Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L2/Lect11

Lecture 11 How a cause which is not simultaneous with its effect may be taken as a middle in demonstration

Latin	English
	Lecture 11 (95b1-37) HOW A CAUSE WHICH IS NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH ITS EFFECT MAY BE TAKEN AS A MIDDLE IN DEMONSTRATION
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 1 Postquam philosophus quaesivit utrum in his quae non simul fiunt, posterius secundum continuitatem temporis sequatur ad prius; et interposuit quoddam necessarium, scilicet quod a priori ad posterius non syllogizatur; hic accedit ad determinandum quaestionem motam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quomodo se habeant fieri et factum esse secundum temporis continuitatem; secundo, ostendit propositum; ibi: de hoc quidem igitur et cetera.	After stating the question whether in things that do not come to be simultaneously the subsequent according to temporal continuity follows the prior, and after interjecting something necessary, namely, that one may not syllogize from what is prior to what is subsequent, the Philosopher now undertakes to settle the question he raised. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows how coming to be and having come to be are related according to continuity of time. Secondly, he proves his proposal (95b12).
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod ad ostendendum propositum oportet speculari quid est coniungens, vel continuans factum esse ei quod est fieri, ut post unum continuo sequatur aliud. Et circa hoc dicit primo, manifestum esse quod fieri cum eo quod est factum esse, non est habitum, idest consequenter se habens. Dicuntur autem consequenter se habentia, quorum nihil est medium eiusdem generis, sicut duo milites in acie, vel duo clerici in choro. Habitum autem supra id quod est consequenter addit contactum, sicut dicitur in V Physicor. Sic ergo dicit quod fieri non potest esse consequenter se habens et contiguum cum hoc quod est factum esse.	He says therefore first (95b1), that in order to prove the proposal it is necessary to investigate what it is that joins or forms a continuity between a “having come to be” and a “coming to be,” so that one might follow the other without interruption. In regard to this he says first of all that it is obvious that a “coming to be” is not had, i.e., is not consecutive to a “having come to be.” (Those things are said to be consecutive which have no member of their genus between them; for example, two soldiers in a line or two clerics in their choir stalls. Had, however, adds the notion of contact to that which is consequent, as it is stated in Physics V). Thus, therefore, he is saying that a “coming to be” cannot be consecutive or contiguous to a “having come to be.”
Et hoc probat, quia neque etiam factum esse est contiguum, scilicet ut consequenter se habens cum alio factum esse; eo quod duo facta esse hoc modo se habent ut quaedam ultima et indivisibilia in tempore, sicut duo puncta in linea. Unde sicut duo puncta non sunt consequenter se habentia ad invicem, ita etiam neque duo facta esse; quia tam puncta quam facta esse sunt sicut indivisibilia, et talia non se habent consequenter in continuis, ut probatur in VI Physicor. Et quia duo facta esse non sunt consequenter se habentia, propter hoc etiam manifestum est quod fieri et factum esse non consequenter se habent. Fieri enim est divisibile, sicut et moveri; sed factum esse est indivisibile, sicut et punctus. Sicut igitur se habet linea ad punctum, sic se habet fieri ad factum esse. Sunt enim infinita facta esse in eo quod est fieri, sicut et infinita puncta sunt potentialiter in linea. Et haec est causa quare in linea non possunt accipi duo puncta consequenter se habentia, quia scilicet inter quaelibet duo puncta est accipere aliud punctum: et similiter inter quaelibet duo facta esse est accipere aliud. Unde duo facta esse non se habent consequenter.	Then he proves this, because not even a “having come to be” is contiguous in the sense of consecutive to any other “having come to be”: for two instances of “having come to be” are related in the way that two indivisible boundaries of time are related, or as two points in a line. Hence just as two points are not consecutive to one another, so neither are two instances of “having come to be”: for the points and the instances of “having come to be” exist as indivisibles, and such things are not consecutive in their continua, as is proved in Physics VI. And since two instances of “having come to be” are not consecutive, it is therefore obvious that a “coming to be” and a “having come to be” are not consecutive. For a “coming to be” is something divisible, just as a “being moved” is; but a “having come to be” is something indivisible, just as a point is. Therefore, as the line is to the point, so the “coming to be” is to the “having come to be.” For there is an infinitude of “having come to be’s,” just as there is potentially an infinitude of points in a line. And this is the cause why it is impossible to take two points that are consecutive in a line, namely, because between any two points there is still another point to be taken; likewise, between any two “having come to be’s” there is another to be taken. Hence two “having come to be’s” are not consecutive.
