Authors/Thomas Aquinas/perihermenias/perihermenias I/L13

LECTURE 13

Latin	English
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de oppositione enunciationum et ostendit quomodo dividunt verum et falsum oppositae enunciationes; hic inquirit de quodam quod poterat esse dubium, utrum scilicet id quod dictum est similiter inveniatur in omnibus enunciationibus vel non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, proponit dissimilitudinem; secundo, probat eam; ibi: nam si omnis affirmatio et cetera.	1. Now that he, has treated opposition of enunciations and has shown the way in which opposed enunciations divide truth and falsity, the Philosopher inquires about a question that might arise, namely, whether what has been said is found to be so in all enunciations or not. And first he proposes a dissimilarity in enunciations with regard to dividing truth and falsity, then proves it where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod philosophus in praemissis triplicem divisionem enunciationum assignavit, quarum prima fuit secundum unitatem enunciationis, prout scilicet enunciatio est una simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secunda fuit secundum qualitatem, prout scilicet enunciatio est affirmativa vel negativa; tertia fuit secundum quantitatem, utpote quod enunciatio quaedam est universalis, quaedam particularis, quaedam indefinita et quaedam singularis.	2. In relation to the dissimilarity which he intends to prove we should recall that the Philosopher has given three divisions of the enunciation. The first was in relation to the unity of enunciation, and according to this it is divided into one simply and one by conjunction; the second was in relation to quality, and according to this it is divided into affirmative and negative; the third was in relation to quantity, and according to this it is either universal, particular, indefinite, or singular.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 3 Tangitur autem hic quarta divisio enunciationum secundum tempus. Nam quaedam est de praesenti, quaedam de praeterito, quaedam de futuro; et haec etiam divisio potest accipi ex his quae supra dicta sunt: dictum est enim supra quod necesse est omnem enunciationem esse ex verbo vel ex casu verbi; verbum autem est quod consignificat praesens tempus; casus autem verbi sunt, qui consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum. Potest autem accipi quinta divisio enunciationum secundum materiam, quae quidem divisio attenditur secundum habitudinem praedicati ad subiectum: nam si praedicatum per se insit subiecto, dicetur esse enunciatio in materia necessaria vel naturali; ut cum dicitur, homo est animal, vel, homo est risibile. Si vero praedicatum per se repugnet subiecto quasi excludens rationem ipsius, dicetur enunciatio esse in materia impossibili sive remota; ut cum dicitur, homo est asinus. Si vero medio modo se habeat praedicatum ad subiectum, ut scilicet nec per se repugnet subiecto, nec per se insit, dicetur enunciatio esse in materia possibili sive contingenti.	3. Here he treats of a fourth division of enunciation, a division according to time. Some enunciations are about the present, some about the past, some about the future. This division could be seen in what Aristotle has already said, namely, that every enunciation must have a verb or a mode of a verb, the verb being that which signifies the present time, the modes with past or future time. In addition, a fifth division of the enunciation can be made, a division in regard to matter. It is taken from the relationship of the predicate to the subject. If the predicate is per se in the subject, it will be said to be an enunciation in necessary or natural matter. Examples of this are "Man is an animal” and "Man is risible.” If the predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, as excluding the notion of it, it is said to be an enunciation in impossible or remote matter; for example, the enunciation "Man is an ass.” If the predicate is related to the subject in a way midway between these two, being neither per se repugnant to the subject nor per se in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or contingent matter.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 4 His igitur enunciationum differentiis consideratis, non similiter se habet iudicium de veritate et falsitate in omnibus. Unde philosophus dicit, ex praemissis concludens, quod in his quae sunt, idest in propositionibus de praesenti, et in his quae facta sunt, idest in enunciationibus de praeterito, necesse est quod affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera vel falsa. Diversificatur tamen hoc, secundum diversam quantitatem enunciationis; nam in enunciationibus, in quibus de universalibus subiectis aliquid universaliter praedicatur, necesse est quod semper una sit vera, scilicet affirmativa vel negativa, et altera falsa, quae scilicet ei opponitur. Dictum est enim supra quod negatio enunciationis universalis in qua aliquid universaliter praedicatur, est negativa non universalis, sed particularis, et e converso universalis negativa non est directe negatio universalis affirmativae, sed particularis; et sic oportet, secundum praedicta, quod semper una earum sit vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia. Et eadem ratio est in enunciationibus singularibus, quae etiam contradictorie opponuntur, ut supra habitum est. Sed in enunciationibus, in quibus aliquid praedicatur de universali non universaliter, non est necesse quod semper una sit vera et altera sit falsa, qui possunt ambae esse simul verae, ut supra ostensum est.	4. Given these differences of enunciations, the judgment of truth and falsity is not alike in all. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, as a conclusion from what has been established: In enunciations about that which is, i.e., in propositions about the present, or has taken place, i.e., in enunciations about the past, the affirmation or the negation must be determinately true or false. However, this differs according to the different quantity of the enunciations. In enunciations in which something is universally predicated of universal subjects, one must always be true, either the affirmative or negative, and the other false, i.e., the one opposed to it. For as was said above, the negation of a universal enunciation in which something is predicated universally, is not the universal negative, but the particular negative, and conversely, the universal negative is not directly the negation of the universal affirmative, but the particular negative. According to the foregoing, then, one of these must always be true and the other false in any matter whatever. And the same is the case in singular enunciations, which are also opposed contradictorily. However, in enunciations in which something is predicated of a universal but not universally, it is not necessary that one always be true and the other false, for both could be at once true.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 5 Et hoc quidem ita se habet quantum ad propositiones, quae sunt de praeterito vel de praesenti: sed si accipiamus enunciationes, quae sunt de futuro, etiam similiter se habent quantum ad oppositiones, quae sunt de universalibus vel universaliter vel non universaliter sumptis. Nam in materia necessaria omnes affirmativae determinate sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus; negativae vero falsae. In materia autem impossibili, e contrario. In contingenti vero universales sunt falsae et particulares sunt verae, ita in futuris sicut in praeteritis et praesentibus. In indefinitis autem, utraque simul est vera in futuris sicut in praesentibus vel praeteritis.	5. The case as it was just stated has to do with propositions about the past or the present. Enunciations about the future that are of universals taken either universally or not universally are also related in the same way in regard to oppositions. In necessary matter all affirmative enunciations are determinately true; this holds for enunciations in future time as well as in past and present time; and negative enunciations are determinately false. In impossible matter the contrary is the case. In contingent matter, however, universal enunciations are false and particular enunciations true. This is the case in enunciations about the future as well as those of the past and present. In indefinite enunciations, both are at once true in future enunciations as well as in those of the present or the past.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 6 Sed in singularibus et futuris est quaedam dissimilitudo. Nam in praeteritis et praesentibus necesse est quod altera oppositarum determinate sit vera et altera falsa in quacumque materia; sed in singularibus quae sunt de futuro hoc non est necesse, quod una determinate sit vera et altera falsa. Et hoc quidem dicitur quantum ad materiam contingentem: nam quantum ad materiam necessariam et impossibilem similis ratio est in futuris singularibus, sicut in praesentibus et praeteritis. Nec tamen Aristoteles mentionem fecit de materia contingenti, quia illa proprie ad singularia pertinent quae contingenter eveniunt, quae autem per se insunt vel repugnant, attribuuntur singularibus secundum universalium rationes. Circa hoc igitur versatur tota praesens intentio: utrum in enunciationibus singularibus de futuro in materia contingenti necesse sit quod determinate una oppositarum sit vera et altera falsa.	6. In singular future enunciations, however, there is a difference. In past and present singular enunciations, one of the opposites must be determinately true and the other false in any matter whatsoever, but in singulars that are about the future, it is not necessary that one be determinately true and the other false. This holds with respect to contingent matter; with respect to necessary and impossible matter the rule is the same as in enunciations about the present and the past. Aristotle has not mentioned contingent matter until now because those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to singulars, whereas those that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to singulars according to the notions of their universals. Aristotle is therefore wholly concerned here with this question: whether in singular enunciations about the future in contingent matter it is necessary that one of the opposites be determinately true and the other determinately false.