Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect24

Lecture 24 How there is demonstration “quia” through things not immediately connected

Latin	English
	Lecture 24 (78b13-34) HOW THERE IS DEMONSTRATION “QUIA” THROUGH THINGS NOT IMMEDIATELY CONNECTED
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 1 Postquam manifestavit philosophus per exempla, qualiter demonstratur quia per effectum; hic ostendit qualiter demonstratur quia per non immediata. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, manifestat propositum; secundo, ostendit qualiter in huiusmodi demonstrationibus media se habeant ad conclusiones; ibi: comparantur autem huiusmodi et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit intentum; secundo, manifestat per exemplum; ibi: ut quare non respirat etc.; tertio, ordinat in forma syllogistica; ibi: syllogismus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod non solum in his quae probantur per effectum demonstratur quia et non propter quid, sed etiam in quibus medium extra ponitur.	After clarifying with examples how there is demonstration quia through effect, the Philosopher here shows how there is demonstration quia through things not immediately connected. First, he amplifies his proposition. Secondly, he shows how the middles relate themselves to the conclusions in this type of demonstration (78b27). Concerning the first he does three things. First, he states his intention. Secondly, he clarifies it with examples (78b14). Thirdly, he puts it in syllogistic form (78b24). He says therefore first (78b13) that there is demonstration quia and not propter quid not only in those matters that are proved through an effect but also “in matters in which the middle is set outside.”
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 2 Dicitur autem medium extra poni quando est diversum a maiori termino, ut accidit in syllogismis negativis. Vel medium extra poni dicitur, quando est extra genus, quasi communius, et non convertitur cum maiori termino. Quod autem per tale medium non possit demonstrari propter quid probat ex hoc, quod demonstratio propter quid est per causam. Tale autem medium non est causa proprie loquendo.	Now a middle is said to be set outside when it is diverse from the major term, as in negative syllogisms; or a middle is said to be set outside when it is outside the genus as being something more common and not convertible with the major term. That something cannot be demonstrated propter quid through such a middle he proves on the ground that demonstration propter quid is through a cause. But the middle in question is not, properly speaking, a cause.
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: ut quare non respirat etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum, dicens: ut si quis velit probare, quod non respirat paries, quia non est animal, non demonstrat propter quid, nec accipit causam. Quia si non esse animal esset causa non respirandi, oporteret quod esse animal esset causa respirandi: quod falsum est. Multa enim sunt animalia quae non respirant. Oportet enim, si negatio est causa negationis, quod affirmatio sit causa affirmationis; sicut non esse calidum et frigidum in mensura est causa quod aliquis non sanetur, et esse calidum et frigidum in mensura est causa quod aliquis sanetur. Similiter autem est e converso, quod si affirmatio est causa affirmationis, et negatio est causa negationis. In praemissis autem hoc non contingit, quia affirmatio non est causa affirmationis; quia non omne quod est animal respirat.	Then (78b14) he clarifies what he had said with an example, saying that if someone attempted to prove that a wall does not breathe because it is not an animal, he would not be demonstrating propter quid or giving the cause. Because if the fact of not being an animal were the cause of not breathing, it would be required that being an animal would be the cause of breathing-which is false. For there are many animals which do not breathe. For it is required, if a negation is the cause of a negation, that the affirmation be the cause of the affirmation, as the fact of not being warm and cold in due measure is the cause of someone’s not getting well, and the fact of being warm and cold in due measure is the cause of someone’s getting well. The converse is also true, namely, that if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, the negation is the cause of the negation. But this does not occur in the case at hand, because the affirmation is not the cause of an affirmation, since not every animal breathes.