Et quia factum esse est terminus eius quod est fieri, sequitur consequenter quod nec fieri se habeat consequenter cum eo quod est factum esse: quia tunc duo facta esse se haberent consequenter ad invicem. Sed fieri immediate terminatur ad factum esse, sicut linea ad punctum. De his autem patet magis in universalibus de motu, idest in libro physicorum. Tractatur enim de his in sexto illius libri.	Furthermore, because a “having come to be” is the terminus of a “coming to be,” it follows that not even a “coming to be” is consecutive to a “having come to be”; otherwise two “having come to be’s” would be consecutive. Rather a “coming to be” is terminated immediately at a “having come to be,” as a line is terminated at a point. This matter is treated at greater length in the analysis of motion, i.e., Physics VI.
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: de hoc quidem igitur etc., ostendit secundum praedicta quomodo accipi possit immediate vel mediate effectus causae in his quae non simul sunt. Et primo, ostendit propositum; secundo, manifestat per exempla; ibi: habet autem sic se in operibus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum in praeteritis; secundo, in futuris; ibi: similiter autem in eo quod erit et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit propositum; secundo, excludit quamdam obviationem; ibi: aut semper intercidet et cetera.	Then (95b12) he shows in the light of the foregoing how the effect can be taken as being immediate or mediate to the cause in cases where they are not simultaneous. First, he proves his proposal. Secondly, he elucidates it with examples (95b31). Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows his proposal in regard to the past. Secondly, in future things (95b25). Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows his proposal. Secondly, he excludes an objection (95b23).
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 4 Dicit ergo primo quod ex praemissis accipi potest quomodo causa, quae accipitur ut medium in demonstratione, se habeat consequenter ei quod est in fieri vel generari: quia etiam in his demonstrationibus, quae syllogizant de his quae sunt in fieri, necesse est accipere esse aliquod medium et primum quae sint immediata; sicut si concludamus quod a factum est propter hoc quod c factum est; ita scilicet quod posterius factum sit c, et prius a. Puta si dicamus: iste sanatus est; ergo bibit medicinam: a priori enim non sequeretur syllogismus, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum c accipitur ut principium, quamvis sit posterius in fieri, propter id quod est magis proximum ipsi nunc praesenti quam a.	He says, therefore first (95b12) that from what has been established it is possible to gather how a cause which is taken as a middle in demonstration may be consecutive to that which is in the process of becoming or of being generated: because even in these demonstrations which syllogize about things that are in a “coming to be,” it is necessary to admit a middle and a first which are immediate, as when we conclude that A has come to be because C has come to be, so long, namely, as C has come to be subsequently and A previously. For example, if we should say, “He has been cured; therefore he drank the medicine”: for the syllogism would not follow if we began with what is prior, as we have established above; but C is taken as a principle, although it is later in coming to be, owing to the fact that it is closer to the present now than A.
Praesens autem nunc est principium temporis, quia secundum ipsum distinguitur praeteritum et futurum, et sic oportet praesens nunc accipere ut principium notificandi temporis successionem. In praeteritis enim tanto aliquid est posterius in fieri, quanto est proximius in praesenti nunc; in futuris autem est e converso. Sicut igitur c accipitur ut principium syllogizandi, eo quod est posterius in fieri quam a, et propinquius praesenti nunc; ita et accipiamus d propinquius praesenti nunc quam c, et concludamus quod si factum est d, quod prius factum est c; puta si perfecit opus sani hominis, prius sanatus est.	But the present now is a principle of time because according to it the past and future are distinguished; hence it is necessary to take the present now as the principle for making known the succession of time. For in the realm of the past, something is more subsequent in becoming, future. Therefore, just as C is taken as the principle of syllogizing, since it is more subsequent in coming to be than A and closer to the present now, so we may take D as nearer to the present now than C, and conclude that if D has come to be, C came to be previously: for example, if he performs the tasks of a healthy man, then previous to that he was cured.
Possumus ergo concludere quod si factum est d, necesse est quod prius factum sit a: et accipitur pro causa id quod erat in medio, scilicet c. Facto enim d, necesse est quod prius factum fuerit c; et facto c, necesse est quod prius factum fuerit a; ergo facto d, necesse est quod prius factum fuerit a. Puta si hic homo iam perfecit opus sani hominis, sequitur quod prius fuerit sanatus; et si est sanatus, necesse est quod prius biberit medicinam. Sic igitur semper accipiendo medium, puta aliquid aliud inter c et a, sicut c acceptum est medium inter d et a, stabitur alicubi ad aliquod immediatum.	Therefore, we can conclude that if D has come to pass, it is necessary that A have previously come to pass; and we take as cause that which was in the interim, namely, C. For D having come to be, it is necessary that C previously have come to be; and C having come to be, it is necessary that A have previously come to be. Therefore, D having come to be, it is necessary that A have previously come to be. For example, if this person now accomplishes the tasks of a healthy man, it follows that previously he had been cured; and if he has been cured, it is necessary that previously he have drunk the medicine. Therefore, by always taking a middle in this way, for example, something else between C and A, as C was taken as middle between D and A, one will come to rest somewhere at something immediate.
