Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L2/lect4

Lecture 4 PHYSICS CONSIDERS NOT ONLY MATTER BUT ALSO EVERY FORM EXISTING IN MATTER

Latin	English
	LECTURE 4 (194 a 12-b 15) PHYSICS CONSIDERS NOT ONLY MATTER BUT ALSO EVERY FORM EXISTING IN MATTER
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit differentiam inter naturalem et mathematicum, hic ostendit ad quid se extendat consideratio naturalis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod ad naturalem pertinet considerare formam et materiam; secundo ostendit quid sit terminus considerationis naturalis circa formam, ibi: usque ad quantum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ex praemissis concludit propositum; secundo movet dubitationes circa determinatum, ibi: etenim iam et cetera.	166. Having shown the difference between natural science and mathematics, the Philosopher here designates that to which the consideration of natural science extends. Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that it pertains to natural science to consider both form and matter. Secondly, where he says, ‘How far then . (194 b 10 #175), he points out the limits of natural science in its consideration of form. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he draws his conclusion from what has gone before. Secondly, where he says, ‘Here too indeed...’ (194 a 15 #168), he raises difficulties against his own position.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod quia natura dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de materia et forma, ut supra dictum est, sic est considerandum in scientia naturali, sicut cum intendimus de simo quid est: tunc enim non solum formam, idest curvitatem, sed etiam materiam, idest nasum attendimus. Unde in scientia naturali neque est consideratio sine materia sensibili, neque etiam solum secundum materiam, sed etiam secundum formam. Et est notandum quod iste processus Aristotelis includit duo media. Per unum quorum sic potest argumentari. Naturalis philosophus debet considerare de natura; sed natura est tam forma quam materia; ergo debet tam de materia quam de forma considerare. Per aliud vero sic. Naturalis differt a mathematico, ut dictum est, quia consideratio naturalis est sicut consideratio simi, consideratio vero mathematici est sicut consideratio curvi; sed consideratio simi est consideratio formae et materiae; ergo et consideratio naturalis est consideratio utriusque.	167. He says, therefore, first that since ‘nature’ is used in two ways, i.e., of the matter and of the form, as was said above [L2 #145ff], so must it be considered in natural science. Thus when we consider what the snub is, we consider not only its form, i.e., its curvature, but we also consider its matter, i.e., the nose. Hence in natural science nothing is considered, in respect to matter and also in respect to form, without sensible matter. And it must be noted that this argument of Aristotle includes two approaches. In one way we can argue as follows. The natural philosopher ought to consider nature. But nature is both form and matter. Therefore he ought to consider both matter and form. The other way is as follows. The natural philosopher differs from the mathematician, as was said above [L3 #163], because the consideration of the natural philosopher is like the consideration of the snub, whereas that of the mathematician is like the consideration of the curved. But the consideration of the snub is a consideration of the form and the matter. Therefore the consideration of the natural philosopher is a consideration of both.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: etenim iam etc., movet circa praemissa dubitationem duplicem. Quarum prima est: cum natura dicatur de materia et de forma, utrum scientia naturalis sit tantum de materia, vel tantum de forma, vel de eo quod est ex utroque compositum. Secunda dubitatio est: supposito quod de utroque consideret scientia naturalis, utrum sit eadem scientia naturalis quae consideret de forma et materia, vel alia et alia de utroque.	168. Next where he says, ‘Here too indeed...’ (194 a 15), he raises a two-fold problem relative to what he has just said. The first is as follows. Since ‘nature’ is used for matter and form, is natural science about the matter alone, or the form alone, or about that which is a composite of both? The second problem is as follows. Supposing that natural science does consider both, is it the same natural science which considers form and matter, or are there different sciences which consider each?
