Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect27

Lecture 27 How ignorance or deception bearing on first and immediate things can be induced by syllogism and lead one to suppose something to be which is not

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	Lecture 27 79b23-80a8) HOW IGNORANCE OR DECEPTION BEARING ON FIRST AND IMMEDIATE THINGS CAN BE INDUCED BY SYLLOGISM AND LEAD ONE TO SUPPOSE SOMETHING TO BE WHICH IS NOT
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de syllogismo demonstrativo, per quem acquiritur scientia, hic determinat de syllogismo, per quem inducitur in nobis ignorantia sive deceptio. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo enim ostendit qualis ignorantia per syllogismum induci possit; secundo, ostendit modum, quo talis syllogismus procedit; ibi: simplicis quidem igitur opinionis et cetera.	After determining about the demonstrative syllogism through which science is acquired, the Philosopher here determines concerning the syllogism through which ignorance or deception is produced in us. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows what sort of ignorance can be induced by a syllogism. Secondly, he shows the mode in which such a syllogism proceeds (79b28).
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 2 Distinguit ergo primo duplicem ignorantiam; quarum una est secundum negationem; alia est secundum dispositionem. Ignorantia quidem secundum negationem est quando homo omnino nihil scit de re. Et haec est ignorantia in non attingendo, ut philosophus dicit in IX Metaph.; sicut patet de rustico, qui omnino nihil scit de triangulo, an habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Ignorantia autem secundum dispositionem est quando aliquis habet quidem aliquam dispositionem in cognoscendo, sed corruptam: dum scilicet existimat aliquid circa rem sed falso; dum vel existimat esse, quod non est, vel non esse quod est. Et haec ignorantia idem est, quod error. Prima ergo ignorantia non fit per syllogismum: sed secunda per syllogismum fieri potest. Et tunc vocatur deceptio.	He distinguishes therefore first (79b23) a twofold ignorance, one of which is negative and the other a positive state. There is ignorance in a negative way, when a man has no scientific knowledge at all about a thing. This ignorance consists in not attaining, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IX, and is exemplified in a peasant who knows absolutely nothing about whether a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. But ignorance is present as a positive state, when one does have a definite opinion but it is unsound. For example, when he falsely thinks something about a thing, either because he thinks something to be which is not, or something not to be which is. And this ignorance is the same as error.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 3 Haec autem ignorantia sive deceptio potest contingere circa duo. Uno quidem modo circa ea quae sunt prima principia et immediata, dum scilicet opinatur quis opposita principiis: quae quidem etsi non possit opinari interius in mente, ut supra dictum est, quia non cadunt sub apprehensione; potest tamen eis contradicere secundum vocem, et secundum quamdam falsam imaginationem, ut dicitur de quibusdam negantibus principia in IV Metaphys. Alio modo circa conclusiones, quae non sunt prima et immediata. Et prima quidem ignorantia sive deceptio opponitur cognitioni intellectus. Secunda autem cognitioni scientiae.	Now the first ignorance is not produced by a syllogism, but the second can be, and then it is called deception. Such ignorance or deception can concern two things: first, those things which are first and immediate principles, namely, when a person opines things opposed to the principles. And although he cannot so opine inwardly in the mind, as has been stated above, because these things do not fall under apprehension, nevertheless he can contradict them orally and according to a false imagination, as is said in Metaphysics IV of some who deny the principles. Secondly, it might be concerned with conclusions which are not first and immediate. Furthermore, the first of these ignorances or deceptions is opposed to the knowledge which is understanding, and the second to the knowledge which is science.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 4 Utraque autem ignorantia dispositionis, sive sit de his quae sunt prima, sive sit de his quae non sunt prima, potest homini provenire dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter, quando scilicet absolute absque aliquo ductu rationis existimat falsum, sive affirmando, sive negando. Alio modo, quando inducitur ad falsum existimandum, per aliquam rationem syllogisticam, sicut philosophus dicit in IV Metaphys., quod quidam principiis contradicunt, velut rationibus persuasi; alii vero, non quasi ratione persuasi, sed propter ineruditionem vel pertinaciam, volentes in omnibus quaerere demonstrationem.	Each of these states of ignorance, whether concerned with things that are first or things not first, can befall a man in two ways: first, straightway, when independently of any process of reasoning he thinks a falsehood by affirming or denying. In another way, when he is brought to his opinion through some syllogized reason. Hence the Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that some contradict the principles as though persuaded by reasons; but others, not as though persuaded by reasons, but through lack of erudition or through wilfullness which demands to have a demonstration in all matters.