Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L2/lect6

Lecture 6 CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING AND THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE CONSEQUENT UPON THESE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING

Latin	English
	LECTURE 6 (195 a 28-b 30) CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING AND THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE CONSEQUENT UPON THESE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam philosophus distinxit species causarum, hic distinguit diversos modos causarum, etiam secundum eandem speciem causae. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo distinguit diversos modos causarum; secundo determinat quaedam consequentia ad distinctionem praedictam, ibi: differunt autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo distinguit diversos modos causarum; secundo reducit eos ad certum numerum, ibi: sed tamen hae omnes et cetera. Circa primum distinguit modos causarum secundum quatuor divisiones. Dicit ergo primo quod multi numero sunt modi causarum: sed si reducantur capitulatim, sive in quadam summa, ad aliqua communia, inveniuntur pauciores. Vel capitales accipiuntur secundum combinationem: manifestum est enim quod pauciores sunt combinationes modorum quam modi.	187. After the Philosopher has distinguished the species of causes, he here distinguishes the various modes of causes in respect to the same species of cause. Concerning this he makes two points. First he distinguishes the different modes of causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘The difference is ...’ (195 b 17 #195), he treats certain consequences of this distinction. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he distinguishes the different modes of causes, and secondly, where he says, ‘All these various ...’ (195 b 13 #194), he reduces them to a certain number. Concerning the first part he distinguishes the modes of causes according to four divisions. He says, therefore, first that the modes of causes are numerous, but if they are reduced to headings, either under some highest, or under some common aspect, they are found to be fewer. Or ‘headings’ may be taken as a combination, for it is obvious that combinations of the modes are fewer than the modes.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 2 Prima ergo divisio vel combinatio modorum est, quod in eadem specie causae dicitur una causa prior altera, ut intelligamus causam priorem universaliorem: ut sanitatis causa est medicus ut causa propria et posterior, artifex autem ut communior et prior; et hoc in specie causae efficientis. Et simile est in specie causae formalis: nam causa formalis diapason propria et posterior est proportio dupla; causa autem prior et communior est proportio numeralis, quae dicitur multiplicitas. Et similiter ea quae continet unamquamque causam communitate sui ambitus, dicitur causa prior.	188. Therefore the first division or combination of modes is that in the same species of cause one cause is said to be prior to another, as when we understand that the more universal cause is prior. Thus the doctor is the proper and posterior cause of health, whereas the artisan is the more common and prior cause. This is in the species of efficient cause. And the same thing is true in the species of formal cause. For the proper and posterior formal cause of the octave is the proportion of the double, whereas the more common and prior is the numerical proportion which is called multiplicity. And in like manner a cause which contains any cause in the community of its extension is a prior cause.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 3 Advertendum est autem quod causa universalis et propria, vel prior et posterior, potest accipi aut secundum communitatem praedicationis, secundum exempla hic posita de medico et artifice; vel secundum communitatem causalitatis, ut si dicamus solem esse causam universalem calefactionis, ignem vero causam propriam: et haec duo sibi invicem correspondent. Manifestum est enim quod quaelibet virtus extenditur ad aliqua secundum quod communicant in una ratione obiecti; et quanto ad plura extenditur, tanto oportet illam rationem esse communiorem: et cum virtus proportionetur obiecto secundum eius rationem, sequitur quod causa superior agat secundum formam magis universalem et minus contractam. Et sic est considerare in ordine rerum: quia quanto aliqua sunt superiora in entibus, tanto habent formas minus contractas, et magis dominantes supra materiam, quae coarctat virtutem formae. Unde et id quod est prius in causando, invenitur esse prius quodammodo secundum rationem universalioris praedicationis; ut puta, si ignis est primum calefaciens, caelum non tantum est primum calefaciens, sed primum alterans.	