Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect10

Lecture 10 How something is said to be predicated per se of a thing

Latin	English
	Lecture 10 (73a34-b26) HOW SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE PREDICATED PER SE OF A THING
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 1 Postquam determinavit philosophus de dici de omni, hic determinat de per se. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quot modis dicitur aliquid per se; secundo, ostendit qualiter his modis demonstrator utatur; ibi: quae ergo dicuntur et cetera.	After determining about “said of all,” the Philosopher now determines about “said per se” [i.e., said in virtue of itself] and does three things. First, he shows the number of ways something is said per se. Secondly, how the demonstrator makes use of these ways (73b16). Thirdly, he summarizes (73b25).
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 2 Circa primum sciendum est quod haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae; designat etiam interdum et situm, sicut cum dicitur aliquis esse per se, quando est solitarius. Causae autem habitudinem designat, aliquando quidem formalis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus vivit per animam. Quandoque autem habitudinem causae materialis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus est coloratum per superficiem: quia scilicet proprium subiectum coloris est superficies. Designat etiam habitudinem causae extrinsecae et praecipue efficientis; sicut cum dicitur quod aqua calescit per ignem. Sicut autem haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae, quando aliquid extrinsecum est causa eius, quod attribuitur subiecto; ita quando subiectum vel aliquid eius est causa eius, quod attribuitur ei, et hoc significat per se.	In regard to the first it should be noted that this preposition per [“in virtue of” or “by”] denotes a causal relationship, although sometimes it also signifies a state, as when someone is said to be per se, i.e., by himself, when he is alone. But when it designates a relationship to a cause, sometimes the cause is formal, as when it is stated that the body lives in virtue of the soul; sometimes the relationship is to a material cause, as when it is stated that a body is colored in virtue of its surface, i.e., because the surface is the subject of color; again, it might even designate a relationship to an extrinsic cause, particularly an efficient cause, as when it is said that water is made hot in virtue of fire. But just as this preposition per designates a relationship to a cause, when something extrinsic is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject, so also when the subject or something pertaining to the subject is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject. This latter is what per se, i.e., in virtue of itself, signifies.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 3 Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est, quando id, quod attribuitur alicui, pertinet ad formam eius. Et quia definitio significat formam et essentiam rei, primus modus eius quod est per se est, quando praedicatur de aliquo definitio vel aliquid in definitione positum (et hoc est quod dicit quod per se sunt quaecunque insunt in eo, quod quid est, idest in definitione indicante quid est), sive ponatur in recto sive in obliquo. Sicut in definitione trianguli ponitur linea; unde linea per se inest triangulo: et similiter in definitione lineae ponitur punctum; unde punctum per se inest lineae. Rationem autem quare ista ponantur in definitione subiungit dicens: substantia, idest essentia, quam significat definitio ipsorum, idest trianguli et lineae, est ex his, idest ex linea et punctis. Quod non est intelligendum quod linea ex punctis componatur, sed quod punctum sit de ratione lineae, sicut linea de ratione trianguli. Et hoc dicit ad excludendum ea, quae sunt partes materiae et non speciei, quae non ponuntur in definitione, sicut semicirculus non ponitur in definitione circuli, nec digitus in definitione hominis, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Et subiungit quod quaecumque universaliter insunt in ratione dicente quid est, per se attribuuntur alicui.	Therefore, the first way of saying something per se (73a34) is when that which is attributed to a subject pertains to its form. And because the form and essence of a thing are signified by its definition, the first mode of that which is per se is when the definition itself or something expressed in the definition is predicated of the thing defined. This is what he means when he says, “Essential attributes are such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature,” i.e., included in the definition which indicates what it is, whether those elements are stated in the nominative case or in one of the oblique cases. Thus, “line” is stated in the definition of triangle. Hence “line” is in triangle per se. Again, in the definition of line, “point” is mentioned; hence “point” is per se in line. And the reason why they are mentioned in the definition is stated when he says, “for the very being or substance” [i.e., the essence, which the definition signifies] “of triangle and line is composed of these elements,” namely, of lines and points. However, this does not mean that a line is formed out of points, but that “point” is involved in the very notion of line, just as “line” is involved in the very notion of triangle. And he asserts this in order to exclude things which are part of a thing’s matter and not of its species: thus, “semicircle” is not mentioned in the definition of circle, or “finger” in the definition of man, as it is stated in Metaphysics VII. He states further that all those items which are found universally in the definition expressing what a thing is are attributed to it per se.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 4 Secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae materialis, prout scilicet id, cui aliquid attribuitur, est propria materia et proprium subiectum ipsius. Oportet autem quod proprium subiectum ponatur in definitione accidentis: quandoque quidem in obliquo, sicut cum accidens in abstracto definitur, ut cum dicimus, quod simitas est curvitas nasi; quandoque vero in recto, ut cum accidens definitur in concreto, ut cum dicimus quod simus est nasus curvus. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius.	The second mode of saying per se is when this preposition per implies a relationship of material cause, in the sense that that to which something, is attributed is its proper matter and subject. For it is required, when defining an accident, to mention its proper subject in one of the oblique, cases: thus when an accident is defined abstractly, we say that “aquilinity” is a curvature of a nose,” but when it is defined concretely, the subject is put in the nominative case, so that we say that “the aquiline is a curved nose.” Now the reason for this is that since the being of an accident depends on its subject, its definition—which signifies its being—must mention that subject. Hence it is the second mode of saying per se, when the subject is mentioned in the definition of a predicate which is a proper accident of the subject.
