Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect3

Lecture 3 Pre-existent knowledge of the conclusion

Latin	English
	Lecture 3 (71a24-b9) PRE-EXISTENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONCLUSION
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quomodo oportet praecognoscere quaedam alia, antequam de conclusione cognitio sumatur, nunc vult ostendere quomodo ipsam conclusionem contingit praecognoscere, antequam cognitio sumatur de ea per syllogismum vel inductionem. Et circa hoc duo facit.	Having shown the manner in which certain other things must be known before knowledge of the conclusion is obtained, the Philosopher now wishes to show how we know even the conclusion beforehand, i.e., before knowledge of it is obtained through a syllogism or induction. Concerning this he does two things.
Primo namque determinat veritatem, dicens quod, antequam inducatur inductio vel syllogismus ad faciendam cognitionem de aliqua conclusione, illa conclusio quodammodo scitur, et quodammodo non: simpliciter enim nescitur, sed scitur solum secundum quid. Sicut si debeat probari ista conclusio, triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; antequam demonstraretur, ille qui per demonstrationem accipit scientiam eius, nescivit simpliciter, sed scivit secundum quid. Unde quodammodo praescivit, simpliciter autem non. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia, sicut iam ostensum est, oportet principia conclusioni praecognoscere. Principia autem se habent ad conclusiones in demonstrativis, sicut causae activae in naturalibus ad suos effectus (unde in II physicorum propositiones syllogismi ponuntur in genere causae efficientis). Effectus autem, antequam producatur in actu, praeexistit quidem in causis activis virtute, non autem actu, quod est simpliciter esse. Et similiter antequam ex principiis demonstrativis deducatur conclusio, in ipsis quidem principiis praecognitis praecognoscitur conclusio virtute, non autem actu: sic enim in eis praeexistit. Et sic patet quod non praecognoscitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid.	First (71a24), he establishes the truth of the fact, saying that before an induction or syllogism is formed to beget knowledge of a conclusion, that conclusion is somehow known and somehow not known: for, absolutely speaking, it is not known; but in a qualified sense, it is known. Thus, if the conclusion that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles has to be proved, the one who obtains science of this fact through demonstration already knew it in some way before it was demonstrated; although absolutely speaking, he did not know it. Hence in one sense he already knew it, but in the full sense he did not. And the reason is that, as has been pointed out, the principles of the conclusion must be known beforehand. Now the principles in demonstrative matters are to the conclusion as efficient causes in natural things are to their effects; hence in Physics II the propositions of a syllogism are set in the genus of efficient cause. But an effect, before it is actually produced, pre-exists virtually in its efficient causes but not actually, which is to exist absolutely. In like manner, before it is drawn out of its demonstrative principles, the conclusion is pre-known virtually, although not actually, in its self-evident principles. For that is the way it pre-exists in them. And so it is clear that it is not pre-known in the full sense, but in some sense.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 2 Secundo; ibi: si vero non etc., excludit ex veritate determinata quandam dubitationem, quam Plato ponit in libro Menonis, sic intitulato ex nomine sui discipuli. Est autem dubitatio talis. Inducit enim quendam, omnino imperitum artis geometricae, interrogatum ordinate de principiis, ex quibus quaedam geometrica conclusio concluditur, incipiendo ex principiis per se notis: ad quae omnia ille, ignarus geometriae, id quod verum est respondit: et sic deducendo quaestiones usque ad conclusiones per singula verum respondit. Ex hoc igitur vult habere, quod etiam illi, qui videntur imperiti aliquarum artium, antequam de eis instruantur, earum notitiam habent. Et sic sequitur quod vel homo nihil addiscat, vel addiscat ea quae prius novit.	