Authors/Thomas Aquinas/perihermenias/perihermenias I/L14

LECTURE 14

Latin	English
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 1 Ostenderat superius philosophus ducendo ad inconveniens quod non est similiter verum vel falsum determinate in altero oppositorum in singularibus et futuris, sicut supra de aliis enunciationibus dixerat; nunc autem ostendit inconvenientia ad quae adduxerat esse impossibilia. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit impossibilia ea quae sequebantur; secundo, concludit quomodo circa haec se veritas habeat; ibi: igitur esse quod est et cetera.	1. The Philosopher has shown—by leading the opposite position to what is unlikely—that in singular future enunciations truth or falsity is not determinately in one of the opposites, as it is in other enunciations. Now he is going to show that the unlikely things to which it has led are impossibilities. First he shows that the things that followed are impossibilities; then he concludes what the truth is, where he says, Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, etc.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 2 Circa primum tria facit: primo, ponit inconvenientia quae sequuntur; secundo, ostendit haec inconvenientia ex praedicta positione sequi; ibi: nihil enim prohibet etc.; tertio, ostendit esse impossibilia inconvenientia memorata; ibi: quod si haec possibilia non sunt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, ex praedictis rationibus concludens, quod haec inconvenientia sequuntur, si ponatur quod necesse sit oppositarum enunciationum alteram determinate esse veram et alteram esse falsam similiter in singularibus sicut in universalibus, quod scilicet nihil in his quae fiunt sit ad utrumlibet, sed omnia sint et fiant ex necessitate. Et ex hoc ulterius inducit alia duo inconvenientia. Quorum primum est quod non oportebit de aliquo consiliari: probatum est enim in III Ethicorum quod consilium non est de his, quae sunt ex necessitate, sed solum de contingentibus, quae possunt esse et non esse. Secundum inconveniens est quod omnes actiones humanae, quae sunt propter aliquem finem (puta negotiatio, quae est propter divitias acquirendas), erunt superfluae: quia si omnia ex necessitate eveniunt, sive operemur sive non operemur erit quod intendimus. Sed hoc est contra intentionem hominum, quia ea intentione videntur consiliari et negotiari ut, si haec faciant, erit talis finis, si autem faciunt aliquid aliud, erit alius finis.	2. With respect to the impossibilities that follow he first states the unlikely things that follow from the opposite position, then shows that these follow from the aforesaid position, where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc. Finally he shows that these are impossibilities where he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc. He says, then, concluding from the preceding reasoning, that these unlikely things follow—if the position is taken that of opposed enunciations one of the two must be determinately true and the other false in the same way in singular as in universal enunciations—namely, that in things that come about nothing is indeterminate to either of two, but all things are and take place of necessity. From this he infers two other unlikely things that follow. First, it will not be necessary to deliberate about anything; whereas he proved in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 19] that counsel is not concerned with things that take place necessarily but only with contingent things, i.e., things which can be or not be. Secondly, all human actions that are for the sake of some end (for example, a business transaction to acquire riches) will be superfluous, because what we intend will take place whether we take pains to bring it about or not—if all things come about of necessity. This, however, is in opposition to the intention of men, for they seem to deliberate and to transact business with the intention that if they do this there will be such a result, but if they do something else, there will be another result.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: nihil enim prohibet etc., probat quod dicta inconvenientia consequantur ex dicta positione. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit praedicta inconvenientia sequi, quodam possibili posito; secundo, ostendit quod eadem inconvenientia sequantur etiam si illud non ponatur; ibi: at nec hoc differt et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, non esse impossibile quod ante mille annos, quando nihil apud homines erat praecogitatum, vel praeordinatum de his quae nunc aguntur, unus dixerit quod hoc erit, puta quod civitas talis subverteretur, alius autem dixerit quod hoc non erit. Sed si omnis affirmatio vel negatio determinate est vera, necesse est quod alter eorum determinate verum dixerit; ergo necesse fuit alterum eorum ex necessitate evenire; et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis; ergo omnia ex necessitate eveniunt.	3. Where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc., he proves that the said unlikely things follow from the said position. First he shows that the unlikely things follow from the positing of a certain possibility; then he shows that the same unlikely things follow even if that possibility is not posited, where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. He says, then, that it is not impossible that a thousand years before, when men neither knew nor ordained any of the things that are taking place now, a man said, "This will be,” for example, that such a state would be overthrown, and another man said, "This will not be.” But if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, one of them must have spoken the truth. Therefore one of them had to take place of necessity; and this same reasoning holds for all other things. Therefore everything takes place of necessity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: