Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L2/Lect16

Lecture 16 How to search for the definition of a thing by examining things similar to it and dissimilar

Latin	English
	Lecture 16 (97b7-40) HOW TO SEARCH FOR THE DEFINITION OF A THING BY EXAMINING THINGS SIMILAR TO IT AND DISSIMILAR
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 1 Postquam philosophus docuit investigare quod quid est secundum modum maxime congruum, qui est per divisionem generis, hic docet investigare quod quid est alio modo. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, docet praedictum modum investigandi; secundo, manifestat per exemplum; ibi: ut puta dico etc.; tertio, probat hunc modum esse convenientem; ibi: semper autem est omnis definitio et cetera.	After teaching how to investigate the quod quid according to the most suitable method which is by division of the genus, the Philosopher now teaches another method. Concerning this he does three things. First, he describes the method. Secondly, he gives examples (97b15). Thirdly, he proves that this method is satisfactory (97b26).
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod si aliquis inquirit definitionem alicuius rei, oportet quod attendat ad ea quae sunt similia illi, et etiam ad ea quae sunt differentia ab illa re. Quod quidem qualiter fieri debeat, ostendit subdens quod primo oportet circa similia considerare quid idem in omnibus inveniatur; puta quid idem inveniatur in omnibus hominibus, qui omnes conveniunt in hoc quod est esse rationale. Postea considerandum est iterum in aliis, quae conveniunt cum primis in eodem genere, et sunt sibi invicem idem specie, sunt autem altera specie ab illis, quae primo accipiebantur, sicut equi ab hominibus: oportet etiam accipere quid sit idem in his, scilicet equis, puta hinnibile.	He says therefore first (97b7) that if someone is searching for the definition of some thing, he should examine things which are similar to it as well as things which are different from it. He shows how this should be done when he says that in those things which are similar, one should consider some item that is the same in all; for example, what is found to be the same in all men is that they all coincide in being rational. After that, one should investigate the things which agree with the first things in genus and are specifically the same among themselves, although specifically different from the things first taken, as horses from men. It is also necessary to investigate what is the same in these things, namely, these horses; say neighing.
Cum ergo accipiatur quid sit idem in omnibus his, scilicet hominibus, quia rationale; et quid sit idem similiter in omnibus aliis, scilicet equis, quia hinnibile; iterum considerandum est si aliquid est idem in istis duobus acceptis, scilicet in rationali et hinnibili. Et ita est considerandum quousque perveniatur ad aliquam unam rationem communem. Haec enim erit definitio rei. Si vero talis consideratio non inducat in unam rationem communem, sed inducat in duas rationes diversas, aut etiam in plures; manifestum erit quod illud cuius definitio quaeritur, non erit unum secundum essentiam, sed plura: et ita non poterit habere unam definitionem.	Then having taken what is the same in all of the former, i.e., men, namely, rational, and what is the same in the others, i.e., horses, namely, neighing, the next step will be to consider whether anything is the same in those two, namely, in rational and neighing. And this method of investigating must be continued until one common formality is found. For this will be the definition of the thing. However, if such an investigation does not uncover one common formality, but leads to two or even several diverse formalities, it will be obvious that the thing whose definition is being sought will not be one thing according to essence but several. Consequently, it will not have one definition.
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: ut puta, si quid est magnanimitas etc., manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum; et dicit quod si quaeramus quid est magnanimitas, debemus attendere ad quosdam magnanimos, ut sciamus quid unum habent in seipsis, in quantum magnanimi sunt. Sicut Alcibiades dictus est magnanimus, et etiam Achilles, et etiam Aiax; qui omnes habent unum quid commune, quod est non sustinere iniurias. Cuius signum est, quod Alcibiades non sustinens iniurias dimicavit, Achilles vero in insaniam versus est propter iram, Aiax autem interfecit seipsum. Iterum debemus considerare in aliis qui dicuntur magnanimi, sicut in Lysandro aut Socrate. Habent enim hoc commune, quod non mutabantur propter prosperitatem fortunae et per infortunia, sed indifferenter se habebant in utrisque.	Then (97b15) he elucidates what he had said with an example, saying that if we would investigate what magnanimity is, we should first of all consider certain magnanimous persons, in order to learn what is the one item they have insofar as they are magnanimous. Thus, Alcibiades was said to be magnanimous, and so were Achilles and Ajax; all of whom have one item in common—not to tolerate insults. The sign of this is that Alcibiades fought rather than accept insults; Achilles went mad from anger; Ajax committed suicide. Then we should consider this in others who are said to be magnanimous, say in Lysander and Socrates. For they have this in common that they were unmoved by good fortune or bad, but were indifferent to both.
