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Lecture 3 Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles

Latin English
Lecture 3 Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam philosophus posuit rationes ad ostendendum motum semper esse, hic ponit rationes contra Anaxagoram et Empedoclem, qui contrarium ponebant. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit rationem contra eorum positionem; secundo contra rationem quam supponebant, ibi: similiter autem et dicere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit quod motus semper est, non erit dicendum quod aliquando sit motus et aliquando non, sicut dixerunt Empedocles et Anaxagoras: sic enim dicere sicut ipsi posuerunt, assimilatur cuidam figmento, quia scilicet absque ratione hoc ponebant; omne enim quod ponitur absque ratione vel auctoritate divina, fictitium esse videtur. Auctoritas autem divina praevalet etiam rationi humanae, multo magis quam auctoritas alicuius philosophi praevaleret alicui debili rationi, quam aliquis puer induceret. Non ergo assimilantur figmento quae per fidem tenentur, licet absque ratione credantur: credimus enim divinae auctoritati miraculis approbatae, idest illis operibus quae solus Deus facere potest. 991. After presenting the reasons showing that motion always existed, the Philosopher here gives arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles who posited the contrary. About this he does two things: First he gives an argument against their position; Secondly, against the argument they presupposed, at 992. He says therefore first that since it has been shown that motion always exists, it is wrong to say, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did, that at some time motion exists and at another time it does not; for to make such a claim is a figment, because it has no basis. Something stated without a reason or the support of divine authority seems, indeed, to be a fiction. However, divine authority has more value than human reason, much more indeed than the authority of a philosopher is more valuable than the weak argument some child might give. Therefore, what is held by faith, even though it be believed without an argument is not a figment of the mind, because we believe on the divine authority approved by miracles —works that God alone can produce.
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem et dicere etc., obiicit contra rationem cui innitebantur. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit istam rationem esse inconvenientem; secundo ostendit quod inconvenientior erat secundum positionem Anaxagorae, quam secundum positionem Empedoclis, ibi: at vero nihil inordinatum etc.; tertio ostendit quod nec secundum opinionem Empedoclis convenienter se habet, ibi: sed et oportet hoc dicentem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod similiter etiam hoc videtur esse fictitium, quod aliquis ponens motum quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, dicat hoc pro ratione, quod hoc ideo est, quia natum est sic esse, et hoc oportet accipere tanquam principium; sicut Empedocles videtur dicere, quod hoc quod res in parte temporis teneant amicitiam et in parte temporis teneant discordiam et moveantur, et quod in medio tempore quiescant, inest rebus ex necessitate; sicut si aliquis diceret quare calidum calefacit, quia sic necesse est esse, et hoc accipiatur quasi principium, quod calidum calefaciat. Similiter accipiebat Empedocles quasi principium, quod necesse est sic esse, quandoque res moveri per amicitiam, quandoque per discordiam, et quandoque quiescere. Et forte etiam eodem modo diceret Anaxagoras et alii ponentes unum principium activum, quod oportet hoc accipere quasi principium, quod motus inceperit postquam infinito tempore non fuit. 992. Then at (763 252 a5) he objects against the argument on which they rested. About this he does three things: First he suggests that their argument is unsuitable; Secondly, that it was more unsuitable to Anaxagoras’ position than to that of Empedocles, at 993; Thirdly, he shows that even according to Empedocles’ opinion it is unsuitable, at 994. He says therefore First (763 252 a5) that it also seems a fiction that anyone, positing that motion at one time exists and at another time does not, should give as his reason that this is so because it is natural for it to be that way, and then adds that this statement must be accepted as a principle. Now that is what Empedocles seems to say, namely, that the situation whereby during one period of time things maintain friendship, and during another are ruled by discord that sets things in motion, but in the interim are at rest, is due to a sort of necessity in things. That is like saying that the reason why heat warms is that it has to be that way, and that heat warms should then be accepted as a principle. This is exactly what Empedocles does, when he takes as a principle that it is due to an ordinance of nature that things are at one time being moved by friendship, and at another time by discord, and at another time are at rest. Perhaps Anaxagoras, too, and others who posit one active principle would speak in a similar vein, namely, that we must accept as a principle that motion began to exist after not existing for an infinite period of time.