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: in antiquos quidem enim etc., solvit praedictas dubitationes, et maxime secundam; ostendens quod ad eiusdem scientiae naturalis considerationem pertinet considerare de forma et de materia. Nam prima quaestio satis videbatur soluta esse per hoc quod dixerat, quod consideratio naturalis est sicut cum intendimus de simo quid sit. Circa hoc ergo duo facit. Primo ponit quid antiqui sensisse videntur. Et dicit quod si aliquis velit aspicere ad dicta antiquorum naturalium, videtur quod scientia naturalis non sit nisi de materia: quia vel nihil tractaverunt de forma, vel aliquid modicum; sicut tetigerunt eam Democritus et Empedocles, inquantum posuerunt aliquid fieri ex multis secundum aliquem determinatum modum mixtionis vel congregationis.	169. Next where he says, ‘If we look at the ancients ...’ (194 a 19), he answers the above mentioned problems, and especially the second, showing that it pertains to the consideration of the same natural science to consider both form and matter. For the first question seems to have been adequately answered by what he has said, namely, that the consideration of natural science is the same as the consideration of what the snub is. Concerning this, therefore, he makes two points. First he states what the ancients seem to have thought. He says that if one wishes to look at the sayings of the ancient natural philosophers, it seems that [for them] natural science is concerned only with matter. For they said either nothing about form, or some small bit, as when Democritus and Empedocles touched upon it insofar as they held that a thing comes to be from many according to a determinate mode of mixing or joining.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 5 Secundo, ibi: si autem ars imitatur etc., ostendit propositum tribus rationibus: quarum prima talis est. Ars imitatur naturam; oportet igitur quod sic se habeat scientia naturalis circa naturalia, sicut se habet scientia artificialis circa artificialia. Sed eiusdem scientiae artificialis est cognoscere materiam et formam usque ad aliquem certum terminum; sicut medicus cognoscit sanitatem ut formam, et choleram et phlegma et huiusmodi sicut materiam in qua est sanitas, nam in contemperatione humorum sanitas consistit; et similiter aedificator considerat formam domus, et lateres et ligna, quae sunt materia domus; et ita est in omnibus aliis artibus. Ergo eiusdem scientiae naturalis est cognoscere tam materiam quam formam.	170. Secondly, where he says, ‘But if on the other hand...’(194 a 21), he proves his position with three arguments, the first of which is as follows. Art imitates nature. Therefore natural science must be related to natural things as the science of the artificial is related to artificial things. But it belongs to the same science of the artificial to know the matter and the form up to a certain point, as the doctor knows health as a form, and bile and phlegm and such things as the matter in which health is. For health consists in a harmony of humours. And in like manner the builder considers the form of the house and also the bricks and the wood which are the matter of the house. And so it is in all the other arts. Therefore it belongs to the same natural science to know both the matter and the form.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 6 Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est, quia principium operationis artificialis cognitio est; omnis autem nostra cognitio est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta: unde ad similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur. Ideo autem res naturales imitabiles sunt per artem, quia ab aliquo principio intellectivo tota natura ordinatur ad finem suum, ut sic opus naturae videatur esse opus intelligentiae, dum per determinata media ad certos fines procedit: quod etiam in operando ars imitatur.	171. The reason for saying that art imitates nature is as follows. Knowledge is the principle of operation in art. But an of our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible, natural things. Hence in artificial things we work to a likeness of natural things. And so imitable natural things are [i.e., are produced] through art, because all nature is ordered to its end by some intellective principle, so that the work of nature thus seems to be the work of intelligence as it proceeds to certain ends through determinate means. And this order is imitated by art in its operation.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 7 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: adhuc quod cuius causa et cetera. Eiusdem scientiae est considerare finem et ea quae sunt ad finem: et hoc ideo quia ratio eorum quae sunt ad finem, a fine sumitur. Sed natura quae est forma, est finis materiae; ergo eiusdem scientiae naturalis est considerare materiam et formam.	172. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Again “that for the sake of which”...’ (194 a 27). It belongs to the same science to consider the end and those things which are for the end. This is so because the reason [ratio] for those things which are for the end is taken from the end. But nature, which is form, is the end of matter. Therefore it belongs to the same natural science to consider matter and form.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 8 Quod autem forma sit finis materiae, sic probat. Ad hoc quod aliquid sit finis alicuius motus continui, duo requiruntur: quorum unum est quod sit ultimum motus, et aliud est quod sit cuius causa fit. Aliquid enim potest esse ultimum, sed non est cuius causa fit; unde non habet rationem finis. Et quia de ratione finis est quod sit cuius causa fit, poeta hoc apposuit, quod derisorie se habet dicere finem cuius causa fit. Videtur enim esse nugatio, sicut si diceretur homo animal: quia animal est de ratione hominis, sicut et cuius causa fit de ratione finis. Vult enim poeta quod non omne ultimum sit finis, sed illud quod est ultimum et optimum, hoc est cuius causa fit. Et quidem quod forma sit ultimum generationis, hoc est per se manifestum. Sed quod sit cuius causa fit respectu materiae, manifestat per similitudinem in artibus. Inveniuntur enim quaedam artes quae faciunt materiam: quarum quaedam faciunt eam simpliciter, sicut ars figuli facit lateres, quae sunt materia domus; quaedam vero faciunt eam operose, idest materiam praeexistentem in natura disponunt ad receptionem formae, sicut ars carpentaria praeparat ligna ad formam navis. Item considerandum est quod nos utimur omnibus quae sunt secundum artem facta, sicut propter nos existentibus. Nos enim sumus quodammodo finis omnium artificialium. Et dicit quodammodo: quia sicut dictum est in philosophia prima, dupliciter dicitur id cuius causa fit, scilicet cuius et quo; sicut finis domus ut cuius est habitator, ut quo est habitatio. Ex his igitur accipere possumus quod duae artes sunt principantes materiam, idest quae praecipiunt artibus facientibus materiam, et cognoscentes, idest diiudicantes de ipsis; una scilicet quae utitur, et alia quae est factiva artificiati, inducens scilicet formam. Et haec est sicut architectonica respectu eius quae disponit materiam, sicut navifactiva respectu carpentariae, quae secat ligna: unde etiam oportet quod ipsa ars usualis sit quodammodo architectonica, idest principalis ars, respectu factivae. Quamvis igitur utraque sit architectonica, scilicet usualis et factiva, tamen differunt: quia usualis est architectonica inquantum est cognoscitiva et diiudicativa de forma; alia autem, quae est architectonica tanquam factiva formae, est cognoscitiva materiae, idest diiudicat de materia. Et hoc manifestat per exemplum. Usus enim navis pertinet ad gubernatorem; et sic gubernatoria est usualis; et sic est architectonica respectu navifactivae, et cognoscit et diiudicat de forma. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod gubernator cognoscit et instituit qualis debeat esse forma temonis. Alius autem, scilicet factor navis, cognoscit et diiudicat ex quibus et qualibus lignis debeat fieri navis. Sic ergo manifestum est quod ars quae inducit formam, praecipit arti quae facit vel disponit materiam; ars autem quae utitur artificiato iam facto, praecipit arti quae inducit formam. Ex quo possumus accipere quod sic se habet materia ad formam, sicut forma ad usum. Sed usus est cuius causa fit artificiatum: ergo et forma est cuius causa est materia in artificialibus. Et sicut in his quae sunt secundum artem, nos facimus materiam propter opus artis, quod est ipsum artificiatum; ita in naturalibus materia inest a natura non a nobis facta, nihilominus eundem habens ordinem ad formam, scilicet quod est propter formam. Unde sequitur quod eiusdem scientiae naturalis sit considerare materiam et formam.	173. That form is the end of matter he proves as follows. In order for something to be the end of a continuous motion two things are required. First it must be the final stage of the motion, and secondly it must be that for the sake of which the thing comes to be. For something can be last, but not be that for the sake of which something comes to be, and hence not have the nature [ratio] of an end. And because it is of the nature [ratio] of an end that it be that for the sake of which something comes to be, the poet maintained that it would be a jest to say that the end is that for the sake of which something comes to be. This seemed to him to be a trifle, for just as if we were to say ‘man animal’ because animal is in the nature [ratio] of man, so also, that for the sake of which something comes to be is in the nature [ratio] of end. For the poet wished to say that not every last thing is an end, but rather only that which is last and best. This is that for the sake of which something comes to be. And indeed that the form is last in generation is per se evident. But that it is that for the sake of which something comes to be with respect to matter is made clear by a simile taken from the arts. Certain arts make matter. And of these some make it simply, as the art of the moulder makes tiles which are the matter of a house, while others make it operative, i.e., they dispose matter pre-existing in nature for the reception of a form, as the art of the carpenter prepares wood for the form of a ship. It must further be noted that we use all things which are made by art as though they exist for us. For we are in a sense the end of all artificial things. And he says ‘in a sense’ because, as is said in first philosophy [Metaph. XII:7], that for the sake of which something comes to be is used in two ways, i.e., ‘of which’ and ‘for which’. Thus the end of a house as ‘of which’ is the dweller, as ‘for which’ it is a dwelling. From this, therefore, we can conclude that matter is ordered by two arts, that is, those that direct the arts which make matter, and those that pass judgment on the former. Thus there is one art which uses, and another art which is productive of the artifact, as it were, inducing the form. And this latter art is architectonic with reference to that which disposes matter. Thus the art of the ship builder is architectonic with respect to the art of the carpenter who cuts wood. Hence it is necessary that the art which uses be in a sense architectonic, i.e., the principal art, with respect to the productive art. Therefore, although each is architectonic, i.e., the art which uses and the productive art, they nevertheless differ. For the art which uses is architectonic insofar as it knows and passes judgment on the form, whereas the other, which is architectonic as productive of the form, knows the matter, i.e., passes judgment on the matter. He makes this clear by an example. The use of a ship pertains to the navigator, and thus the art of the navigator is an art which uses, and hence it is architectonic with respect to the art of the ship builder, and knows and passes judgment on the form. He says that the navigator knows and judges what the shape of the rudder should be. The other art, however, i.e., the art of the ship builder, knows and judges from what wood and from what kind of wood the ship should be made. It is clear, therefore, that the art which produces the form directs the art which makes or disposes the matter. However the art which uses the completed artifact directs the art which produces the form. From this, then, we can conclude that matter is related to form as form is related to use. But use is that for the sake of which the artifact comes to be. Therefore, form also is that for the sake of which matter is in artificial things. And so as in those things which are according to art we make matter for the sake of the work of art, which is the artifact itself, likewise matter is in natural things from nature, and not made by us; nevertheless it has the same ordination to form, i.e., it is for the sake of form. Hence it follows that it belongs to the same natural science to consider the matter and the form.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 9 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: amplius eorum etc.: quae talis est. Eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, una est scientia. Sed materia est de numero eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, quia dicitur ad formam. Quod non ideo dicitur quasi ipsa materia sit in genere relationis, sed quia cuilibet formae determinatur propria materia: et hoc est quod subdit, quod sub alia forma oportet esse aliam materiam. Unde relinquitur quod eiusdem scientiae naturalis sit considerare formam et materiam.	174. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘Again matter is...’ (194 b 9). The argument is as follows. Things which are related belong to one science. But matter is one of the things which are related, because it is spoken of in relation to form. However it is not spoken of as if matter itself were in the genus of relation, but rather because a proper matter is determined for each form. And he adds that there must be a different matter under a different form. Hence it follows that the same natural science considers form and matter.