Accipiamus ergo haec duo, scilicet impassibilitatem a fortuitis casibus et non tolerare iniurias, et consideremus si est aliquid commune eis. In hoc enim consistit ratio magnanimitatis. Sicut si dicamus quod utrumque contingit propter hoc, quod aliquis existimat se dignum magnis. Ex hoc enim contingit quod homo non patitur iniurias; et ex hoc etiam contingit quod contemnit mutationem exteriorum bonorum, tanquam minimorum. Si autem nihil commune inveniretur illis duobus acceptis, non esset una species magnanimitatis, sed duae. Unde non posset dari una communis definitio.	Therefore, let us take these two items, namely, equanimity in the face of the vicissitudes of life and intolerance of insults, and see if there is anything common to them. For in this consists the notion of magnanimity. For example, we might say that these two things are due to the fact that a person considers himself worthy of great things. For it is from this attitude that a man does not tolerate insults and it is also from this attitude that he scorns fluctuations affecting external goods as being trifles. But if nothing common is to be found in the two items taken, the species of magnanimity would not be one but two. Hence one common definition could not be given.
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: semper autem est omnis etc., ostendit praemissum modum inveniendi quod quid est esse convenientem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit hunc modum esse convenientem; secundo, ostendit quid oportet in hoc modo vitare; ibi: si autem neque disputare et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo, ostendit praedictum modum esse convenientem quantum ad terminum, prout scilicet pervenitur ad aliquid commune; secundo, quantum ad processum, prout scilicet proceditur in praedicto modo a particularibus; ibi: faciliusque est singulare et cetera.	Then (97b26) he shows that the above method is well adapted to finding the quod quid. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows that the method is suitable. Secondly, he shows what should be avoided in this method (97b38). Concerning the first he does two things. First, he shows that the above method is suitable as to its result, namely, as to arriving at something common. Secondly, as to its procedure, namely, inasmuch as it starts with particular cases (97b28).
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 5 Dicit ergo primo quod convenienter dictum est quod oportet inquirentem quod quid est pervenire ad aliquod commune, quia omnis definitio datur de aliquo secundum quod consideratur in universali, non autem secundum quod consideratur in hoc singulari vel in illo. Non enim medicus definit quid sit sanum in hoc oculo huius hominis; sed vel in universali simpliciter quantum ad omnes, vel distinguit sanum secundum diversas species, puta cum dicit hoc esse sanum cholericis, illud autem phlegmaticis.	He says therefore first (97b26) that it was said advisedly that one who is investigating the quod quid must reach something common, because every definition of something is given insofar as that thing is considered in its universality, and not as it is considered in this or that individual. For a physician does not define health as it exists in this eye of this man, but either as it is universally and absolutely in regard to all men, or he distinguishes health according to various species; for example, when he says this to be health for the cholerics, or for the bilious.
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: facilius autem est singulare etc., ostendit praedictum modum esse convenientem quantum ad processum, quo scilicet proceditur a minus communibus ad magis commune. Et hoc dupliciter: primo, ratione facilitatis: procedit enim disciplina a facilioribus. Facilius autem est definire singulare, idest aliquod minus commune, quam universale, quod est magis commune; in quantum scilicet in universalibus, quia sunt minus determinata, magis latent aequivocationes quam in illis quae sunt indifferentia, idest quae non dividuntur per differentias specificas. Et ideo oportet a singularibus definiendo ascendere ad universalia.	Then (97b28) he shows that this method is satisfactory as to procedure, inasmuch as it proceeds from the less common to the more common. And this in two ways: first, by reason of facility. For a discipline begins from the easier things. But it is easier to define something singular, i.e., something less common, than something universal, which is more common; inasmuch as equivocations are less likely to be detected in universals, because they are less determinate, than in things which are undifferentiated, i.e., in things which are not divided by specific differences. Accordingly, one must define by ascending from singulars to universals.
