Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L2/Lect10

Lecture 10 How something is demonstrated through a cause not simultaneous with its caused.

Latin	English
	Lecture 10 (95a10-b1) HOW SOMETHING IS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH A CAUSE NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH ITS CAUSED HOW A CAUSE NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH ITS EFFECT IS TAKEN AS MIDDLE IN DEMONSTRATING
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo quatuor genera causarum in demonstrationibus pro mediis assumuntur, hic ostendit quomodo in diversis demonstratur aliquid per causam. Est autem circa hoc duplex differentia consideranda: prima quidem secundum quod causa simul est cum effectu vel non simul; secunda prout causa producit effectum semper aut sicut frequenter; et de hac agit ibi: sunt autem quidem quaedam quae fiunt universaliter et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit quomodo aliquid demonstretur per causam quae est simul cum eo cuius est causa; secundo, quomodo demonstratur aliquid per causam quae non est simul cum eo cuius est causa; ibi: in his autem quae non simul et cetera.	After showing how the four genera of causes are used as middles in demonstrating, the Philosopher now shows how in different cases something is demonstrated through a cause. But there are two differences to be noted in this regard: the first difference is whether the cause is or is not simultaneous with its effect; the second difference is whether the cause produces its effect always or only as a general rule—this second difference will be discussed later (96a8) [L. 12]. Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows how something is proved through a cause which is simultaneous with that of which it is the cause. Secondly, how something is demonstrated through a cause which is not simultaneous with that of which it is the cause (95a23).
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod, quia in motu necesse est considerare prius et posterius, in causis motus est accipere causam et causatum se habere secundum prius et posterius. Sicut patet quod causa agens naturalis movendo perducit ad suum effectum: et sicut per totum motum perducitur mobile ad terminum motus, ita per primam partem motus perducitur ad secundam, et sic deinceps. Unde sicut motus est causa quietis consequentis, ita prima pars motus est causa subsequentis, et sic deinceps.	In regard to the first point it should be noted that since one is involved with the notions of prior and subsequent when he analyzes motion, so too in considering the causes of motion one must take into account that the cause and the caused are related as prior and subsequent. For it is obvious that a natural agent causes its effect by moving something. Furthermore, just as the movable object is brought to the terminus of its motion by virtue of the entire motion, so by virtue 0~1 the first part of that motion it is brought to the second part, and so on. Hence, just as the entire motion is the cause of the subsequent state of rest, so the first part of the motion is the cause of the subsequent part, and so on.
Et hoc indifferenter sive hoc consideretur in uno mobili, quod movetur continue a principio usque ad finem; sive in diversis mobilibus, quorum primum movet secundum, et secundum tertium. Et licet simul dum primum movens movet, primum motum moveatur, tamen primum motum remanet movens postquam desiit moveri, quo movente simul movetur secundum mobile. Et ita successive moventur mobilia, quorum unum est causa motus alterius, sicut de his quae proiiciuntur manifestat philosophus in VIII Physic. Per hunc ergo modum contingit quod causa non est simul cum eo cuius est causa, in quantum scilicet prima pars motus est causa secundae, vel primum motum movet secundum.	This analysis is true whether we confine ourselves to one object which is being moved without interruption from beginning to end, or to several objects the first of which moves the second and the second the third. And although at the same time that the first mover is moving its object that object is being moved, nevertheless the object thus moved continues to act as mover even after it stops being moved. Consequently, while it is acting as mover, another object is being moved. In this way several moveable objects are successively moved in such a way that one is the cause of the motion of another, and so on, as happens in the case of thrown objects whose motion the Philosopher explained in Physics VIII. Therefore, in this example it turns out that the cause is not simultaneous with that of which it is the cause, namely, inasmuch as the first part of the motion is the cause of the second part, or the first moved object moves the second.