Et hoc est quod dicit, et per se dicuntur quibuscunque eorum, idest de numero eorum, quae insunt ipsis, idest subiectis accidentium, ipsa subiecta insunt in ratione demonstrante quid est ipsum accidens, idest in definitione accidentis. Sicut rectum et circulare insunt lineae per se: nam linea ponitur in definitione eorum. Et eadem ratione par et impar per se insunt numero, quia numerus in eorum definitione ponitur: nam par est numerus medium habens. Et similiter primum et compositum per se praedicantur de numero, et numerus in definitione eorum ponitur. Est enim primum in numeris, numerus qui nullo alio numero mensuratur, sed sola unitate, ut septenarius. Compositus autem numerus est, quem etiam alius numerus mensurat, sicut novenarius. Et similiter isopleuros, idest aequilaterum, et scalenon, idest trium inaequalium laterum et altera parte longius, per se insunt triangulo, et triangulus ponitur in definitione eorum. Et ideo subiungit quod, subiecta quae insunt omnibus praemissis accidentibus in ratione dicente quid est, idest in definitione, sicut alicui praedictorum accidentium inest linea, alicui vero numerus, et similiter in aliis, unicuique, inquam, ipsorum subiectorum, per se inesse dico suum accidens.	And this is what he means when he states (73a38), “essential attributes are those such that while they belong to certain subjects,” i.e., to subjects of accidents, “the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula,” i.e., in the expression which describes what the accident is, i.e., in the definition of the accident. “Thus straight and curved belong to line per se.” For “line” is mentioned in their definition. For the same reason “odd” and “even” belong per se to number, because “number” is mentioned in their definition. Again, prime and compound are predicated per se of number, and “number” is mentioned in their definition. (For a prime number, for example, seven, is one which is exactly divisible by no other number but “1”; but a compound number, for example, nine, is one which is exactly divisible by some number greater than “1.” Again, “isoplural,” i.e., equilateral, and scalene, i.e., having three unequal sides, belong per se to triangle, and “triangle” is mentioned in their definition. Accordingly, he adds that their respective subjects belong to each of the aforesaid accidents and are mentioned in the expression which states what each is, i.e., in the definition: thus “line” belongs to some of them, and “number” to others.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 5 Quae vero praedicata neutraliter insunt, idest neque ita quod ponantur in definitione subiectorum, neque subiecta in definitione eorum, sunt accidentia, idest per accidens praedicantur, sicut musicum et album praedicantur de animali per accidens.	In each of these subjects that have been mentioned, I say that its accident is in it per se. But those predicates which are neutral, i.e., of such a nature as not to be mentioned in the definition of their subjects, nor the subjects in their definition, are accidents, i.e., are predicated per accidens: for example, “musical” and “white” are predicated per accidens of animal.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: amplius quod non etc., ponit alium modum eius, quod est per se, prout per se significat aliquid solitarium, sicut dicitur quod per se est aliquod particulare, quod est in genere substantiae, quod non praedicatur de aliquo subiecto. Et huius ratio est, quia cum dico, ambulans vel album, non significo ambulans vel album, quasi aliquid per se solitarium existens, cum intelligatur aliquid aliud esse quod sit ambulans vel album. Sed in his, quae significant hoc aliquid, scilicet in primis substantiis, hoc non contingit. Cum enim dicitur Socrates vel Plato, non intelligitur quod sit aliquid alterum, quam id quod vere ipsa sunt, quod scilicet sit subiectum eorum. Sic igitur hoc modo quae non praedicantur de subiecto sunt per se, quae vero dicuntur de subiecto, scilicet sicut in subiecto existentia, accidentia sunt.	Then (73b5) he sets down another mode of that which is per se, i.e., the sense in which it signifies something in isolation. Thus something which is a singular in the genus of substance and which is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se. The reason for this is that when I say, “walking” or “white,” I do not signify either of them as something isolated or apart, since something else which is walking or white is understood. But this is not the case with terms which signify a “this something,” i.e., with terms that signify first substance. For when I say, “Socrates” or “Plato,” it is not to be supposed that there is something else, over and above what they really are, which would be their subject. Therefore, things which are thus not predicated of any subject are per se, but things which are predicated of a subject, as being in the subject, are accidents. However, not all things predicated of a subject, as universals of their inferiors, are accidents.