at vero neque hoc differt etc., ostendit quod idem sequitur si illud possibile non ponatur. Nihil enim differt, quantum ad rerum existentiam vel eventum, si uno affirmante hoc esse futurum, alius negaverit vel non negaverit; ita enim se habebit res si hoc factum fuerit, sicut si hoc non factum fuerit. Non enim propter nostrum affirmare vel negare mutatur cursus rerum, ut sit aliquid vel non sit: quia veritas nostrae enunciationis non est causa existentiae rerum, sed potius e converso. Similiter etiam non differt quantum ad eventum eius quod nunc agitur, utrum fuerit affirmatum vel negatum ante millesimum annum vel ante quodcumque tempus. Sic ergo, si in quocumque tempore praeterito, ita se habebat veritas enunciationum, ut necesse esset quod alterum oppositorum vere diceretur; et ad hoc quod necesse est aliquid vere dici sequitur quod necesse sit illud esse vel fieri; consequens est quod unumquodque eorum quae fiunt, sic se habeat ut ex necessitate fiat. Et huiusmodi consequentiae rationem assignat per hoc, quod si ponatur aliquem vere dicere quod hoc erit, non potest non futurum esse. Sicut supposito quod sit homo, non potest non esse animal rationale mortale. Hoc enim significatur, cum dicitur aliquid vere dici, scilicet quod ita sit ut dicitur. Eadem autem habitudo est eorum, quae nunc dicuntur, ad ea quae futura sunt, quae erat eorum, quae prius dicebantur, ad ea quae sunt praesentia vel praeterita; et ita omnia ex necessitate acciderunt, et accidunt, et accident, quia quod nunc factum est, utpote in praesenti vel in praeterito existens, semper verum erat dicere, quoniam erit futurum.	4. Then he shows that the same thing follows if this possibility is not posited where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. It makes no difference in relation to the existence or outcome of things whether a person denies that this is going to take place when it is affirmed, or not; for as was previously said, the event will either take place or not whether the affirmation and denial have been made or not. That something is or is not does not result from a change in the course of things to correspond to our affirmation or denial, for the truth of our enunciation is not the cause of the existence of things, but rather the converse. Nor does it make any difference to the outcome of what is now being done whether it was affirmed or denied a thousand years before, or at any other time before. Therefore, if in all past time, the truth of enunciations was such that one of the opposites had to have been truly said and if upon the necessity of something being truly said it follows that this must be or take place, it will follow that everything that takes place is such that it takes place of necessity. The reason he assigns for this consequence is the following. If it is posited that someone truly says this will be, it is not possible that it will not be, just as having supposed that man is, he cannot not be a rational mortal animal. For to be truly said means that it is such as is said. Moreover, the relationship of what is said. now to what will be is the same as the relationship of what was said previously to what is in the present or the past. Therefore, all things have necessarily happened, and they are necessarily happening, and they will necessarily happen, for of what is accomplished now, as existing in the present or in the past, it was always true to say that it would be.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quod si haec possibilia non sunt etc., ostendit praedicta esse impossibilia: et primo, per rationem; secundo, per exempla sensibilia; ibi: et multa nobis manifesta et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum in rebus humanis; secundo, etiam in aliis rebus; ibi: et quoniam est omnino et cetera. Quantum autem ad res humanas ostendit esse impossibilia quae dicta sunt, per hoc quod homo manifeste videtur esse principium eorum futurorum, quae agit quasi dominus existens suorum actuum, et in sua potestate habens agere vel non agere; quod quidem principium si removeatur, tollitur totus ordo conversationis humanae, et omnia principia philosophiae moralis. Hoc enim sublato non erit aliqua utilitas persuasionis, nec comminationis, nec punitionis aut remunerationis, quibus homines alliciuntur ad bona et retrahuntur a malis, et sic evacuatur tota civilis scientia. Hoc ergo philosophus accipit pro principio manifesto quod homo sit principium futurorum; non est autem futurorum principium nisi per hoc quod consiliatur et facit aliquid: ea enim quae agunt absque consilio non habent dominium sui actus, quasi libere iudicantes de his quae sunt agenda, sed quodam naturali instinctu moventur ad agendum, ut patet in animalibus brutis. Unde impossibile est quod supra conclusum est quod non oporteat nos negotiari vel consiliari. Et sic etiam impossibile est illud ex quo sequebatur, scilicet quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant.	5. When he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc., he shows that what has been said is impossible. He shows this first by reason, secondly by sensible examples, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. First he argues that the position taken is impossible in relation to human affairs, for clearly man seems to be the principle of the future things that he does insofar as he is the master of his own actions and has the power to act or not to act. Indeed, to reject this principle would be to do away with the whole order of human association and all the principles of moral philosophy. For men are attracted to good and withdrawn from evil by persuasion and threat, and by punishment and reward; but rejection of this principle would make these useless and thus nullify the whole of civil science. Here the Philosopher accepts it as an evident principle that man is the principle of future things. However, he is not the principle of future things unless