Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L1/lect14

LECTURE 14 THE PROBLEMS AND THE ERRORS OF THE ANCIENTS WHICH SPRING FROM AN IGNORANCE OF MATTER ARE RESOLVED

Latin	English
	LECTURE 14 (191 a 23-b 34) THE PROBLEMS AND THE ERRORS OF THE ANCIENTS WHICH SPRING FROM AN IGNORANCE OF MATTER ARE RESOLVED BY THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES ALREADY DETERMINED
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit veritatem de principiis naturae, hic excludit antiquorum dubitationes per ea quae determinata sunt de principiis. Et primo dubitationes seu errores qui provenerunt ex ignorantia materiae; secundo dubitationes seu errores qui provenerunt ex ignorantia privationis, ibi: tangentes quidem igitur etc.; tertio reservat alteri scientiae dubitationes quae accidunt circa formam, ibi: de principio autem secundum speciem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit dubitationem et errorem in quem antiqui inciderunt ex ignorantia materiae; secundo solvit eorum dubitationem per ea quae sunt determinata, ibi: nos autem dicimus et cetera.	120. Having determined the truth about the principles of nature, the Philosopher here excludes certain difficulties of the ancients by means of what has been determined about the principles. He considers first the problems or errors which stem from an ignorance of matter, and secondly, where he says, ‘Others indeed ...’ (191 b 35; L15 #129), the problems or errors which stem from an ignorance of privation. Thirdly, where he says, ‘The accurate determination ...’ (192 a 34; L15 #140), he reserves for another science the problems which arise with reference to form. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states the problem and the error into which the ancients fell through their ignorance of matter. Secondly, where he says, ‘Our explanation ...’ (191 a 33 #122) he answers their difficulty by means of those things which have already been determined.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod post determinatam veritatem de principiis, dicendum est quod solum ista via omnis defectus, idest dubitatio, antiquorum solvitur. Et hoc est signum esse verum quod de principiis dictum est: nam veritas excludit omnem falsitatem et dubitationem; sed posito quocumque falso, oportet aliquam difficultatem remanere. Dubitatio autem et error antiquorum philosophorum hic fuit. Primi qui secundum philosophiam inquisierunt veritatem et naturam rerum, diverterunt in quandam aliam viam a via veritatis et a via naturali: quod accidit eis propter infirmitatem intellectus eorum. Dixerunt enim quod nihil neque generatur neque corrumpitur: quod est et contra veritatem et contra naturam. Et ad hoc ponendum eos infirmitas intellectus coegit; quia nescierunt hanc rationem solvere, per quam videbatur probari quod ens non generatur. Quia si ens fit, aut fit ex ente aut ex non ente: et utrumque horum videtur esse impossibile, scilicet quod ens fiat ex ente et quod fiat ex non ente. Quod enim ex ente aliquid fieri sit impossibile, ex hoc manifestum est, quia id quod est non fit; nihil enim est antequam fiat: et ens iam est; ergo non fit. Quod etiam ex non ente aliquid fieri sit impossibile, ex hoc manifestum est, quia semper oportet aliquid subiici ei quod fit, ut supra ostensum est, et ex nihilo nihil fit. Et ex hoc concludebatur quod entis non erat generatio neque corruptio. Et ulterius in hoc argumentantes augebant suam positionem, ut dicerent quod non essent multa entia, sed unum ens tantum. Et hoc dicebant propter rationem praedictam. Cum enim ponerent unum esse materiale principium, et ex illo nihil dicerent causari secundum generationem et corruptionem, sed solum secundum alterationem, sequebatur quod id remaneret semper unum secundum substantiam.	121. He says, therefore, first that, after determining the truth about the principles, it must be pointed out that only in this way is every difficulty of the ancients solved. And this is an indication that what has been said about the principles is true. For truth excludes every falsehood and difficulty. But given a position which is in some way false, some difficulty must remain. Now the problem and error of the ancient philosophers was this. The first ones who philosophically sought the truth and the nature of things were diverted into a path other than the way of truth and the way of nature. This happened to them because of the weakness of their understanding. For they said that nothing is either generated or corrupted. This is contrary to truth and contrary to nature. The weakness of their understanding forced them to hold this position because they did not know how to resolve the following argument, according to which it seemed to be proven that being is not generated. If being comes to be, it comes to be either from being or from non-being. And each of these seems to be impossible, i.e., that being comes