Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L1/lect13

LECTURE 13 THERE ARE TWO PER SE PRINCIPLES OF THE BEING AND OF THE BECOMING OF NATURAL THINGS

Latin	English
	LECTURE 13 (190 b 16-191 a 22) THERE ARE TWO PER SE PRINCIPLES OF THE BEING AND OF THE BECOMING OF NATURAL THINGS, NAMELY, MATTER AND FORM, AND ONE PER ACCIDENS PRINCIPLE, NAMELY, PRIVATION
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quod in quolibet fieri naturali tria inveniuntur, hic ex praemissis intendit ostendere quot sunt principia naturae. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit propositum; secundo recapitulando ostendit quae dicta sunt, et quae restant dicenda, ibi: primum quidem igitur dictum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit tria naturae principia; secundo notificat ea, ibi: subiecta autem natura et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit veritatem de principiis naturae; secundo ex veritate ostensa solvit praemissas de principiis dubitationes, ibi: unde est quod sicut duo etc.; tertio, quia ab antiquis dictum est quod principia sunt contraria, ostendit utrum semper requirantur contraria vel non, ibi: quot quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit duo esse principia naturae per se; secundo ostendit tertium esse principium naturae per accidens, ibi: est autem subiectum et cetera.	110. After the Philosopher has shown that three things are found in every natural coming to be, he intends here to show from the foregoing how many principles of nature there are. Concerning this he makes two points. First he explains his position. Secondly, where he says, ‘Briefly, we explained ...’ (191 a 15 #119), in recapitulation he explains what has already been said and what remains to be said. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that there are three principles of nature. Secondly he names them, where he says, ‘The underlying nature ...’ (191 a 8 #118). Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he explains the truth about the first principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘There is a sense ...’ (190 b 28 #114) from this disclosure of the truth he answers the problems about the principles which were raised above. Thirdly, since the ancients had said that the principles are contraries, he shows whether or not contraries are always required, where he says, ‘We have now stated ...’ (191 a 3 #115). Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that there are two per se principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘Now the subject ...’ (190 b 23 #112), he shows that the third principle is a per accidens principle of nature.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 2 Circa primum utitur tali ratione. Illa dicuntur esse principia et causae rerum naturalium, ex quibus sunt et fiunt per se, et non secundum accidens; sed omne quod fit, est et fit ex subiecto et forma; ergo subiectum et forma sunt per se causae et principia omnis eius quod fit secundum naturam. Quod autem id quod fit secundum naturam, fit ex subiecto et forma, probat hoc modo. Ea in quae resolvitur definitio alicuius rei, sunt componentia rem illam; quia unumquodque resolvitur in ea ex quibus componitur. Sed ratio eius quod fit secundum naturam, resolvitur in subiectum et formam: nam ratio hominis musici resolvitur in rationem hominis et in rationem musici; si quis enim velit definire hominem musicum, oportet quod assignet definitionem hominis et musici. Ergo id quod fit secundum naturam, est et fit ex subiecto et forma. Et notandum est quod hic intendit inquirere principia non solum fiendi, sed etiam essendi: unde signanter dicit ex quibus primis sunt et fiunt. Et dicit ex quibus primis, idest per se et non secundum accidens. Per se ergo principia omnis quod fit secundum naturam, sunt subiectum et forma.	111. With reference to the first point he uses the following argument. Those things from which natural things are and come to be per se, and not per accidens, are said to be the principles and causes of natural things. Whatever comes to be exists and comes to be both from subject and from form. Therefore the subject and the form are per se causes and principles of everything which comes to be according to nature. That that which comes to be according to nature comes to be from subject and form he proves as follows. Those things into which the definition of a thing is resolved are the components of that thing, because each thing is resolved into the things of which it is composed. But the definition [ratio] of that which comes to be according to nature is resolved into subject and form. For the definition [ratio] of musical man is resolved into the definition [ratio] of man and the definition [ratio] of musical. For if anyone wishes to define musical man, he will have to give the definitions of man and musical. Therefore, that which comes to be according to nature both is and comes to be from subject and form. And it must be noted that he intends here to inquire not only into the principles of the coming to be but also into the principles of the being. Hence he says significantly that things both are and come to be from these first principles. And by ‘first principles’ he means per se and not per accidens principles. Therefore, the per se principles of everything which comes to be according to nature are subject and form.