Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L2/lect9

Lecture 9 THE MEANING OF THE THINGS WHICH THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE COMMON MAN SAY ABOUT FORTUNE

Latin	English
	LECTURE 9 (197 a 8-35) THE MEANING OF THE THINGS WHICH THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE COMMON MAN SAY ABOUT FORTUNE
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 1 Posita definitione fortunae, hic ex praemissa definitione assignat rationem eorum quae de fortuna dicuntur. Et primo eorum quae dicta sunt a philosophis antiquis de fortuna; secundo eorum quae ab hominibus vulgariter de fortuna dicuntur, ibi: et fortunam dicere et cetera. Posuit autem supra tres opiniones de fortuna et casu, quarum mediam improbavit tanquam omnino falsam; quia scilicet ponebat fortunam esse causam caeli et mundanorum omnium. Unde ea subtracta de medio, primo assignat quomodo veritatem habet tertia opinio, quae ponebat fortunam esse immanifestam homini; secundo quomodo veritatem habeat prima opinio, quae posuit nihil fieri a fortuna et a casu, ibi: et est ut a fortuna et cetera. Quia autem superius dictum est quod causae per accidens sunt infinitae; et iterum dictum est quod fortuna est causa per accidens; concludit ex praemissis quod eius quod est a fortuna, sunt infinitae causae. Et quia infinitum, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, inde est quod fortuna immanifesta est homini.	217. Having given the definition of fortune, he establishes from this definition the meaning [ratio] of those things which are said about fortune. First he considers those things which the ancient philosophers said about fortune. Secondly, where he says, ‘Thus to say...’ (197 a 18 #219), he considers those things which the common man says about fortune. He has given above [L7 #199ff] three opinions concerning fortune and chance. And he disproved the second of these opinions as being altogether false, for this position held that fortune is the cause of the heavens and of all worldly things. Thus, having rejected the second opinion, he here shows that the third opinion, which holds that fortune is hidden to man, is true. Secondly, where he says, ‘... and why...’ (197 a 10 #218), he shows how the first opinion, which holds that nothing comes to be by fortune or chance, might be true. Since it was said above [L8 #214] that per accidens causes are infinite, and since it was also said [L8 #214] that fortune is a per accidens cause, he concludes from this that the causes of that which is by fortune are infinite. And since the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown, it follows that fortune is hidden to man.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit: et est ut a fortuna etc., ostendit quomodo prima opinio veritatem habeat: et dicit quod quodammodo est verum dicere quod a fortuna nihil fit. Haec enim omnia quae ab aliis dicta sunt de fortuna, quodammodo recte dicuntur, quia rationem aliquam habent. Cum enim fortuna sit causa per accidens, sequitur quod a fortuna sit aliquid per accidens; quod autem est per accidens, non est simpliciter; unde sequitur quod fortuna simpliciter nullius sit causa. Et hoc quod dixerat circa utramque opinionem, manifestat per exempla: et dicit quod sicut aedificator est causa per se domus et simpliciter, tibicen autem est causa domus per accidens; similiter quod aliquis veniat ad aliquem locum non causa deportandi argentum, est causa reportationis per accidens. Sed haec causa per accidens infinita est: quia infinitis aliis de causis potest homo ire ad locum illum; puta si vadat causa visitandi aliquem, vel causa persequendi hostem, vel causa fugiendi persequentem, vel causa videndi aliqua spectabilia. Omnia autem ista et quaecumque similia sunt causa reportationis argenti quae contingit a fortuna.	218. Next where he says,’... and why...’(197 a 10), he shows how the first opinion might be true. He says that in a way it is true to say that nothing comes to be by fortune. For all of those things which others say about fortune are in a certain respect true, because they have some meaning [ratio]. Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that what is by fortune is something per accidens. But what is per accidens is not simply. Hence it follows that fortune is not the cause of anything simply. And he clarifies what he has said about each of these opinions through an example. He says that as the builder is the per se cause of a house and is the cause simply, whereas flute player is a per accidens cause of the house; in like manner the fact that someone should come to a place with no intention of taking money away is a per accidens cause of carrying it away. But this per accidens cause is infinite, because it is possible for a man to go to that place because of an infinity of other reasons, e.g., if he came to visit someone, or to pursue an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort. Now all these things and anything similar are causes of the taking of money which happens by chance.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: et fortunam dicere etc., assignat rationem eorum quae dicuntur de fortuna vulgariter. Et primo assignat rationem eius quod dicitur de fortuna, esse sine ratione; secundo eius quod dicitur, fortunam esse bonam vel malam, ibi: fortuna autem dicitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit propositum; secundo movet quandam dubitationem, ibi: tamen deficiet in quibusdam et cetera.	219. Next where he says, ‘Thus to say ...’ (197 a 18), he explains the meaning [ratio] of those things which are commonly said about fortune. First he explains why it is said that that which is by fortune is without reason [ratio]. Secondly, where he says, ‘Chance, or fortune ...’ (197 a 25 #222), he explains why it is said that fortune is good or bad. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he proves his position. Secondly he raises a certain difficulty where he says, ‘Yet in some cases...’ (197 a 21 #221).