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: simplicis quidem igitur etc., ostendit quomodo praedictae ignorantiae causantur. Et primo quomodo causatur ignorantia, quae est per syllogismum; secundo, quomodo proveniat ignorantia homini sine syllogismo; ibi: manifestum est autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit; primo, ostendit quomodo causetur ignorantia per syllogismum in primis et immediatis; secundo, quomodo causetur in his, quae non sunt prima et immediata; ibi: in his autem quae non individua et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quomodo causetur ignorantia, qua existimatur esse quod non est; secundo, quomodo causetur ignorantia, qua existimatur non esse quod est; ibi: quae vero ipsius non esse et cetera.	Then (79b28) he shows how these ignorances are caused. First, how the ignorance produced by a syllogism is caused. Secondly, how ignorance befalls a man without syllogizing (81a38) [L. 30]. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he states how ignorance in regard to first and immediate principles is engendered by a syllogism. Secondly, how it is caused in regard to things not first and immediate (80b17) [L. 29]. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he states how the ignorance is caused whereby that which is not is believed to be. Secondly, that whereby that which is is believed not to be (80a8) [L. 28].
Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit modum, quo praedicta ignorantia communiter causatur; secundo, assignat diversitates circa hoc contingentes; ibi: contingit quidem etc.; tertio, respondet tacitae quaestioni; ibi: ipsius quidem igitur esse et cetera.	Regarding the first he does three things. First, he states how the aforesaid ignorance is generally caused. Secondly, he assigns its various possible forms (79b31). Thirdly, he answers a tacit question (80a6).
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 6 Dicit ergo primo quod falsae opinionis, quam supra vocavit simplicem, est simplex deceptio, idest uno solo modo ad hoc pervenitur. Non enim causatur ex ratione, quae diversificari potest, sed magis ex defectu rationis, qui non diversificatur per diversos modos, sicut nec aliae negationes secundum propriam rationem.	He says therefore first (79b28) that the deception according to false opinion which above was said to occur straightway is simple, i.e., is engendered in only one way. For it is not caused by a reason, which might vary, but by the lack of a reason which [lack] is not diversified into various modes each having its own characteristics any more than other negations are.
Sed quia ratio falsa multipliciter variari potest, inde est quod huiusmodi ignorantia, quae fit per syllogismum, multipliciter accidere potest, secundum quod multipliciter potest esse falsus syllogismus. Ponit autem communem modum dicens: non sit enim a in nullo b individualiter, idest sit haec propositio vera immediata, nullum b est a: ponuntur enim duae negationes, loco unius; puta, si dicamus, nulla quantitas est substantia, secundum doctrinam supra positam de negativis immediatis. Si quis ergo concludat oppositum huius, per aliquem syllogismum, ostendens scilicet omne b esse a, accipiens pro medio c, erit deceptio per syllogismum.	Yet because false reasons can be various and many, this ignorance, when it is engendered by a syllogism can occur in many ways according to the several ways in which a syllogism can be false. The common way is set forth when he says, “Let A be in no B individually” (79b29), i.e., let this proposition be immediately true, “No B is A.” For two negations are stated in the place of one— for instance if we should say, “No quality is a substance”— according to the doctrine on immediate negative propositions presented above. Therefore, if someone were to conclude the opposite of this with a syllogism, taking C as a middle to show that every B is A, there will be a deception through syllogism.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: contingit quidem igitur etc., ostendit quot modis potest hoc variari. Est autem sciendum quod falsa conclusio non concluditur nisi falso syllogismo. Syllogismus autem potest esse falsus dupliciter. Uno modo, quia deficit in forma syllogistica. Et hic non est syllogismus, sed apparens. Alio modo, quia utitur falsis propositionibus. Et hic quidem est syllogismus propter syllogisticam formam, est autem falsus propter falsas propositiones assumptas. In disputatione ergo dialectica, quae fit circa probabilia, usus est utriusque falsi syllogismi, quia talis disputatio procedit ex communibus. Et ita in ea error attendi potest et circa materiam quam assumit, quae est communis, et etiam circa formam, quae est communis.	Then (79b31) he shows in how many ways this can vary. And first of all it should be noted that a false conclusion is not concluded except when the syllogism is false. But a syllogism can be false in two ways: first, because it lacks syllogistic form, in which case it is not a syllogism but appears to be one. In a second way, because it employs false propositions, in which case it is a syllogism as to form, but it is a false one because of the false propositions used. Therefore, in a dialectical disputation, which bears on probables, use could be made of both types of false syllogism, because such a disputation proceeds from common premises. Consequently, error can arise in it both as regards the matter employed, which is common, and also as regards the form, which is common.