Secondly (71a28), in virtue of this established fact, he settles a doubt which Plato maintained in the book, Meno, which gets its title from the name of his disciple. The doubt is presented in the following manner: A person utterly ignorant of the art of geometry is questioned in an orderly Way concerning the per se known principles from which a geometric conclusion is concluded. By starting with principles that are per se known, to each of which this person ignorant of geometry gives a true answer, Aid leading him thus by questions to the conclusion, he gives the true Answer step by step. From this, therefore, he would have it that even those who seem to be ignorant of certain arts really have a knowledge of them before being instructed in them. And so it follows that either a man learns nothing or he learns what he already knew.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 3 Circa hoc ergo quatuor facit. Primo enim, proponit quod praedicta dubitatio vitari non potest, nisi supposita praedeterminata veritate, scilicet quod conclusio, quam quis addiscit per demonstrationem vel inductionem, erat nota non simpliciter, sed secundum quod est virtute in suis principiis: de quibus aliquis, ignarus scientiae, interrogatus, veritatem respondere potest. Secundum vero Platonis sententiam, conclusio erat praecognita simpliciter; unde non addiscebatur de novo, sed potius per deductionem aliquam rationis in memoriam reducebatur. Sicut etiam de formis naturalibus Anaxagoras ponit, quod ante generationem praeexistebant in materia simpliciter. Aristoteles vero ponit quod praeexistunt in potentia et non simpliciter.	In dealing with this problem he [Aristotle] does four things. First, he suggests that it cannot be settled unless we grant the truth established above, namely, that the conclusion which a person learns through demonstration or induction was already known, not absolutely, but as it was virtually known in its principles concerning which a person ignorant of a science can give true answers. However, according to Plato’s theory the conclusion was pre-known absolutely, so that no one learns afresh but is led to recall by some rational process of deduction. This is similar to Anaxagoras’ position on natural forms, namely, that before they are generated, they already pre-existed in the matter absolutely, whereas Aristotle says that they pre-exist in potency and not absolutely.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 4 Secundo, cum dicit: non enim sicut etc., ponit falsam quorundam obviationem ad dubitationem Platonis: qui scilicet dicebant quod conclusio antequam demonstraretur vel quocunque modo addisceretur, nullo modo erat cognita. Poterat enim eis obiici secundum dubitationem Platonis hoc modo: si quis interrogaret ab aliquo imperito: nunquid tu scis quod omnis dualitas par est? Et dicente eo, idest concedente se scire, afferret quandam dualitatem, quam ille interrogatus non opinaretur esse, puta illam dualitatem quae est tertia pars senarii; concluderetur quod sciret tertiam partem senarii esse numerum parem: quod erat ei incognitum, sed per demonstrationem inductam addiscit. Et sic videtur sequi quod vel non hoc addisceret vel addisceret quod prius scivit. Ut igitur hanc dubitationem evitarent, solvebant dicentes, quod ille qui interrogatus respondit se scire quod omnis dualitas sit numerus par, non dixit se cognoscere omnem dualitatem simpliciter, sed illam, quam scivit esse dualitatem. Unde cum ista dualitas, quae est allata, fuerit ab eo penitus ignorata, nullo modo scivit quod haec dualitas esset numerus par. Et sic sequitur quod apud cognoscentem principia nullo modo conclusio sit praecognita, nec simpliciter, nec secundum quid.	Secondly, he shows that the way some have answered Plato’s problem is false, namely, by saying that a conclusion is not in any sense known before it is demonstrated or learned by some method or other. For they might face the following objection based on Plato’s problem: If an unlearned person were asked by someone, “Do you know that every duo (pair) is an even number?” and, if upon answering that he does know this, he were presented with a duo which the person interrogated did not know existed, for example, the duo which is one third of six, the conclusion would be that he knew one third of six to be an even number, a fact which had not been known by him but which he learned through the demonstration proposed to him. And so it seems to follow that he either did not freshly learn this or that he learned what he already knew. To avoid this dilemma, they would answer that the person who was questioned and who answered that he knew every duo to be an equal number did not say that he knew every duo absolutely, but those he knew to be duo’s. Hence, since that duo which was proposed was utterly unknown to him, he did not in any sense know that this duo was an even number. And so it follows that when one knows the principles, the conclusion is not in any sense pre-known, either absolutely or in a qualified sense.