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 4 Dicit ergo primo quod recte dicitur fortunam esse sine ratione: quia ratiocinari non possumus nisi de iis quae sunt semper vel frequenter; fortuna autem est extra utrumque. Et ideo, quia causae tales, in paucioribus existentes, sunt per accidens et infinitae et sine ratione, sequitur quod fortunae sint causae infinitae et sine ratione: omnis enim causa per se producit effectum suum vel semper, vel ut frequenter.	220. He says, therefore, first that fortune is rightly said to be without reason [ratio]. For we can reason only about those things which happen always or in most instances. But fortune lies outside of both of these. And so since such causes, which occur in exceptional cases, are per accidens and infinite and without reason [ratio], it follows that causes by fortune are infinite and without reason [ratio]. For every per se cause produces its effect either always or in most cases.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: tamen deficiet etc.; movet quandam dubitationem: et dicit quod licet dicatur quod fortuna est causa per accidens, in quibusdam tamen deficiet, idest dubitabit aliquis. Et est dubitatio utrum quaecumque contingit esse causas per accidens, debeant dici causa eius quod fit a fortuna. Sicut patet quod sanitatis causa per se potest esse vel natura vel ars medicinae; causae autem per accidens possunt dici omnia illa, quibus contingentibus contingit fieri sanitatem, sicut est spiritus, idest ventus, et aestus et abrasio capitis: numquid igitur quodlibet istorum est causa per accidens? Sed quia supra diximus quod fortuna maxime dicitur causa per accidens ex parte effectus, prout scilicet aliquid dicitur esse causa eius quod accidit effectui; manifestum est quod causa fortuita aliquid operatur ad effectum fortuitum, licet non intendat illud, sed aliquid aliud effectui coniunctum. Et secundum hoc ventus aut aestus possunt dici causae fortuitae sanitatis, inquantum faciunt aliquam alterationem in corpore, ad quam sequitur sanitas: sed depilatio, aut aliquid aliud huiusmodi non facit manifeste aliquid ad sanitatem. Sed tamen inter causas per accidens aliquae sunt propinquiores, et aliquae remotiores. Illae autem quae sunt remotiores, minus videntur esse causae.	221. Next where he says, ‘Yet in some cases...’ (197 a 21), he raises a certain difficulty. He says that although it may be said that fortune is a per accidens cause, some will question this. The problem is whether everything which happens to be a per accidens cause ought to be called a cause of that which comes to be by fortune. Thus it is clear that the per se cause of health can be either nature or the art of the doctor. However, can all those things with which the coming to be of health happens to be connected, such as the wind, and the heat, and shaving of the head, be called causes per accidens ? The question, therefore, is whether each of these is a cause per accidens. Now since we said above [L8 #214] that fortune is most properly called a per accidens cause on the part of the effect, since a thing is said to be a cause of that which happens to the effect, it is clear that a fortuitous cause produces something in the fortuitous effect although it does not intend that, but rather something else connected with the effect. According to this wind or heat can be called fortuitous causes of health insofar as they produce some change in the body, upon which change health follows. But removing the hair or some other such thing does not produce anything clearly related to health. But among the per accidens causes, some are nearer [to the per se cause] and others are more remote. Those which are more remote seem less to be causes.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: fortuna autem etc., assignat rationem eius quod dicitur, fortunam esse bonam vel malam. Et primo assignat rationem quare dicitur fortuna bona vel mala simpliciter. Et dicit quod fortuna dicitur bona quando aliquod bonum contingit; et mala quando malum.	222. Next where he says, ‘Chance or fortune ...’ (197 a 25), he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad. First he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad simply. He says that fortune is said to be good when something good happens and bad when something bad happens.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 7 Secundo ibi: eufortunium etc., assignat rationem eufortunii et infortunii. Et dicit quod eufortunium et infortunium dicitur, quando habet aliquod bonum vel malum cum magnitudine: nam eufortunium dicitur quando sequitur aliquod magnum bonum; infortunium autem quando sequitur aliquod magnum malum. Et quia privari bono accipitur in ratione mali, et privari malo in ratione boni; ideo quando aliquis parum distat a magno bono, si amittat illud, dicitur infortunatus; et si aliquis sit propinquus magno malo, et liberetur ab illo, dicitur eufortunatus; et hoc ideo, quia intellectus accipit illud quod parum distat, ac si nihil distaret, sed iam haberetur.	223. Secondly, where he says, ‘The terms “good fortune”...’ (197 a 26), he explains the meaning [ratio] of good fortune and misfortune. He says that we refer to good fortune and misfortune when [the fortuitous event] has some great good or great evil. For an event is called good fortune when some great good follows; it is called misfortune when some great evil follows. And since being deprived of a good is included in the notion [ratio] of evil, and being deprived of evil is included in the notion [ratio] of the good, then when one is a little removed from a great good, he is said to be unfortunate if he misses it. On the other hand, if one is close to a great evil and is freed from it, he is said to be fortunate. This is so because the intellect takes that which is only a little removed as if it were not removed at all, but already possessed.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 8 Tertio ibi: amplius incertum etc., assignat rationem quare eufortunia sint incerta: et dicit quod hoc ideo est, quia eufortunium fortuna quaedam est; fortuna autem est incerta, cum sit eorum quae non sunt semper neque frequenter, ut dictum est. Unde sequitur eufortunium esse incertum.	224. Thirdly where he says, ‘Further, it is with reason ...’ (197 a 30), he explains why good fortune is uncertain. He says that this is so because good fortune is a kind of fortune. But fortune is uncertain because it pertains to things which are neither always nor frequent, as was said.’ Hence it follows that good fortune is uncertain.
lib. 2 l. 9 n. 9 Ultimo ibi: sunt quidem igitur ambo etc., concludit quasi recapitulando quod utrumque, scilicet casus et fortuna, est causa per accidens; et utrumque est in iis quae contingunt non simpliciter, idest semper, neque frequenter; et utrumque est in iis quae fiunt propter aliquid, ut ex supra dictis patet.	225. Finally where he says, ‘Both are then ...’ (197 a 33), he concludes as a sort of résumé that each, i.e., chance and fortune, is a cause per accidens, and that each pertains to things which do not happen simply, i.e., neither always nor frequently, and that each pertains to things which come to be for the sake of something, as is clear from what was said above [L7 #198ff].