Sed in disputatione demonstrativa, quae est circa necessaria, non est usus, nisi illius syllogismi qui est falsus propter materiam; quia, ut dicitur in I topicorum, paralogismus disciplinae procedit ex propriis disciplinae, sed non ex veris. Unde, cum forma syllogistica sit inter communia computanda, paralogismus disciplinae, de quo nunc agitur, non peccat in forma, sed solum in materia, et circa propria, non circa communia. Et ideo primo, ostendit quomodo huiusmodi syllogismus procedat ex duabus falsis; secundo, quomodo procedat ex altera falsa; ibi: sed alteram contingit et cetera. Primum autem contingit dupliciter, quia falsa propositio, aut est contraria verae, aut contradictoria. Primo ergo ostendit quomodo huiusmodi syllogismus procedat ex duabus falsis contrariis veris; secundo, quomodo accipitur contradictio; ibi: potest autem sic se habere et cetera.	But in a demonstrative disputation, which bears on necessary things, the type of syllogism used is the one which could be false only on account of the matter, because as it is stated in Topics I, a paralogism in a given discipline proceeds from things proper to the discipline, but not from true things. Hence, since syllogistic form must be counted among the common things, paralogism within a discipline-which is the matter under discussion-is not defective in form but only in matter, and furthermore in regard to proper and not in regard to common things. And so: First, he tells how such a syllogism might proceed from two false premises. Secondly, how it might proceed from one or the other premise being false (79b40). But since the first can occur in two ways, namely, the false proposition might be contrary to the true or contradictory to it, therefore: First, he shows how such a syllogism might proceed from two false statements that are contrary to true statements. Secondly, how a contradiction is accepted (79b34).
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 8 Dicit ergo primo quod in praedicto syllogismo deceptionem causante, contingit quandoque utrasque propositiones esse falsas, et quandoque alteram tantum. Utrasque autem falsas, uno modo si accipiamus contrarias verarum. Habeat enim ita se c ad a et ad b, quod nullum c sit a, et quod nullum b sit c. Si ergo accipiantur contraria horum, scilicet, omne c est a; omne b est c; utraeque propositiones erunt falsae totaliter. Puta si dicam: omnis qualitas est substantia; omnis quantitas est qualitas; ergo omnis quantitas est substantia.	First, then (79b30) he says that in a syllogism causing deception it sometimes happens that both premises are false, and sometimes only one. Let us take”the case of two false premises, each contrary to what is true. For example, suppose that C is so related to A and to B. that no C is A and no B is C. Now if we take the contraries of these, namely, that every C is A and every B is C, these two propositions will be completely false. For example, if I should say: “Every quality is a substance; every quantity is a quality: therefore, every quantity is a substance.”
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit: potest autem sic se habere etc., ostendit quomodo possunt esse ambae falsae, et non sunt contrariae veris, sed contradictoriae. Puta, si sic se habeat c ad a et ad b, quod nec contineatur totaliter sub a, neque universaliter insit b. Puta si accipiamus, perfectum vel ens in actu, et procedamus sic: omne perfectum est substantia; omnis quantitas est perfecta; ergo et cetera. Manifestum est quod utraque est falsa, sed non totaliter. Sunt enim contradictoriae earum verae, scilicet, quoddam perfectum non est substantia, et, quaedam quantitas non est perfecta.	Then (79b34) he shows how both premises can be false and not contrary, but contradictory, to what is true. For example, if C is so related to A and to B, that it is neither contained totally under A nor is universally in B. Thus one might take C as “perfect” or “actual being,” and proceed in the following way: “Every perfect thing is a substance; every quantity is perfect: therefore, every quantity is a substance. Now although both are false, they are not entirely so, for their contradictories are true, namely, “Some perfect things are not substances,” and “Some quantity is not perfect”; but their contraries are false, namely, “No perfect thing is a substance,” and “No quantity is perfect.”