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: syllogismus autem etc., ordinat praedictum exemplum in forma syllogistica, dicens quod syllogismum praedictum oportet fieri in media figura. Et hoc ideo est, quia in prima figura non potest esse, quando conclusio est negativa, quod maior sit affirmativa; quod oportet in praedicto exemplo esse. Nam respirare, quod est maior terminus, oportet quod coniungatur cum animali, quod est medius terminus, secundum affirmationem. Sed paries, quod est minor terminus, oportet quod coniungatur cum animali, quod est medium, secundum negationem.	Then (78b24) he arranges the aforesaid example in syllogistic form and says that it should be arranged in the second figure. And this is so because in the first figure there cannot be a negative conclusion such that the major would be affirmative, as our example requires. For “to breathe,” which is the major extreme, must be joined with “animal,” which is the middle term, according to affirmation. But “wall,” which is the minor extreme, must be joined with “animal,” which is the middle, according to negation. Consequently, the major will be affirmative and the minor negative. But such a thing never occurs in the first figure, but only in the second.
Et sic oportet quod maior sit affirmativa et minor negativa. Quod quidem nunquam fit in prima figura; sed solum in secunda. Accipiatur ergo animal a, idest medius terminus; b respirare, idest maior extremitas; et paries c, idest minor extremitas. Sic igitur a est in omni b, quia omne respirans est animal; in nullo autem c est a, quia nullus paries est animal: quare sequitur quod etiam b in nullo c sit, scilicet quod nullus paries respiret. Si autem acciperetur medium propinquum, esset demonstratio propter quid. Ut si ostenderetur quod paries non respiret, quia non habet pulmonem. Omne enim habens pulmonem respirat, et e converso.	Let “animal,” then, be A, i.e., the middle term, “breathe” be B, i.e., the major extreme, and “wall” be C, i.e., the minor extreme. it therefore follows that A is in every B, because everything that breathes is an animal; but A is in no C, because no wall is an animal. Hence it follows that B, too, is in no C, i.e., that no wall breathes. Furthermore, if the most proximate middle were used, it would be demonstration propter quid: for example, if it were shown that a wall does not breathe because it does not have lungs. For whatever has lungs breathes, and conversely.
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: comparantur huiusmodi etc., ostendit quomodo media se habeant ad conclusiones, dicens quod huiusmodi causae remotae comparantur dictis secundum excellentiam, quia scilicet excedunt communitatem conclusionis probandae. Et huiusmodi medium contingit dicere quod est multum distans. Ut patet in probatione Anacharsidis, qui probat quod apud Scythas non sunt sibilatores, propter hoc, quod non sunt ibi vites. Hoc enim est medium valde remotum. Propinquum enim esset non habere vinum; et adhuc propinquius non bibere vinum; ex quo sequitur laetitia cordis quae movet ad cantandum, ut sic sibilatio pro cantu intelligatur. Vel melius potest dici quod sibilus hic accipitur non pro quolibet cantu; sed pro cantu vindemiantium, qui vocatur celeuma.	Then (78b27) he shows how these middles are related to the conclusion, saying that such far-away causes are compared to what they explain as being too remote, because they go beyond the pale of the conclusion to be proved. Furthermore, a middle of this sort happens to assign what is far-fetched, as in Anacharsis’ proof that there are no flutists among the Scythians because there are no vines there. For this is quite a far-fetched middle. A nearer one would be that they have no wine, and nearer still, that they do not drink wine, from which follows a merry heart which moves one to sing-if fluting is taken to mean singing. Or it might be better to say that fluting is not taken for just any singing but for the song of the grape harvesters, called “celeuma.”
lib. 1 l. 24 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: secundum quidem etc., epilogat quod dixerat, dicens: quod hae sunt differentiae syllogismi quia ad syllogismum qui est propter quid, in eadem scientia, et secundum eorumdem positionem, idest eorum qui habent eumdem ordinem. Quod dicitur ad removendum illud, quod post dicet, quod una scientia est sub altera.	Then (78b32) he summarizes what he had said and declares that these are the differences between the syllogism quia and the syllogism propter quid in the same science, “and according to the position of the same,” i.e., of those that have the same order. This he says to exclude what he will discuss later, namely, that one science is under another.