Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1/Lect6

Lecture 6 Knowledge of immediate principles

Latin	English
	Lecture 6 (7245-b4) KNOWLEDGE OF IMMEDIATE PRINCIPLES
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quae sunt immediata principia, hic de eorum cognitione determinat. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quod immediata principia sunt magis nota conclusione; secundo, ostendit quod etiam falsitas contrariorum debet esse notissima; ibi: non solum autem et cetera. Circa primum tria facit.	After showing what immediate principles are, the Philosopher now determines concerning our knowledge of them. Apropos of this he does two things. First, he shows that immediate principles are better known than the conclusion. Secondly, that the falsity of their contraries ought to be most evident (72a38). Concerning the first he does three things.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 2 Primo, proponit intentum dicens quod quia nos credimus alicui rei conclusae et scimus eam per hoc quod habemus syllogismum demonstrativum, et hoc quidem est in quantum scimus syllogismum demonstrativum; necesse est non solum praecognoscere prima principia conclusioni, sed etiam ea magis cognoscere, quam conclusionem.	First (72a25), he states his proposition and says that because we give our assent to a thing which has been concluded and we know it scientifically precisely because we have a demonstrative syllogism (and this insofar as we know the demonstrative syllogism in a scientific way), it is necessary not only to know the first principles of the conclusion beforehand, but also to know them better than we know the conclusion.
Addit autem aut omnia, aut quaedam; quia quaedam principia probatione indigent, ad hoc quod sint nota, et antequam probentur, non sunt magis nota conclusione. Sicut quod, angulus exterior trianguli valeat duos angulos intrinsecos sibi oppositos, antequam probetur, ita ignotum est, sicut quod, triangulus habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Quaedam vero principia sunt quae, statim proposita, sunt magis nota conclusione. Vel aliter: quaedam conclusiones sunt quae sunt notissimae, utpote per sensum acceptae, sicut quod, sol eclipsetur. Unde principium per quod probatur non est simpliciter magis notum, scilicet quod, luna interponatur inter solem et terram, licet sit magis notum in via rationis procedentis ex causa in effectum. Vel aliter: hoc ideo dicit, quia etiam supra dixerat quod quaedam principia tempore prius cognoscuntur quam conclusio, quaedam vero simul tempore nota fiunt cum conclusione.	He adds, “either all or some,” because some principles require proof in order to be known; so that before they are proved, they are not better known than the conclusion. Thus the fact that an exterior angle of a triangle is equal to its two opposite interior angles is, until proved, as unknown as the fact that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. But there are other principles which, once they are posited, are better known than the conclusion. Or, in another way, there are some conclusions which are most evident; for example, those based on sense perception, as that the sun is eclipsed. Hence the principle through which this is proved is not better known absolutely—the principle being that the moon is between the sun and the earth—although it is better known within the reasoning process that goes from cause to effect. Or, in another way, he says this because he had said above that in the order of time certain principles are known before the conclusion, but others are known along with the conclusion at the same moment of time.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 3 Secundo; ibi: semper enim propter quod etc., probat propositum dupliciter. Primo ratione ostensiva; sic: propter quod unumquodque et illud est magis; sicut si amamus aliquem, propter alterum; ut si magistrum propter discipulum, discipulum magis amamus. Sed conclusiones scimus et eis credimus propter principia. Ergo magis scimus principia et magis eis credimus, quam conclusioni.	Secondly (72a28), he proves his proposition in two ways: first, with an ostensive argument, thus: That in virtue of which something is so, is itself more so; for example, if we love someone because of someone else, as a master because of his disciple, we love the disciple more. But we know conclusions and give our assent to them because of the principles. Therefore, we know the principles with more conviction and give them stronger assent than the conclusion.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 4 Attendendum est autem circa hanc rationem quod causa semper est potior effectu suo. Quando ergo causa et effectus conveniunt in nomine, tunc illud nomen magis praedicatur de causa quam de effectu; sicut ignis est magis calidus quam ea, quae per ignem calefiunt. Quandoque vero causa et effectus non conveniunt in nomine et tunc licet nomen effectus non conveniat causae, tamen convenit ei aliquid dignius; sicut etsi in sole non sit calor, est tamen in eo virtus quaedam, quae est principium caloris.	