Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber9/lect8

Lecture 8

Latin	English
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quod actus est prior potentia, ratione, et tempore quodammodo, hic ostendit, quod sit prior secundum substantiam: quod erat superius tertio propositum. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit propositum rationibus sumptis ex his, quae quandoque sunt in potentia quandoque in actu. In secunda vero per comparationem sempiternorum quae semper sunt actu ad mobilia quae quandoque sunt in potentia, quandoque in actu, ibi, at vero magis proprie. Et quia esse prius secundum substantiam est esse prius perfectione, perfectio autem attribuitur duabus causis, scilicet formae et fini; ideo duabus rationibus in parte prima utitur ad propositum ostendendum. Quarum prima sumitur ex parte formae. Secunda ex parte finis, quae ponitur ibi, et quia omne ad principium vadit. Dicit ergo primo, quod non solum actus est prior potentia et ratione et tempore sed substantia, idest perfectione. Nomine enim substantiae consuevit forma significari per quam aliquid est perfectum. Et hoc quidem primum apparet tali ratione: quia ea quae sunt posteriora in generatione, sunt priora secundum substantiam et speciem, idest perfectione, quia generatio semper procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum, sicut vir est posterior generatione quam puer, nam ex puero fit vir, et homo posterius generatione quam sperma. Et hoc ideo quia vir et homo iam habent speciem perfectam, puer autem et sperma nondum. Cum igitur in eodem secundum numerum actus generatione et tempore sit posterior potentia, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod actus sit prior potentia substantia et ratione.	1856. Having shown that actuality is prior to potency in intelligibility and in one sense in time, the Philosopher now shows that it is prior in substance. This was the third way given above (1845) in which actuality is prior to potency. This is divided into two parts. In the first part he proves his thesis by arguments taken from things which are sometimes potential and sometimes actual. In the second part (1867) he proves his thesis by comparing eternal things, which are always actual, with mobile things, which are sometimes actual and sometimes potential (“But actuality”). And since to be prior in substance is to be prior in perfection, and since perfection is attributed to two things, namely, to the form and to the goal [or end], therefore in the first part he uses two arguments to prove his thesis. The first of these pertains to the form, and the second (1857) to the goal, given at the words, “And because.” He accordingly says, first, that actuality is prior to potency not only in intelligibility and in time “but in substance,” i.e., in perfection; for the form by which something is perfected is customarily signified by the term substance. This first part is made clear by this argument: those things which are subsequent in generation are “prior in substance and form,” i.e., in perfection, because the process of generation always goes from what is imperfect to what is perfect; for example, in the process of generation man is subsequent to boy, because man comes from boy; and human being is subsequent to seed. The reason is that man and human being already have a perfect form, whereas boy and seed do not yet have such a form. Hence, since in numerically one and the same subject actuality is subsequent to potency both in generation and in time, as is evident from the above, it follows that actuality is prior to potency in substance and in intelligibility.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit et quia ostendit idem ratione sumpta a parte finis: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit rationem. Secundo manifestat quoddam in ratione suppositum, ibi, non enim ut visum habeant. Tertio determinat quoddam quod posset facere dubium circa praedicta, ibi, quoniam vero est horum. Dicit ergo primo, quod omne quod fit vadens ad finem, vadit ad quoddam principium. Nam finis cuius causa fit aliquid, est quoddam principium. Est enim prius in intentione agentis, quia eius causa fit generatio. Sed actus est finis potentiae: ergo actus est prior potentia, et principium quoddam eius.	1857. And (2) because (785). Here he proves the same point by an argument involving the goal of activity. First, he sets forth the argument. Second (1858), he explains one of the principles assumed in his argument (“For animals”). Third (1862), he settles an issue which could cause difficulty in the above argument (“But while”). He accordingly says, first, that everything which comes to be when it moves towards its goal moves towards a principle. For a goal, or that for the sake of which a thing comes to be, is a principle because it is the first thing intended by an agent, since it is that for the sake of which generation takes place. But actuality is the goal of potency, and therefore actuality is prior to potency and is one of its principles.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit non enim ostendit quod supra posuerat, scilicet quod actus sit finis potentiae. Quod quidem primo manifestat in potentiis activis naturalibus; dicens, quod animalia non vident ut habeant potentiam visivam; sed magis habent potentiam visivam ut videant. Et sic manifestum est quod potentia est propter actum, et non e converso.	1858. For animals (786). He now explains the position which he maintained above, namely, that actuality is the goal of potency. He makes this clear, first, in the case of natural active potencies. He says (~) that animals do not see in order that they may have the power of sight, but (+) they rather have the power of sight in order that they may see. Thus it is clear that potency exists for the sake of actuality and not vice versa.