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5 Tertio, ibi: et etiam sciunt etc., improbat hanc solutionem hoc modo. Illud scitur de quo demonstratio habetur, vel de quo de novo accipitur demonstratio. Et hoc dicitur propter addiscentem, qui incipit scire. Addiscentes autem non accipiunt demonstrationem de omni dualitate de qua sciunt, sed de omni simpliciter, et similiter de omni numero aut de omni triangulo. Non ergo verum est quod sciat de omni numero, quem scit esse numerum, aut de omni dualitate, quam scit esse dualitatem, sed de omni simpliciter. Quod autem non sciat de omni numero, quem scit esse numerum, sed de omni simpliciter, probat; ibi: neque enim una propositio etc.: conclusio cum praemissis convenit in terminis: nam subiectum et praedicatum conclusionis sunt maior et minor extremitas in praemissis; sed in praemissis non accipitur aliqua propositio de numero aut de recta linea, cum hac additione, quam tu nosti, sed simpliciter de omni; neque ergo conclusio demonstrationis est cum additione praedicta, sed simpliciter de omni.	Thirdly (71bl), he refutes this solution in the following way: That is known, concerning which a demonstration is had, or concerning which a demonstration is for the first time received. And this is said on account of those learners who begin to know scientifically. But learners do not obtain a demonstration touching every duo they happen to know but every duo absolutely; and the same applies to every number or every triangle. Therefore, it is not true that he knows something about every number which he knows to be a number, or of every duo which he knows to be a duo, but he knows it about every one absolutely. And that he knows it not only of every number he happens to know is a number, but of every number absolutely, is proved at (71b5) on the ground that the conclusion agrees with the premises in its terms. For the subject and predicate of the conclusion are the major and minor extremes in the premises. But in the premises no proposition concerning number or straight line is stated with the addition, “which you know,” but it is stated of all without qualification. Neither, therefore, is the conclusion of the demonstration asserted with the aforesaid qualification, but it is asserted of all without reservation.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6 Quarto, ibi: sed nihil etc., ponit veram solutionem dubitationis praedictae secundum praedeterminatam veritatem, dicens quod illud quod quis addiscit, nihil prohibet primo quodammodo scire et quodammodo ignorare. Non enim est inconveniens si aliquis quodammodo praesciat id quod addiscit; sed esset inconveniens si hoc modo praecognosceret, secundum quod addiscit. Addiscere enim proprie est scientiam in aliquo generari. Quod autem generatur, ante generationem neque fuit omnino non ens neque omnino ens, sed quodammodo ens et quodammodo non ens: ens quidem in potentia, non ens vero actu: et hoc est generari, reduci de potentia in actum. Unde nec id quod quis addiscit erat omnino prius notum, ut Plato posuit, nec omnino ignotum, ut secundum solutionem supra improbatam ponebatur; sed erat notum potentia sive virtute in principiis praecognitis universalibus, ignotum autem actu, secundum propriam cognitionem. Et hoc est addiscere, reduci de cognitione potentiali, seu virtuali, aut universali, in cognitionem propriam et actualem.	Fourthly (71b5), he presents the true solution of the problem under discussion in terms of the truth already established, saying that there is nothing to prevent a person from somehow knowing and somehow not knowing a fact before he learns it. For it is not a paradox if one somehow already knows what he learns, but it would be, if he already knew it in the same way that he knows it when he has learned it. For learning is, properly speaking, the generation of science in someone. But that which is generated was not, prior to its generation, a being absolutely, but somehow a being and somehow non-being: for it was a being in potency, although actually non-being. And this is what being generated consists in, namely, in being converted from potency to act. In like fashion, that which a person learns was not previously known absolutely, as Plato preferred; but neither was it absolutely unknown, as they maintained whose answer was refuted above. Rather it was known in potency, i.e., virtually, in the pre-known universal principles; however, it was not actually known in the sense of specific knowledge. And this is what learning consists in, namely, in being brought from potential or virtual or universal knowledge to specific and actual knowledge.