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: at vero nihil inordinatum etc., ostendit quod hac ratione inconvenientius utebatur Anaxagoras quam Empedocles. Manifestum est enim quod cum ponitur aliquid esse quasi principium, oportet accipere quod hoc sit secundum rei naturam; hoc est, ut natura rei sit talis quod hoc ei conveniat. Sic enim accipimus quasi principium, quod omne totum maius est sua parte, quia hoc est de ratione et natura totius, quod excedat partis quantitatem. Unde Empedocles dicebat, sic aptum natum esse; dans intelligere quod hoc esset accipiendum quasi principium. Et similiter Anaxagoras diceret, licet non exprimeret. Sed manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis, nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt, potest esse absque ordine; quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem, non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium. Sed duo infinita non habent ordinem ad invicem, quia infiniti ad infinitum nulla est proportio; omnis autem ordo proportio quaedam est. Sic ergo patet quod quiescere res tempore infinito, et postea incipere moveri per infinitum tempus, sine hoc quod sit aliqua differentia inter hoc tempus et illud, quare nunc magis quam prius motus fiat; neque iterum assignare aliquam aliam ordinationem inter aliqua duo, quorum uno deficiente, alterum incipiat et fiat motus, ut Anaxagoras ponebat; hoc non est opus naturae. Quia quidquid est in natura, aut semper simpliciter, idest eodem modo, se habet, et non aliquando sic, aliquando autem aliter, sicut ignis semper sursum fertur; aut aliqua ratio est quare non semper est eodem modo, sicut non semper animalia crescunt, sed quandoque diminuuntur, et hoc habet aliquam rationem. Sic ergo non videtur secundum naturam procedere, quod infinito tempore res quieverint, et postmodum moveri inceperint, ut Anaxagoras posuit. Unde melius est quod dicatur, sicut Empedocles dixit, vel quicumque alius similiter opinatus est, quod totum universum in quadam parte temporis quiescit, et iterum movetur in alia parte temporis; quia iam hoc potest habere aliquam ordinationem: finiti enim ad finitum potest esse proportio. Est autem considerandum quod sententia fidei nostrae non est similis positioni Anaxagorae. Non enim ponimus ante mundum infinita spatia temporis, cuius sit necesse accipere proportionem ad tempus sequens: sed antequam mundus inciperet, sola Dei simplex aeternitas fuit, sicut dictum est, quae est omnino extra genus temporis. 993. Then at (764 252 a11) he shows that Anaxagoras used this argument in a more unsuitable way than did Empedocles. For it is clear that when something is laid down as a principle, it should be accepted as being according to the nature of a thing, i.e., that the nature of a thing is such that such a thing belongs to it. Thus we accept the principle that the whole is greater than its part, because it is the very reason and nature of a whole that it exceed the quantity of a part. Hence, when Empedocles says, “It is natural that it be that way,” he gives us to understand that it should be accepted as a principle. Anaxagoras would have said the same, although he did not express it. But it is clear that no natural thing nor anything that belongs to things naturally, can exist without order, because nature is a cause of order. For we see that nature in its works proceeds in an orderly fashion from one thing to another. Therefore, whatever does not possess order is not according to nature and cannot be called a principle. But two infinites have no order, one to the other, because there is no ratio between one infinite and another, whereas every order is a kind of ratio. Accordingly, it is evidently not a work of nature that things rest for an infinite time and later begin to be moved for an infinite time without there being, between this time and that, any difference to explain why motion comes to be now rather than before; any more than it is a work of nature not to assign some other order between the two things, so that when one fails the other begins and motion comes to be, as Anaxagoras posited. These are not works of nature, because whatever is in nature either is always the same and not sometimes this way and then that way—as fire always moves upwards—or there is some reason why it is not always the same, as for example, animals do not always continue growing but reach a point when they start to decrease—and for this there is a reason. Accordingly, it does not seem to be according to nature that for an infinite time things be at rest and later begin to be moved, as Anaxagoras assumed. Hence it is better to say, as Empedocles said—and those who believed as he—that the whole universe is at rest at one time and in motion at another, because at least in this case there would be order, for there can be a ratio between one finite and another. It should, however, be considered that the tenet of our faith is not akin to Anaxagoras’ position, for we do not assume before the world any infinite reaches of time that have to be related to a later time; rather, before the world began, only the simple eternity of God existed, and that is outside the genus of time.
