an eunuch. The same is true of other things which are acted upon insofar as they have within themselves a principle for being acted upon, which is called passive potency. But active potency is in the agent, as heat in the thing which heats and the art of building in the builder.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 16 Et quia potentia activa et passiva in diversis sunt, manifestum est quod nihil patitur a seipso, inquantum aliquid est aptum natum agere vel pati. Per accidens autem aliquid pati contingit a seipso; sicut medicus sanat seipsum, non ut medicum, sed sicut infirmum. Ideo autem non patitur aliquid a seipso, quia per se loquendo, alicui uni et eidem inest unum dictorum principiorum et non aliud. Cui enim inest principium agendi, non inest principium patiendi, nisi secundum accidens, ut dictum est.	1783. And since active potency and passive potency are present in different things, it is obvious that nothing is acted upon by itself inasmuch as it is naturally disposed to act or to be acted upon. However, it is possible for something to be acted upon by itself accidentally, as a physician heals himself not inasmuch as he is a physician but inasmuch as he is ill. But in this case a thing is not acted upon by itself, because, properly speaking, one of the aforesaid principles is present in one and the same thing, and not the other. For the principle of being acted upon is not present in the one having the principle of action except accidentally, as has been said (1782).
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit et impotentia determinat de impotentia; dicens, quod impotentia, quia est contraria dictae potentiae, et impossibile, quod dicitur secundum huiusmodi impotentiam, est privatio praedictae potentiae. Hoc autem dicit ad differentiam impossibilis, quod significat aliquem modum falsitatis, quod non dicitur secundum aliquam impotentiam sicut nec possibile secundum aliquam potentiam. Quia enim privatio et habitus sunt eiusdem et secundum idem, necesse est quod potentia et impotentia sint eiusdem et secundum idem. Et ideo quot modis dicitur potentia, tot modis dicitur impotentia sibi opposita.	1784. And incapacity (745). Here he establishes the truth about incapacity, saying that incapacity (which is the contrary of the above-mentioned potency or capacity) or impossibility (which is referred to incapacity of this sort) is the privation of the potency in question. However, he says this to distinguish it from the impossible which signifies some mode of falsity, which is not referred to any incapacity, just as the possible is also not referred to any potency. For since privation and possession belong to the same subject and refer to the same attribute, potency and incapacity must belong to the same subject and refer to the same attribute. Hence there are as many senses of incapacity as there are of potency, to which it is opposed.
lib. 9 l. 1 n. 18 Sed sciendum est quod privatio dicitur multipliciter. Uno enim modo quicquid non habet aliquid, potest dici esse privatum; sicut si dicamus lapidem privatum visu, eo quod non habet visum. Alio modo dicitur privatum solum quod est aptum natum habere, et non habet. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo universaliter quando non habet; sicut si dicatur canis privatus visu, quando non habet visum. Alio modo si non habet, quando aptus natus est habere. Unde canis ante nonum diem non dicitur privatus visu. Et iterum hoc diversificatur. Nam uno modo dicitur privatum eo quod non habet aliquo modo determinato, scilicet perfecte et bene; sicut cum vocamus caecum eum qui non bene videt. Alio modo quando non habet omnino; sicut dicimus privatum visu, qui omnino visum non habet. Quandoque vero in ratione privationis includitur violentia. Unde quaedam dicimus privari, quando per violentiam amiserunt ea quae nata sunt habere.	1785. But it must be noted that the term privation is used in many senses. For in one sense whatever does not have some attribute can be said to be deprived of it, as when we say that a stone is deprived of sight because it does not have sight; and in another sense a thing is said to be deprived only of what it can have and does not have. And this may happen in two ways: in one way when the thing does not have it at all, as a dog is said to be deprived of sight when it does not have it; and, in another way, if it does not have it when it is naturally disposed to have it. Hence a dog is not said to be deprived of sight before the ninth day. This sense of privation is again divided. For in one sense a thing is said to be deprived of some attribute because it does not have it in a particular way, namely, completely and well; as when we say that someone who does not see well is blind. And in another sense a thing is said to be deprived of some attribute when it does not have it in any way at all; for example, we say that a person is deprived of sight who does not have sight at all. But sometimes force is included in the notion of privation, and then we say that some things are deprived of certain attributes when those which they are naturally disposed to have are removed by force.