Authors/Thomas Aquinas/perihermenias/perihermenias I/L2

LECTURE 2

Latin	English
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1 Praemisso prooemio, philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces significativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de significatione vocum: et deinde de vocibus significativis determinat de quibus in prooemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi: nomen ergo est vox significativa et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, determinat qualis sit significatio vocum; secundo, ostendit differentiam significationum vocum complexarum et incomplexarum; ibi: est autem quemadmodum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo quidem, praemittit ordinem significationis vocum; secundo, ostendit qualis sit vocum significatio, utrum sit ex natura vel ex impositione; ibi: et quemadmodum nec litterae et cetera.	1. After his introduction the Philosopher begins to investigate the things he has proposed. Since the things he promised to speak of are either complex or incomplex significant vocal sounds, he prefaces this with a treatment of the signification of vocal sounds; then he takes up the significant vocal sounds he proposed in the introduction where he says, A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, etc. In regard to the signification of vocal sounds he first determines what kind of signification vocal sound has and then shows the difference between the signification of complex and incomplex vocal sounds where he says, As sometimes there is thought in the soul, etc. With respect to the first point, he presents the order of the signification of vocal sounds and then shows what kind of signification vocal sound has, i.e., whether it is from nature or by imposition. This he does where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men, etc.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 2 Est ergo considerandum quod circa primum tria proponit, ex quorum uno intelligitur quartum. Proponit enim Scripturam, voces et animae passiones, ex quibus intelliguntur res. Nam passio est ex impressione alicuius agentis; et sic passiones animae originem habent ab ipsis rebus. Et si quidem homo esset naturaliter animal solitarium, sufficerent sibi animae passiones, quibus ipsis rebus conformaretur, ut earum notitiam in se haberet; sed quia homo est animal naturaliter politicum et sociale, necesse fuit quod conceptiones unius hominis innotescerent aliis, quod fit per vocem; et ideo necesse fuit esse voces significativas, ad hoc quod homines ad invicem conviverent. Unde illi, qui sunt diversarum linguarum, non possunt bene convivere ad invicem. Rursum si homo uteretur sola cognitione sensitiva, quae respicit solum ad hic et nunc, sufficeret sibi ad convivendum aliis vox significativa, sicut et caeteris animalibus, quae per quasdam voces, suas conceptiones invicem sibi manifestant: sed quia homo utitur etiam intellectuali cognitione, quae abstrahit ab hic et nunc; consequitur ipsum sollicitudo non solum de praesentibus secundum locum et tempus, sed etiam de his quae distant loco et futura sunt tempore. Unde ut homo conceptiones suas etiam his qui distant secundum locum et his qui venturi sunt in futuro tempore manifestet, necessarius fuit usus Scripturae.	2. Apropos of the order of signification of vocal sounds he proposes three things, from one of which a fourth is understood. He proposes writing, vocal sounds, and passions of the soul; things is understood from the latter, for passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence passions of the soul have their origin from things. Now if man were by nature a solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things so as to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by nature a political and social animal it was necessary that his conceptions be made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore there had to be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social unity. Again, if man had only sensitive cognition, which is of the here and now, such significant vocal sounds as the other animals use to manifest their conceptions to each other would be sufficient for him to live with others. But man also has the advantage of intellectual cognition, which abstracts from the here and now, and as a consequence, is concerned with things distant in place and future in time as well as things present according to time and place. Hence the use of writing was necessary so that he might manifest his conceptions to those who are distant according to place and to those who will come in future time.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 3 Sed quia logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici. Et ideo exponens ordinem significationum non incipit a litteris, sed a vocibus: quarum primo significationem exponens, dicit: sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in voce, notae, idest, signa earum passionum quae sunt in anima. Dicit autem ergo, quasi ex praemissis concludens: quia supra dixerat determinandum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis praedictis; haec autem sunt voces significativae; ergo oportet vocum significationem exponere.	