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: nam si omnis affirmatio etc., probat praemissam differentiam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, probat propositum ducendo ad inconveniens; secundo, ostendit illa esse impossibilia quae sequuntur; ibi: quare ergo contingunt inconvenientia et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod in singularibus et futuris non semper potest determinate attribui veritas alteri oppositorum; secundo, ostendit quod non potest esse quod utraque veritate careat; ibi: at vero neque quoniam et cetera. Circa primum ponit duas rationes, in quarum prima ponit quamdam consequentiam, scilicet quod si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est vera vel falsa ita in singularibus et futuris sicut in aliis, consequens est quod omnia necesse sit vel determinate esse vel non esse. Deinde cum dicit: quare si hic quidem etc. vel, si itaque hic quidem, ut habetur in Graeco, probat consequentiam praedictam. Ponamus enim quod sint duo homines, quorum unus dicat aliquid esse futurum, puta quod Socrates curret, alius vero dicat hoc idem ipsum non esse futurum; supposita praemissa positione, scilicet quod in singularibus et futuris contingit alteram esse veram, scilicet vel affirmativam vel negativam, sequetur quod necesse sit quod alter eorum verum dicat, non autem uterque: quia non potest esse quod in singularibus propositionibus futuris utraque sit simul vera, scilicet affirmativa et negativa: sed hoc habet locum solum in indefinitis. Ex hoc autem quod necesse est alterum eorum verum dicere, sequitur quod necesse sit determinate vel esse vel non esse. Et hoc probat consequenter: quia ista duo se convertibiliter consequuntur, scilicet quod verum sit id quod dicitur, et quod ita sit in re. Et hoc est quod manifestat consequenter dicens quod si verum est dicere quod album sit, de necessitate sequitur quod ita sit in re; et si verum est negare, ex necessitate sequitur quod ita non sit. Et e converso: quia si ita est in re vel non est, ex necessitate sequitur quod sit verum affirmare vel negare. Et eadem etiam convertibilitas apparet in falso: quia, si aliquis mentitur falsum dicens, ex necessitate sequitur quod non ita sit in re, sicut ipse affirmat vel negat; et e converso, si non est ita in re sicut ipse affirmat vel negat, sequitur quod affirmans vel negans mentiatur.	7. He proves that there is a difference between these opposites and the others where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. First he proves it by showing that the opposite position leads to what is unlikely; secondly, he shows that what follows from this position is impossible, where he says, These absurd consequences and others like them, etc. In his proof he first shows that in enunciations about future singulars, truth cannot always be determinately attributed to one of the opposites, and then he shows that both cannot lack truth, where he says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. He gives two arguments with respect to the first point. In the first of these he states a certain consequence, namely, that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true or false, in future singulars as in the others, it follows that all things must determinately be or not be. He proves this consequence where he says, wherefore, if one person says, etc.,or as it is in the Greek, for if one person says something will be, etc.”’ Let us suppose, he argues, that there are two men, one of whom says something will take place in the future, for instance, that Socrates will run, and the other says this same thing will not take place. If the foregoing position is supposed—that in singular future enunciations one of them will be true, either the affirmative or the negative it would follow that only one of them is saying what is true, because in singular future propositions both cannot be at once true, that is, both the affirmative and the negative. This occurs only in indefinite propositions. Moreover, from the fact that one of them must be speaking the truth, it follows that it must determinately be or not be. Then he proves this from the fact that these two follow upon each other convertibly, namely, truth is that which is said and which is so in reality. And this is what he manifests when he says that, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it necessarily follows that it is so in reality; and if it is true to deny it, it necessarily follows that it is not so. And conversely, for if it is so in reality, or is not, it necessarily follows that it is true to affirm or deny it. The same convertibility is also evident in what is false, for if someone lies, saying what is false, it necessarily follows that in reality it is not as he affirms or denies it to be; and conversely, if it is not in reality as he affirms or denies it to be, it follows that in affirming or denying it he lies.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 8 Est ergo processus huius rationis talis. Si necesse est quod omnis affirmatio vel negatio in singularibus et futuris sit vera vel falsa, necesse est quod omnis affirmans vel negans determinate dicat verum vel falsum. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod omne necesse sit esse vel non esse. Ergo, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera, necesse est omnia determinate esse vel non esse. Ex hoc concludit ulterius quod omnia sint ex necessitate. Per quod triplex genus contingentium excluditur.	8. The process of Aristotle’s reasoning is as follows. If it is necessary that every affirmation or negation about future singulars is true or false, it is necessary that everyone who affirms or denies, determinately says what is true or false. From this it follows that it is necessary that everything be or not be. Therefore, if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, it is necessary that everything determinately be or not be. From this he concludes further that all things are of necessity. This would exclude the three kinds of contingent things,