Contrariae autem sunt falsae, scilicet, nullum perfectum est substantia, et nulla quantitas est perfecta. Quod autem c non universaliter insit b (idest, quod ista non sit vera: omnis quantitas est perfecta, quae erat minor; ut, omne b est c) probat per hoc, quod b non potest contineri sub aliquo toto, quod de eo universaliter praedicetur. Et hoc ideo, quia haec propositio: nullum b est a, dicebatur esse immediata, quod est a non inesse b primo. Dictum est autem supra illas negativas esse immediatas, quarum neuter terminorum est sub aliquo toto.	But that C is not in B universally (i.e., that the statement, “Every quantity is perfect,” which was the minor, is not true), i.e., that “Every B is C,” is not true he proves by the fact that B cannot be contained under any whole that might be predicated universally of it. And this is so because the proposition, “No B is A,” was said to be immediate, which means that A is universally not in B. But, as has been stated above, those negative propositions are immediate, neither of whose terms is under a whole.
Sed videtur haec probatio non esse sufficiens, quia de eo etiam quod non est sub aliquo toto, sicut species sub genere, potest aliquid universaliter praedicari. Non enim solum genus aut differentia universaliter praedicatur, sed etiam proprium. Sed dicendum est quod licet praedicta probatio non sit efficax, communiter loquendo, est tamen efficax in proposito. Quia, sicut in I topicorum dicitur, paralogismus disciplinae, de quo hic loquitur, procedit ex convenientibus disciplinae. Unde intendit uti talibus mediis, qualibus utitur demonstrator. Demonstrationis autem medium est definitio, ut supra dictum est. Unde et syllogismus, de quo hic loquitur, intendit uti definitione pro medio. Definitio autem continet genus et differentiam. Unde oportet id quod universaliter praedicatur in hoc syllogismo, continere id, in quo est subiectum, sicut in toto.	Nevertheless, this proof does not seem sufficient, because something can be predicated universally even of that which is not under some whole as a species under a genus. For the genus and the difference are not the only things predicated universally, but a property is too. But it must be said that although the proof in question is not efficacious generally speaking, it is in this case. Because, as it is stated in Topics I, a paralogism within a discipline— with which we are concerned here— proceeds from items that accord with the discipline. Hence he intends to use such middles as a demonstrator uses. But the middle of a demonstration is the definition, as has been stated above. Therefore, even in the syllogism of which he is speaking, he intends to use a definition as the middle. Now a definition contains the genus and difference. Hence that which is predicated universally in this syllogism should contain that in which the subject is, as in a whole.