3. However, since logic is ordered to obtaining knowledge about things, the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the conceptions of the intellect, is its principal consideration. The signification of written signs, being more remote, belongs to the consideration of the grammarian rather than the logician. Aristotle therefore begins his explanation of the order of signification from vocal sounds, not written signs. First he explains the signification of vocal sounds: Therefore those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul. He says "therefore” as if concluding from premises, because he has already said that we must establish what a name is, and a verb and the other things he mentioned; but these are significant vocal sounds; therefore, signification of vocal sounds must be explained.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 4 Utitur autem hoc modo loquendi, ut dicat, ea quae sunt in voce, et non, voces, ut quasi continuatim loquatur cum praedictis. Dixerat enim dicendum esse de nomine et verbo et aliis huiusmodi. Haec autem tripliciter habent esse. Uno quidem modo, in conceptione intellectus; alio modo, in prolatione vocis; tertio modo, in conscriptione litterarum. Dicit ergo, ea quae sunt in voce etc.; ac si dicat, nomina et verba et alia consequentia, quae tantum sunt in voce, sunt notae. Vel, quia non omnes voces sunt significativae, et earum quaedam sunt significativae naturaliter, quae longe sunt a ratione nominis et verbi et aliorum consequentium; ut appropriet suum dictum ad ea de quibus intendit, ideo dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, idest quae continentur sub voce, sicut partes sub toto. Vel, quia vox est quoddam naturale, nomen autem et verbum significant ex institutione humana, quae advenit rei naturali sicut materiae, ut forma lecti ligno; ideo ad designandum nomina et verba et alia consequentia dicit, ea quae sunt in voce, ac si de lecto diceretur, ea quae sunt in ligno.	4. When he says "Those that are in vocal sound,” and not "vocal sounds,” his mode of speaking implies a continuity with what he has just been saying, namely, we must define the name and the verb, etc. Now these have being in three ways: in the conception of the intellect, in the utterance of the voice, and in the writing of letters. He could therefore mean when he says "Those that are in vocal sound,” etc., names and verbs and the other things we are going to define, insofar as they are in vocal sound, are signs. On the other hand, he may be speaking in this way because not all vocal sounds are significant, and of those that are, some are significant naturally and hence are different in nature from the name and the verb and the other things to be defined. Therefore, to adapt what he has said to the things of which he intends to speak he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” i.e., that are contained under vocal sound as parts under a whole. There could be still another reason for his mode of speaking. Vocal sound is something natural. The name and verb, on the other hand, signify by human institution, that is, the signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as the form of a bed is added to wood. Therefore, to designate names and verbs and the other things he is going to define he says, "Those that are in vocal sound,” in the same way he would say of a bed, "that which is in wood.”
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 5 Circa id autem quod dicit, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, considerandum est quod passiones animae communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum. Et verum est quod huiusmodi passiones significant naturaliter quaedam voces hominum, ut gemitus infirmorum, et aliorum animalium, ut dicitur in I politicae. Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate, secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen homo naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.	5. When he speaks of passions in the soul we are apt to think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy, and the other passions that are customarily and commonly called passions of the soul, as is the case in II Ethicorum [5: 1105b 21]. It is true that some of the vocal sounds man makes signify passions of this kind naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the sounds of other animals, as is said in I Politicae [2: 1253a 10-14]. But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are significant by human institution. Therefore "passions in the soul” must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name "man” signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 6 Sed quia non est consuetum quod conceptiones intellectus Aristoteles nominet passiones; ideo Andronicus posuit hunc librum non esse Aristotelis. Sed manifeste invenitur in 1 de anima quod passiones animae vocat omnes animae operationes. Unde et ipsa conceptio intellectus passio dici potest. Vel quia intelligere nostrum non est sine phantasmate: quod non est sine corporali passione; unde et imaginativam philosophus in III de anima vocat passivum intellectum. Vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est, ut dicitur in III de anima. Utitur autem potius nomine passionum, quam intellectuum: tum quia ex aliqua animae passione provenit, puta ex amore vel odio, ut homo interiorem conceptum per vocem alteri significare velit: tum etiam quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.	6. Since Aristotle did not customarily speak of conceptions of the intellect as passions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not Aristotle’s. In I De anima, however, it is obvious that he calls all of the operations of the soul "passions” of the soul. Whence even the conception of the intellect can be called a passion and this either because we do not understand without a phantasm, which requires corporeal passion (for which reason the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect) [De Anima III, 5: 430a 25]; or because by extending the name "passion” to every reception, the understanding of the possible intellect is also a kind of undergoing, as is said in III De anima [4: 429b 29]. Aristotle uses the name "passion,” rather than "understanding,” however, for two reasons: first, because man wills to signify an interior conception to another through vocal sound as a result of some passion of the soul, such as love or hate; secondly, because the signification of vocal sound is referred to the conception of the intellect inasmuch as the conception arises from things by way of a kind of impression or passion.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 7 Secundo, cum dicit: et ea quae scribuntur etc., agit de significatione Scripturae: et secundum Alexandrum hoc inducit ad manifestandum praecedentem sententiam per modum similitudinis, ut sit sensus: ita ea quae sunt in voce sunt signa passionum animae, sicut et litterae sunt signa vocum. Quod etiam manifestat per sequentia, cum dicit: et quemadmodum nec litterae etc.; inducens hoc quasi signum praecedentis. Quod enim litterae significent voces, significatur per hoc, quod, sicut sunt diversae voces apud diversos, ita et diversae litterae. Et secundum hanc expositionem, ideo non dixit, et litterae eorum quae sunt in voce, sed ea quae scribuntur: quia dicuntur litterae etiam in prolatione et Scriptura, quamvis magis proprie, secundum quod sunt in Scriptura, dicantur litterae; secundum autem quod sunt in prolatione, dicantur elementa vocis. Sed quia Aristoteles non dicit, sicut et ea quae scribuntur, sed continuam narrationem facit, melius est ut dicatur, sicut Porphyrius exposuit, quod Aristoteles procedit ulterius ad complendum ordinem significationis. Postquam enim dixerat quod nomina et verba, quae sunt in voce, sunt signa eorum quae sunt in anima, continuatim subdit quod nomina et verba quae scribuntur, signa sunt eorum nominum et verborum quae sunt in voce.	7. When he says, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound, he treats of the signification of writing. According to Alexander he introduces this to make the preceding clause evident by means of a similitude; and the meaning is: those that are in vocal sound are signs of the passions of the soul in the way in which letters are of vocal sound; then he goes On to manifest this point where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same—by introducing this as a sign of the preceding. For when he says in effect, just as there are diverse vocal sounds among diverse peoples so there are diverse letters, he is signifying that letters signify vocal. sounds. And according to this exposition Aristotle said those that are written are signs... and not, letters are signs of those that are in vocal sound, because they are called letters in both speech and writing, alt bough they are more properly called letters in writing; in speech they are called elements of vocal sound. Aristotle, however, does not say, just as those that are written, but continues with his account. Therefore it is better to say as Porphyry does, that Aristotle adds this to complete the order of signification; for after he says that names and verbs in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, he adds—in continuity with this—that names and verbs that are written are sians of the names and verbs that are in vocal sound.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: et quemadmodum nec litterae etc., ostendit differentiam praemissorum significantium et significatorum, quantum ad hoc, quod est esse secundum naturam, vel non esse. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim, ponit quoddam signum, quo manifestatur quod nec voces nec litterae naturaliter significant. Ea enim, quae naturaliter significant sunt eadem apud omnes. Significatio autem litterarum et vocum, de quibus nunc agimus, non est eadem apud omnes. Sed hoc quidem apud nullos unquam dubitatum fuit quantum ad litteras: quarum non solum ratio significandi est ex impositione, sed etiam ipsarum formatio fit per artem. Voces autem naturaliter formantur; unde et apud quosdam dubitatum fuit, utrum naturaliter significent. Sed Aristoteles hic determinat ex similitudine litterarum, quae sicut non sunt eaedem apud omnes, ita nec voces. Unde manifeste relinquitur quod sicut nec litterae, ita nec voces naturaliter significant, sed ex institutione humana. Voces autem illae, quae naturaliter significant, sicut gemitus infirmorum et alia huiusmodi, sunt eadem apud omnes.	8. Then where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same, he shows that the foresaid things differ as signified and signifying inasmuch as they are either according to nature or not. He makes three points here. He first posits a sign to show that neither vocal sounds nor letters signify naturally; things that signify naturally are the same among all men; but the signification of letters and vocal sounds, which is the point at issue here, is not the same among all men. There has never been any question about this in regard to letters, for their character of signifying is from imposition and their very formation is through art. Vocal sounds, however, are formed naturally and hence there is a question as to whether they signify naturally. Aristotle determines this by comparison with letters: these are not the same among all men, and so neither are vocal sounds the same. Consequently, like letters, vocal sounds do not signify naturally but by human institution. The vocal sounds that do signify naturally, such as groans of the sick and others of this kind, are the same among all men.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9 Secundo, ibi: quorum autem etc., ostendit passiones animae naturaliter esse, sicut et res, per hoc quod eaedem sunt apud omnes. Unde dicit: quorum autem; idest sicut passiones animae sunt eaedem omnibus (quorum primorum, idest quarum passionum primarum, hae, scilicet voces, sunt notae, idest signa; comparantur enim passiones animae ad voces, sicut primum ad secundum: voces enim non proferuntur, nisi ad exprimendum interiores animae passiones), et res etiam eaedem, scilicet sunt apud omnes, quorum, idest quarum rerum, hae, scilicet passiones animae sunt similitudines. Ubi attendendum est quod litteras dixit esse notas, idest signa vocum, et voces passionum animae similiter; passiones autem animae dicit esse similitudines rerum: et hoc ideo, quia res non cognoscitur ab anima nisi per aliquam sui similitudinem existentem vel in sensu vel in intellectu. Litterae autem ita sunt signa vocum, et voces passionum, quod non attenditur ibi aliqua ratio similitudinis, sed sola ratio institutionis, sicut et in multis aliis signis: ut tuba est signum belli. In passionibus autem animae oportet attendi rationem similitudinis ad exprimendas res, quia naturaliter eas designant, non ex institutione.	9. Secondly, when he says, but the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all, he shows that passions of the soul exist naturally, just as things exist naturally, for they are the same among all men. For, he says, but the passions of the soul, i.e., just as the passions of the soul are the same for all men; of which first, i.e., of which passions, being first, these, namely, vocal sounds, are tokens,” i.e., signs” (for passions of the soul are compared to vocal sounds as first to second since vocal sounds are produced only to express interior passions of the soul), so also the things... are the same, i.e., are the same among all, of which, i.e., of which things, passions of the soul are likenesses. Notice he says here that letters are signs, i.e., signs of vocal sounds, and similarly vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul, but that passions of the soul are likenesses of things. This is because a thing is not known by the soul unless there is some likeness of the thing existing either in the sense or in the intellect. Now letters are signs of vocal sounds and vocal sounds of passions in such a way that we do not attend to any idea of likeness in regard to them but only one of institution, as is the case in regard to many other signs, for example, the trumpet as a sign of war. But in the passions of the soul we have to take into account the idea of a likeness to the things represented, since passions of the soul designate things naturally, not by institution.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10 Obiiciunt autem quidam, ostendere volentes contra hoc quod dicit passiones animae, quas significant voces, esse omnibus easdem. Primo quidem, quia diversi diversas sententias habent de rebus, et ita non videntur esse eaedem apud omnes animae passiones. Ad quod respondet Boethius quod Aristoteles hic nominat passiones animae conceptiones intellectus, qui numquam decipitur; et ita oportet eius conceptiones esse apud omnes easdem: quia, si quis a vero discordat, hic non intelligit. Sed quia etiam in intellectu potest esse falsum, secundum quod componit et dividit, non autem secundum quod cognoscit quod quid est, idest essentiam rei, ut dicitur in III de anima; referendum est hoc ad simplices intellectus conceptiones (quas significant voces incomplexae), quae sunt eaedem apud omnes: quia, si quis vere intelligit quid est homo, quodcunque aliud aliquid, quam hominem apprehendat, non intelligit hominem. Huiusmodi autem simplices conceptiones intellectus sunt, quas primo voces significant. Unde dicitur in IV metaphysicae quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio. Et ideo signanter dicit: quorum primorum hae notae sunt, ut scilicet referatur ad primas conceptiones a vocibus primo significatas.	10. There are some who object to Aristotle’s position that passions of the soul, which vocal sounds signify, are the same for all men. Their argument against it is as follows: different men have different opinions about things; therefore, passions of the soul do not seem to be the same among all men. Boethius in reply to this objection says that here Aristotle is using "passions of the soul” to denote conceptions of the intellect, and since the intellect is never deceived, conceptions of the intellect must be the same among all men; for if someone is at variance with what is true, in this instance he does not understand. However, since what is false can also be in the intellect, not as it knows what a thing is, i.e., the essence of a thing, but as it composes and divides, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. Aristotle’s statement should be referred to the simple conceptions of the intellect—that are signified by the incomplex vocal sounds—which are the same among all men; for if someone truly understands what man is, whatever else than man he apprehends he does not understand as man. Simple conceptions of the intellect, which vocal sounds first signify, are of this kind. This is why Aristotle says in IV Metaphysicae [IV, 4: 1006b 4] that the notion which the name signifies is the definition.” And this is the reason he expressly says, "of which first [passions] these are signs,” i.e., so that this will be referred to the first conceptions first signified by vocal sounds.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 11 Sed adhuc obiiciunt aliqui de nominibus aequivocis, in quibus eiusdem vocis non est eadem passio, quae significatur apud omnes. Et respondet ad hoc Porphyrius quod unus homo, qui vocem profert, ad unam intellectus conceptionem significandam eam refert; et si aliquis alius, cui loquitur, aliquid aliud intelligat, ille qui loquitur, se exponendo, faciet quod referet intellectum ad idem. Sed melius dicendum est quod intentio Aristotelis non est asserere identitatem conceptionis animae per comparationem ad vocem, ut scilicet unius vocis una sit conceptio: quia voces sunt diversae apud diversos; sed intendit asserere identitatem conceptionum animae per comparationem ad res, quas similiter dicit esse easdem.	11. The equivocal name is given as another objection to this position, for in the case of an equivocal name the same vocal sound does not signify the same passion among all men. Porphyry answers this by pointing out that a man who utters a vocal sound intends it to signify one conception of the intellect. If the person to whom he is speaking understands something else by it, the one who is speaking, by explaining himself, will make the one to whom he is speaking refer his understanding to the same thing. However it is better to say that it is not Aristotle’s intention to maintain an identity of the conception of the soul in relation to a vocal sound such that there is one conception in relation to one vocal sound, for vocal sounds are different among different peoples; rather, he intends to maintain an identity of the conceptions of the soul in relation to things, which things he also says are the same.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 2 n. 12 Tertio, ibi: de his itaque etc., excusat se a diligentiori harum consideratione: quia quales sint animae passiones, et quomodo sint rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro de anima. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale.	12. Thirdly when he says, This has been discussed, however, in our study of the soul, etc., he excuses himself from a further consideration of these things, for the nature of the passions of the soul and the way in which they are likenesses of things does not pertain to logic but to philosophy of nature and has already been treated in the book De anima [III, 4-8].