Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L2/Lect18

Lecture 18 Co-existence of cause and caused

Latin	English
	Lecture 18 (98a35-b40) CO-EXISTENCE OF CAUSE AND CAUSED
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quomodo oportet investigare propter quid, hic movet duas quaestiones circa ipsum propter quid, quarum prima est de coexistentia causae ad causatum, secunda pertinet ad unitatem causae; ibi: utrum autem contingat et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo, proponit quaestionem; secundo, obiicit; ibi: si enim non est etc.; tertio, solvit; ibi: aut contingit unius et cetera.	After showing how one should investigate propter quid, the Philosopher now raises two questions in regard to propter quid. The first of these concerns the co-existence of cause to caused. The second pertains to the unity of cause (99a1) [L. 19]. Concerning the first he does three things. First, he proposes the question. Secondly, he raises an objection (98b2). Thirdly, he solves the question (98b25).
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod de causa et causato potest aliquis dubitare utrum quando est unum eorum, sit et aliud. Quae quidem quaestio non est intelligenda quantum ad simultatem temporis, sed quantum ad simultatem consecutionis, utpote si posito uno consequatur aliud vel simul tempore, vel prius et post. Et ponit duo exempla. In quorum uno causa tempore praecedit causatum: nam lata folia habere est causa quod fluant folia alicuius arboris; non autem habere lata folia et folia fluere sunt simul tempore. In alio autem exemplo causa et causatum sunt simul tempore, sicut interpositio terrae simul tempore est cum defectu lunae. Est ergo quaestio utrum ad unum istorum consequatur aliud.	He says therefore first (98a35) that in regard to cause and caused, it is possible to wonder when one of them exists, does the other also exist? However, this question should not be interpreted as referring to coexistence in time but of succession, such that if one is posited, does the other follow regardless of whether they are concurrent in time, or before and after. And he gives two examples. In one of them, the cause precedes the caused in time: for the cause why the leaves of a tree fall off is that it has broad leaves; for the possession of broad leaves and their falling are not simultaneous in time. In the other example, the cause and the caused are simultaneous in time; as the interposition of the earth is simultaneous in time with the eclipse of the moon. The question, therefore, is whether upon the one of them the other follows.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: si enim non aliqua etc., obiicit ad propositam quaestionem, ostendens quod causa et causatum semper simul sunt secundum consequentiam; et ponit ad hoc duas rationes. Quarum prima sumitur ex ratione causae et causati; et dicit quod omne causatum oportet quod habeat aliquam causam. Unde si posito isto causato, non simul ponitur quod ista eius causa sit, sequitur quod sit eius aliqua alia causa; et hoc ideo, quia necesse est quod causatum simul sit cum aliqua causa. Sicut ad hoc quod est terram esse in medio, sequitur quod luna deficiat; et ad hoc quod est arborem habere lata folia, sequitur quod folia eius fluant. Si ergo non est dare aliam causam, sequitur quod simul sit hoc causatum cum hac causa.	Then (98b2) he objects to the question proposed and shows that cause and caused are always together as to succession: and he gives two reasons for this. The first one is based on the notion of cause and caused. And he says that every caused thing must have some cause. Hence, if something is posited as caused and it is not simultaneously posited that such and such is its cause, it follows that something else is its cause. For example, from the fact that the earth is between, it follows that the moon is eclipsed; and from the fact that a tree has broad leaves, it follows that its leaves fall off. Therefore, if there is no other cause, it follows that this caused is simultaneous with its cause.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 4 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et si demonstrentur per altera etc., quae quidem sumitur ex hoc quod causa et causatum per invicem demonstrantur. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo, ponit rationem; secundo, removet errorem qui posset consequi; ibi: si autem non contingit etc.; tertio, probat quoddam quod supposuerat; ibi: quod autem non deficere et cetera.	Then (98b4) he gives the second reason which is based on the fact that cause and caused are demonstrated the one by the other. Concerning this he does three things. First, he states the reason. Secondly, he dismisses the error that could follow (98b16). Thirdly, he proves what he had presupposed (98b22).