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: est autem subiectum etc., addit tertium principium per accidens. Et dicit quod licet subiectum sit unum numero, tamen specie et ratione est duo, ut supra dictum est; quia homo et aurum et omnis materia numerum quendam habet. Est enim ibi considerare ipsum subiectum, quod est aliquid positive, ex quo fit aliquid per se et non per accidens, ut hoc quod est homo et aurum; et est ibi considerare id quod accidit ei, scilicet contrarietatem et privationem, ut immusicum et infiguratum. Tertium autem est species vel forma, sicut ordinatio est forma domus, vel musica hominis musici, vel aliquod aliorum quae hoc modo praedicantur. Sic igitur forma et subiectum sunt principia per se eius quod fit secundum naturam; sed privatio vel contrarium est principium per accidens, inquantum accidit subiecto; sicut dicimus quod aedificator est causa activa domus per se, sed musicum est causa activa domus per accidens, inquantum accidit aedificatori esse musicum. Et sic homo est causa per se, ut subiectum, hominis musici; sed non musicum est causa et principium eius per accidens.	112. Next where he says, ‘Now the subject ...’ (190 b 23), he adds the third per accidens principle. He says that although the subject is one in number, it is nevertheless two in species and nature [ratio], as was said above [L12 #104]. For man and gold and any matter has some sort of number. This is a consideration of the subject itself, such as man or gold, which is something positive, and from which something comes to be per se and not per accidens. It is another thing, however, to consider that which happens to the subject, i.e., contrariety and privation, such as to be unmusical and unshaped. The third principle, then, is a species or form, as order is the form of a house, or musical is the form of a musical man, or as any of the other things which are predicated in this way. Therefore the subject and the form are per se principles of that which comes to be according to nature, but privation or the contrary is a per accidens principle, insofar as it happens to the subject. Thus we say that the builder is the per se active cause of the house, but the musician is a per accidens active cause of the house insofar as the builder also happens to be musical. Hence the man is the per se cause as subject of musical man, but the non-musical is a per accidens cause and principle.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 4 Posset autem aliquis obiicere quod privatio non accidit subiecto quando est sub forma; et sic privatio non est principium essendi per accidens. Et ideo dicendum quod materia nunquam est sine privatione: quia quando habet unam formam, est cum privatione alterius formae. Et ideo dum est in fieri aliquid quod fit (ut homo musicus), in subiecto quando nondum habet formam, est privatio ipsius musicae; et ideo principium per accidens hominis musici in fieri est non musicum; hoc enim accidit homini dum fit musicus. Sed quando iam advenit ei haec forma, adiungitur ei privatio alterius formae; et sic privatio formae oppositae est principium per accidens in essendo. Patet ergo secundum intentionem Aristotelis quod privatio, quae ponitur principium naturae per accidens, non est aliqua aptitudo ad formam, vel inchoatio formae, vel aliquod principium imperfectum activum, ut quidam dicunt, sed ipsa carentia formae vel contrarium formae, quod subiecto accidit.	113. However someone may object that privation does not belong to a subject while it is under some form, and thus privation is not a per accidens principle of being. Hence it must be said that matter is never without privation. For when matter has one form, it is in privation of some other form. And so while it is coming to be that which it becomes (e.g., musical man), there is in the subject, which does not yet have the form, the privation of the musical itself. And so the per accidens principle of a musical man, while he is coming to be musical, is the non-musical. For he is a non-musical man while he is coming to be musical. But when this latter form has already come to him, then there is joined to him the privation of the other form. And thus the privation of the opposite form is a per accidens principle of being. It is clear, therefore, according to the opinion of Aristotle that privation, which is posited as a per accidens principle of nature, is not a capacity for a form, nor an inchoate form, nor some imperfect active principle, as some say. Rather it is the very absence of form, or the contrary of form, which occurs in the subject.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: unde est etc., solvit secundum determinatam veritatem dubitationes omnes praecedentes. Et concludit ex praedictis quod quodammodo dicendum est esse duo principia, scilicet per se; et quodammodo tria, si coassumatur principium per accidens cum principiis per se. Et quodammodo sunt principia contraria, ut si aliquis accipiat musicum et non musicum, calidum et frigidum, consonans et inconsonans; et quodammodo principia non sunt contraria, scilicet si accipiantur sine subiecto; quia contraria non possunt pati ad invicem, nisi hoc solvatur per hoc, quod contrariis supponitur aliquod subiectum, ratione cuius ad invicem patiuntur. Et sic concludit quod principia non sunt plura contrariorum, idest contrariis, hoc est quam contraria; sed sunt duo tantum per se. Sed nec totaliter duo, quia unum eorum secundum esse est alterum: subiectum enim secundum rationem est duo, sicut dictum est, et sic sunt tria principia: quia homo et non musicus, et aes et infiguratum differunt secundum rationem. Sic igitur patet quod priores sermones disputati ad utramque partem, fuerunt secundum aliquid veri, sed non totaliter.	114. Next where he says, ‘There is a sense...’ (190 b 28), he resolves, in the light of the truth already determined, all the preceding difficulties. He concludes from the foregoing that in a certain respect it must be said that there are two principles, namely, the per se principles, and in another respect that there are three, if we accept along with the per se principles the per accidens principle. And in a certain respect the principles are contraries, if one takes the musical and the non-musical, the hot and the cold, the harmonious and the inharmonious. Yet in another respect the principles, if they are taken without the subject, are not contraries, for contraries cannot be acted upon by each other, unless it be held that some subject is supposed for the contraries by reason of which they are acted upon by one another. And thus he concludes that the principles are not more than the contraries, for there are only two per se principles. But there are not just two principles, for one of them according to its being [esse] is other, for the subject according to nature [ratio] is two, as was said [L12 #104ff]. And thus there are three principles, because man and the non-musical, and bronze and the unshaped, differ according to nature [ratio]. Therefore it is clear that the early opinions which argued for a part of the truth were in a certain respect true, but not altogether true.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quot quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo sunt duo contraria necessaria et quomodo non. Et dicit manifestum esse ex dictis quot sunt principia circa generationem naturalium, et quomodo sint tot. Ostensum est enim quod oportet duo esse contraria, quorum unum est principium per se et alterum per accidens; et quod aliquid subiiciatur contrariis, quod est etiam principium per se. Sed aliquo modo alterum contrariorum non est necessarium ad generationem: sufficit enim alterum contrariorum quandoque facere mutationem absentia sua et praesentia.	115. Next where he says, ‘We have now stated ...’ (191 a 3), he shows in what way two contraries are necessary, and in what way they are not necessary. He says that from what has been said it is clear how many principles of the generation of natural things there are, and how it happens that there are this number. For it was shown that it is necessary that two of the principles be contraries, of which one is a per se principle and the other a per accidens principle, and that something be the subject of the contraries, which is also a per se principle. But in a certain respect one of the contraries is not necessary for generation, for at times it is sufficient if one of the contraries bring about the change by its absence and its presence.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 7 Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod, sicut in quinto huius dicetur, tres sunt species mutationis, scilicet generatio et corruptio et motus. Quorum haec est differentia, quia motus est de uno affirmato in aliud affirmatum, sicut de albo in nigrum; generatio autem est de negato in affirmatum, sicut de non albo in album, vel de non homine in hominem; corruptio autem est de affirmato in negatum, sicut de albo in non album, vel de homine in non hominem. Sic igitur patet quod in motu requiruntur duo contraria et unum subiectum. Sed in generatione et corruptione requiritur praesentia unius contrarii et absentia eius, quae est privatio. Generatio autem et corruptio salvantur in motu: nam quod movetur de albo in nigrum, corrumpitur album et fit nigrum. Sic igitur in omni mutatione naturali requiritur subiectum et forma et privatio. Non autem ratio motus salvatur in omni generatione et corruptione, sicut patet in generatione et corruptione substantiarum. Unde subiectum et forma et privatio salvantur in omni mutatione; non autem subiectum et duo contraria.	116. As evidence of this we must note that, as will be said in Book V [L2 #649ff], there are three species of mutation, namely, generation and corruption and motion. The difference among these is as follows. Motion is from one positive state to another positive state, as from white to black. Generation, however, is from the negative to the positive, as from the non-white to the white, or from non-man to man. Corruption, on the other hand, is from the positive to the negative, as from the white to the non-white, or from man to non-man. Therefore, it is clear that in motion two contraries and one subject are required. But in generation and corruption there is required the presence of one contrary and its absence, which is privation. Generation and corruption, however, are found in motion. For when something is moved from white to black, white is corrupted and black comes to be. Therefore in every natural mutation subject and form and privation are required. However, the nature [ratio] of motion is not found in every generation and corruption, as is clear in the generation and corruption of substances. Hence subject and form and privation are found in every mutation, but not a subject and two contraries.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 8 Haec etiam oppositio invenitur in substantiis, quae est primum genus, non autem oppositio contrarietatis: nam formae substantiales non sunt contrariae, licet differentiae in genere substantiae contrariae sint, secundum quod una accipitur cum privatione alterius, sicut patet de animato et inanimato.	117. This opposition is also found in substances, which are the first genus. This, however, is not the opposition of contrariety. For substantial forms are not contraries, even though differentiae in the genus of substance are contrary insofar as one is received along with the privation of the other, as is clear in the animate and the inanimate.