189. It must be noted, however, that the universal cause and the proper cause, and the prior cause and the posterior cause, can be taken either according to a commonness in predication, as in the example given about the doctor and the artisan, or according to a commonness in causality, as if we say the sun is a universal cause of heating, whereas fire is a proper cause. And these two divisions correspond to each other. For it is clear that any power extends to certain things insofar as they share in one nature [ratio], and the farther that that power extends, the more common that nature [ratio] must be. And since a power is proportioned to its object according to its nature [ratio], it follows that a higher cause acts according to a form which is more universal and less contracted. And this can be seen in the order of things. For to the extent that among beings some things are superior, to that extent they have forms which are less contracted and more dominant over matter, which contracts the power of form. And so that which is prior in causing is found to be prior in some way under the aspect [ratio] of a more universal predication. For example, if fire is the first in heating, then the heavens are not only the first in heating but also the first in producing alteration.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 4 Secundam divisionem ponit ibi: amplius autem secundum accidens et cetera. Et dicit quod sicut causae per se dividuntur per causas priores et posteriores, vel communes et proprias, ita etiam et causae per accidens. Est enim praeter causas per se, accipere causas per accidens, et genera horum; sicut causa statuae per accidens quidem est Polycletus, per se autem causa statuae est faciens statuam: Polycletus enim est causa statuae inquantum accidit ei esse statuam facientem. Et etiam ea quae sua communitate continent Polycletum, sunt causa statuae per accidens, sicut et homo et animal. Et iterum considerandum est quod in causis per accidens quaedam sunt propinquiores causis per se, et quaedam magis remotae. Nam causa per accidens dicitur omne illud quod coniungitur causae per se, quod non est de ratione eius; hoc autem contingit esse vel propinquius rationi causae, vel remotius ab ea; et secundum hoc causae per accidens erunt vel propinquiores vel remotiores: sicut, si statuam facienti accidat esse album et musicum, musicum propinquius est, quia est in eodem subiecto et secundum idem, scilicet secundum animam, in qua est musica et ars statuae factiva; album autem inest secundum corpus. Sed subiectum propinquius se habet adhuc quam alia accidentia, sicut Polycletus quam album vel musicum: non enim coniunguntur haec statuam facienti nisi propter subiectum.	190. He gives the second division where he says, ‘Another mode of causation ...’ (195 a 33). He says that just as per se causes are divided into prior and posterior or common and proper, so also are per accidens causes. For besides per se causes there are per accidens causes and their genera. Thus Polycletus is a per accidens cause of the statue, while the sculptor is a per se cause. For Polycletus is a cause of statue insofar as he happens to be a sculptor. And in like manner those things which contain Polycletus in their commonness, e.g., man and animal, are per accidens causes of statue. Moreover it must be noted that among per accidens causes some are closer to the per se causes and some are more removed. For everything which is joined to the per se cause but is not of its nature [ratio] is called a per accidens cause. Now a thing can be closer to the nature [ratio] of the [per se] cause or more removed from it, and to this extent the per accidens causes are closer or more removed. Thus, if a sculptor happens to be white and musical, the musical is closer, because it is in the same subject in respect to the same thing, i.e., in respect to the soul in which are both [the art of the] musician and the art of statue making. But the subject itself is still more closely related than the other accidents. Thus Polycletus is closer than white or musical, for these latter are not joined to this sculptor except through the subject.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 5 Tertiam divisionem ponit ibi: praeter autem omnes et cetera. Et dicit quod praeter causas proprie dictas, idest per se, et per accidens, quaedam dicuntur causae in potentia, sicut potentes operari; quaedam vero sicut operantes in actu; sicut causa aedificandi domum potest dici vel aedificans in habitu vel aedificans in actu.	191. He gives the third division where he says, ‘All causes...’ (195 b 4). He says that besides the causes properly so called, i.e., the causes per se and the causes per accidens, some things are said to be causes in potency, as being able to operate, while other things are actually operating causes. Thus either the builder in habit or the builder in act can be called the cause of the building of a house.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 6 Et sicut distinguuntur causae modis praedictis, similiter distinguuntur ea quorum sunt causae. Est enim aliquid causatum posterius et magis proprium, et aliquid quod est prius et magis commune: sicut si dicatur quod aliquid est causa huius statuae vel statuae in communi; et adhuc communius si dicatur causa imaginis. Et similiter si dicatur aliquid causa motiva huius aeris, vel aeris in universali, vel materiae. Et ita etiam potest dici in effectibus per accidens, et quod aliquid sit communius, et aliquid minus commune. Et dicitur effectus per accidens, quod coniungitur effectui per se et est praeter rationem eius: sicut per se effectus coqui est cibus delectabilis, per accidens autem cibus sanativus; medici autem e converso.	192. And just as causes are distinguished according to the above mentioned modes, so also the things of which they are the causes are distinguished. For one thing is caused posteriorly and more properly, and another priorly and more commonly. Thus something might be called the cause of this statue, or of statue in general, or still more commonly it might be called the cause of an image. And likewise something might be called the moving cause of this bronze, or of bronze in the universal, or of matter. So also, in per accidens effects, it can be said that one thing is more common and another less common. An effect is said to be per accidens when it is joined to a per se effect and is outside its nature [ratio]. Thus the per se effect of cooking is delectable food, but the per accidens effect is healthful food. However the converse is true of medicine.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 7 Quartam divisionem ponit ibi: amplius autem complexae et cetera. Et dicit quod quandoque complexe accipiuntur causae per se cum causis per accidens; ut si non dicamus causam statuae Polycletum, qui est causa per accidens, neque facientem statuam, qui est causa per se, sed Polycletum statuam facientem.	193. He gives the fourth division where he says, ‘Again we may use...’ (195 b 10). He says that sometimes per se causes are taken as a complex with per accidens causes, as when we say that neither Polycletus, who is a per accidens cause, nor the sculptor, who is the cause per se, is the cause of the statue, but rather that the sculptor Polycletus is the cause.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: sed tamen hae omnes etc., reducit praedictos modos ad certum numerum. Et dicit quod praedicti modi certo numero sunt sex; sed quilibet eorum dupliciter dicitur. Sex autem modi sunt isti: singulare et genus, quod supra dixit prius et posterius; accidens et genus accidentis; simplex et complexum. Et quodlibet horum dividitur per potentiam et actum: et sic fiunt omnes modi duodecim. Distinguit autem omnes modos per potentiam et actum, quia quod est in potentia, non simpliciter est.	194. Next where he says, ‘All these various uses ...’ (195 b 13), he reduces the above mentioned modes to a certain number. He says that the above mentioned modes are six in number, but each of them is used in two ways. These are the six modes: the singular and the genus, which above [#188] he called the prior and the posterior, the accident and the genus of the accident, the simple and the complex. And each of these is divided by potency and act; and so all the modes become twelve. He distinguishes all the modes by potency and act because what is in potency is not simply.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit: differunt autem etc., determinat tria consequentia ad praedictam distinctionem modorum. Primum est, quod inter causas in actu et causas in potentia est ista differentia, quod causae operantes in actu simul sunt et non sunt cum eis quorum causae sunt in actu; ita tamen quod accipiantur causae singulares, idest propriae; sicut hic medicans simul est et non est cum hoc qui fit sanus, et hic aedificans cum hoc quod aedificatur. Si vero non acciperentur causae propriae, licet acciperentur in actu, non esset verum quod dicitur. Non enim aedificans est et non est simul cum hoc quod aedificatur: potest enim esse quod est aedificans in actu, sed tamen hoc aedificium non aedificatur, sed aliud. Sed si accipiamus aedificantem hoc aedificium, et hoc aedificium secundum quod est in aedificari, necesse est quod posito uno ponatur et alterum, et remoto uno removeatur et alterum. Hoc autem non accidit semper in causis quae sunt in potentia: non enim simul corrumpitur domus et homo qui aedificavit ipsam. Unde habetur quod sicut agentia inferiora, quae sunt causa rerum quantum ad suum fieri, oportet simul esse cum iis quae fiunt quandiu fiunt; ita agens divinum, quod est causa existendi in actu, simul est cum esse rei in actu. Unde subtracta divina actione a rebus, res in nihilum deciderent, sicut remota praesentia solis lumen in aere deficeret.	