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 5 Circa primum dicit quod etiam manifestum est quod causa et causatum simul se consequuntur, si hoc verum est, quod per invicem demonstrentur; quia ad medium demonstrationis ex necessitate sequitur conclusio. Quod autem per invicem demonstrentur, probat in praedicto exemplo. Sit enim folium fluere in quo a, quae est maior extremitas; latum folium habere in quo b, quod est medium; vites vero accipiantur in quo c, quod est minor extremitas. Sic igitur in b est a, quia omne quod habet latum folium, folio fluit; in c autem est b, quia omnis vitis habet lata folia; et sic concluditur quod a est in c, idest quod omnis vitis folio fluit. Et in toto hoc processu causa accipitur pro medio, et sic causatum per causam demonstratur.	In regard to the first he says (98b4) that it is also manifest that cause and caused follow upon one another simultaneously, if it is true that either can be demonstrated by the other: because the conclusion of a demonstration follows of necessity from the middle. But the fact that either can be demonstrated by the other is shown by the following example: Let leaf falls off be A, the major extreme; to have a broad leaf be B, the middle; and vines be C, which is the minor. Thus, therefore, A is in B, because whatever has broad leaves, its leaves fall off; but B is in C, because every vine has broad leaves. And so it is concluded that A is in C, because every vine loses its leaves. Now in this whole process the cause is taken as middle; consequently, the caused is demonstrated by the cause.
Contingit autem et e converso demonstrare causam per causatum, scilicet quod vitis habet lata folia per hoc quod fluit folio. Accipiatur enim lata folia habere quasi maior extremitas, quae est d; fluere folio quasi medium, quod est e; vitis vero minor extremitas, quae est z. Sic igitur e est in z, quia omnis vitis fluit folio; d autem est in e, quia scilicet omne quod fluit folio, habet lata folia; et ex hoc concluditur quod omnis vitis sit lati folii, et accipitur pro causa in consequendo folio fluere.	But it is also possible conversely to demonstrate the cause through the caused, namely, that a vine has broad leaves because its leaves fall off. For we may take as D, the major term, the fact of having broad leaves; and as E, the middle, the fact that the leaves fall off; and as Z, vine, which is the minor extreme. Thus, therefore, E is in Z, because from every vine the leaves fall off; but D is in E, namely, that whose leaves fall off has broad leaves. From this it is concluded that every vine has broad leaves, which is taken as the cause accounting for the leaves falling off.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: si autem non contingit etc., excludit quemdam errorem, qui posset sequi ex praemissis, ut scilicet eadem ratione unum praedictorum demonstretur ex alio. Sed ipse excludens hoc dicit quod si non contingit quod aliqua duo sint sibi invicem causae, scilicet in eodem genere (eo quod causa est prior eo cuius est causa; non autem contingit idem esse prius et posterius eodem modo); cum causa defectus lunae sit terram esse in medio, non est possibile quod defectus lunae sit causa eius quod terra sit in medio. Si igitur demonstratio quae est per causam, est demonstratio propter quid, quae autem non est per causam, est ipsius quia, ut in primo habitum est; sequitur quod ille qui per defectum lunae demonstrat quod terra sit in medio, cognoscit quidem quia, non propter quid.	Then (98b16) he excludes an error which could follow from the foregoing, namely, that according to the same reason one of the foregoing may be demonstrated from the other. But he rejects this, saying that if it does not occur that the two given things are mutually causes one of the other, namely, in the same genus of cause (since the cause is prior to that of which it is the cause, and it does not occur that a same thing is prior and subsequent in the same way), then since the cause of the eclipse of the moon is the fact that the earth is between, it is not possible that the eclipse of the moon is the cause of the earth’s being between. Therefore, if a demonstration through cause is a demonstration proper quid, whereas one which is not through the cause is demonstration of the quia, as was established in Book I, it follows that one who demonstrates through the eclipse of the moon that the earth is between, knows quia not propter quid.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quod autem non deficere etc., probat quod supposuerat, scilicet quod interpositio terrae sit causa defectus, et non e converso; et dicit manifestum esse quod lunam deficere non est causa eius quod est terram esse in medio, sed e converso; quia in ratione eclipsis ponitur quod terra sit in medio, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur quid et propter quid sint idem, manifestum est quod defectus lunae cognoscitur per interpositionem terrae, sicut per medium propter quid, et non e converso.	Then (98b22) he proves what he had supposed, namely, that the interposition of the earth is the cause of the eclipse and not the converse. And he says that it is obvious that the eclipsing of the moon is not the cause of the earth’s being between, but it is rather the converse; because in explaining an eclipse it is stated that the earth is between, as has been stated. Therefore, since quid and propter quid are the same, it is clear that the eclipse of the moon is known through the fact that the earth is between, as through a middle which is propter quid; and not conversely.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: aut contingit unius plures causas etc., solvit praemissam quaestionem ostendens in quibus verum sit quod causa et causatum semper se consequantur, et in quibus non. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit in quibus non sit verum; secundo, in quibus sit verum; ibi: aut si semper et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod contingit aliquid unum commune habere plures causas secundum quod convenit diversis, sicut esse vituperabile convenit audaci propter excessum, timido autem propter defectum. Accipiatur ergo quod aliquod unum praedicetur de pluribus primo et immediate, et praedicetur a de b primo, et similiter de c, sicut esse vituperabile de superabundantia et defectu; et ista duo, scilicet c et b, praedicentur de d et e, sicut superabundantia convenit audaci, defectus autem timido. Praedicabitur itaque a de d et e, quia tam audax quam timidus est vituperabilis. Causa autem quod a sit in d est ipsum b: est enim audax vituperabilis propter superabundantiam. Quod autem a insit ipsi e, causa est ipsum c: timidus enim vituperabilis est propter defectum. Patet ergo quod cum causa sit, necesse est rem esse; quia sive a sit superabundantia, sive defectus, necesse est aliquid esse vituperabile. Sed existente re, necesse est quidem quod aliqua causarum sit, non tamen necesse est quamlibet causam esse. Sicut posito quod aliquid sit vituperabile, non est necesse quod sit in superabundantia, sed necesse est quod sit vel in superabundantia vel in defectu.	Then (98b25) he solves the proposed question, showing the cases in which it is true that cause and caused always follow upon one another, and the cases in which it is not true. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows the cases in which it is not true. Secondly, those in which it is true (98b32). He says therefore first (98b25) that one common thing happens to have several causes, insofar as it is found in diverse things; as to be worthy of blame belongs to a rash person because of excess, but to a timid person because of a deficiency. Therefore, let us assume that some thing is predicated of several things chiefly and immediately, i.e., that A is predicated in a first way of B and also of C; as to be blameworthy is predicated of excessiveness and deficiency. Let us further assume that these two, namely, C and B, are predicated of D and E; as excessiveness of rash, and deficiency of timid. Therefore, A will be predicated of D and of E, because both the rash and the timid are blameworthy. But the cause of A’s being in D is B; for a rash person is blameworthy because of excess. But the cause of A’s being in E is C; for a timid person is blameworthy because of defect. It is clear, therefore, that since the cause exists, the thing must exist: because whether A is excess or defect, it is necessary that something be blameworthy. On the other hand, if the thing exists, it is necessary that one of the causes exist, although it is not necessary that both causes exist. For example, supposing that something is blameworthy, it is not necessary that it be due to excess, but it is necessary that it be due either to excess or to defect.
lib. 2 l. 18 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit: aut si semper est universale etc., ostendit in quibus necesse sit simul se consequi causam et causatum; et dicit quod si aliquid quaeratur in universali, et accipiatur tam causa quam id cuius causa quaeritur, in universali; tunc oportet quod ad causam semper sequatur effectus, et ad effectum causa. Sicut hoc quod est fluere folio, non convenit primo pluribus, ut erat in praemisso exemplo, sed determinate uni primo communi, quamvis illius communis sint multae species, quibus universaliter convenit quod fluunt folio; puta si accipiamus vel plantas vel tales plantas, scilicet lata folia habentes. Unde in omnibus istis oportet accipere aequale medium, ita quod convertatur causa et id cuius est causa. Sicut si quaeramus quare arbores fluant folio; si accipiatur causa huius esse propter hoc quod humidum est condensatum et sic facilius est desiccabile, sequetur quod si causatum sit, quod etiam causa sit; puta si fluit arbor, oportet quod sit condensatio humoris. Et e converso, oportet quod posita causa in tali subiecto ponatur effectus; ut puta si condensatio humoris est, non in quacunque re sed in arbore, sequitur quod folio fluat.	Then (98b32) he shows in which cases it is necessary that cause and caused follow one another simultaneously. And he says that if something be asked in a universal way, and if both the cause and that whose cause is sought be taken in a universal way, then it is required that the effect always follow upon the cause, and the cause upon the effect. Thus the fact of losing leaves does not belong in a first way to several things as it did in the above example, but it belongs determinately to one common first thing; although of that common thing there are many species, to which it belongs universally that their leaves fall off: say, if we took either plants or this type of plant, namely, the type that has broad leaves. Hence in all of these it is required to take an equal middle, so that the cause and that of which it is the cause are converted. Thus we might inquire why trees lose their leaves: if the cause of this is taken to be the fact that the moist element has hardened and made easier to dry out, it will follow that if the effect exists, the cause also exists; for example, if the tree has its leaves falling off, it is required that there be a hardening of its moist element. Conversely, it is required that if the cause is posited, then the effect is posited in such a thing: thus if the hardening of the sap exists, it follows not of anything at random but of the tree, that the leaves fall off.