lib. 2 l. 4 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: usque ad quantum etc., ostendit quantum se extendat consideratio scientiae naturalis circa formam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo movet quaestionem hanc, scilicet usque ad quantum oporteat naturalem considerare de forma et quidditate rei (nam considerare formas et quidditates rerum absolute videtur pertinere ad philosophum primum); secundo solvit quod sicut medicus considerat nervum, et faber aes usque ad aliquem terminum, ita et naturalis formas. Medicus enim non considerat de nervo inquantum est nervus, hoc enim pertinet ad naturalem, sed inquantum est subiectum sanitatis; et similiter faber de aere non inquantum est aes, sed inquantum est subiectum statuae aut alicuius huiusmodi. Et similiter naturalis non considerat de forma inquantum est forma, sed inquantum est in materia. Et ideo sicut medicus in tantum considerat de nervo in quantum pertinet ad sanitatem, cuius causa considerat nervum; similiter naturalis in tantum considerat de forma in quantum habet esse in materia. Et ideo terminus considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae quidem sunt aliquo modo separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. Et huiusmodi formae sunt animae rationales: quae quidem sunt separatae inquantum intellectiva virtus non est actus alicuius organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; sed in materia sunt inquantum dant esse naturale tali corpori. Et quod sint in materia, per hoc probat, quod forma cuiuslibet rei generatae ex materia est forma in materia: ad hoc enim terminatur generatio, ut forma sit in materia. Sed homo generatur ex materia et ab homine, quasi ab agente proprio, et a sole tanquam ab agente universali respectu generabilium: unde sequitur quod anima, quae est forma humana, sit forma in materia. Unde usque ad animam rationalem se extendit consideratio naturalis, quae est de formis. Sed quomodo se habeant formae totaliter a materia separatae, et quid sint, vel etiam quomodo se habeat haec forma, idest anima rationalis, secundum quod est separabilis et sine corpore existere potens, et quid sit secundum suam essentiam separabile, hoc determinare pertinet ad philosophum primum.	175. Next where he says, ‘How far then ...’ (194 b 10), he shows to what extent natural science considers form. Concerning this he makes two points. First he raises the question, i.e., to what extent should natural science consider the form and quiddity of a thing. (For to consider the forms and quiddities of things absolutely seems to belong to first philosophy.) Secondly, he answers the question by saying that as the doctor considers nerves, and the smith considers bronze, up to a certain point, so also the natural philosopher considers forms. For the doctor does not consider nerve insofar as it is nerve, for this belongs to the natural philosopher. Rather he considers it as a subject of health. So also the smith does not consider bronze insofar as it is bronze, but insofar as it is the subject of a statue or something of the sort. So also the natural philosopher does not consider form insofar as it is form, but insofar as it is in matter. And thus, as the doctor considers nerve only insofar as it pertains to health, for the sake of which he considers nerve, so also the natural philosopher considers form only insofar as it has existence in matter. And so the last things considered by natural science are forms which are, indeed, in some way separated, but which have existence in matter. And rational souls are forms of this sort. For such souls are, indeed, separated insofar as the intellective power is not the act of a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of an eye. But they are in matter insofar as they give natural existence to such a body. That such souls are in matter he proves as follows. The form of anything generated from matter is a form which is in matter. For the generation is-terminated when the form is in matter. But man is generated from matter and by man, as by a proper agent, and by the sun, as by a universal agent with respect to the generable. Whence it follows that the soul, which is the human form, is a form in matter. Hence the consideration of natural science about forms extends to the rational soul. But how forms are totally separated from matter, and what they are, .or even how this form, i.e., the rational soul, exists insofar as it is separable and capable of existence without a body, and what it is according to its separable essence, are questions which pertain to first philosophy.