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 4 Secundo ibi, similiter autem manifestat idem in potentiis rationalibus; dicens, quod ad hoc homines potentiam habent aedificandi ut aedificent; ad hoc habent theoricam, scilicet scientiam speculativam, ut speculentur. Non autem speculantur ut habeant theoricam, nisi addiscentes, qui meditantur ea quae sunt scientiae speculativae, ut acquirant eam. Et hi non perfecte speculantur, sed quodammodo et imperfecte, ut supra dictum est; quia speculari non est propter aliquam indigentiam, sed scientia iam habita uti. Discentium autem speculatio est, quia indigent acquirere scientiam.	1859. And similarly (787). Second, he makes the same thing clear in the case of rational potencies. He says that men have the power of building in order that they may build; and they have “theoretical knowledge,” or speculative science, in order that they may speculate. However, they do not speculate in order that they may have theoretical knowledge, unless they are learning and meditating about those matters which belong to a speculative science in order that they may acquire it. And these do not speculate perfectly but to some degree and imperfectly, as has been said above (1853-55), because speculation is not undertaken because of some need but for the sake of using science already acquired. But there is speculation on the part of those who are learning because the need to acquire science.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 5 Tertio ibi, amplius autem manifestat idem in potentiis passivis; dicens, quod materia est in potentia donec veniat ad formam vel speciem; sed tunc primo est in actu, quando habet speciem. Et ita est in omnibus aliis, quae moventur propter finem. Unde, sicut docentes putant ad finem pertingere, quando demonstrant discipulum, quem instruxerunt, operantem ea quae sunt artis; ita et natura pertingit ad finem, quando consequitur actum. Et sic manifestum est quod actus est finis in motu naturali.	1860. Further, matter (788). Third he makes the same point clear in the case of passive potencies. He says that matter is in potency until it receives a form or specifying principle, but then it is first in a state of actuality when it receives its form. And this is what occurs in the case of all other things which are moved for the sake of a goal. Hence, just as those who are teaching think they have attained their goal when they exhibit their pupil whom they have instructed performing those activities which belong to his art, in a similar fashion nature attains its goal when it attains actuality. Hence it is made evident in the case of natural motion that actuality is the goal of potency.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 6 Quarto ibi, nam si non manifestat propositum deducendo ad inconveniens: dicens, quod si perfectio et finis non consisterent in actu, tunc non videretur differentia inter aliquem sapientem, sicut fuit Mercurius, et aliquem insipientem, sicut fuit Paxonas. Si enim perfectio scientiae non esset in agendo, non esset Mercurius manifestatus in sua scientia, si haberet scientiam interius, scilicet quantum ad interiorem actum, aut exterius, quantum ad exteriorem actum, sicut nec Paxonas. Nam per actum scientiae manifestatur aliquis esse sciens, et non per potentiam. Operatio enim est finis scientiae. Operatio autem est actus quidam. Propter quod, nomen actus dicitur ab operatione, ut supra dictum est. Et inde derivatum est ad formam, quae dicitur endelechia sive perfectio.	1861. For if this were not (789). Fourth, he proves his thesis by an argument from the untenable consequences. He says that if a thing’s perfection and goal do not consist in actuality, there would then seem to be no difference between someone wise, as Mercury was, and someone foolish, as Pauson was. For if the perfection of science were not in the one acting, Mercury would not have exhibited it in his own science, if he had “internal scientific knowledge,” i.e., in reference to its internal activity, “or external,” i.e., in reference to its external activity, as neither would Pauson. For it is by means of the actual use of scientific knowledge, and not by means of the potency or power, that one is shown to have a science; because activity is the goal of a science, and activity is a kind of actuality. And for this reason the term actuality is derived from activity, as has been stated above (1805); and from this it was extended to form, which is called completeness or perfection.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero manifestat quoddam quod poterat esse dubium circa praedicta. Quia enim dixerat, quod opus est finis, posset aliquis credere, quod hoc esset verum in omnibus. Sed ipse hoc removet, dicens, quod quarumdam activarum potentiarum ultimus finis est solus usus potentiae, et non aliquid operatum per actionem potentiae; sicut ultimus finis potentiae visivae est visio, et praeter eam non fit a potentia visiva aliquod opus operatum. In quibusdam vero potentiis activis fit aliquod opus praeter actionem, ut ab arte aedificativa fit domus praeter ipsam aedificationem.	1862. But while (790). He explains a point which could cause a difficulty in the foregoing argument. For since he had said that some product is the goal of activity, one could think that this is true in all cases. But he denies this, saying that the ultimate goal or end of some active potencies consists in the mere use of those potencies, and not in something produced by their activity; for example, the ultimate goal of the power of sight is the act of seeing, and there is no product resulting from the power of sight in addition to this activity. But in the case of some active potencies something else is produced in addition to the activity; for example, the art of building also produces a house in addition to the activity of building.