he deliberates about a thing and then does it. In those things that men do without deliberation they do not have dominion over their acts, i.e., they do not judge freely about things to be done, but are moved to act by a kind of natural instinct such as is evident in the case of brute animals. Hence, the conclusion that it is not necessary for us to take pains about something or to deliberate is impossible; likewise what it followed from is impossible, i.e., that all things take place of necessity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: et quoniam est omnino etc., ostendit idem etiam in aliis rebus. Manifestum est enim etiam in rebus naturalibus esse quaedam, quae non semper actu sunt; ergo in eis contingit esse et non esse: alioquin vel semper essent, vel semper non essent. Id autem quod non est, incipit esse aliquid per hoc quod fit illud; sicut id quod non est album, incipit esse album per hoc quod fit album. Si autem non fiat album permanet non ens album. Ergo in quibus contingit esse et non esse, contingit etiam fieri et non fieri. Non ergo talia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed est in eis natura possibilitatis, per quam se habent ad fieri et non fieri, esse et non esse.	6. Then he shows that this is also the case in other things where he says, and that universally in the things not always in act, there is a potentiality to be and not to be, etc. In natural things, too, it is evident that there are some things not always in act; it is therefore possible for them to be or not be, otherwise they would either always be or always not be. Now that which is not begins to be something by becoming it; as for example, that which is not white begins to be white by becoming white. But if it does not become white it continues not to be white. Therefore, in things that have the possibility of being and not being, there is also the possibility of becoming and not becoming. Such things neither are nor come to be of necessity but there is in them the kind of possibility which disposes them to becoming and not becoming, to being and not being.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: ac multa nobis manifesta etc., ostendit propositum per sensibilia exempla. Sit enim, puta, vestis nova; manifestum est quod eam possibile est incidi, quia nihil obviat incisioni, nec ex parte agentis nec ex parte patientis. Probat autem quod simul cum hoc quod possibile est eam incidi, possibile est etiam eam non incidi, eodem modo quo supra probavit duas indefinitas oppositas esse simul veras, scilicet per assumptionem contrarii. Sicut enim possibile est istam vestem incidi, ita possibile est eam exteri, idest vetustate corrumpi; sed si exteritur non inciditur; ergo utrumque possibile est, scilicet eam incidi et non incidi. Et ex hoc universaliter concludit quod in aliis futuris, quae non sunt in actu semper, sed sunt in potentia, hoc manifestum est quod non omnia ex necessitate sunt vel fiunt, sed eorum quaedam sunt ad utrumlibet, quae non se habent magis ad affirmationem quam ad negationem; alia vero sunt in quibus alterum eorum contingit ut in pluribus, sed tamen contingit etiam ut in paucioribus quod altera pars sit vera, et non alia, quae scilicet contingit ut in pluribus.	7. Next he shows the impossibility of what was said by examples perceptible to the senses, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. Take a new garment for example. It is evident that it is possible to cut it, for nothing stands in the way of cutting it either on the part of the agent or the patient. He proves it is at once possible that it be cut and that it not be cut in the same way he has already proved that two opposed indefinite enunciations are at once true, i.e., by the assumption of contraries. just as it is possible that the garment be cut, so it is possible that it wear out, i.e., be corrupted in the course of time. But if it wears out it is not cut. Therefore both are possible, i.e., that it be cut and that it not be cut. From this he concludes universally in regard to other future things which are not always in act, but are in potency, that not all are or take place of necessity; some are indeterminate to either of two, and therefore are not related any more to affirmation than to negation; there are others in which one possibility happens for the most part, although it is possible, but for the least part, that the other part be true, and not the part which happens for the most part.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 8 Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Boethius dicit hic in commento, circa possibile et necessarium diversimode aliqui sunt opinati. Quidam enim distinxerunt ea secundum eventum, sicut Diodorus, qui dixit illud esse impossibile quod nunquam erit; necessarium vero quod semper erit; possibile vero quod quandoque erit, quandoque non erit. Stoici vero distinxerunt haec secundum exteriora prohibentia. Dixerunt enim necessarium esse illud quod non potest prohiberi quin sit verum; impossibile vero quod semper prohibetur a veritate; possibile vero quod potest prohiberi vel non prohiberi. Utraque autem distinctio videtur esse incompetens. Nam prima distinctio est a posteriori: non enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia semper erit; sed potius ideo semper erit, quia est necessarium: et idem patet in aliis. Secunda autem assignatio est ab exteriori et quasi per accidens: non enim ideo aliquid est necessarium, quia non habet impedimentum, sed quia est necessarium, ideo impedimentum habere non potest. Et ideo alii melius ista distinxerunt secundum naturam rerum, ut scilicet dicatur illud necessarium, quod in sua natura determinatum est solum ad esse; impossibile autem quod est determinatum solum ad non esse; possibile autem quod ad neutrum est omnino determinatum, sive se habeat magis ad unum quam ad alterum, sive se habeat aequaliter ad utrumque, quod dicitur contingens