Apropos of this reason it should be noted that a cause is always more noble than its effect. When, therefore, cause and effect have the same name, that name is said principally of the cause rather than of the effect; thus fire is primarily called hot rather than things heated by fire. But sometimes the name of the effect is not attributed to the cause. In that case, although the name the effect has does not belong to the cause, nevertheless, something more noble belongs to it. For example, although the sun does not possess heat, nevertheless, there is in it a certain power which is the principle of heat.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 5 Deinde, cum dicit: non potest autem credere etc., probat idem ratione ducente ad impossibile, quae talis est. Principia praecognoscuntur conclusioni, ut supra habitum est; et sic quando principia cognoscuntur nondum conclusio est cognita. Si igitur principia non essent magis nota quam conclusio, sequeretur quod homo vel plus, vel aequaliter cognosceret ea, quae non novit quam ea quae novit. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod principia non sint magis nota quam conclusio.	Then (72a33) he proves the same thing with a principle which leads to an impossibility. He reasons thus: Principles are known prior to the conclusion, as has been shown above; consequently, when the principles are known, the conclusion is not yet known. If, therefore, the principles were not more known than the conclusion, it would follow that a man would know things he does not know either as well as or better than the things he does know. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is also impossible that the principles not be better known than the conclusion.
Littera sic exponitur: neque sciens, neque alius melius dispositus in cognoscendo quam sciens, si contingeret aliquem esse talem (quod dicit propter intelligentem principia, de quo adhuc non est manifestum), non potest magis credere quae non contingunt, scilicet sciri ab eo, his, quae iam scit. Accidet autem hoc, nisi aliquis de numero credentium conclusionem per demonstrationem, praecognoverit, idest magis cognoverit principia. In Graeco planius habetur sic: non est autem possibile credere magis his, quae novit, quae non existit nec sciens, neque melius dispositus quam si contigerit sciens.	Phrase by phrase this is explained in the following manner: “A man who knows scientifically or even one who knows in a way superior to this, if such there be,” (he says this, having in mind the person who has the intuition of principles, a state he has not yet explained), “cannot give more credence to things he does not know than to things he does know. But this will be the case if one who assents to a conclusion obtained through demonstration did not foreknow,” i.e., did not know the principles better. In Greek it is stated more clearly: “But no one, whether he has scientific knowledge or that form of knowledge which is better than the scientific (if there be such), can believe anything more firmly than the things he knows.”
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 6 Tertio, ibi: magis enim necesse est etc., exponit quod dixerat, dicens quod hoc, quod dictum est, quod magis necesse est credere principiis aut omnibus aut quibusdam quam conclusioni, intelligendum est de illo, qui debet accipere scientiam per demonstrationem. Si enim aliunde conclusio esset nota, sicut per sensum, nihil prohiberet principia non esse magis nota conclusione in via illa.	Thirdly (7206), he clarifies what he had said, saying that his statement to the effect that it is more necessary to believe the principles (either all or some) than the conclusion should be understood as referring to a person who is to acquire a discipline through demonstration. For if the conclusion were more known through some other source, such as sense-perception, nothing would preclude the principles not being better known than the conclusion in that case.
lib. 1 l. 6 n. 7 Deinde, cum dicit: non solum oportet etc., ostendit quod non solum oportet magis cognoscere principia quam conclusionem demonstrandam, sed etiam nihil debet esse certius quam quod opposita principiis sint falsa. Et hoc ideo, quia oportet scientem non esse incredibilem principiis, sed firmissime eis assentire. Quicunque autem dubitat de falsitate unius oppositorum, non potest firmiter inhaerere opposito: quia semper formidat de veritate alterius oppositi.	Then (72a38) he shows that it is not only necessary to know the principles more than the demonstrative conclusion, but nothing should be more certain than the fact that the opposites of the principles are false. And this because the scientific knower must not disbelieve the principles, but assent to them most firmly. But anyone who doubts the falseness of one of two opposites cannot assent firmly to the other, because he will always fear that the opposite one might be true.