Nam quae dicuntur de subiecto, sicut universalia de inferioribus, non semper accidentia sunt. Sciendum est autem quod iste modus non est modus praedicandi, sed modus existendi. Unde etiam in principio non dixit, per se dicuntur, sed, per se sunt.	It should be noted, however, that this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of existing; hence at the very start he said that they exist per se and not that they are said per se.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: item alio modo etc., ponit quartum modum, secundum quod haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae efficientis vel cuiuscunque alterius. Et ideo dicit quod quidquid inest unicuique propter seipsum, per se dicitur de eo; quod vero non propter seipsum inest alicui, per accidens dicitur, sicut cum dico: hoc ambulante coruscat. Non enim propter id quod ambulat, coruscavit; sed hoc dicitur secundum accidens. Si vero quod praedicatur insit subiecto propter seipsum, per se inest, ut si dicamus quod interfectum interiit: manifestum est enim quod propter id quod illud interfectum est, interiit, et non est accidens quod interfectum interierit.	Then (73b10) he gives the fourth mode, according to which the preposition per designates a relationship of efficient cause or of any other. Consequently, he says that whatever is attributed to a thing because of itself, is said of it per se; but whatever is not so attributed is said per accidens, as when I say, “While he was walking, it lightened.” For it is not the fact that he walks that causes lightning, but this is said by coincidence. Butt if the predicate is in the subject because of itself, it is per se, as when we say, “Slaughtered, it died.” For it is obvious that because something was slaughtered, it died, and it is not a mere coincidence that something slaughtered should die.
lib. 1 l. 10 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: quae ergo dicuntur etc., ostendit qualiter utatur praedictis modis demonstrator. Ubi notandum est quod cum scientia proprie sit conclusionum, intellectus autem principiorum, proprie scibilia dicuntur conclusiones demonstrationis, in quibus passiones praedicantur de propriis subiectis. Propria autem subiecta non solum ponuntur in definitione accidentium, sed etiam sunt causae eorum. Unde conclusiones demonstrationum includunt duplicem modum dicendi per se, scilicet secundum et quartum.	Then (73b16) he shows how the demonstrator uses the aforesaid modes. But first it should be noted that, since science bears on conclusions, and understanding [intuition] bears on principles, the scientifically knowable are, properly speaking, the conclusions of a demonstration wherein proper attributes are predicated of their appropriate subjects. Now the appropriate subjects are not only placed in the definition of attributes, but they are also their causes. Hence the conclusions of demonstrations involve two modes of predicating per se, namely, the second and the fourth.
Et hoc est quod dicit quod illa quae praedicantur in simpliciter scibilibus, hoc est, in conclusionibus demonstrationum, sic sunt per se, sicut inesse praedicantibus, idest sicut quando subiecta insunt in definitione accidentium, quae de eis praedicantur, aut inesse propter ipsa, idest quando praedicata insunt subiecto propter ipsum subiectum, quod est causa praedicati.	And this is what he means when he says that the predications “in the scientifically knowable in the strict sense,” i.e., in the conclusions of demonstrations are per se in the sense of something contained in the predicates, i.e., in the way that subjects are contained in the definition of accidents which are predicated of the former; or are present on account of them, i.e., in the way that predicates are in a subject by reason of the subject itself, which is the cause of the predicate.
Et consequenter ostendit quod huiusmodi scibilia sunt necessaria: quia non contingit quin proprium accidens praedicetur de subiecto. Sed hoc est duobus modis. Quandoque quidem simpliciter, sicut cum unum accidens convertitur cum subiecto, ut habere tres cum triangulo, et risibile cum homine. Quandoque autem duo opposita sub disiunctione accepta ex necessitate subiecto insunt, ut lineae aut rectum aut obliquum, et numero par aut impar. Cuius rationem ostendit, quia contrarium, privatio et contradictio sunt in eodem genere. Nam privatio nihil aliud est, quam negatio in subiecto determinato. Quandoque etiam contrarium aequiparatur negationi in aliquo genere, sicut in numeris idem est impar quod non par secundum consequentiam. Sicut ergo necesse est affirmare vel negare, ita necesse est alterum eorum, quae per se insunt, proprio inesse subiecto. Deinde epilogat dicens: de omni quidem et cetera. Quod est planum.	Then he shows that such scientifically knowable things are necessary, because it is impossible for a proper accident not to be predicated of its subject. But this can occur in two ways: sometimes it is absolute, as when the accident is convertible with its subject, as “having three angles equal to two right angles” is convertible with triangle, and “risible” with man. At other times, two opposites stated disjunctively are of necessity in the subject, as “straight or oblique” in line, and.”odd or even” in number. He shows that the reason for this is the fact that contrariety, privation and contradiction are in the same genus. For privation is nothing more, than a negation in a determinate subject. Again, a contrary is equivalent to a negation in some genus, as in the genus of numbers, odd is the same as “not even” by way of consequence. Therefore, just as it is necessary, either to affirm or deny, so it is necessary that one of two things that belong per se, be in its proper subject. Then (73b25) he summarizes, and the text is clear.