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 7 Secundo, ibi: sicut autem in demonstrationibus etc., ostendit idem ex ratione evidentiae. Sicut enim in demonstrationibus oportet syllogizari praesupponendo aliquid, quod est evidens et manifestum, sic etiam et in terminis, idest in definitionibus. Non enim potest aliquis devenire in cognitionem alicuius ignoti nisi per aliquod notum sive aliquis intendat cognoscere quia est, quod fit per demonstrationem, sive quid est, quod fit per definitionem.	Secondly (97b31), he shows the same thing by reason of evidence. For just as in demonstrations one should syllogize by presupposing something which is evident and obvious, so too in terms, i.e., in definitions. For no one can pass to a knowledge of something which is unknown except by means of something known, whether he intends to know quia est, which is made known through demonstration, or quid est, which is done by definition.
Hoc autem contingit, ut scilicet praeexistat aliquid evidens, si sit, idest contingat, separatim, idest distinctim, definiri per ea quae singulariter dicuntur, idest quae proprie conveniunt et distincte huic vel illi; sicut si aliquis velit notificare quid est simile, non considerabit ad omne id quod potest simile dici, sed de quibusdam similibus; puta quomodo dicatur simile in coloribus, et quomodo dicatur simile in figuris. Dicitur enim simile in coloribus ex unitate coloris; dicitur autem simile in figuris ex eo quod anguli sunt aequales, et latera proportionalia. Similiter etiam in aliis, si velit definire acutum non respiciet ad omne quod dici potest acutum, sed respiciet ad acutum secundum quod dicitur in voce. Et per hunc modum patet quod aliquis definire intendens refugit statim ne contingat aliqua aequivocatio.	But this happens, i.e., something evident preexists, if it is defined or happens to be defined separately, i.e., distinctly, by means of items that are predicated singularly, i.e., which belong to this or that thing properly and distinctively. Thus, if someone desires to know what similar is, he will not examine every single thing which can be called similar, but only some similar things; for example, how things are similar in color, and how something is accounted similar in figure. For it is from the unity of color that things are said to be similar in color; but in the realm of figure, two things are similar because corresponding angles are equal and the sides proportional. Likewise in other things: if someone desires to define sharp, he will not examine everything which can be called sharp, but he will consider sharp as applied to a sound.
Et per hoc patet esse convenientem modum definiendi, quo ex inferioribus proceditur ad commune; in quantum scilicet in specialibus specialia definire facilius est, et magis in talibus potest esse nota univocatio.	Hence it is clear that one who follows this method when he defines is automatically avoiding the possibility of equivocation. Consequently, it is clear that this is a practical method of defining, i.e., the method of passing from the less common to the more common, inasmuch as it is easier in special things to define what is special, and univocation can be more easily recognized in such things.
lib. 2 l. 16 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: si autem non oportet etc., excludit quemdam modum procedendi in definitionibus. Et dicit quod sicut non oportet disputare per metaphoras, ita etiam non oportet definire per metaphoras; utpote si dicamus quod homo est arbor inversa: nec oportet in definitionibus assumere quaecunque metaphorice dicuntur. Cum enim definitiones sint praecipua et efficacissima media in disputationibus, si definitiones darentur per metaphoras, sequeretur quod oporteret ex metaphoris disputare. Hoc autem fieri non debet, quia metaphora accipitur secundum aliquid simile, non autem oportet ut id quod est simile secundum unum, sit simile quantum ad omnia.	Then (97b38) he excludes a certain method of procedure in definitions, saying that just as one may not dispute by metaphors, so he may not define by metaphors; for example, by stating that man is an inverted tree. Furthermore, in definitions one may not use anything stated metaphorically. For since definitions are the most important and most efficacious middles in disputations, it would follow, if definitions were stated in metaphorical terms, that one would have to dispute by metaphors. But this is not valid, because a metaphor is interpreted according to something which is similar; whereas it does not follow, if something is similar in one respect, that it is similar in all respects.