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 8 Tamen haec differentia non facit quod in aliquibus harum potentiarum minus sit actus finis potentiae, et in aliquibus magis; quia ipsa actio est in facto, ut aedificatio in eo quod aedificatur. Et aedificatio simul fit et habet esse cum domo. Unde, si domus aut aedificatum sit finis, non excluditur quin actus sit finis potentiae.	1863. However, this difference does not cause actuality to be the goal of potency to a lesser degree in the case of some of these potencies and to a greater degree in the case of others; for the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of building in the thing being built; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house. Hence if the house, or the thing built, is the goal, this does not exclude actuality from being the goal of potency.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 9 Talis autem differentia inter praedictas potentias est consideranda, quod quando praeter actum ipsum potentiae, qui est actio, sit aliquod operatum, actio talium potentiarum est in facto, et actus facti, ut aedificatio in aedificato, et contextio in contexto, et universaliter motus in moto. Et hoc ideo, quia quando per actionem potentiae constituitur aliquod operatum, illa actio perficit operatum, et non operantem. Unde est in operato sicut actio et perfectio eius, non autem in operante.	1864. Now it is necessary to consider such a difference among the aforesaid potencies, because (1) when something else is produced besides the actuality of these potencies, which is activity, the activity of such potencies is in the thing being produced and is their actuality, just as the act of building is in the thing being built, and the act of weaving in the thing being woven, and in general motion in the thing being moved. And this is true, because when some product results from the activity of a potency, the activity perfects the thing being produced and not the one performing it. Hence it is in the thing being produced as an actuality and perfection of it, but not in the one who is acting.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 10 Sed, quando non est aliquod opus operatum praeter actionem potentiae, tunc actio existit in agente et ut perfectio eius, et non transit in aliquid exterius perficiendum; sicut visio est in vidente ut perfectio eius, et speculatio in speculante, et vita in anima, ut per vitam intelligamus opera vitae. Unde manifestum est, quod etiam felicitas in tali operatione consistit, quae est in operante, non quae transit in rem exteriorem, cum felicitas sit bonum felicis, et perfectio eius. Est enim aliqua vita felicis, scilicet vita perfecta eius. Unde sicut vita est in vivente, ita felicitas in felice. Et sic patet quod felicitas non consistit nec in aedificando, nec in aliqua huiusmodi actione, quae in exterius transeat, sed in intelligendo et volendo.	1865. But (2) when nothing else is produced in addition to the activity of the potency, the actuality then exists in the agent as its perfection and does not pass over into something external in order to perfect it; for example, the act of seeing is in the one seeing as his perfection, and the act of speculating is in the one speculating, and life is in the soul (if we understand by life vital activity). Hence it has been shown that happiness also consists in an activity of the kind which exists in the one acting, and not of the kind which passes over into something external; for happiness is a good of the one who is happy, namely, his perfect life. Hence, just as life is in one who lives, in a similar fashion happiness is in one who is happy. Thus it is evident that happiness does not consist either in building or in any activity of the kind which passes over into something external, but it consists in understanding and willing.
lib. 9 l. 8 n. 11 Ultimo autem cum dicit quare manifestum redit ad concludendum principale propositum; dicens, quod manifestum est ex praedictis, quod substantia et forma et species est actus quidam. Et ex hoc manifestum est, quod actus est prior quam potentia secundum substantiam et formam. Et est prior tempore, ut supra dictum est, quia semper prius exigitur actus secundum quem generans aut movens aut faciens est actu, ante alterum actum quo generatum vel factum est in actu, postquam fuit in potentia; quousque veniatur ad primum movens, quod est in actu tantum. Id enim, quod exit de potentia in actum, requirit actum praecedentem in agente, a quo reducitur in actum.	1866. It is evident (791). Lastly he retraces his steps in order to draw the main conclusion which he has in mind. He says that it has been shown from the above discussion that a thing’s substance or form or specifying principle is a kind of actuality; and from this it is evident that actuality is prior to potency in substance or form. And it is prior in time, as has been stated above (1848), because the actuality whereby the generator or mover or maker is actual must always exist first before the other actuality by which the thing generated or produced becomes actual after being potential. And this goes on until one comes to the first mover, which is actuality alone; for whatever passes from potency to actuality requires a prior actuality in the agent, which brings it to actuality.