Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect11

Lecture 11 How something is said to be predicated as commensurately universal

Latin	English
	Lecture 11 (73b27-74a3) HOW SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE PREDICATED AS COMMENSURATELY UNIVERSAL
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de dici de omni et per se, hic determinat de universali. Et dividitur in duas partes: in prima, ostendit quid sit universale; in secunda, ostendit quomodo in acceptione universalis contingit errare; ibi: oportet autem non latere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quid sit universale; secundo, ostendit quomodo demonstrator universali utatur; ibi: demonstratio autem per se et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quod universale continet in se et dici de omni et per se; secundo, ostendit quid supra ea addat; ibi: universale autem et cetera.	After determining about “said of all” and “said per se,” the Philosopher here determines concerning the “universal.” This treatment falls into two parts. In the first he shows what the universal is. Secondly, how error occurs in our understanding of it (74a4) [L. 12]. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows what the universal is. Secondly, how the demonstrator uses the universal (74a1). Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows that the universal contains within itself the attributes of “being said of all” and of “being said per se.” Secondly, he shows what the universal adds to them (73b33).
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 2 Ad evidentiam autem eorum, quae hic dicuntur, sciendum est quod universale non hoc modo hic accipitur, prout omne quod praedicatur de pluribus universale dicitur, secundum quod Porphyrius determinat de quinque universalibus; sed dicitur hic universale secundum quandam adaptationem vel adaequationem praedicati ad subiectum, cum scilicet neque praedicatum invenitur extra subiectum, neque subiectum sine praedicato.	To understand what is being said here it should be noted that “universal” is not to be taken here in the sense that anything predicated of several is a universal, as when Porphyry treats of the five universals; rather “universal” is taken here according to a certain correspondence or commensurateness of the subject with the predicate, so that the predicate is not found outside the subject nor is the subject without the predicate.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 3 His autem visis, sciendum est quod circa primum tria facit. Primo dicit quod universale, scilicet praedicatum, est quod et de omni est, idest universaliter praedicatur de subiecto, et etiam per se, scilicet inest ei, idest convenit subiecto secundum quod ipsum subiectum est. Multa enim universaliter de aliquibus praedicantur, quae non conveniunt eis per se, et secundum quod ipsa. Sicut omnis lapis coloratus est; non tamen secundum quod lapis, sed secundum quod est superficiem habens.	With this in mind, it should be noted that he does three things with respect to the first point. First (73b27), he says that the universal, namely, the predicate, is both verified of all, i.e., is predicated universally of its subject, and is said per se, i.e., is in and belongs to the subject according to the essential nature of the subject. For many things are said universally of certain things to which they do not belong per se and as such. Thus, every stone is colored, but not precisely as stone, but as it has a surface.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 4 Secundo; ibi: manifestum igitur etc., infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, dicens quod, ex quo universale est, quod per se inest; quae autem per se insunt ex necessitate insunt, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod universalia praedicata, prout hic sumuntur, ex necessitate insunt rebus, de quibus praedicantur.	Secondly (73b28), he draws a corollary from this and says that since the universal is something which is per se in a thing, and since it has been shown that whatever things are in something per se are in it of necessity, it is obvious that universal predicates, as they are being taken here, are necessarily present in the things of which they are predicated.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 5 Tertio; ibi: per se autem etc., ne aliquis crederet aliud esse quod in definitione universalis dixerat per se, et secundum quod ipsum est, ostendit quod per se et secundum quod ipsum est, idem est. Sicut lineae per se inest punctum primo modo, et rectitudo secundo modo: nam utrunque inest ei secundum quod linea est. Et e converso triangulo secundum quod triangulus est insunt duo recti, idest quod valet duos rectos, quia per se triangulo inest.	Thirdly (73b29), lest anyone suppose that “per se” and “precisely as such,” both of which were mentioned in the definition of the universal, are different, he shows that they are the same. Thus, “point” is per se in line in the first way, and “straight” in the second way. For each is in line precisely as it is a line. In like manner, “two right angles” belongs to triangle precisely as triangle, i.e., its angles are equal to two right angles, which is per se in triangle.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: universale autem etc., ostendit quid addat universale supra dici de omni et per se. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo, dicit quod tunc est universale praedicatum, cum non solum in quolibet est de quo praedicatur, sed et primo demonstratur inesse ei, de quo praedicatur.	Then (73b33) he shows what “universal” adds to the notions, “being said of all” and “being said per se.” In regard to this he does two things: First, he says that a predicate is “universal,” when it is not only in each thing of which it is asserted, but it is demonstrated to be first or primarily in the thing which receives that predicate.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 7 Secundo; ibi: ut duos rectos habere etc., manifestat per exemplum, dicens quod habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, non inest cuilibet figurae universaliter: licet hoc de figura demonstretur, quia de triangulo demonstratur qui est figura; sed tamen non cuilibet figurae inest, nec demonstrator in sua demonstratione utitur qualibet figura. Quadrangulus enim figura quaedam est, sed non habet tres duobus rectis aequales. Isosceles autem, idest triangulus duorum aequalium laterum, habet quidem universaliter tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, sed non convenit primo isosceli, sed prius triangulo, quia isosceli convenit, in quantum est triangulus. Quod igitur primo demonstratur habere duos rectos, aut quodcunque aliud huiusmodi, huic primo inest praedicatum universale, sicut triangulo.	Secondly (73b34), he clarifies this with an example and says that “having three angles equal to two right angles” is not found in just any figure in general, although this could be demonstrated of some figure, because it is demonstrated of triangle, which is a figure; yet it is not found in any random figure, nor is just any figure used when it is demonstrated. For a rhombus is a figure, but it does not have three angles equal to two right angles. But an isosceles, i.e., a triangle with two equal sides, always has its three angles equal to two right angles. Nevertheless, isosceles is not the primary thing to which this belongs, for it belongs basically to triangle, and belongs to isosceles precisely as it is a triangle. Therefore, whatever is demonstrated basically to have its three angles equal to two right angles (or whatever else be thus demonstrated), the universal predicate is present in it primarily, as in triangle.
lib. 1 l. 11 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: et demonstratio etc., ostendit qualiter demonstrator universali utatur, et dicit quod demonstratio est per se huius universalis: sed aliorum est quodammodo et non per se. Demonstrator enim demonstrat passionem de proprio subiecto: et si demonstret de aliquo alio, hoc non est nisi in quantum pertinet ad illud subiectum. Sicut passionem trianguli probat de figura et isoscele, in quantum quaedam figura triangulus est, et triangulus quidam isosceles est. Quod autem non primo inest isosceli habere tres, hoc non est quia non universaliter praedicetur de eo, sed quia est frequentius, idest in pluribus quam isosceles, cum hoc commune sit omni triangulo.	Then (74a1) he shows how a demonstrator uses the “universal,” saying that demonstration is concerned per se with such a universal, but with other things qualifiedly and not per se. For a demonstrator demonstrates a proper attribute of its proper subject; and if he demonstrates it of anything else, he does so only insofar as it pertains to that subject. Thus, he proves that some property of triangle belongs to a figure and to an isosceles precisely as some figure is a triangle, and as the isosceles is a triangle. But the reason why “having three” is not in isosceles primarily is not because it is not predicated of it universally, but because it is found more frequently, i.e., in more things than in isosceles, since this is common to every triangle.