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: aut semper intercidet propter etc., ponit quamdam obviationem. Potest enim aliquis dicere quod nunquam veniatur ad immediatum, sed semper erit accipere aliquod medium inter duo facta esse, propter hoc quod in ipso fieri sunt infinita facta esse, eo quod factum esse non consequenter se habet ad aliud factum esse, ut dictum est. Sed hanc obviationem excludit ipse, quia quamvis sint infinita facta esse in uno fieri, tamen necesse est incipere ab aliquo medio, scilicet ab ipso nunc, tanquam a primo: dictum est enim quod id quod est posterius, est principium syllogizandi; respectu autem omnium in praeterito factorum, postremum est ipsum praesens nunc; unde necesse est ipsum praesens nunc accipere ut primum et immediatum principium. Quodlibet autem aliorum factorum accipitur ut principium mediatum.	Then (95b23) he presents an objection. For someone can say that some thing immediate will never be reached, but it will always be necessary to take something between two “having come to be’s” on the ground that in every instance of coming to be there is an infinitude of “having come to be’s,” since one “having come to be” is not consecutive to another, as has been said. But he excludes this objection because although there is an infinitude of “having come to he’s” in one case of coming to be, nevertheless it is necessary to begin at some middle, namely, from a now as from something first: for it has been established that that which is subsequent is a principle of syllogizing. But in relation to all things that have come to be in the past, the latest is the present now; hence it is necessary to take the present now as the first and immediate principle. However, any other “having come to be” is taken as a mediate principle.
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem est etc., manifestat idem in futuris; et dicit quod, sicut se habet in eo quod factum est, similiter se habet et in eo quod factum erit; quia si verum est quod erit d, necesse est quod prius verificetur quod sit a; et huiusmodi causa accipietur c, quod cadit medium inter d et a. Quia si erit d, necesse est quod prius erit c; et si erit c, necesse est quod prius sit futurum a.	Then (95b25) he shows the same for future things, saying that as the case was in that which has come to be, so it is in that which will have come to be: because if it is true that D will be, it is necessary that it previously be verified that A exists; and the cause of this will be taken to be C, which falls as middle between D and A. For if C will be, it is necessary that prior to it A will be.
Et similiter etiam in his potest fieri obiectio de infinita divisione futuri in instantia, vel motus in momenta; quia sicut in praeteritis, ita et in futuris non consequenter se habent indivisibilia. Et tamen hic etiam accipiendum est aliquid sicut immediatum principium, sicut dictum est in his quae facta sunt in praeterito. Licet enim non sit accipere duo facta esse se consequenter habentia, neque in praeterito neque in futuro, potest tamen accipi aliquid ultimum utrobique, et hoc accipietur ut principium immediatum.	In this case, too, the objection concerning the infinite division of the future into instants, or of motion into moments can be lodged: because, as in the case of past things, so also in future things, the indivisibles are not consecutive. Nevertheless here too, something must be taken as an immediate principle, as was done in things which came to be in the past. For although one cannot take two consecutive “having come to be’s” either in the past or in the future, nevertheless something terminal can be the closer it is to the present now; but the converse is true in regard to the taken in both, and this will be taken as the immediate principle.
lib. 2 l. 11 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: habet autem sic se etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exempla; et dicit quod praedictus modus argumentandi potest considerari circa opera humana. Accipiamus enim factum esse domus tanquam quoddam postremum, ex quo concluditur sicut quoddam primum, quod necesse est lapides prius fuisse decisos; et accipiemus pro medio constructionem fundamenti: quia si domus facta est, necesse est quod prius sit factum fundamentum; et si factum est fundamentum, necesse est quod prius sint lapides decisi. Et quod dictum est in praeterito, accipiendum est etiam in futuro: puta si erit domus, necesse est quod prius futura sit decisio lapidum, et quod hoc demonstretur per medium, quod est constructio fundamenti.	Then (95b31) he elucidates what he had said with examples, saying that the manner of arguing employed above can be considered in regard, to human works. Thus, let us take the “having come to be” of a house as something terminal; from this it is concluded, as something first, that it is necessary that the stones have previously been cut; and we shall take as middle the laying of the foundation: because if the house has been constructed, it is necessary that previously the foundation has been laid; and if the foundation has been laid, it is necessary first that the stones have been cut. And what was taken in regard to the past must also be taken in regard to the future: for example, if a house will exist, it is necessary that first the cutting of the stones will occur, and that this be’ demonstrated through some middle, which is the laying of the foundation.