195. Next where he says, ‘The difference is ...’ (195 b 17), he treats three things which follow from the distinction of modes just made. The first point is that causes in act and causes in potency differ as follows. Causes operating in act exist and do not exist simultaneously with those things of which they are the causes in act. For example, if we take singular causes, i.e., proper causes, then this healer exists and does not exist simultaneously with him who becomes healed, and this builder exists simultaneously with that which is built. But this is not true if we take causes in act which are not proper causes. For it is not true that builder exists and does not exist simultaneously with that which is built. For it can happen that the builder is in act but this building is not being built, but some other. But if we take the one who is building this building, and if we take this building insofar as it is being built, then it is necessary that when one is posited, the other must be posited also, and when one is removed the other is removed. But this does not always happen in regard to causes which are in potency. For a home and the man who built it are not corrupted simultaneously. And thus it follows that just as inferior agents, which are causes of the coining to be of things, must exist simultaneously with the things which come to be as long as they are coming to be, so also the divine agent, which is the cause of existing in act, is simultaneous with the existence of the thing in act. Hence if the divine action were removed from things, things would fall into nothingness, just as when the presence of the sun is removed, light ceases to be in the air.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 10 Secundum ponit ibi: oportet autem semper etc.; dicens quod in naturalibus oportet semper supremam causam uniuscuiusque requirere, sicut contingit in artificialibus. Ut si quaeramus quare homo aedificat, respondetur, quia est aedificator; et similiter si quaeramus quare est aedificator, respondetur, quia habet artem aedificativam: et hic statur, quia haec est prima causa in hoc ordine. Et ideo oportet in rebus naturalibus procedere usque ad causam supremam. Et hoc ideo est, quia effectus nescitur nisi sciatur causa; unde si alicuius effectus causa sit etiam alterius causae effectus, sciri non poterit nisi causa eius sciatur; et sic quousque perveniatur ad primam causam.	196. He sets forth the second point where he says, ‘In investigating the cause...’ (195 b 21). He says that it is necessary to seek in natural things the first cause of each thing, just as we do in artificial things. So if we should ask why it is that a man builds, we answer ‘because he is a builder’. Likewise, if we ask why he is a builder, we answer, ‘because he possesses the builder’s art’. And here the inquiry stops, because this is the first cause in this order. Hence in natural things we should proceed to the first cause. This is so because the effect is not known unless the cause is known. Hence if the cause of an effect is also the effect of some other cause, then it cannot be known unless its cause is known, and so on until we arrive at a first cause.
lib. 2 l. 6 n. 11 Tertium ponit ibi: amplius autem aliae et cetera. Et est, quod causis debent proportionaliter respondere effectus, ita quod generalibus causis generales effectus reddantur, et singularibus singulares; puta, si dicatur quod statuae causa est statuam faciens, et huius statuae hic statuam faciens. Et similiter causis in potentia respondent effectus in potentia, et causis in actu effectus in actu. Et ultimo epilogando concludit quod sufficienter determinatum est de speciebus et modis causarum.	197. He sets forth the third point where he says, ‘Further generic effects ...’ (195 b 25). Effects should correspond proportionally to causes so that general effects be referred to general causes and singular effects to singular causes. For example, if it is said that the cause of statue is sculptor, then the cause of this statue is this sculptor. In like manner effects in potency should correspond to causes in potency and effects in act to causes in act. And finally in summary he concludes that this is a sufficient treatment of the species and modes of causes.