Quamvis autem motus in suis partibus successionem habeat, tamen simul est cum causa movente. Simul enim dum movens movet, mobile movetur, eo quod motus nihil est aliud quam actus mobilis a movente, secundum quem movens dicitur movere et mobile moveri. Et multo magis in his quae sunt extra motum, oportet causam simul esse cum suo causato; sive accipiatur aliquid ut terminus motus (sicut illuminatio aeris simul est cum solis exortu), sive aliquid accipiatur in his quae sunt penitus immobilia, et in causis essentialibus, quae sunt causae ipsius esse.	But although the motion has succession in its parts, it is nevertheless simultaneous with its movent cause. For the moveable object is moved at the same time that the mover acts, inasmuch as motion is nothing else than the act existing in the moveable object from the mover, such that in virtue of that act the mover is said to move and the object is said to be moved. Indeed, the requirement that the cause be simultaneous with what is caused must be fulfilled even more in things that are outside of motion whether we take something outside of motion to mean the terminus of the motion-as the illumination of air is simultaneous with the rising of the sun--or in the sense of something absolutely immovable, or in the sense of essential causes which are the cause of a thing’s being.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 3 Circa primum ergo duo facit: primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, manifestat propositum per exempla; ibi: ut propter quid factus est defectus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod quandocunque causa est simul cum suo effectu, oportet eamdem causam accipere quantum ad hoc quod est fieri vel factum esse vel futurum esse, quae accipitur quantum ad hoc quod est esse: quia si causa est simul cum suo causato, sicut necesse est quod quando est causa est effectus, ita necesse est quod quando fit causa fiat effectus, et quando est facta quod sit factus effectus, et quando est futura quod sit futurus effectus. Nec est instantia quod dum fit aedificator, addiscendo artem aedificativam, nondum fit aedificium, cuius ipse est causa per artem aedificativam; quia aedificator non nominat causam aedificii in actu, sed causam in potentia vel in habitu. Sed aedificans nominat causam in actu, quam oportet simul esse cum eo cuius est causa, ut dicitur in II Physic. Est autem identitas quantum ad hoc, quod in omnibus medium est causa. Sed hoc accipiendum est secundum debitam proportionem; ut scilicet ipsum esse causae proportionetur ipsi esse effectus, et fieri causae fieri causati, et factum esse causae facto esse causati, et futurum esse causae futuro esse causati.	Concerning the first point, therefore, he does two things. First, he states what he intends to establish. Secondly, he clarifies this with examples (95a13). He says therefore first (95a10) that whenever the cause is simultaneous with its effect, it is necessary to take the same cause for the coming to be or the “having come to be” or the future existence, as is taken for the actual existence: for if the cause is simultaneous with that of which it is the cause, then just as it is necessary that when the cause exists, the effect be, so it is necessary that when the cause is coming to be, the effect be coming to be; and when the cause has come to be, the effect should have come to be; and when the cause will have been, the effect will have been. Nor does it avail to object that when a builder is coming to be—while he is learning the art of building—the edifice is not yet being constructed: for “builder” does not stand for the cause in act of the edifice, but for the cause in potency, or as possessed of the skill. But “someone building” denotes the cause in act: it is this cause that must be simultaneous with that of which it is the cause, as it is stated in Physics II. There is identity in the sense that in all these cases the middle is the cause. However, this must be taken according to a due proportion, namely, so that the to be of the cause corresponds to the to be of the effect, and the coming to be of the cause to the coming to be of the effect, and the “having come to be” of the cause to the “having come to be” of the effect, and the future being of the cause to the future being of the effect.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: ut propter quid factus est defectus etc., manifestat quod dixerat per duo exempla, quorum primum est de eclipsi lunae. Dicimus enim quod heri factus est defectus lunae propter hoc quod heri facta est interpositio terrae inter solem et lunam; et quod nunc fit defectus lunae propter hoc quod nunc fit talis interpositio terrae; et quod cras fiet defectus lunae propter id quod terra ponetur in medio; et quod nunc est defectus lunae propter id quod nunc est interpositio terrae.	Then (95a13) he clarifies what he had said with two examples, the first of which concerns the eclipse of the moon. For we say that there was an eclipse of the moon yesterday, because the earth was interposed between the sun and the moon yesterday; and that an eclipse of the moon is now coming to be, because such an interposition is now coming to be; and that tomorrow there will be an eclipse of the moon, because the earth will be between then; and that there is now an eclipse of the moon, because the earth is now interposed.