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: sed et oportet hoc dicentem etc., ostendit quod nec etiam Empedocli convenit praedicta ratio. Et primo ostendit propositum; secundo excludit quandam falsam existimationem, ibi: omnino enim existimare et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod etiam qui hoc dicit quod Empedocles dixit, non oportet quod solum affirmet quod dicit, sed etiam quod assignet causam sui dicti; et quod nihil ex se apponat ultra id quod causa assignata requirit; neque etiam aliquid velit accipere ut dignitatem, idest ut principium, absque ratione. Sed oportet quod adducat ad manifestationem eius quod accepit quasi principium, aut inductionem, sicut in principiis naturalibus quae ex sensibilium experimento accipiuntur; aut demonstrationem, sicut in principiis quae per priora principia demonstrantur. Sed hoc Empedocles non servat. Esto enim quod ipse ponat amicitiam et litem esse causas, tamen hoc non est de ratione amicitiae vel inimicitiae, quod unum eorum post alterum moveat. Non est enim de ratione amicitiae, quod in inimicitiam convertatur, nec e converso: sed de ratione amicitiae est quod congreget, de ratione vero inimicitiae est quod disgreget. Sed si ulterius determinetur quod in quadam parte temporis haec congreget, et iterum in quadam parte temporis illa disgreget; est ulterius manifestandum in aliquibus particularibus, in quibus hoc contingat. Sicut quod amicitia congreget, et inimicitia disgreget, manifestatur in hominibus, quia amicitia homines adunantur ad invicem, inimicitia vero fugiunt ab invicem; et ideo hoc ab Empedocle supponitur esse in toto universo, quia videtur sic esse in aliquibus. Sed quod secundum aequalia tempora moveant successive amicitia et inimicitia, hoc indiget aliqua ratione manifestante: non enim videtur hoc in hominibus contingere. 994. Then at (765 252 a22) he shows that the above-mentioned argument is not appropriate in Empedocles’ situation either. First he explains the proposition; Secondly, he rejects a false interpretation, at 995. He says therefore first (765 252 a22) that even the holder of Empedocles’ theory ought not to assert the fact only but also should explain the cause of his statement and not go beyond what is required by the cause he assigns. Nor should he accept anything as an axiom, i.e., as a principle without reason; rather, whatever is accepted as a principle should be explained either by induction, as is done in the case of natural principles based on sense experience, or by demonstration, as in the case of those principles which are proved by prior principles. But Empedocles does not do that. Granted that he posits friendship and discord as causes, yet it is not the property of friendship or hostility that one should cause motion after the other. For it is not the nature of friendship to be changed into hostility, or vice versa; though it is of the nature of friendship to gather and of hostility to scatter. But if it is further determined that at one time the one gathers and that at another time the other scatters, it must be further made clear by definite instances in which this occurs. For example, that friendship gathers and discord scatters is manifested among men, because by the former men are united but by the latter they fly from one another. So Empedocles supposed that this is what happens in the whole universe, because it seems to happen in certain cases. But that according to equal periods friendship should move at one time and discord at another, needs to be supported by argument, since that is not seen to happen among men.
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: omnino enim existimare etc., excludit quandam falsam existimationem. Posset enim aliquis credere, quod quidquid semper est, non habet causam, propter hoc quod videmus ea quae apud nos causantur, de novo incipere: et ideo videbatur aliquibus, quod quando reducebatur aliqua quaestio in aliquid quod est semper, non oporteret ulterius causam seu rationem quaerere. Sic ergo posset Empedocles dicere, quod amicitia et lis semper secundum aequalia tempora moverunt: et ideo non est quaerenda huius alia ratio. Hoc ergo Aristoteles removet, dicens quod non recte se habet opinari quod aliquid existimetur esse principium, propter hoc quod semper aut sic est, aut sic fit. Ad hoc enim Democritus reducebat omnes causas naturales, assignans principium iis quae de novo fiunt; sed eius quod est semper, nolebat aliquod principium quaerere. Quod quidem in aliquibus recte dicitur, sed non in omnibus. Manifestum est enim quod triangulus semper habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; sed tamen huius perpetuae passionis est altera causa. Sed aliqua perpetua sunt, sicut principia, quorum non est alia causa. 995. Then at (766 252 a32) he rejects a false assumption. For someone could believe that whatever is eternal has no cause, since whatever we observe as being caused among us is something that begins newly to be. Consequently, it seemed to some that when a discussion reached something that always existed, there was no need to inquire any further for a cause or a reasons In this vein Empedocles could say that friendship and discord had always caused motion according to equal times and therefore no reason for it need be sought. But Aristotle disqualifies this by saying that it is a wrong assumption to suppose that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so. In this way Democritus reduced all the causes that explain nature to something existing always: he assigned a principle for things that begin newly to be, but would not look for a principle of what has always been, Now this is true in some things and not in others. For it is clear that a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles, but even of this eternal property there is a cause other than the fact. But some things are indeed eternal, such as principles, that do not have a cause.
lib. 8 l. 3 n. 6 Est autem valde notandum quod hic dicitur; quia ut in II Metaphys. habetur, eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et in veritate. Sicut igitur aliqua sunt semper vera et tamen habent causam suae veritatis, ita Aristoteles intellexit quod essent aliqua semper entia, scilicet corpora caelestia et substantiae separatae, et tamen haberent causam sui esse. Ex quo patet quod quamvis Aristoteles poneret mundum aeternum, non tamen credidit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius tantum, ut quidam dixerunt. Ultimo autem concludit principale propositum epilogando. Et dicit tanta dicta esse de hoc quod nullum tempus erit in futuro, neque erat in praeterito, in quo aliquis motus non sit. 996. Very special attention should be paid to what is here said, because, as is mentioned in Metaphysics II, the arrangement of things in existence and in truth is the same. Therefore, just as some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence. From this it is evident that although Aristotle posited a world that was eternal, he did not believe that God is not the world’s cause of existence but of its motion only, as some maintained. Finally, he concludes his main proposition with a summary. And he says: “Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our claim that there never was a time when there was not motion and there will never be a time when there will not be motion.”

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