Quod autem a non universaliter insit ipsi c (idest, quod ista non sit universaliter vera: omne perfectum est substantia, quae erat maior, ut, omne c est a), probat per hoc, quod non est necesse de quocunque universali, quod insit universaliter omnibus quae sunt: quia nullum praedicamentum praedicatur de his, quae continentur sub alio praedicamento; neque etiam universaliter praedicatur de his quae communiter consequuntur ens, quae sunt actus et potentia, perfectum et imperfectum, prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi.	Again, that A is not in C universally, i.e., that the statement, “Every perfect thing is a substance,” is not universally true is proved by the fact that it is not required of every universal that it be universally in all things that are: because no predicament is predicated of things contained under another predicament nor universally predicated of those items that commonly follow upon being, namely, act and potency, perfect and imperfect, prior and posterior, and the like.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: sed alteram contingit etc., ostendit quomodo praedictus syllogismus procedat ex altera vera, et altera falsa. Et dicit quod in praedicto syllogismo contingit accipere alteram veram, scilicet maiorem, quae est a.c, altera existente falsa, scilicet minore, quae est b.c. Et quod propositio minor, quae est b.c, semper sit falsa probat, sicut et supra, per hoc quod b in nullo est, sicut in toto. Sed quod haec propositio a.c possit esse vera, altera existente falsa, probat in terminis. Sit enim ita, quod a insit b et c individualiter, idest immediate, sicut genus proximis speciebus, ut color albedini et nigredini. Manifestum est enim secundum hoc, quod maior erit vera, scilicet, omne c est a, puta: omnis albedo est color; minor autem est falsa, scilicet, omnis nigredo est albedo; quia quando aliquid primo praedicatur de pluribus, neutrum istorum plurium de neutro praedicatur. Prima enim praedicatio generis est de oppositis speciebus.	Then (79b40) he shows how the aforesaid syllogism might proceed from one true and one false. And he says that in the aforesaid syllogism we might take one true, i.e., the major, which is AC, and the other false, namely, the minor, which is BC. That the minor proposition, which is BC, is always the false one he proves, as he did above, on the ground that B is in no C as in a whole. But that this proposition AC could be true, while the other is false he proves in terms. Let A be in B and in C individually, i.e., immediately, as a genus in its species; for example, as color is to whiteness and blackness. Now under these conditions it is obvious that the major will be true, namely, “Every C is A,” for example, “Every whiteness is a color,” and the minor false, namely, “Every blackness is whiteness”: for when something is predicated “first” of several, none of the several is predicated of any other of them. For the first predication of a genus is of species which are opposite.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 11 Est autem circa hoc dubitatio: quia his terminis positis, non sequitur conclusio falsa, sed vera. Erit enim conclusio quod a insit b, cui suppositum est inesse individualiter. Sed dicendum quod hoc exemplum ponitur solum ad manifestandum quomodo possit esse maior vera et minor falsa. Sed hoc exemplum non habet locum in proposito, ubi quaeritur conclusio falsa. Et ideo philosophus subiungit: differt autem nihil, nec si non individualiter insit. Possumus enim accipere tales terminos, quod a non insit b individualiter, neque aliquo modo; immo potius ab eo individualiter removeatur. Nec est etiam necesse quod insit c individualiter, quia non est necessarium quod demonstrator utatur solum propositionibus immediatis; sed etiam his, quae per immediata fidem acceperunt. Accipere ergo possumus alios terminos, ad propositum pertinentes, ut si accipiamus pro medio substantiam intellectualem: omnis enim intelligentia est substantia; minor autem est falsa: omnis quantitas est intelligentia. Unde sequitur conclusio falsa.	Here, too, a doubt arises, because from the terms used here, not a false but a true conclusion follows. For the conclusion will be that A is in B, it having also been assumed that it is in B individually. But it must be answered that this example was used merely to illustrate how the major could be true and the minor false; although it is of no use in a case where a false conclusion is sought. Hence the Philosopher at once adds, “It is equally the case of AC if not atomic.” However, we could take terms such that A is not in B either individually or in any way, but is rather immediately removed from B. Neither is it necessary that it be in C individually, because it is not necessary that a demonstrator employ only immediate propositions: for he may use ones which are supported by immediate propositions. We can, therefore, take other terms pertaining to the present case, for example, “intellectual substance,” as the middle, for “Every intelligence is a substance,” and take as the false minor, “Every quantity is an intelligence.” Hence a false conclusion follows.
lib. 1 l. 27 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit: ipsius quidem igitur etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni. Posset enim aliquis ab eo requirere quod ostenderet diversitatem huius syllogismi in aliis figuris. Sed ipse respondet quod deceptio, quae est ipsius esse, idest per quam aliquis existimat propositionem affirmativam falsam, potest fieri solum per primam figuram: quia in alia figura, scilicet in secunda, non potest fieri syllogismus affirmativus. Tertia autem figura non pertinet ad propositum, quia in ea non potest concludi universalis, quae principaliter intenditur in demonstratione, et in hoc syllogismo.	Then (80a6) he answers a tacit question. For someone might request that he exemplify the diversity of such a syllogism in the other figures. But he answers that a deception, which bears on being, i.e., through which someone opines a false affirmative proposition, can be derived only by the first figure, because in the next figure, i.e., in the second, an affirmative syllogism cannot be formed. As for the third figure, it has no bearing on the case, because it cannot conclude a universal, which is principally intended in demonstration and in this syllogism.