Secundum autem exemplum est de crystallo: puta si dicamus quid est crystallus; et accipiatur hoc pro eius definitione, quod sit aqua condensata vehementer. Sit ergo aqua c, idest minor extremitas; et densatum esse sit a, idest maior extremitas; et accipiatur pro medio b, idest quod penitus caret calore. Exhalante enim calido inspissatur humidum: unde quando intense exhalat calidum, consequens est quod intense inspissetur humidum. Reducendo ergo ad formam syllogisticam, dicemus quod b est in c, quia scilicet crystallus habet perfectam exhalationem calidi; in b autem est a, quia illud quod perfecte caret calido, est densatum. Sicut igitur huius quod est crystallum esse aquam plene densatam, causa est quod habeat defectum caloris; ita etiam causa quod fiat crystallus, causa est quod fiat b. Et eadem ratio est in factum esse, et in futurum esse. Et sic concludit quod si sic accipiantur causa et causatum quod sint simul, oportet quod similiter sint simul in fieri, et in esse, et in factum esse, et in futurum esse.	The second example concerns ice. Thus we might state what ice is and take as its definition that it is rigidly congealed water. Therefore, let C be water, i.e., the minor extreme, and A be congealed, i.e., the major extreme, and take B as the middle, i.e., that which completely lacks heat. For when that which is moist gives off heat it congeals; hence when it intensely gives off heat, the moist object becomes very thick and hard. Bringing this into syllogistic form, therefore, we shall say that B is in C, namely, because ice involves a complete giving up of heat; but A is in B, because that which completely lacks heat is congealed. Therefore, just as the fact that it has a deficiency of heat is the cause of ice’s being water which is completely congealed, so the cause of ice’s coming to be is that B is coming to be. And the same holds for having come to be and for future coming to be. And so he concludes that if the cause and the caused are taken to be simultaneous, it is necessary that they be simultaneous in coming to be, in being, in having come to be, and in future coming to be.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: in his autem quae non simul etc., ostendit quomodo causa quae non est simul cum causato, accipiatur medium demonstrationis. Et primo, in his quae fiunt in directum; secundo, in his quae fiunt circulariter; ibi: quoniam autem videmus et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit quaestionem; secundo, interponit quoddam quod necessarium est praecognoscere ad solutionem quaestionis: ibi: est igitur a posterius facto etc.; tertio, solvit quaestionem; ibi: speculandum est igitur quid est continens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, proponit quaestionem; secundo, manifestat eam; ibi: sicut videtur nobis et cetera. Movet ergo primo quaestionem utrum in causis quae non simul fiunt cum suis causatis, sit dicere quod causatum secundum tempus continuum consequatur ad causam vel non.	Then (95a23) he shows how a cause which is not simultaneous with its effect is taken as the middle of demonstration. First, in things that come to be in a direct line. Secondly, in things that come to be reciprocally (95b38) [L: 12]. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he states the question. Secondly, he interjects something that must be known in order to solve the question (95a27). Thirdly, he settles the question (95b1) [L. I I]. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proposes the question. Secondly, he elucidates it (95a24). First therefore (95a23) he proposes the question, namely, whether in the case of causes which are not simultaneous with what they cause, one should say that what is caused follows upon its cause according to a continuous temporal succession, or not?
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: sicut videtur nobis alias etc., manifestat quaestionem. Videmus enim quod aliae sunt causae aliorum non simul cum eis existentes; sicut eius quod est factum esse est alia causa praecedens, quod est fieri; et ipsius fore, idest quod aliquid sit futurum, causa est aliquod futurum fieri; et iterum ipsius fieri causa est aliquid quod prius factum est. Est igitur quaestio: utrum istae causae se consequentes sint in tempore continuo vel non? Hoc enim necessarium est scire demonstratori, quia si non sit continuatio in huiusmodi causis, non erit accipere immediatum principium, quia semper inter duo nunc discontinuata est accipere aliquod medium. Et ideo si illud nunc in quo est effectus, non sit continuum ad illud nunc in quo est causa, erit in medio aliquid accipere quod sit causa media, et sic in infinitum.	Then (95a24) he restates the question more plainly. For we see that some causes of things do not exist at the same time as those things: thus the cause of a “having come to be” is something prior to it, namely, a “coming to be”; and the cause of a “shall have come to be” is a “shall be coming to be”; and again the cause of a “coming to be” is a previous “has come to be.” Therefore, the question is this: Do these causes which follow one upon the other exist in a continuous span of time or not? For it is necessary that the demonstrator know this, because if there is no continuity in these causes, it will not be possible to employ an immediate principle, because between any two discontinuous now’s it is always possible to take something intermediate. Consequently, if that now during which the effect exists is not continuous with that now in which the cause exists, it will be possible to find a cause between them, and so on to infinity.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: est igitur a posterius facto syllogismus etc., manifestat quoddam quod est necessarium ad solutionem praemissae quaestionis. Et primo, proponit quod intendit; secundo, probat propositum; ibi: neque enim determinati et cetera. Circa primum considerandum est quod, sicut linea est quoddam continuum, punctus autem est quoddam indivisibile quod terminat et dividit lineam; ita etiam ipsum fieri vel moveri est quoddam continuum, ipsum autem quod est motum esse vel factum esse, est quoddam indivisibile, quod potest accipi vel ut terminans totum motum, vel ut dividens motum tanquam finis primae partis motus et principium secundae, sicut patet de puncto quod dividit lineam.	Then (95a27) he explains something that must be understood in order to solve this question. First, he proposes what he intends. Secondly, he proves what he has proposed (95a32). In regard to the first (95a27) it should be noted that just as a line is a continuous thing, but a point is an indivisible which terminates and divides the line, so the process of becoming or of being moved is something continuous, but the fact of having been moved or having come to be is something indivisible which can be taken either as terminating an entire motion or as dividing the motion, in the sense of being the end of the first part and the beginning of the second part of the motion, just as in the case of a point which divides the line.