to be from being or that it comes to be from non-being. It is clearly impossible for something to come to be from being, because that which is does not come to be, for nothing is before it comes to be. And being already is, hence it does not come to be. It is also clearly impossible for something to come to be from non-being. For it is always necessary that there be a subject for that which comes to be, as was shown above [L12 #107]. From nothing, nothing comes to be. And from this it was concluded that there is neither generation nor corruption of being. And those who argued in this fashion exaggerated their position to the point where they said that there are not many beings, but only one being. And they said this for the reason already given. Since they held that there is only one material principle, and since they said that nothing is caused from that one principle by way of generation and corruption, but only by way of alteration, then it follows that it would always be one according to substance.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: nos autem dicimus etc., solvit praedictam obiectionem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo solvit dupliciter praedictam obiectionem; secundo concludit principale propositum, ibi: quare secundum quod vere et cetera. Prima dividitur in duas secundum duas solutiones quas ponit; secunda ibi: alius autem quoniam et cetera.	122. Next where he says, ‘Our explanation...’ (191 a 33), he answers the objection just mentioned. Concerning this he makes two points. First, he answers the aforesaid objection in two ways. Secondly, where he says, ‘So as we said ...’ (191 b 30 #128), he draws the conclusion which he has uppermost in mind. The first point is divided into two parts according to the two solutions given, the second of which is found where he says, ‘Another consists in ...’ (191 b 28 #127).
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 4 Dicit ergo primo quod, quantum ad modum loquendi, non differt dicere quod aliquid fit ex ente vel ex non ente, vel quod ens aut non ens faciat aliquid aut patiatur, sive de quocumque alio; et dicere huiusmodi propositiones de medico, scilicet quod medicus faciat aliquid aut patiatur, vel quod ex medico sit aliquid aut fiat. Sed dicere quod medicus faciat aliquid aut patiatur, vel quod ex medico fiat aliquid, duplicem habet intellectum: ergo dicere quod ex ente aut ex non ente fiat aliquid, aut quod ens aut non ens faciat aliquid aut patiatur, duplicem habet intellectum. Et similiter est in quibuscumque aliis terminis ponatur; puta si dicatur quod ex albo fiat aliquid, aut quod album faciat aliquid aut patiatur. Quod autem duplicem habeat intellectum, cum dicitur quod medicus aliquid facit aut patiatur, aut quod ex medico fit aliquid, sic manifestat. Dicimus enim quod medicus aedificat: sed hoc non facit inquantum est medicus, sed inquantum est aedificator: et similiter dicimus quod medicus fit albus, sed non inquantum est medicus, sed inquantum est niger. Alio modo dicimus quod medicus medicatur inquantum est medicus; et similiter quod medicus fit non medicus inquantum est medicus. Sed tunc dicimus proprie et per se medicum aliquid facere vel pati, vel ex medico aliquid fieri, quando hoc attribuitur medico inquantum est medicus: per accidens autem quando attribuitur ei, non inquantum est medicus, sed inquantum est aliquid aliud. Sic igitur patet quod cum dicitur medicum facere aliquid aut pati, vel ex medico fieri aliquid, dupliciter intelligitur, scilicet per se et per accidens. Unde manifestum est quod cum dicitur aliquid fieri ex non ente, proprie et per se hoc intelligitur si fiat aliquid ex non ente inquantum est non ens: et similis ratio est de ente. Et hanc distinctionem antiqui non percipientes, in tantum peccaverunt, quod nihil opinati sunt fieri; nec opinati sunt quod aliquod aliorum praeter id quod ponebant primum principium materiale, haberet esse substantiale. Puta, dicentes aerem esse primum materiale principium, dicebant omnia alia significare quoddam esse accidentale; et sic excludebant omnem generationem substantialem, solam alterationem relinquentes: ex eo scilicet quod, quia non fit aliquid per se vel ex non ente vel ex ente, opinabantur quod nihil possit fieri ex ente vel non ente.	123. He says, therefore, first that as far as the mode of speaking is concerned, it makes no difference whether we say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being does something or is acted upon, or anything else, or whether we say this same sort of thing about a doctor; namely, that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something is or comes to be from the doctor. But to say that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, has two meanings. Therefore, to say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being makes something, or is acted upon, has two meanings. And the same is true regardless of the terms which are used; e.g., it might be said that something comes to be from white, or that the white does something or is acted upon. That there is a twofold meaning when we use expressions such as the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, he shows as follows. We say that a doctor builds. But he does not do this insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is a builder. And in like manner we say that the doctor becomes white, but not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is black. However in another sense we say that the doctor heals insofar as he is doctor, and in like manner that the doctor becomes a non-doctor insofar as he is a doctor. Thus we say properly and per se that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, when we attribute this to the doctor insofar as he is a doctor. But when something is attributed to him per accidens, it is not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is something else. Therefore, it is clear that when it is said that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from doctor, this has two meanings, i.e., per se and per accidens. Whence it is clear that when it is said that a thing comes to be from non-being, this is to be understood properly and per se if that thing should come to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being. And same argument applies to being. But the ancients, failing to perceive this distinction, erred insofar as they thought that nothing comes to be. And they did not think that anything other than their first material principle had substantial existence. For example, those who said that air is the first material principle held that all other things signify a certain accidental existence. Thus they excluded every substantial generation, retaining only alteration. Because of the fact that nothing comes to be per se either from non-being or from being, they thought that it would not be possible for anything to come to be from being or non-being.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 5 Sed nos etiam ipsi dicimus quod ex non ente nihil fit simpliciter et per se, sed solum secundum accidens: quia quod est, idest ens, per se quidem non est ex privatione. Et hoc ideo, quia privatio non intrat essentiam rei factae; ex hoc autem aliquid fit per se, quod inest rei postquam iam facta est; sicut figuratum fit ex infigurato non per se, sed per accidens, quia postquam iam est figuratum, infiguratum non inest ei. Sed iste est mirabilis modus fiendi aliquid ex non ente, et qui videbatur impossibilis antiquis philosophis. Sic igitur patet quod ex non ente fit aliquid non per se, sed per accidens.	124. And we also say that nothing comes to be from non-being simply and per se, but only per accidens. For that which is, i.e., being, is not from privation per se. And this is so because privation does not enter into the essence of the thing made. Rather a thing comes to be per se from that which is in the thing after it has already been made. Thus the shaped comes to be from. the unshaped, not per se, but per accidens, because once it already has been shaped, the unshaped is not in it. But this is a remarkable way for a thing to come to be from non-being, and seemed impossible to the ancient philosophers. Therefore, it is clear that a thing comes to be from non-being not per se but per accidens.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 6 Similiter si quaeratur utrum ex ente fiat aliquid, dicendum est quod ex ente fit aliquid per accidens, sed non per se. Et hoc manifestat per tale exemplum. Ponamus enim quod ex equo generetur aliquis canis: quo posito, manifestum est quod ex quodam animali fiat quoddam animal; et sic ex animali fiet animal. Non tamen fiet animal ex animali per se, sed per accidens: non enim fit inquantum est animal, sed inquantum est hoc animal; quia animal iam est antequam fiat canis, quia est equus, sed non est hoc animal quod est canis. Unde per se hoc animal quod est canis, fit ex non hoc animali, idest ex non cane. Sed si fieret animal per se et non per accidens, oporteret quod fieret ex non animali. Sic etiam est de ente: fit enim ens aliquod ex non ente hoc, sed accidit ei quod non est hoc quod fit ens. Unde non fit aliquid per se ex ente, neque per se ex non ente: hoc enim per se significat aliquid fieri ex non ente, si fiat ex non ente inquantum est non ens, ut dictum est. Et sicut cum hoc animal fit ex hoc animali, vel hoc corpus ex hoc corpore, non removetur omne corpus nec omne non corpus, nec omne animal vel non animal, ab eo ex quo aliquid fit; sic non removetur ab eo ex quo fit hoc ens, neque omne esse neque omne non esse: quia id ex quo fit hoc ens quod est ignis, habet aliquod esse, quia est aer, et aliquod non esse, quia non est ignis.	