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 9 Quaedam enim contingunt ut in paucioribus, quae accidunt a casu vel fortuna. Quaedam vero se habent ad utrumlibet, quia scilicet non magis se habent ad unam partem, quam ad aliam, et ista procedunt ex electione. Quaedam vero eveniunt ut in pluribus; sicut hominem canescere in senectute, quod causatur ex natura. Si autem omnia ex necessitate evenirent, nihil horum contingentium esset. Et ideo dicit nihil est quantum ad ipsam permanentiam eorum quae permanent contingenter; neque fit quantum ad productionem eorum quae contingenter causantur; nec casu quantum ad ea quae sunt in minori parte, sive in paucioribus; nec utrumlibet quantum ad ea quae se habent aequaliter ad utrumque, scilicet esse vel non esse, et ad neutrum horum sunt determinata: quod significat cum subdit, nec erit, nec non erit. De eo enim quod est magis determinatum ad unam partem possumus determinate verum dicere quod hoc erit vel non erit, sicut medicus de convalescente vere dicit, iste sanabitur, licet forte ex aliquo accidente eius sanitas impediatur. Unde et philosophus dicit in II de generatione quod futurus quis incedere, non incedet. De eo enim qui habet propositum determinatum ad incedendum, vere potest dici quod ipse incedet, licet per aliquod accidens impediatur eius incessus. Sed eius quod est ad utrumlibet proprium est quod, quia non determinatur magis ad unum quam ad alterum, non possit de eo determinate dici, neque quod erit, neque quod non erit. Quomodo autem sequatur quod nihil sit ad utrumlibet ex praemissa hypothesi, manifestat subdens quod, si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate sit vera, oportet quod vel ille qui affirmat vel ille qui negat dicat verum; et sic tollitur id quod est ad utrumlibet: quia, si esse aliquid ad utrumlibet, similiter se haberet ad hoc quod fieret vel non fieret, et non magis ad unum quam ad alterum. Est autem considerandum quod philosophus non excludit hic expresse contingens quod est ut in pluribus, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tale contingens non excludit quin altera oppositarum enunciationum determinate sit vera et altera falsa, ut dictum est. Secundo, quia remoto contingenti quod est in paucioribus, quod a casu accidit, removetur per consequens contingens quod est ut in pluribus: nihil enim differt id quod est in pluribus ab eo quod est in paucioribus, nisi quod deficit in minori parte.	9. The three kinds of contingent things are these: some, the ones that happen by chance or fortune, happen infrequently; others are in determinate to either of two alternatives because they are not inclined more to one part than to another, and these proceed from choice; still others occur for the most part, for example, men becoming gray in old age, which is caused by nature. If, however, everything took place of necessity, there would be none of these kinds of contingent things. Therefore, Aristotle says, nothing is with respect to the very permanence of those things that are contingently permanent; or takes place with respect to those that are caused contingently; by chance with respect to those that take place for the least part, or infrequently; or is indeterminate to either of two alternatives with respect to those that are related equally to either of two, i.e., to being or to nonbeing, and are determined to neither of these, which he signifies when he adds, or will be, or will not be. For of that which is more determined to one part we can truly and determinately say that it will be or will not be, as for example, the physician truly says of the convalescent, "He will be restored to health,” although perchance by some accident his cure may be impeded. The Philosopher makes this same point when he says in II De generatione [11: 337b 7], "A man about to walk might not walk.” For it can be truly said of someone who has the determined intention to walk that he will walk, although by some accident his walking might be impeded. But in the case of that which is indeterminate to either of two, it cannot determinately be said of it either that it will be or that it will not be, for it is proper to it not to be determined more to one than to another. Then he manifests how it follows from the foregoing hypothesis that nothing is indeterminate to either of two when he adds that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, then either the one who affirms or the one who denies must be speaking the truth. That which is indeterminate to either of two is therefore destroyed, for if there is something indeterminate to either of two, it would be related alike to taking place or not taking place, and no more to one than to the other. It should be, noted that the Philosopher is not expressly excluding the contingent that is for the most part. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this kind of contingency still excludes the determinate truth of one of the opposite enunciations and the falsity of the other, as has been said. Secondly, when the contingent that is infrequent, i.e., that which takes place by chance, is removed, the contingent that is for the most part is removed as a consequence, for there is no difference between that which is for the most part and that which is infrequent except that the former fails for the least part.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: amplius si est album etc., ponit secundam rationem ad ostendendum praedictam dissimilitudinem, ducendo ad impossibile. Si enim similiter se habet veritas et falsitas in praesentibus et futuris, sequitur ut quidquid verum est de praesenti, etiam fuerit verum de futuro, eo modo quo est verum de praesenti. Sed determinate nunc est verum dicere de aliquo singulari quod est album; ergo primo, idest antequam illud fieret album, erat verum dicere quoniam hoc erit album. Sed eadem ratio videtur esse in propinquo et in remoto; ergo si ante unum diem verum fuit dicere quod hoc erit album, sequitur quod semper fuit verum dicere de quolibet eorum, quae facta sunt, quod erit. Si autem semper est verum dicere de praesenti quoniam est, vel de futuro quoniam erit, non potest hoc non esse vel non futurum esse. Cuius consequentiae ratio patet, quia ista duo sunt incompossibilia, quod aliquid vere dicatur esse, et quod non sit. Nam hoc includitur in significatione veri, ut sit id quod dicitur. Si ergo ponitur verum esse id quod dicitur de praesenti vel de futuro, non potest esse quin illud sit praesens vel futurum. Sed quod non potest non fieri idem significat cum eo quod est impossibile non fieri. Et quod impossibile est non fieri idem significat cum eo quod est necesse fieri, ut in secundo plenius dicetur. Sequitur ergo ex praemissis quod omnia, quae futura sunt, necesse est fieri. Ex quo sequitur ulterius, quod nihil sit neque ad utrumlibet neque a casu, quia illud quod accidit a casu non est ex necessitate, sed ut in paucioribus; hoc autem relinquit pro inconvenienti; ergo et primum est falsum, scilicet quod omne quod est verum esse, verum fuerit determinate dicere esse futurum.	10. When he says, Furthermore, on such a supposition, if something is now white, it was true to say formerly that it will be white, etc., he gives a second argument to show the dissimilarity of enunciations about future singulars. This argument is by reduction to the impossible. If truth and falsity. are related in like manner in present and in future enunciations, it follows that whatever is true of the present was also true of the future, in the way in which it is true of the present. But it is now determinately true to say of some singular that it is white; therefore formerly, i.e., before it became white, it was true to say that this will be white. Now the same reasoning seems to hold for the proximate and the remote. Therefore, if yesterday it was true to say that this will be white, it follows that it was always true to say of anything that has taken place that it will be. And if it is always true to say of the present that it is, or of the future that it will be, it is not possible that this not be, or, that it will not be. The reason for this consequence is evident, for these two cannot stand together, that something truly be said to be, and that it not be; for this is included in the signification of the true, that that which is said, is. If therefore that which is said concerning the present or the future is posited to be true, it is not possible that this not be in the present or future. But that which cannot not take place signifies the same thing as that which is impossible not to take place. And that which is impossible not to take place signifies the same thing as that which necessarily takes place, as will be explained more fully in the second book. It follows, therefore, that all things that are future must necessarily take place. From this it follows further, that there is nothing that is indeterminate to either of two or that takes place by chance, for what happens by chance does not take place of necessity but happens infrequently. But this is unlikely. Therefore the first proposition is false, i.e., that of everything of which it is true that it is, it was determinately true to say that it would be.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 11 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod cum verum hoc significet ut dicatur aliquid esse quod est, hoc modo est aliquid verum, quo habet esse. Cum autem aliquid est in praesenti habet esse in seipso, et ideo vere potest dici de eo quod est: sed quamdiu aliquid est futurum, nondum est in seipso, est tamen aliqualiter in sua causa: quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, ut sic sit in sua causa ut ex necessitate ex ea proveniat; et tunc determinate habet esse in sua causa; unde determinate potest dici de eo quod erit. Alio modo, aliquid est in sua causa, ut quae habet inclinationem ad suum effectum, quae tamen impediri potest; unde et hoc determinatum est in sua causa, sed mutabiliter; et sic de hoc vere dici potest, hoc