Sic igitur ipsum factum esse est causa praecedens ipsum fieri cuius est principium; et est effectus consequens illud fieri cuius est terminus. Si ergo debeamus demonstrare, oportet fieri syllogismum demonstrativum a posteriori factum esse ad fieri praecedens; ut si dicamus: hoc factum est; ergo illud prius fiebat. Sed quia et ipsum factum esse est principium ipsius fieri, sive quae facta sunt eorum quae fiunt, consequens est ut similiter se habeat in his quae fiunt; ut scilicet a posteriori fieri syllogizetur ad prius factum; puta si dicamus: sol movetur ad punctum medii coeli; ergo prius motus est ad punctum orientis. Sed a priori non poterit fieri syllogismus ad posterius; ut puta si dicamus quod, quia hoc prius factum est, ideo sequitur quod illud quod est posterius fiat vel factum sit. Et quae ratio est de fieri et de factum esse, eadem ratio est de fore et futurum fieri.	In this way, therefore, a “having come to be” is both a cause which precedes a “coming to be” of which it is the principle, and an effect following the “coming to be” of which it is the terminus. Therefore’ if we are to demonstrate, the demonstrative syllogism must proceed from a subsequent “having come to be” to a previous “coming to be.” Thus, we would say: “This has come to be; therefore that was previously coming to be.” But because the very “having come to be” is the principle of the “coming to be” (or the things that have come to be are the cause of those that are coming to be), it follows that the former is similarly related to the things that are coming to be, namely, that one may syllogize from a subsequent “coming to be” to a prior “having come to be,” as though we were to say: “The sun is being moved to the midst of the heavens; therefore it was previously moved to a point in the east.” But one may not syllogize from what is prior to what is later and say, for example, that because this has first come to be, it follows that what is later is coming to be or has come to be. And what is true of the relationship between coming to be and having come to be applies to what shall have come to be and what will be coming to be.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: neque enim determinati etc., probat quod dixerat. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, probat propositum ratione accepta ex parte temporis absolute considerati; secundo, ex parte temporis quod contingit esse medium inter causam priorem et effectum posteriorem; ibi: amplius enim neque indeterminatum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod ideo a priori non potest syllogizari ad posterius, quia posito priori non oportet quod sequatur posterius, neque secundum aliquod determinatum tempus, neque simpliciter non determinate.	Then (95a32) he proves what he had said. In regard to this he does two things. First, he proves his proposition with a reason based on the notion of time considered absolutely. Secondly, with a reason based on the time that intervenes between a cause which is prior and an effect which is subsequent (95a39). He says therefore first (95a32) that the reason why one may not syllogize from what is prior to what is subsequent is that the prior having been posited, it is not necessary that the subsequent follow either at some definite time or at some indefinite future time.
Et hoc primo manifestat quantum ad determinatum tempus, puta si dicamus: bibit infirmus potionem; ergo tali die sanabitur. Si enim a priori facto syllogizari possit posterius secundum determinatum tempus, poterit concludi quod quia verum est dicere hoc factum esse, puta infirmum bibisse potionem, quod etiam verum sit dicere hoc factum esse quod posterius est, puta eum esse sanatum. Sed hoc non sequitur, quia potest dari aliquod tempus in quo verum est eum potionem bibisse, et tamen nondum verum est eum sanatum esse, sicut in intermedio tempore inter sumptionem medicinae et sanitatem adeptam.	First, therefore, he manifests this in regard to a definite time, as in the case where we might say: “The patient has drunk the medicine; therefore he will be cured on such and such a day.” For if one could syllogize from a previous fact to something which will occur later at a definite time, it would be possible to conclude that because it is true to say that this has happened, namely, that the patient has drunk the medicine, it will also be true to say that what is subsequent has come to pass, namely, that he has been cured. But this does not follow: because it is possible to discover some time in which it is true to say that he has drunk the medicine but not yet true to say that he has been cured, say the time between the taking of the medicine and the attainment of the cure.