ad utrumlibet. Et hoc est quod Boethius attribuit Philoni. Sed manifeste haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc loco. Assignat enim rationem possibilitatis et contingentiae, in his quidem quae sunt a nobis ex eo quod sumus consiliativi, in aliis autem ex eo quod materia est in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum.	8. With regard to this question about the possible and the necessary, there have been different opinions, as Boethius says in his Commentary, and these will have to be considered. Some who distinguished them according to result—for example, Diodorus—said that the impossible is that which never will be, the necessary, that which always will be, and the possible, that which sometimes will be, sometimes not. The Stoics distinguished them according to exterior restraints. They said the necessary was that which could not be prevented from being true, the impossible, that which is always prevented from being true, and the possible, that which can be prevented or not be prevented. However, the distinctions in both of those cases seem to be inadequate. The first distinctions are a posteriori, for something is not necessary because it always will be, but rather, it always will be because it is necessary; this holds for the possible as well as the impossible. The second designation is taken from what is external and accidental, for something is not necessary because it does not have an impediment, but it does not have an impediment because it is necessary. Others distinguished these better by basing their distinction on the nature of things. They said that the necessary is that which in its nature is determined only to being, the impossible, that which is determined only to nonbeing, and the possible, that which is not altogether determined to either, whether related more to one than to another or related equally to both. The latter is known as that which is indeterminate to either of two. Boethius attributes these distinctions to Philo. However, this is clearly the opinion of Aristotle here, for he gives as the reason for the possibility and contingency in the things we do the fact that we deliberate, and in other things the fact that matter is in potency to either it of two opposites.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 9 Sed videtur haec ratio non esse sufficiens. Sicut enim in corporibus corruptibilibus materia invenitur in potentia se habens ad esse et non esse, ita etiam in corporibus caelestibus invenitur potentia ad diversa ubi, et tamen nihil in eis evenit contingenter, sed solum ex necessitate. Unde dicendum est quod possibilitas materiae ad utrumque, si communiter loquamur, non est sufficiens ratio contingentiae, nisi etiam addatur ex parte potentiae activae quod non sit omnino determinata ad unum; alioquin si ita sit determinata ad unum quod impediri non potest, consequens est quod ex necessitate reducat in actum potentiam passivam eodem modo.	9. But this reasoning does not seem to be adequate either. While it is true that in corruptible bodies matter is in potency to being and nonbeing, and in celestial bodies there is potency to diverse location; nevertheless nothing happens contingently in celestial bodies, but only of necessity. Consequently, we have to say that the potentiality of matter to either of two, if we are speaking generally, does not suffice as a reason for contingency unless we add on the part of the active potency that it is not wholly determined to one; for if it is so determined to one that it cannot be impeded, it follows that it necessarily reduces into act the passive potency in the same mode.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 10 Hoc igitur quidam attendentes posuerunt quod potentia, quae est in ipsis rebus naturalibus, sortitur necessitatem ex aliqua causa determinata ad unum quam dixerunt fatum. Quorum Stoici posuerunt fatum in quadam serie, seu connexione causarum, supponentes quod omne quod in hoc mundo accidit habet causam; causa autem posita, necesse est effectum poni. Et si una causa per se non sufficit, multae causae ad hoc concurrentes accipiunt rationem unius causae sufficientis; et ita concludebant quod omnia ex necessitate eveniunt.	10. Considering this, some maintained that the very potency which is in natural things receives necessity from some cause determined to one. This cause they called fate. The Stoics, for example, held that fate was to be found in a series or interconnection of causes on the assumption that everything that happens has a cause; but when a cause has been posited the effect is posited of necessity, and if one per se cause does not suffice, many causes concurring for this take on the nature of one sufficient cause; so, they concluded, everything happens of necessity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 11 Sed hanc rationem solvit Aristoteles in VI metaphysicae interimens utramque propositionum assumptarum. Dicit enim quod non omne quod fit habet causam, sed solum illud quod est per se. Sed illud quod est per accidens non habet causam; quia proprie non est ens, sed magis ordinatur cum non ente, ut etiam Plato dixit. Unde esse musicum habet causam, et similiter esse album; sed hoc quod est, album esse musicum, non habet causam: et idem est in omnibus aliis huiusmodi. Similiter etiam haec est falsa, quod posita causa etiam sufficienti, necesse est effectum poni: non enim omnis causa est talis (etiamsi sufficiens sit) quod eius effectus impediri non possit; sicut ignis est sufficiens causa combustionis lignorum, sed tamen per effusionem aquae impeditur combustio.	