erit, sed non per omnimodam certitudinem. Tertio, aliquid est in sua causa pure in potentia, quae etiam non magis est determinata ad unum quam ad aliud; unde relinquitur quod nullo modo potest de aliquo eorum determinate dici quod sit futurum, sed quod sit vel non sit.	11. For clarification of this point, we must consider the following. Since "true” signifies that something is said to be what it is, something is true in the manner in which it has being. Now, when something is in the present it exists in itself, and hence it can be truly said of it that it is. But as long as something is future, it does not yet exist in itself, but it is in a certain way in its cause, and this in a threefold way. It may be in its cause in such a way that it comes from it necessarily. In this case it has being determinately in its cause, and therefore it can be determinately said of it that it will be. In another way, something is in its cause as it has an inclination to its effect but can be impeded. This, then, is determined in its cause, but changeably, and hence it can be truly a said of it that it will be but not with complete certainty. Thirdly, something is in its cause purely in potency. This is the case in which the cause is as yet not determined more to one thing than to another, and consequently it cannot in any way be said determinately of these that it is going to be, but that it is or is not going to be.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 13 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque quoniam etc., ostendit quod veritas non omnino deest in singularibus futuris utrique oppositorum; et primo, proponit quod intendit dicens quod sicut non est verum dicere quod in talibus alterum oppositorum sit verum determinate, sic non est verum dicere quod non utrumque sit verum; ut si quod dicamus, neque erit, neque non erit. Secundo, ibi: primum enim cum sit etc., probat propositum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est: affirmatio et negatio dividunt verum et falsum, quod patet ex definitione veri et falsi: nam nihil aliud est verum quam esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; et nihil aliud est falsum quam esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est; et sic oportet quod si affirmatio sit falsa, quod negatio sit vera; et e converso. Sed secundum praedictam positionem affirmatio est falsa, qua dicitur, hoc erit; nec tamen negatio est vera: et similiter negatio erit falsa, affirmatione non existente vera; ergo praedicta positio est impossibilis, scilicet quod veritas desit utrique oppositorum. Secundam rationem ponit; ibi: ad haec si verum est et cetera. Quae talis est: si verum est dicere aliquid, sequitur quod illud sit; puta si verum est dicere quod aliquid sit magnum et album, sequitur utraque esse. Et ita de futuro sicut de praesenti: sequitur enim esse cras, si verum est dicere quod erit cras. Si ergo vera est praedicta positio dicens quod neque cras erit, neque non erit, oportebit neque fieri, neque non fieri: quod est contra rationem eius quod est ad utrumlibet, quia quod est ad utrumlibet se habet ad alterutrum; ut navale bellum cras erit, vel non erit. Et ita ex hoc sequitur idem inconveniens quod in praemissis.	12. Then Aristotle says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. Here he shows that truth is not altogether lacking to both of the opposites in singular future enunciations. First he says that just as it is not true to say that in such enunciations one of the opposites is determinately true, so it is not true to say that neither is true; as if we could say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place. Then when he says, In the first place, though the affirmation be false, etc., he gives two arguments to prove his point. The first is as follows. Affirmation and negation divide the true and the false. This is evident from the definition of true and false, for to be true is to be what in fact is, or not to be what in fact is not; and to be false is to be what in fact is not, or not to be what in fact is. Consequently, if the affirmation is false, the negation must be true, and conversely. But if the position is taken that neither is true, the affirmation, "This will be” is false, yet the negation is not true; likewise the negation will be false and the affirmation not be true. Therefore, the aforesaid position is impossible, i.e., that truth is lacking to both of the opposites. The second argument begins where he says, Secondly, if it is true to say that a thing is white and large, etc. The argument is as follows. If it is true to say something, it follows that it is. For example, if it is true to say that something is large and white, it follows that it is both. And this is so of the future as of the present, for if it is true to say that it will be tomorrow, it follows that it will be tomorrow. Therefore, if the position that it neither will be or not be tomorrow is true, it will be necessary that it neither happen nor not happen, which is contrary to the nature of that which is indeterminate to either of two, for that which is indeterminate to either of two is related to either; for example, a naval battle will take place tomorrow, or will not. The same unlikely things follow, then, from this as from the first argument.