Authors/Thomas Aquinas/perihermenias/perihermenias I/L8

LECTURE 8

Latin	English
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 1 Postquam philosophus definivit enunciationem, hic dividit eam. Et dividitur in duas partes: in prima, ponit divisionem enunciationis; in secunda, manifestat eam; ibi: necesse est autem et cetera.	1. Having defined the enunciation the Philosopher now divides it. First he gives the division, and then manifests it where he says, Every enunciative speech however, must contain a verb, etc.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod Aristoteles sub breviloquio duas divisiones enunciationis ponit. Quarum una est quod enunciationum quaedam est una simplex, quaedam est coniunctione una. Sicut etiam in rebus, quae sunt extra animam, aliquid est unum simplex sicut indivisibile vel continuum, aliquid est unum colligatione aut compositione aut ordine. Quia enim ens et unum convertuntur, necesse est sicut omnem rem, ita et omnem enunciationem aliqualiter esse unam.	2. It should be noted that Aristotle in his concise way gives two divisions of the enunciation. The first is the division into one simply and one by conjunction. This parallels things outside of the soul where there is also something one simply, for instance the indivisible or the continuum, and something one either by aggregation or composition or order. In fact, since being and one are convertible, every enunciation must in some way be one, just as every thing is.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 3 Alia vero subdivisio enunciationis est quod si enunciatio sit una, aut est affirmativa aut negativa. Enunciatio autem affirmativa prior est negativa, triplici ratione, secundum tria quae supra posita sunt: ubi dictum est quod vox est signum intellectus, et intellectus est signum rei. Ex parte igitur vocis, affirmativa enunciatio est prior negativa, quia est simplicior: negativa enim enunciatio addit supra affirmativam particulam negativam. Ex parte etiam intellectus affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat compositionem intellectus, est prior negativa, quae significat divisionem eiusdem: divisio enim naturaliter posterior est compositione, nam non est divisio nisi compositorum, sicut non est corruptio nisi generatorum. Ex parte etiam rei, affirmativa enunciatio, quae significat esse, prior est negativa, quae significat non esse: sicut habitus naturaliter prior est privatione.	3. The other is a subdivision of the enunciation: the division of it as it is one into affirmative and negative. The affirmative enunciation is prior to the negative for three reasons, which are related to three things already stated. It was said that vocal sound is a sign of thought and thought a sign of the thing. Accordingly, with respect to vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to negative because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative particle to the affirmative. With respect to thought, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies composition by the intellect, is prior to the negative, which signifies division, for division is posterior by nature to composition since division is only of composite things—just as corruption is only of generated things. With respect to the thing, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies to be is prior to the negative, which signifies not to be, as the having of something is naturally prior to the privation of it.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4 Dicit ergo quod oratio enunciativa una et prima est affirmatio, idest affirmativa enunciatio. Et contra hoc quod dixerat prima, subdit: deinde negatio, idest negativa oratio, quia est posterior affirmativa, ut dictum est. Contra id autem quod dixerat una, scilicet simpliciter, subdit quod quaedam aliae sunt unae, non simpliciter, sed coniunctione unae.	4. What he says, then, is this: Affirmation, i.e., affirmative enunciation, is one and the first enunciative speech. And in opposition to first he adds, then negation, i.e., negative speech, for it is posterior to affirmative, as we have said. In Opposition to one, i.e., one simply, he adds, certain others are one, not simply, but one by conjunction.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 5 Ex hoc autem quod hic dicitur argumentatur Alexander quod divisio enunciationis in affirmationem et negationem non est divisio generis in species, sed divisio nominis multiplicis in sua significata. Genus enim univoce praedicatur de suis speciebus, non secundum prius et posterius: unde Aristoteles noluit quod ens esset genus commune omnium, quia per prius praedicatur de substantia, quam de novem generibus accidentium.	5. From what Aristotle says here Alexander argues that the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation is Dot a division of a genus into species, but a division of a multiple name into its meanings; for a genus is not predicated according to the prior and posterior, but is predicated univocally of its species; this is the reason Aristotle would not grant that being is a common genus of all things, for it is predicated first of substance, and then of the nine genera of accidents.