11. Aristotle refutes this reasoning in VI Metaphysicae [2: 1026a 33] by destroying each of the assumed propositions. He says there that not everything that takes place has a cause, but only what is per se has a cause. What is accidental does not have a cause, for it is not properly being but is more like nonbeing, as Plato also held. Whence, to be musical has a cause and likewise to be white, but to be musical white does not have a cause; and the same is the case with all others of this kind. It is also false that when a cause has been posited—even a sufficient one—the effect must be posited, for not every cause (even if it is sufficient) is such that its effect cannot be impeded. For example, fire is a sufficient cause of the combustion of wood, but if water is poured on it the combustion is impeded.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 12 Si autem utraque propositionum praedictarum esset vera, infallibiliter sequeretur omnia ex necessitate contingere. Quia si quilibet effectus habet causam, esset effectum (qui est futurus post quinque dies, aut post quantumcumque tempus) reducere in aliquam causam priorem: et sic quousque esset devenire ad causam, quae nunc est in praesenti, vel iam fuit in praeterito; si autem causa posita, necesse est effectum poni, per ordinem causarum deveniret necessitas usque ad ultimum effectum. Puta, si comedit salsa, sitiet: si sitiet, exibit domum ad bibendum: si exibit domum, occidetur a latronibus. Quia ergo iam comedit salsa, necesse est eum occidi. Et ideo Aristoteles ad hoc excludendum ostendit utramque praedictarum propositionum esse falsam, ut dictum est.	12. However, if both of the aforesaid propositions were true, it would follow infallibly that everything happens necessarily. For if every effect has a cause, then it would be possible to reduce an effect (which is going to take place in five days or whatever time) to some prior cause, and so on until it reaches a cause which is now in the present or already has been in the past. Moreover, if when the cause is posited it is necessary that the effect be posited, the necessity would reach through an order of causes all the way to the ultimate effect. For instance, if someone eats salty food, he will be thirsty; if he is thirsty, he will go outside to drink; if he goes outside to drink, he will be killed by robbers. Therefore, once he has eaten salty food, it is necessary that he be killed. To exclude this position, Aristotle shows that both of these propositions are false.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 13 Obiiciunt autem quidam contra hoc, dicentes quod omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquid per se, et ita oportet effectum qui est per accidens reduci in causam per se. Sed non attendunt quod id quod est per accidens reducitur ad per se, in quantum accidit ei quod est per se, sicut musicum accidit Socrati, et omne accidens alicui subiecto per se existenti. Et similiter omne quod in aliquo effectu est per accidens consideratur circa aliquem effectum per se: qui quantum ad id quod per se est habet causam per se, quantum autem ad id quod inest ei per accidens non habet causam per se, sed causam per accidens. Oportet enim effectum proportionaliter referre ad causam suam, ut in II physicorum et in V methaphysicae dicitur.	13. However, some persons object to this on the grounds that everything accidental is reduced to something per se and therefore an effect that is accidental must be reduced to a per se cause. Those who argue in this way fail to take into account that the accidental is reduced to the per se inasmuch as it is accidental to that which is per se; for example, musical is accidental to Socrates, and every accident to some subject existing per se. Similarly, everything accidental in some effect is considered in relation to some per se effect, which effect, in relation to that which is per se, has a per se cause, but in relation to what is in it accidentally does not have a per se cause but an accidental one. The reason for this is that the effect must be proportionately referred to its cause, as is said in II Physicorum [3: 195b 25-28] and in V Metaphysicae [2: 1013b 28].
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 14 Quidam vero non attendentes differentiam effectuum per accidens et per se, tentaverunt reducere omnes effectus hic inferius provenientes in aliquam causam per se, quam ponebant esse virtutem caelestium corporum in qua ponebant fatum, dicentes nihil aliud esse fatum quam vim positionis syderum. Sed ex hac causa non potest provenire necessitas in omnibus quae hic aguntur. Multa enim hic fiunt ex intellectu et voluntate, quae per se et directe non subduntur virtuti caelestium corporum: cum enim intellectus sive ratio et voluntas quae est in ratione, non sint actus organi corporalis, ut probatur in libro de anima, impossibile est quod directe subdantur intellectus seu ratio et voluntas virtuti caelestium corporum: nulla enim vis corporalis potest agere per se, nisi in rem corpoream. Vires autem sensitivae in quantum sunt actus organorum corporalium per accidens subduntur actioni caelestium corporum. Unde philosophus in libro de anima opinionem ponentium voluntatem hominis subiici motui caeli adscribit his, qui non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu. Indirecte tamen vis caelestium corporum redundat ad intellectum et voluntatem, in quantum scilicet intellectus et voluntas utuntur viribus sensitivis. Manifestum autem est quod passiones virium sensitivarum non inferunt necessitatem rationi et voluntati. Nam continens habet pravas concupiscentias, sed non deducitur, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethicorum. Sic igitur ex virtute caelestium corporum non provenit necessitas in his quae per rationem et voluntatem fiunt. Similiter nec in aliis corporalibus effectibus rerum corruptibilium, in quibus multa per accidens eveniunt. Id autem quod est per accidens non potest reduci ut in causam per se in aliquam virtutem naturalem, quia virtus naturae se habet ad unum; quod autem est per accidens non est unum; unde et supra dictum est quod haec enunciatio non est una, Socrates est albus musicus, quia non significat unum. Et ideo philosophus dicit in libro de somno et vigilia quod multa, quorum signa praeexistunt in corporibus caelestibus, puta in imbribus et tempestatibus, non eveniunt, quia scilicet impediuntur per accidens. Et quamvis illud etiam impedimentum secundum se consideratum reducatur in aliquam causam caelestem; tamen concursus horum, cum sit per accidens, non potest reduci in aliquam causam naturaliter agentem.	