Et hoc est quod dicit, quod ideo praedicta conclusio non sequitur, quia in medio tempore falsum erit dicere quod hoc sit factum, scilicet hunc esse sanatum, quamvis alterum iam sit factum, scilicet eum medicinam bibisse. Et eadem ratio est etiam respectu futuri: non enim possumus concludere: iste nunc medicinam bibit; ergo erit sanatus, pro aliquo tempore determinato; quia hoc non erit verum in quolibet tempore futuro, scilicet in tempore medio.	And this is what he says, namely, that the reason why the aforesaid conclusion does not follow is because during the interim it is false to say that this has taken place, namely, that he has been cured, although the other has already taken place, namely, that he has drunk the medicine. The same reasoning holds in regard to the future. For we cannot condude, “He is now drinking the medicine; therefore he will be cured,” referring to some definite time; because this will not be true for each subsequent period of time, namely, not in the intervening time.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 9 Secundo, ibi: neque quoniam hoc factum est etc., probat idem quantum ad tempus indeterminatum, puta si dicamus: iste medicinam bibit; ergo sanabitur. Non enim sequitur quod quia hoc factum est, scilicet quod iste medicinam bibit, hoc erit, scilicet sanabitur. Iam enim supra dictum est quod causa quae ex necessitate infert effectum, est simul cum effectu. Et accipitur quasi medium homogeneum, idest unius generis; sicut ad probandum aliqua esse facta in praeterito, accipitur pro medio et causa aliquid quod est factum in praeterito; et similiter futurorum, id quod est futurum; et eorum quae sunt in fieri, id quod est in fieri; et eorum quae existunt, id quod existit. Sed quando sic syllogizatur: hoc factum est; ergo hoc erit; non accipitur medium unius generis, sed unum est prius et aliud posterius. Unde posito priori non sequitur ex necessitate posterius in illis in quibus effectus causarum impediri possunt.	Secondly (95a35). he proves the same point in regard to an unspecified future time, as when we might say, “He is drinking the medicine; therefore he will be cured.” For it does not follow that because this has taken place, namely, that he has drunk the medicine, that this will be, namely, that he will be cured. For it has already been established that a cause which necessarily infers its effect is simultaneous with its effect. Furthermore, the middle which is taken is homogeneous, i.e., of one genus. For example, to prove that certain things have come to be in the past, one takes as the middle and cause something which has taken place in tile past; likewise, for things of the future, something which is future, and for things that are in the process of coming to be, one takes that which is coming to be, and for things that exist, one takes that which exists. However, when one syllogizes, “This has taken place; therefore this will be,” the middle taken is not of one genus, but one middle is prior and the other subsequent. Therefore, having posited what is prior, the subsequent does not follow of necessity in those cases in which the effect of causes can be impeded.
lib. 2 l. 10 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: amplius enim neque etc., ponit aliam rationem, quae sumitur ex parte temporis medii; et dicit quod, sicut ex parte temporis absolute considerati manifestum est quod non potest syllogizari a priori ad posterius, nec secundum tempus determinatum, neque secundum tempus indeterminatum; ita etiam nec ex parte medii temporis contingit accipi aliquod determinatum aut indeterminatum, in quo scilicet possit concludi posterius a priori. Iam enim dictum est quod in toto tempore intermedio falsum est dicere id quod est posterius esse, quamvis id quod est prius iam praecesserit.	Then (95a39) he presents another argument which is based on the intervening time. And he says that just as on the part of time considered absolutely, it is obvious that one may not syllogize from what is prior to what is subsequent either according to a specified time or according to an unspecified time; so neither on the part of the intervening time is it possible to assume a specified or an unspecified time in which that which is subsequent can be concluded from what is prior. For it has already been established that during the entire intervening time it is false to say that the subsequent exists, even though that which is prior has already occurred.