125. In like manner, if it is asked whether a thing comes to be from being, we must say that a thing comes to be from being per accidens, but not per se. He shows this by the following example. Let us suppose that a dog is generated from a horse. Granting this, it is clear that a certain animal comes to be from a certain animal, and thus animal would come to be from animal. However, animal would not come to be from animal per se, but per accidens. For it does not come to be insofar as it is animal, but insofar as it is this animal. For animal already is before the dog comes to be. For the horse already is, but is not a dog. Hence the dog comes to be per se from that which is not a dog. And if animal were to come to be per se, and not per accidens, it would be necessary for it to come to be from non-animal. And the same is true of being. For a being comes to be from that non-being which is not that which the being comes to be. Hence a thing does not come to be per se from being or per se from non-being. For this expression per se signifies that a thing comes to be from non-being in the sense that it comes to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being, as was said [#123]. And thus when this animal comes to be from this animal, or when this body comes to be from this body, not all animal or non-animal, nor all body or non-body, is removed from that from which the thing comes to be. And likewise not all being [esse] nor all non-being [non-esse] is removed from that from which this being comes to be. For ,that from which fire comes to be has some being, because it is air, and, also has some non-being, because it is not fire.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 7 Iste est igitur unus modus solvendi praedictam dubitationem. Sed iste modus solvendi insufficiens est: si enim ens fit per accidens et ex ente et ex non ente, oportet ponere aliquid ex quo fiat ens per se; quia omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se.	126. This, then, is one way of resolving the problem raised above. But this approach is not sufficient. For if being comes to be per accidens both from being and from non-being, it is necessary to posit something from which being comes to be per se. For every thing which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 8 Ad ostendendum igitur ex quo fit aliquid per se, subiungit secundum modum, ibi: alius autem quoniam et cetera. Et dicit quod contingit aliqua eadem dicere et secundum potentiam et secundum actum, ut certius determinatum est in aliis, scilicet in IX Metaphys. Ex ente igitur in potentia fit aliquid per se; ex ente autem in actu, vel ex non ente, fit aliquid per accidens. Hoc autem dicit quia materia, quae est ens in potentia, est id ex quo fit aliquid per se: haec est enim quae intrat substantiam rei factae. Sed ex privatione vel forma praecedente fit aliquid per accidens, inquantum materiae ex qua fit aliquid per se, conveniebat esse sub tali forma vel sub tali privatione; sicut statua ex aere fit per se, sed ex non habente talem figuram et ex habente aliam figuram, fit statua per accidens.	127. In order to designate that from which a thing comes to be per se, he adds a second approach where he says, ‘Another consists...’ (191 b 28). He says that the same thing can be explained in terms of potency and act, as is clearly indicated in another place, i.e., in Metaphysics, IX:1. Thus a thing comes to be per se from being in potency; but a thing comes to be per accidens from being in act or from non-being. He says this because matter, which is being in potency, is that from which a thing comes to be per se. For matter enters into the substance of the thing which is made. But from privation or from the preceding form, a thing comes to be per accidens insofar as the matter, from which the thing comes to be per se, happened to be under such a form or under such a privation. Thus a statue comes to be per se from bronze; but the statue comes to be per accidens both from that which does not have such a shape and from that which has another shape.
lib. 1 l. 14 n. 9 Ultimo concludit principale propositum, ibi: quare secundum quod vere dicimus etc.: dicens quod sicut vere dicimus, omnes defectus, idest dubitationes, solvuntur propter praedicta. Ex quibus dubitationibus coacti, aliqui antiqui removerunt quaedam praedictorum, scilicet generationem et corruptionem, et pluralitatem rerum substantialiter differentium. Sed haec natura manifestata, scilicet materia, solvit omnem illorum ignorantiam.	128. Finally, where he says, ‘So as we said ...’ (191 b 30), he draws the conclusion which he had uppermost in mind. He says that we can truly say that all the difficulties are answered by what has been said above. Driven on by certain difficulties, some of the ancients denied some of the things mentioned above, i.e., generation and corruption, and a plurality of substantially different things. But once matter is understood, all of their ignorance is removed.