14. Some, however, not considering the difference between accidental and per se effects, tried to reduce all the effects that come about in this world to some per se cause. They posited as this cause the power of the heavenly bodies and assumed fate to be dependent on this power—fate being, according to them, nothing else but the power of the position of the constellations. But such a cause cannot bring about necessity in all the things accomplished in this world, since many things come about from intellect and will, which are not subject per se and directly to the power of the heavenly bodies. For the intellect, or reason, and the will which is in reason, are not acts of a corporeal organ (as is proved in the treatise De anima [III, 4: 429a 18]) and consequently cannot be directly subject to the power of the heavenly bodies, since a corporeal force, of itself, can only act on a corporeal thing. The sensitive powers, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, are accidentally subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. Hence, the Philosopher in his book De anima [III, 3: 427a 21] ascribes the opinion that the will of man is subject to the movement of the heavens to those who hold the position that the intellect does not differ from sense. The power of the heavenly bodies, however, does indirectly redound to the intellect and will inasmuch as the aq intellect and will use the sensitive powers. But clearly the passions of the sensitive powers do not induce necessity of reason and will, for the continent man has wrong desires but is not seduced by them, as is shown in VII Ethicorum [3: 1146a 5]. Therefore, we may conclude that the power of the heavenly bodies does not bring about necessity in the things done through reason and will. This is also the case in other corporeal effects of corruptible things, in which many things happen accidentally. What is accidental cannot be reduced to a per se cause in a natural power because the power of nature is directed to some one thing; but what is accidental is not one; whence it was said above that the enunciation "Socrates is a white musical being” is not one because it does not signify one thing. This is the reason the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia [object] Close that many things of which the signs pre-exist in the heavenly bodies—for example in storm clouds and tempests—do not take place because they are accidentally impeded. And although this impediment considered as such is reduced to some celestial cause, the concurrence of these, since it is accidental, cannot be reduced to a cause acting naturally.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 15 Sed considerandum est quod id quod est per accidens potest ab intellectu accipi ut unum, sicut album esse musicum, quod quamvis secundum se non sit unum, tamen intellectus ut unum accipit, in quantum scilicet componendo format enunciationem unam. Et secundum hoc contingit id, quod secundum se per accidens evenit et casualiter, reduci in aliquem intellectum praeordinantem; sicut concursus duorum servorum ad certum locum est per accidens et casualis quantum ad eos, cum unus eorum ignoret de alio; potest tamen esse per se intentus a domino, qui utrumque mittit ad hoc quod in certo loco sibi occurrant.	15. However, what is accidental can be taken as one by the intellect. For example, "the white is musical,” which as such is not one, the intellect takes as one, i.e., insofar as it forms one enunciation by composing. And in accordance with this it is possible to reduce what in itself happens accidentally and fortuitously to a preordaining intellect For example, the meeting of two servants at a certain place may be accidental and fortuitous with respect to them, since neither knew the other would be there, but be per se intended by their master who sent each of them to encounter the other in a certain place.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 16 Et secundum hoc aliqui posuerunt omnia quaecumque in hoc mundo aguntur, etiam quae videntur fortuita vel casualia, reduci in ordinem providentiae divinae, ex qua dicebant dependere fatum. Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negaverunt, iudicantes de intellectu divino ad modum intellectus nostri, qui singularia non cognoscit. Hoc autem est falsum: nam intelligere divinum et velle eius est ipsum esse ipsius. Unde sicut esse eius sua virtute comprehendit omne illud quod quocumque modo est, in quantum scilicet est per participationem ipsius; ita etiam suum intelligere et suum intelligibile comprehendit omnem cognitionem et omne cognoscibile; et suum velle et suum volitum comprehendit omnem appetitum et omne appetibile quod est bonum; ut, scilicet ex hoc ipso quod aliquid est cognoscibile cadat sub eius cognitione, et ex hoc ipso quod est bonum cadat sub eius voluntate: sicut ex hoc ipso quod est ens, aliquid cadit sub eius virtute activa, quam ipse perfecte comprehendit, cum sit per intellectum agens.	16. Accordingly, some have maintained that everything whatever that is effected in this world—even the things that seem fortuitous and casual—is reduced to the order of divine providence on which they said fate depends. Other foolish men have denied this, judging of the Divine Intellect in the mode of our intellect which does not know singulars. But the position of the latter is false, for His divine thinking and willing is His very being. Hence, just as His being by its power comprehends all that is in any way (i.e., inasmuch as it is through participation of Him) so also His thinking and what He thinks comprehend all knowing and everything knowable, and His willing and what He wills comprehend all desiring and every desirable good; in other words, whatever is knowable falls under His knowledge and whatever is good falls under His will, just as whatever is falls under His active power, which He comprehends perfectly, since He acts by His intellect.