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 6 Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri: ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio. Sic ergo affirmatio secundum propriam rationem prior est negatione; tamen aequaliter participant rationem enunciationis, quam supra posuit, videlicet quod enunciatio est oratio in qua verum vel falsum est.	6. However, in the division of that which is common, one of the dividing members can be prior to another in two ways: according to the proper notions” or natures of the dividing members, or according to the participation of that common notion that is divided in them. The first of these does not destroy the univocity of a genus, as is evident in numbers. Twoness, according to its proper notion, is naturally prior to threeness, yet they equally participate in the notion of their genus, i.e., number; for both a multitude consisting of three and a multitude consisting of two is measured by one. The second, however, does impede the univocity of a genus. This is why being cannot be the genus of substance and accident, for in the very notion of being, substance, which is being per se, has priority in respect to accident, which is being through another and in another. Applying this distinction to the matter at hand, we see that affirmation is prior to negation in the first way, i.e., according to its notion, yet they equally participate in the definition Aristotle has given of the enunciation, i.e., speech in which there is truth or falsity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: necesse est autem etc., manifestat propositas divisiones. Et primo, manifestat primam, scilicet quod enunciatio vel est una simpliciter vel coniunctione una; secundo, manifestat secundam, scilicet quod enunciatio simpliciter una vel est affirmativa vel negativa; ibi: est autem simplex enunciatio et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, praemittit quaedam, quae sunt necessaria ad propositum manifestandum; secundo, manifestat propositum; ibi: est autem una oratio et cetera.	7. Where he says, Every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, etc., he explains the divisions. He gives two explanations, one of the division of enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction, the second of the division of the enunciation which is one simply into affirmative or negative. The latter explanation begins where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, etc. Before he explains the first division, i.e., into one simply and one by conjunction, he states certain things that are necessary for the evidence of the explanation, and then explains the division where he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 8 Circa primum duo facit: primo, dicit quod omnem orationem enunciativam oportet constare ex verbo quod est praesentis temporis, vel ex casu verbi quod est praeteriti vel futuri. Tacet autem de verbo infinito, quia eumdem usum habet in enunciatione sicut et verbum negativum. Manifestat autem quod dixerat per hoc, quod non solum nomen unum sine verbo non facit orationem perfectam enunciativam, sed nec etiam oratio imperfecta. Definitio enim oratio quaedam est, et tamen si ad rationem hominis, idest definitionem non addatur aut est, quod est verbum, aut erat, aut fuit, quae sunt casus verbi, aut aliquid huiusmodi, idest aliquod aliud verbum seu casus verbi, nondum est oratio enunciativa.	8. He states the first thing that is necessary for his explanation when he says that every enunciative speech must contain a verb in present time, or a case of the verb, i.e., in past or future time. (The infinite verb is not mentioned because it has the same function in the enunciation as the negative verb.) To manifest this he shows that one name, without a verb, does not even constitute imperfect enunciative speech, let alone perfect speech. Definition, he points out, is a certain kind of speech, and yet if the verb "is” or modes of the verb such as "was” or "has been” or something of the kind, is not added to the notion of man, i.e., to the definition, it is not enunciative speech.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 9 Potest autem esse dubitatio: cum enunciatio constet ex nomine et verbo, quare non facit mentionem de nomine, sicut de verbo? Ad quod tripliciter responderi potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla oratio enunciativa invenitur sine verbo vel casu verbi; invenitur autem aliqua enunciatio sine nomine, puta cum nos utimur infinitivis verborum loco nominum; ut cum dicitur, currere est moveri. Secundo et melius, quia, sicut supra dictum est, verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur. Praedicatum autem est principalior pars enunciationis, eo quod est pars formalis et completiva ipsius. Unde vocatur apud Graecos propositio categorica, idest praedicativa. Denominatio autem fit a forma, quae dat speciem rei. Et ideo potius fecit mentionem de verbo tanquam de parte principaliori et formaliori. Cuius signum est, quia enunciatio categorica dicitur affirmativa vel negativa solum ratione verbi, quod affirmatur vel negatur; sicut etiam conditionalis dicitur affirmativa vel negativa, eo quod affirmatur vel negatur coniunctio a qua denominatur. Tertio, potest dici, et adhuc melius, quod non erat intentio Aristotelis ostendere quod nomen vel verbum non sufficiant ad enunciationem complendam: hoc enim supra manifestavit tam de nomine quam de verbo. Sed quia dixerat quod quaedam enunciatio est una simpliciter, quaedam autem coniunctione una; posset aliquis intelligere quod illa quae est una simpliciter careret omni compositione: sed ipse hoc excludit per hoc quod in omni enunciatione oportet esse verbum, quod importat compositionem, quam non est intelligere sine compositis, sicut supra dictum est. Nomen autem non importat compositionem, et ideo non exigit praesens intentio ut de nomine faceret mentionem, sed solum de verbo.	9. But, one might ask, why mention the verb and not the name, for the enunciation consists of a name and a verb? This can be answered in three ways. First of all because enunciative speech is not attained without a verb or a mode of the verb, but it is without a name, for instance, when infinitive forms of the verb are used in place of names, as in "To run is to be moving.” A second and better reason for speaking only of the verb is that the verb is a sign of what is predicated of another. Now the predicate is the principal part of the enunciation because it is the formal part and completes it. This is the reason the Greeks called the enunciation a categorical, i.e., predicative, proposition. It should also be noted that denomination is made from the form which gives species to the thing. He speaks of the verb, then, but not the name, because it is the more principal and formal part of the enunciation. A sign of this is that the categorical enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative solely by reason of the verb being affirmed or denied, and the conditional enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative by reason of the conjunction by which it is denominated being affirmed or denied. A third and even better reason is that Aristotle did not intend to show that the name or verb is not sufficient for a complete enunciation, for he explained this earlier. Rather, he is excluding a misunderstanding that might arise from his saying that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction. Some might think this means that the kind that is one simply, lacks all composition. But he excludes this by saying that there must be a verb in every enunciation; for the verb implies composition and composition cannot be understood apart from the things composed, as he said earlier.” The name, on the other hand, does not imply composition and therefore did not have to be mentioned.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 10 Secundo; ibi: quare autem etc., ostendit aliud quod est necessarium ad manifestationem propositi, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, animal gressibile bipes, quae est definitio hominis, est unum et non multa. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis definitionibus. Sed huiusmodi rationem assignare dicit esse alterius negocii. Pertinet enim ad metaphysicum; unde in VII et in VIII metaphysicae ratio huius assignatur: quia scilicet differentia advenit generi non per accidens sed per se, tanquam determinativa ipsius, per modum quo materia determinatur per formam. Nam a materia sumitur genus, a forma autem differentia. Unde sicut ex forma et materia fit vere unum et non multa, ita ex genere et differentia.	10. The other, point necessary for the evidence of the first division is made where he says, but then the question arises as to why the definition "terrestrial biped animal” is something one, etc. He indicates by this that "terrestrial biped animal,” which is a definition of man, is one and not many. The reason it is one is the same as in the case of all definitions but, he says, to assign the reason belongs to another subject of inquiry. It belongs, in fact, to metaphysics and he assigns the reason in VII and VIII Metaphysicae [VII, 12: 1037b 7; VIII, 6: 1045a 6] which is this: the difference does not accrue to the genus accidentally but per se and is determinative of it in the way in which form determines matter; for the genus is taken from matter, the difference from form. Whence, just as one thing—not many—comes to be from form and matter, so one thing comes to be from the genus and difference.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 11 Excludit autem quamdam rationem huius unitatis, quam quis posset suspicari, ut scilicet propter hoc definitio dicatur unum, quia partes eius sunt propinquae, idest sine aliqua interpositione coniunctionis vel morae. Et quidem non interruptio locutionis necessaria est ad unitatem definitionis, quia si interponeretur coniunctio partibus definitionis, iam secunda non determinaret primam, sed significarentur ut actu multae in locutione: et idem operatur interpositio morae, qua utuntur rhetores loco coniunctionis. Unde ad unitatem definitionis requiritur quod partes eius proferantur sine coniunctione et interpolatione: quia etiam in re naturali, cuius est definitio, nihil cadit medium inter materiam et formam: sed praedicta non interruptio non sufficit ad unitatem definitionis, quia contingit etiam hanc continuitatem prolationis servari in his, quae non sunt simpliciter unum, sed per accidens; ut si dicam, homo albus musicus. Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter.	11. The reason for the unity of this definition might be supposed by some to be only that of juxtaposition of the parts, i.e., that "terrestrial biped animal” is said to be one only because the parts are side by side without conjunction or pause. But he excludes such a notion of its unity. Now it is true that non-interruption of locution is necessary for the unity of a definition, for if a conjunction were put between the parts the second part would not determine the first immediately and the many in locution would consequently signify many in act. The pause used by rhetoricians in place of a conjunction would do the same thing. Whence it is a requirement for the unity of a definition that its parts be uttered without conjunction and interpolation, the reason being that in the natural thing, whose definition it is, nothing mediates between matter and form. However, non-interruption of locution is not the only thing that is needed for unity of the definition, for there can be continuity of utterance in regard to things that are not one simply, but are accidentally, as in white musical man.” Aristotle has therefore manifested very subtly that absolute unity of the enunciation is not impeded either by the composition which the verb implies or by the multitude of names from which a definition is established. And the reason is the same in both cases, i.e., the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter, as is the difference to a genus; but from form and matter a thing that is one simply comes into existence.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit: est autem una oratio etc., accedit ad manifestandam praedictam divisionem. Et primo, manifestat ipsum commune quod dividitur, quod est enunciatio una; secundo, manifestat partes divisionis secundum proprias rationes; ibi: harum autem haec simplex et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, manifestat ipsam divisionem; secundo, concludit quod ab utroque membro divisionis nomen et verbum excluduntur; ibi: nomen ergo et verbum et cetera. Opponitur autem unitati pluralitas; et ideo enunciationis unitatem manifestat per modos pluralitatis.	12. He begins to explain the division when he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc. First he makes the common thing that is divided evident, i.e., the enunciation as it is one; secondly, he makes the parts of the division evident according to their own proper notions, where he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc. After he has made the division of the common thing evident, i.e., enunciation, he then concludes that the name and the verb are excluded from each member of the division where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc. Now plurality is opposed to unity. Therefore he is going to manifest the unity of the enunciation through the modes of plurality.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 13 Dicit ergo primo quod enunciatio dicitur vel una absolute, scilicet quae unum de uno significat, vel una secundum quid, scilicet quae est coniunctione una. Per oppositum autem est intelligendum quod enunciationes plures sunt, vel ex eo quod plura significant et non unum: quod opponitur primo modo unitatis; vel ex eo quod absque coniunctione proferuntur: et tales opponuntur secundo modo unitatis.	13. He begins his explanation by saying that enunciation is either one absolutely, i.e., it signifies one thing said of one thing, or one relatively, i.e., it is one by conjunction. In opposition to these are the enunciations that are many, either because they signify not one but many things, which is opposed to the first mode of unity or because they are uttered without a connecting particle, which is opposed to the second mode of unity.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 14 Circa quod considerandum est, secundum Boethium, quod unitas et pluralitas orationis refertur ad significatum; simplex autem et compositum attenditur secundum ipsas voces. Et ideo enunciatio quandoque est una et simplex puta cum solum ex nomine et verbo componitur in unum significatum; ut cum dico, homo est albus. Est etiam quandoque una oratio, sed composita, quae quidem unam rem significat, sed tamen composita est vel ex pluribus terminis; sicut si dicam, animal rationale mortale currit, vel ex pluribus enunciationibus, sicut in conditionalibus, quae quidem unum significant et non multa. Similiter autem quandoque in enunciatione est pluralitas cum simplicitate, puta cum in oratione ponitur aliquod nomen multa significans; ut si dicam, canis latrat, haec oratio plures est, quia plura significat, et tamen simplex est. Quandoque vero in enunciatione est pluralitas et compositio, puta cum ponuntur plura in subiecto vel in praedicato, ex quibus non fit unum, sive interveniat coniunctio sive non; puta si dicam, homo albus musicus disputat: et similiter est si coniungantur plures enunciationes, sive cum coniunctione sive sine coniunctione; ut si dicam, Socrates currit, Plato disputat. Et secundum hoc sensus litterae est quod enunciatio una est illa, quae unum de uno significat, non solum si sit simplex, sed etiam si sit coniunctione una. Et similiter enunciationes plures dicuntur quae plura et non unum significant: non solum quando interponitur aliqua coniunctio, vel inter nomina vel verba, vel etiam inter ipsas enunciationes; sed etiam si vel inconiunctione, idest absque aliqua interposita coniunctione plura significat, vel quia est unum nomen aequivocum, multa significans, vel quia ponuntur plura nomina absque coniunctione, ex quorum significatis non fit unum; ut si dicam, homo albus grammaticus logicus currit.	14. Boethius interprets this passage in the following way. "Unity” and "plurality” of speech refers to what is signified, whereas "simple” and "composite” is related to the vocal sounds. Accordingly, an enunciation is sometimes one and simple, namely, when one thing is signified by the composition of name and verb, as in "Man is white.” Sometimes it is one and composite. In this case it signifies one thing, but is composed either from many terms, as in "A mortal rational animal is running,” or from many enunciations, as in conditionals that signify one thing and not many. On the other hand, sometimes there is plurality along with simplicity, namely, when a name signifying many things is used, as in "The dog barks,” in which case the enunciation is many because it signifies many things [i.e., it signifies equivocally], but it is simple as far as vocal sound is concerned. But sometimes there is plurality and composition, namely, when many things are posited on the part of the subject or predicate from which one thing does not result, whether a conjunction intervenes or not, as in "The musical white man is arguing.” This is also the case if there are many enunciations joined together, with or without connecting particles as in "Socrates runs, Plato discusses. According to this exposition the meaning of the passage in question is this: an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing, and this is the case whether the enunciation is one simply or is one by conjunction; an enunciation is many when it signifies not one but many things, and this not only when a conjunction is inserted between either the names or verbs or between the enunciations themselves, but even if there are many things that are not conjoined. In the latter case they signify many things either because an equivocal name is used or because many names signifying many things from which one thing does not result are used without conjunctions, as in "The white grammatical logical man is running.”
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 15 Sed haec expositio non videtur esse secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Primo quidem, quia per disiunctionem, quam interponit, videtur distinguere inter orationem unum significantem, et orationem quae est coniunctione una. Secundo, quia supra dixerat quod est unum quoddam et non multa, animal gressibile bipes. Quod autem est coniunctione unum, non est unum et non multa, sed est unum ex multis. Et ideo melius videtur dicendum quod Aristoteles, quia supra dixerat aliquam enunciationem esse unam et aliquam coniunctione unam, vult hic manifestare quae sit una. Et quia supra dixerat quod multa nomina simul coniuncta sunt unum, sicut animal gressibile bipes, dicit consequenter quod enunciatio est iudicanda una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati, etiam si sint plura nomina quae unum significent. Vel si sit aliqua enunciatio una quae multa significet, non erit una simpliciter, sed coniunctione una. Et secundum hoc, haec enunciatio, animal gressibile bipes est risibile, non est una quasi coniunctione una, sicut in prima expositione dicebatur, sed quia unum significat.	15. However, this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind. First of all the disjunction he inserts seems to indicate that he is distinguishing between speech signifying one thing and speech which is one by conjunction. In the second place, he has just said that terrestrial biped animal is something one and not many. Moreover, what is one by conjunction is not one, and not many, but one from many. Hence it seems better to say that since he has already said that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction be is showing here what one enunciation is. Having said, then, that many names joined together are something one as in the example "terrestrial biped animal,” he goes on to say that an enunciation is to be judged as one, not from the unity of the name but from the unity of what is signified, even if there are many names signifying the one thing; and if an enunciation which signifies many things is one, it will not be one simply, but one by conjunction. Hence, the enunciation "A terrestrial biped animal is risible,” is not one in the sense of one by conjunction as the first exposition would have it, but because it signifies one thing.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 16 Et quia oppositum per oppositum manifestatur, consequenter ostendit quae sunt plures enunciationes, et ponit duos modos pluralitatis. Primus est, quod plures dicuntur enunciationes quae plura significant. Contingit autem aliqua plura significari in aliquo uno communi; sicut cum dico, animal est sensibile, sub hoc uno communi, quod est animal, multa continentur, et tamen haec enunciatio est una et non plures. Et ideo addit et non unum. Sed melius est ut dicatur hoc esse additum propter definitionem, quae multa significat quae sunt unum: et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur primo modo unitatis. Secundus modus pluralitatis est, quando non solum enunciationes plura significant, sed etiam illa plura nullatenus coniunguntur, et hic modus pluralitatis opponitur secundo modo unitatis. Et secundum hoc patet quod secundus modus unitatis non opponitur primo modo pluralitatis. Ea autem quae non sunt opposita, possunt simul esse. Unde manifestum est, enunciationem quae est una coniunctione, esse etiam plures: plures in quantum significat plura et non unum. Secundum hoc ergo possumus accipere tres modos enunciationis. Nam quaedam est simpliciter una, in quantum unum significat; quaedam est simpliciter plures, in quantum plura significat, sed est una secundum quid, in quantum est coniunctione una; quaedam sunt simpliciter plures, quae neque significant unum, neque coniunctione aliqua uniuntur. Ideo autem Aristoteles quatuor ponit et non solum tria, quia quandoque est enunciatio plures, quia plura significat, non tamen est coniunctione una, puta si ponatur ibi nomen multa significans.	16. Then—because an opposite is manifested through an opposite—he goes on to show which enunciations are many, and he posits two modes of plurality. Enunciations are said to be many which signify many things. Many things may be signified in some one common thing however; when I say, for example, "An animal is a sentient being,” many things are contained under the one common thing, animal, but such an enunciation is still one, not many. Therefore Aristotle adds, and not one. It would be better to say, however, that the and not one is added because of definition, which signifies many things that are one. The mode of plurality he has spoken of thus far is opposed to the first mode of unity. The second mode of plurality covers enunciations that not only signify many things but many that are in no way joined together. This mode is opposed to the second mode of unity. Thus it is evident that the second mode of unity is not opposed to the first mode of plurality. Now those things that are not opposed can be together. Therefore, the enunciation that is one by conjunction is also many many insofar as it signifies many and not one. According to this understanding of the text there are three modes of the enunciation: the enunciation that is one simply inasmuch as it signifies one thing; the enunciation that is many simply inasmuch as it signifies many things, but is one relatively inasmuch as it is one by conjunction; finally, the enunciations that are many simply—those that do not signify one thing and are not united by any conjunction. Aristotle posits four kinds of enunciation rather than three, for an enunciation is sometimes many because it signifies many things, and yet is not one by conjunction; a case in point would be an enunciation in which a name signifying many things is used.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit: nomen ergo et verbum etc., excludit ab unitate orationis nomen et verbum. Dixerat enim quod enunciatio una est, quae unum significat: posset autem aliquis intelligere, quod sic unum significaret sicut nomen et verbum unum significant. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum subdit: nomen ergo, et verbum dictio sit sola, idest ita sit dictio, quod non enunciatio. Et videtur, ex modo loquendi, quod ipse imposuerit hoc nomen ad significandum partes enunciationis. Quod autem nomen et verbum dictio sit sola manifestat per hoc, quod non potest dici quod ille enunciet, qui sic aliquid significat voce, sicut nomen, vel verbum significat. Et ad hoc manifestandum innuit duos modos utendi enunciatione. Quandoque enim utimur ipsa quasi ad interrogata respondentes; puta si quaeratur, quis sit in scholis? Respondemus, magister. Quandoque autem utimur ea propria sponte, nullo interrogante; sicut cum dicimus, Petrus currit. Dicit ergo, quod ille qui significat aliquid unum nomine vel verbo, non enunciat vel sicut ille qui respondet aliquo interrogante, vel sicut ille qui profert enunciationem non aliquo interrogante, sed ipso proferente sponte. Introduxit autem hoc, quia simplex nomen vel verbum, quando respondetur ad interrogationem, videtur verum vel falsum significare: quod est proprium enunciationis. Sed hoc non competit nomini vel verbo, nisi secundum quod intelligitur coniunctum cum alia parte proposita in interrogatione. Ut si quaerenti, quis legit in scholis? Respondeatur, magister, subintelligitur, ibi legit. Si ergo ille qui enunciat aliquid nomine vel verbo non enunciat, manifestum est quod enunciatio non sic unum significat, sicut nomen vel verbum. Hoc autem inducit sicut conclusionem eius quod supra praemisit: necesse est omnem orationem enunciativam ex verbo esse vel ex casu verbi.	17. Where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc., he excludes the name and the verb from the unity of speech. His reason for making this point is that his statement, "an enunciation is one inasmuch as it signifies one thing,” might be taken to mean that an enunciation signifies one thing in the same way the name or verb signify one thing. To prevent such a misunderstanding he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, i.e., a locution which is not an enunciation. From his mode of speaking it would seem that Aristotle himself imposed the name "phasis” [word] to signify such parts of the enunciation. Then he shows that a name or verb is only a word by pointing out that we do not say that a person is enunciating when be signifies something in vocal sound in the way in which a name or verb signifies. To manifest this he suggests two ways of using the enunciation. Sometimes we use it to reply to questions; for example if someone asks "Who is it who discusses,” we answer "The teacher.” At other times we use the enunciation, not in reply to a question, but of our own accord, as when we say "Peter is running.” What Aristotle is saying, then, is that the person who signifies something one by a name or a verb is not enunciating in the way in which either the person who replies to a question or who utters an enunciation of his own accord is enunciating. He introduces this point because the simple name or verb, when used in reply to a question seems to signify truth or falsity and truth or falsity is what is proper to the enunciation. Truth and falsity is not proper, however, to the name or verb unless it is understood as joined to another part proposed in a question; if someone should ask, for example, "Who reads in the schools,” we would answer, "The teacher,” understanding also, "reads there.” If, then, something expressed by a name or verb is not an enunciation, it is evident that the enunciation does not signify one thing in the same way as the name or verb signify one thing. Aristotle draws this by way of a conclusion from, Every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, which was stated earlier.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit: harum autem haec simplex etc., manifestat praemissam divisionem secundum rationes partium. Dixerat enim quod una enunciatio est quae unum de uno significat, et alia est quae est coniunctione una. Ratio autem huius divisionis est ex eo quod unum natum est dividi per simplex et compositum. Et ideo dicit: harum autem, scilicet enunciationum, in quibus dividitur unum, haec dicitur una, vel quia significat unum simpliciter, vel quia una est coniunctione. Haec quidem simplex enunciatio est, quae scilicet unum significat. Sed ne intelligatur quod sic significet unum, sicut nomen vel verbum, ad excludendum hoc subdit: ut aliquid de aliquo, idest per modum compositionis, vel aliquid ab aliquo, idest per modum divisionis. Haec autem ex his coniuncta, quae scilicet dicitur coniunctione una, est velut oratio iam composita: quasi dicat hoc modo, enunciationis unitas dividitur in duo praemissa, sicut aliquod unum dividitur in simplex et compositum.	18. Then when he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc., he manifests the division of enunciation by the natures of the parts. He has said that the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction. The basis of this division is the nature of one, which is such that it can be divided into simple and composite. Hence, Aristotle says, Of these, i.e., enunciations into which one is divided, which are said to be one either because the enunciation signifies one thing simply or because it is one by conjunction, simple enunciation is one kind, i.e., the enunciation that signifies one thing. And to exclude the understanding of this as signifying one thing in the same way as the name or the verb signifies one thing he adds, something affirmed of something, i.e., by way of composition, or something denied of something, i.e., by way of division. The other kind—the enunciation that is said to be one by conjunction—is composite, i.e., speech composed of these simple enunciations. In other words, he is saying that the unity of the enunciation is divided into simple and composite, just as one is divided into simple and composite.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit: est autem simplex etc., manifestat secundam divisionem enunciationis, secundum videlicet quod enunciatio dividitur in affirmationem et negationem. Haec autem divisio primo quidem convenit enunciationi simplici; ex consequenti autem convenit compositae enunciationi; et ideo ad insinuandum rationem praedictae divisionis dicit quod simplex enunciatio est vox significativa de eo quod est aliquid: quod pertinet ad affirmationem; vel non est aliquid: quod pertinet ad negationem. Et ne hoc intelligatur solum secundum praesens tempus, subdit: quemadmodum tempora sunt divisa, idest similiter hoc habet locum in aliis temporibus sicut et in praesenti.	19. He manifests the second division of the enunciation where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, i.e., the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division that belongs primarily to the simple enunciation and consequently to the composite enunciation; therefore, in order to suggest the basis of the division he says that a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which pertains to affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which pertains to negation. And to make it clear that this is not to be understood only of present time he adds, according to the divisions of time, i.e., this holds for other times as well as the present.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 20 Alexander autem existimavit quod Aristoteles hic definiret enunciationem; et quia in definitione enunciationis videtur ponere affirmationem et negationem, volebat hic accipere quod enunciatio non esset genus affirmationis et negationis, quia species nunquam ponitur in definitione generis. Id autem quod non univoce praedicatur de multis (quia scilicet non significat aliquid unum, quod sit unum commune multis), non potest notificari nisi per illa multa quae significantur. Et inde est quod quia unum non dicitur aequivoce de simplici et composito, sed per prius et posterius, Aristoteles in praecedentibus semper ad notificandum unitatem enunciationis usus est utroque. Quia ergo videtur uti affirmatione et negatione ad notificandum enunciationem, volebat Alexander accipere quod enunciatio non dicitur de affirmatione et negatione univoce sicut genus de suis speciebus.	20. Alexander thought that Aristotle was defining the enunciation here and because he seems to put affirmation and negation in the "definition” he took this to mean that enunciation is not the genus of affirmation and negation, for the species is never posited in the definition of the genus. Now what is not predicated univocally of many (namely, because it does not signify something one that is common to many) cannot be made known except through the many that are signified. "One” is not said equivocally of the simple and composite, but primarily and consequently, and hence Aristotle always used both "simple” and "composite” in the preceding reasoning to make the unity of the enunciation known. Now, here he seems to use affirmation and negation to make the enunciation known; therefore, Alexander took this to mean that enunciation is not said of affirmation and negation univocally as a genus of its species.
Aquinas lib. 1 l. 8 n. 21 Sed contrarium apparet ex hoc, quod philosophus consequenter utitur nomine enunciationis ut genere, cum in definitione affirmationis et negationis subdit quod, affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, scilicet per modum compositionis, negatio vero est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo, scilicet per modum divisionis. Nomine autem aequivoco non consuevimus uti ad notificandum significata eius. Et ideo Boethius dicit quod Aristoteles suo modo breviloquio utens, simul usus est et definitione et divisione eius: ita ut quod dicit de eo quod est aliquid vel non est, non referatur ad definitionem enunciationis, sed ad eius divisionem. Sed quia differentiae divisivae generis non cadunt in eius definitione, nec hoc solum quod dicitur vox significativa, sufficiens est definitio enunciationis; melius dici potest secundum Porphyrium, quod hoc totum quod dicitur vox significativa de eo quod est, vel de eo quod non est, est definitio enunciationis. Nec tamen ponitur affirmatio et negatio in definitione enunciationis sed virtus affirmationis et negationis, scilicet significatum eius, quod est esse vel non esse, quod est naturaliter prius enunciatione. Affirmationem autem et negationem postea definivit per terminos utriusque cum dixit: affirmationem esse enunciationem alicuius de aliquo, et negationem enunciationem alicuius ab aliquo. Sed sicut in definitione generis non debent poni species, ita nec ea quae sunt propria specierum. Cum igitur significare esse sit proprium affirmationis, et significare non esse sit proprium negationis, melius videtur dicendum, secundum Ammonium, quod hic non definitur enunciatio, sed solum dividitur. Supra enim posita est definitio, cum dictum est quod enunciatio est oratio in qua est verum vel falsum. In qua quidem definitione nulla mentio facta est nec de affirmatione, nec de negatione. Est autem considerandum quod artificiosissime procedit: dividit enim genus non in species, sed in differentias specificas. Non enim dicit quod enunciatio est affirmatio vel negatio, sed vox significativa de eo quod est, quae est differentia specifica affirmationis, vel de eo quod non est, in quo tangitur differentia specifica negationis. Et ideo ex differentiis adiunctis generi constituit definitionem speciei, cum subdit: quod affirmatio est enunciatio alicuius de aliquo, per quod significatur esse; et negatio est enunciatio alicuius ab aliquo quod significat non esse.	21. But the contrary appears to be the case, for the Philosopher subsequently uses the name "enunciation” as a genus when in defining affirmation and negation he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something, i.e., by way of composition; negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, i.e., by way of division. Moreover, it is not customary to use an equivocal name to make known the things it signifies. Boethius for this reason says that Aristotle with his customary brevity is using both the definition and its division at once. Therefore when he says that something belongs or does not belong to a subject he is not referring to the definition of enunciation but to its division. However, since the differences dividing a genus do not fall in its definition and since vocal sound signifying is not a sufficient definition of the enunciation, Porphyry thought it would be better to say that the whole expression, vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, is the definition of the enunciation. According to his exposition this is not affirmation and negation that is posited in the definition, but capacity for affirmation and negation, i.e., what the enunciation is a sign of, which is to be or not to be, which is prior in nature to the enunciation. Then immediately following this he defines affirmation and negation in terms of themselves when he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something. But just as the species should not be stated in the definition of the genus, so neither should the properties of the species. Now to signify to be is the property of the affirmation, and to signify not to be the property of the negation. Therefore Ammonius thought it would be better to say that the enunciation was not defined here, but only divided. For the definition was posited above when it was said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity—in which definition no mention is made of either affirmation or negation. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle proceeds very skillfully here, for he divides the genus, not into species, but into specific differences. He does not say that the enunciation is an affirmation or negation, but vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which is the specific difference of affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which is the specific difference of negation. Then when he adds, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something which signifies to be, and negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, which signifies not to be, he establishes the definition of the species by joining the differences to the genus.