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit: subiecta autem natura etc., manifestat praemissa principia. Et dicit quod natura quae primo subiicitur mutationi, idest materia prima, non potest sciri per seipsam, cum omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscatur per suam formam; materia autem prima consideratur subiecta omni formae. Sed scitur secundum analogiam, idest secundum proportionem. Sic enim cognoscimus quod lignum est aliquid praeter formam scamni et lecti, quia quandoque est sub una forma, quandoque sub alia. Cum igitur videamus hoc quod est aer quandoque fieri aquam, oportet dicere quod aliquid existens sub forma aeris, quandoque sit sub forma aquae: et sic illud est aliquid praeter formam aquae et praeter formam aeris, sicut lignum est aliquid praeter formam scamni et praeter formam lecti. Quod igitur sic se habet ad ipsas substantias naturales, sicut se habet aes ad statuam et lignum ad lectum, et quodlibet materiale et informe ad formam, hoc dicimus esse materiam primam. Hoc igitur est unum principium naturae: quod non sic unum est sicut hoc aliquid, hoc est sicut aliquod individuum demonstratum, ita quod habeat formam et unitatem in actu; sed dicitur ens et unum inquantum est in potentia ad formam. Aliud autem principium est ratio vel forma: tertium autem est privatio, quae contrariatur formae. Et quomodo ista principia sint duo et quomodo tria, dictum est prius.	118. Next where he says, ‘The underlying nature ...’ (191 a 8), he clarifies the above-mentioned principles. He says that the nature which is first subject to mutation, i.e., primary matter, cannot be known of itself, since everything which is known is known through its form. Primary matter is, moreover, considered to be the subject of every form. But it is known by analogy, that is, according to proportion. For we know that wood is other than the form of a bench and a bed, for sometimes it underlies the one form, at other times the other. When, therefore, we see that air at times becomes water, it is necessary to say that there is something which sometimes exists under the form of air, and at other times under the form of water. And thus this something is other than the form of water and other than the form of air, as wood is something other than the form of a bench and other than the form of bed. This ‘something’, then, is related to these natural substances as bronze is related to the statue, and wood to the bed, and anything material and unformed to form. And this is called primary matter. This, then, is one principle of nature. It is not one as a ‘this something’, that is, as some determinate individual, as though it had form and unity in act, but is rather called being and one insofar as it is in potency to form. The other principle, then, is the nature [ratio) or form, and the third is privation, which is contrary to the form. And how these principles are two and how they are three was explained above.’
lib. 1 l. 13 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: primum quidem igitur etc., resumit quae dicta sunt, et ostendit quae restant dicenda. Dicit ergo quod prius dictum est quod contraria sunt principia, et postea quod eis aliquid subiicitur; et sic sunt tria principia. Et ex his quae nunc dicta sunt, manifestum est quae differentia sit inter contraria: quia unum est principium per se, et aliud per accidens. Et iterum dictum est quomodo principia se habeant ad invicem: quia subiectum et contrarium sunt unum numero et duo ratione. Et iterum dictum est quid est subiectum, secundum quod manifestari potuit. Sed nondum dictum est quid sit magis substantia, utrum forma vel materia: hoc enim dicetur in principio secundi. Sed dictum est quod principia sunt tria, et quomodo, et quis est modus ipsorum. Et ultimo concludit principale intentum, scilicet quod manifestum est quot sunt principia et quae sint.	119. Next where he says, ‘Briefly, we explained ...’ (191 a 15), he gives a résumé of what has been said, and points out what remains to be said. He says, therefore, that it was said first that the contraries are principles, and afterwards that something is subjected to them, and thus there are three principles. And from what was said just now it is clear what the difference is between the contraries: one of them is a per se principle, and the other a per accidens principle. And then it was pointed out how the principles are related to each other, since the subject and the contrary are one in number yet two in nature [ratio]. Then it was pointed out what the subject is insofar as this could be made clear. But it has not yet been decided which is the greater substance, form or matter, for this will be explained at the beginning of Book II [L2 #153]. But it has been explained that the principles are three in number, how they are principles, and in what way. And he finally draws the conclusion he had uppermost in mind, namely, that it is clear how many principles there are and what they are.