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 17 Sed si providentia divina sit per se causa omnium quae in hoc mundo accidunt, saltem bonorum, videtur quod omnia ex necessitate accidant. Primo quidem ex parte scientiae eius: non enim potest eius scientia falli; et ita ea quae ipse scit, videtur quod necesse sit evenire. Secundo ex parte voluntatis: voluntas enim Dei inefficax esse non potest; videtur ergo quod omnia quae vult, ex necessitate eveniant.	17. It may be objected, however, that if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in this world, at least of good things, it would look as though everything takes place of necessity: first on the part of His knowledge, for His knowledge cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that what He knows happens necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God cannot be inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of necessity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 18 Procedunt autem hae obiectiones ex eo quod cognitio divini intellectus et operatio divinae voluntatis pensantur ad modum eorum, quae in nobis sunt, cum tamen multo dissimiliter se habeant.	18. These objections arise from judging of the cognition of the divine intellect and the operation of the divine will in the way in which these are in us, when in fact they are very dissimilar.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 19 Nam primo quidem ex parte cognitionis vel scientiae considerandum est quod ad cognoscendum ea quae secundum ordinem temporis eveniunt, aliter se habet vis cognoscitiva, quae sub ordine temporis aliqualiter continetur, aliter illa quae totaliter est extra ordinem temporis. Cuius exemplum conveniens accipi potest ex ordine loci: nam secundum philosophum in IV physicorum, secundum prius et posterius in magnitudine est prius et posterius in motu et per consequens in tempore. Si ergo sint multi homines per viam aliquam transeuntes, quilibet eorum qui sub ordine transeuntium continetur habet cognitionem de praecedentibus et subsequentibus, in quantum sunt praecedentes et subsequentes; quod pertinet ad ordinem loci. Et ideo quilibet eorum videt eos, qui iuxta se sunt et aliquos eorum qui eos praecedunt; eos autem qui post se sunt videre non potest. Si autem esset aliquis extra totum ordinem transeuntium, utpote in aliqua excelsa turri constitutus, unde posset totam viam videre, videret quidem simul omnes in via existentes, non sub ratione praecedentis et subsequentis (in comparatione scilicet ad eius intuitum), sed simul omnes videret, et quomodo unus eorum alium praecedit. Quia igitur cognitio nostra cadit sub ordine temporis, vel per se vel per accidens (unde et anima in componendo et dividendo necesse habet adiungere tempus, ut dicitur in III de anima), consequens est quod sub eius cognitione cadant res sub ratione praesentis, praeteriti et futuri. Et ideo praesentia cognoscit tanquam actu existentia et sensu aliqualiter perceptibilia; praeterita autem cognoscit ut memorata; futura autem non cognoscit in seipsis, quia nondum sunt, sed cognoscere ea potest in causis suis: per certitudinem quidem, si totaliter in causis suis sint determinata, ut ex quibus de necessitate evenient; per coniecturam autem, si non sint sic determinata quin impediri possint, sicut quae sunt ut in pluribus; nullo autem modo, si in suis causis sunt omnino in potentia non magis determinata ad unum quam ad aliud, sicut quae sunt ad utrumlibet. Non enim est aliquid cognoscibile secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum secundum quod est in actu, ut patet per philosophum in IX metaphysicae.	19. On the part of cognition or knowledge it should be noted that in knowing things that take place according to the order of time, the cognitive power that is contained in any way under the order of time is related to them in another way than the cognitive power that is totally outside of the order of time. The order of place provides a suitable example of this. According to the Philosopher in IV Physicorum [11:219a 14], before and after in movement, and consequently in time, corresponds to before and after in magnitude. Therefore, if there arc many men passing along some road, any one of those in the ranks has knowledge of those preceding and following as preceding and following, which pertains to the order of place. Hence any one of them sees those who are next to him and some of those who precede him; but he cannot see those who follow behind him. If, however, there were someone outside of the whole order of those passing along the road, for instance, stationed in some high tower where he could see the whole road, he would at once see all those who were on the road—not under the formality of preceding and subsequent (i.e., in relation to his view) but all at the same time and how one precedes another. Now, our cognition falls under the order of time, either per se or accidentally; whence the soul in composing and dividing necessarily includes time, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 32]. Consequently, things are subject to our cognition under the aspect of present, past, and future. Hence the soul knows present things as existing in act and perceptible by sense in some way; past things it knows as remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet exist, but can be known in their causes—with certitude if they are totally determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another, as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX Metaphysicae [9: 1051a 22].
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 20 Sed Deus est omnino extra ordinem temporis, quasi in arce aeternitatis constitutus, quae est tota simul, cui subiacet totus temporis decursus secundum unum et simplicem eius intuitum; et ideo uno intuitu videt omnia quae aguntur secundum temporis decursum, et unumquodque secundum quod est in seipso existens, non quasi sibi futurum quantum ad eius intuitum prout est in solo ordine suarum causarum (quamvis et ipsum ordinem causarum videat), sed omnino aeternaliter sic videt unumquodque eorum quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua.	20. God, however, is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes), but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 21 Ex hoc autem quod homo videt Socratem sedere, non tollitur eius contingentia quae respicit ordinem causae ad effectum; tamen certissime et infallibiliter videt oculus hominis Socratem sedere dum sedet, quia unumquodque prout est in seipso iam determinatum est. Sic igitur relinquitur, quod Deus certissime et infallibiliter cognoscat omnia quae fiunt in tempore; et tamen ea quae in tempore eveniunt non sunt vel fiunt ex necessitate, sed contingenter.	21. Now from the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 22 Similiter ex parte voluntatis divinae differentia est attendenda. Nam voluntas divina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, velut causa quaedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differentias. Sunt autem differentiae entis possibile et necessarium; et ideo ex ipsa voluntate divina originantur necessitas et contingentia in rebus et distinctio utriusque secundum rationem proximarum causarum: ad effectus enim, quos voluit necessarios esse, disposuit causas necessarias; ad effectus autem, quos voluit esse contingentes, ordinavit causas contingenter agentes, idest potentes deficere. Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel necessarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependeant a voluntate divina, sicut a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae. Hoc autem non potest dici de voluntate humana, nec de aliqua alia causa: quia omnis alia causa cadit iam sub ordine necessitatis vel contingentiae; et ideo oportet quod vel ipsa causa possit deficere, vel effectus eius non sit contingens, sed necessarius. Voluntas autem divina indeficiens est; tamen non omnes effectus eius sunt necessarii, sed quidam contingentes.	22. There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine Will, for the divine will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are differences of being, an(] therefore necessity and contingency in things and the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency. This, however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence, either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing; yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 23 Similiter autem aliam radicem contingentiae, quam hic philosophus ponit ex hoc quod sumus consiliativi, aliqui subvertere nituntur, volentes ostendere quod voluntas in eligendo ex necessitate movetur ab appetibili. Cum enim bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, non potest (ut videtur) ab hoc divertere quin appetat illud quod sibi videtur bonum; sicut nec ratio ab hoc potest divertere quin assentiat ei quod sibi videtur verum. Et ita videtur quod electio consilium consequens semper ex necessitate proveniat; et sic omnia, quorum nos principium sumus per consilium et electionem, ex necessitate provenient.	23. Some men, in their desire to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of necessity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 14 n. 24 Sed dicendum est quod similis differentia attendenda est circa bonum, sicut circa verum. Est autem quoddam verum, quod est per se notum, sicut prima principia indemonstrabilia, quibus ex necessitate intellectus assentit; sunt autem quaedam vera non per se nota, sed per alia. Horum autem duplex est conditio: quaedam enim ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita scilicet quod non possunt esse falsa, principiis existentibus veris, sicut sunt omnes conclusiones demonstrationum. Et huiusmodi veris ex necessitate assentit intellectus, postquam perceperit ordinem eorum ad principia, non autem prius. Quaedam autem sunt, quae non ex necessitate consequuntur ex principiis, ita scilicet quod possent esse falsa principiis existentibus veris; sicut sunt opinabilia, quibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus, quamvis ex aliquo motivo magis inclinetur in unam partem quam in aliam. Ita etiam est quoddam bonum quod est propter se appetibile, sicut felicitas, quae habet rationem ultimi finis; et huiusmodi bono ex necessitate inhaeret voluntas: naturali enim quadam necessitate omnes appetunt esse felices. Quaedam vero sunt bona, quae sunt appetibilia propter finem, quae comparantur ad finem sicut conclusiones ad principium, ut patet per philosophum in II physicorum. Si igitur essent aliqua bona, quibus non existentibus, non posset aliquis esse felix, haec etiam essent ex necessitate appetibilia et maxime apud eum, qui talem ordinem perciperet; et forte talia sunt esse, vivere et intelligere et si qua alia sunt similia. Sed particularia bona, in quibus humani actus consistunt, non sunt talia, nec sub ea ratione apprehenduntur ut sine quibus felicitas esse non possit, puta, comedere hunc cibum vel illum, aut abstinere ab eo: habent tamen in se unde moveant appetitum, secundum aliquod bonum consideratum in eis. Et ideo voluntas non ex necessitate inducitur ad haec eligenda. Et propter hoc philosophus signanter radicem contingentiae in his quae fiunt a nobis assignavit ex parte consilii, quod est eorum quae sunt ad finem et tamen non sunt determinata. In his enim in quibus media sunt determinata, non est opus consilio, ut dicitur in III Ethicorum. Et haec quidem dicta sunt ad salvandum radices contingentiae, quas hic Aristoteles ponit, quamvis videantur logici negotii modum excedere.	24. In regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se, but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily, although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another. Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles. The Philosopher makes this point clear in II Physicorum [7: 198a 35]. If, then, there were some good things without the existence of which one could not be happy, these would be desirable of necessity, and especially by the person who perceives such an order. Perhaps to be, to live, and to think, and other similar things, if there are any, are of this kind. However, particular good things with which human acts are concerned are not of this kind nor are they apprehended as bein,r such that without tbeni happiness is impossible, for instance, to eat this food or that, or abstain from it. Such things, nevertheless, do have in them that whereby they move the appetite according to some good considered in them. The will, therefore, is not induced to choose these of necessity. And on this account the Philosopher expressly designates the root of the contingency of things effected by us on the part of deliberation—which is concerned with those things that are for the end and yet are not determined. In those things in which the means are determined there is no need for deliberation, as is said in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 30–1113a 14]. These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter.