Se habere

Sicut enim nicticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et anime nostre intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium nature manifestissima."For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all"

Latin	English
Aquinas
Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita se habere videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?	Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, the situation in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.
Ex quo contingit, quod intellectus animae nostrae hoc modo se habet ad entia immaterialia, quae inter omnia sunt maxime manifesta secundum suam naturam, sicut se habent oculi nycticoracum ad lucem diei, quam videre non possunt, quamvis videant obscura.	From this it follows that our soul’s intellectual power is related to those immaterial beings, which are by nature the most knowable of all, as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, which they cannot see because their power of vision is weak, although they do see dimly lighted things.
Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter se habet homo ad considerationem veritatis, hic ostendit quod cognitio veritatis maxime ad philosophiam primam pertineat.	Having shown how man is disposed for the study of truth, the Philosopher now shows that the knowledge of truth belongs pre-eminently to first philosophy.
Sed finis practicae est opus, quia etsi practici, hoc est operativi, intendant cognoscere veritatem, quomodo se habeat in aliquibus rebus, non tamen quaerunt eam tamquam ultimum finem.	But the end of practical knowledge is action, because, even though “practical men,” i.e., men of action, attempt to understand the truth as it belongs to certain things, they do not seek this as an ultimate end ..
Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei, sed se habet communiter ad omnia entia.	Now the term truth is not proper to one class of beings only, but is applied universally to all beings.
Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut se habet ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam se habet ad hoc quod habeat veritatem.Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo se habet, nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.	Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing is true insofar as it is a being; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always have truth in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.
Et sic dicimus, quod ex puero fit vir, vel quod ex addiscente fit sciens, quia addiscens se habet ut in fieri ad scientem. In alio autem modo, quo dicimus ex aere fieri aquam, unum extremorum non se habet ut via vel medium ad alterum, sicut fieri ad factum esse	Now this is the sense in which we say that a man comes from a boy, or a man of science from a learner, because a learner is one who is becoming a man of science. But in the other sense, i.e., the one in which we say that water comes from fire, one of the limits of the change is not related to the other as a passage or intermediate, as generation is to being …
Illud enim ex quo dicimus aliquid fieri, sicut ex puero virum, se habet ut medium inter duo extrema	For the thing from which we say something else comes as a man comes from a boy has the position of an intermediary between two limits
Scotus
Quia si est immutabilis, ergo immutabiliter se habet ad illud ad quod immediate se habet; ergo illud aliud est immutabile. Probatio consequentiae primae: immutabile, quod est ex se primum agens, non potest diversimode se habere ad effectum suum, quia si quandoque agat, quandoque non, hoc videtur esse ex mutatione sui; non enim hoc potest poni propter approximationem novam passivi vel propter amotionem impedimentorum, quia actio primi agentis non requirit ista. - Probatio secundae consequentiae: ad quodcumque necessarium se habet necessario, illud est necessarium.	Because if he is immutable then he is disposed immutably to that to which he is immediately disposed; therefore that other thing is immutable. Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely disposed to its effect, because if it sometimes acts and sometimes does not, this seems to be from a change in itself; for this change cannot be posited as because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of the removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. - Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily disposed, that is itself necessary.
Ponitur quod decem modis potest aliquid se habere ad esse	It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence
unumquodque autem sic se habet ad esse sicut ad veritatem	but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth
Aristoteles posuit, et similiter Avicenna, Deum necessario sese habere ad alia extra se, et ex hoc sequitur quod quodlibet aliud necessario se habet ad ipsum	Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily disposed to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that some other thing is necessarily disposed to God
Deus necessario se habet ad quidlibet quod est extra se	God is necessarily disposed to something that is outside himself
I D2
Intellectus enim postquam est conversus ad illa ad quae conversus est se habet ut potentiale quoddam et purum possibile	For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it has been turned back, possesses itself as a certain potential and pure possible
Voluntas autem postquam conversa est ad quae conversa est se habet ut activum quoddam	the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, is related as a certain active thing
necessario se habet ad productiones illarum, contingenter autem se habet principium producendi creaturas ad ipsas creaturas	it is necessarily related to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently related to the creatures themselves
Ockham
Unde quando aliquae res sic se habent quod possunt sibi succedere in eodem subiecto	Hence, when some things are related that they can succeed each other in the same subject
Sic se habent 'visus' et 'caecitas'	‘Sight’ and ‘blindness’ are related in this way
sicut se habent 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'album' et 'albedo' et consimilia	‘Just’ and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and suchlike are related in this way
nam tales res quandoque se habent sicut causa et effectus	For such things are sometimes related as cause and effect
Ordinatio (Peter King)
tamen possumus habere notitiam alicuius ficti quod aequaliter se habet ad omnes homines	nevertheless, we can have a notion of some fiction that is equally related to all men
Et ita ordo praedicamentalis substantiae est unum compositum seu aggregatum ex multis qualitatibus naturaliter se habentibus secundum superius et inferius	Thus the categorial order of Substance is a composite or aggregate of many qualities naturally related as higher and lower
si universale esset substantia et aliquid esset sibi additum, oporteret quod se haberent sicut actus et potentia	if the universal were substance and something were added to it, it would be necessary that they be related as act and potency
omni illi ad quod illud informans vel extrinsecum se habet uniformiter illi tale denominans aequaliter conveniet	the denominating [factor] equally agrees to all to which the informing or extrinsic [thing] is related uniformly.
ita quod unum quod est in re ex se aliter se habet ad esse universale quam aliud	such that one [thing] in the world is related to universal being differently from another
Summa (Longeway)
scientia propter quid habetur per aliam scientiam, quo modo se habent ad invicem scientia subalternans et scientia subalternata	knowledge why it is so is had through another science, the two being related to one another in the same way as a subalternating science and a subaltern science
Istae autem duae definitiones serrae --- si sint definitiones; quia exempla ponimus, non ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt --- sic se habent quod quidquid significatur per definitionem secundam, significatur etiam per definitionem primam, quamvis generalius	Now these two definitions of saw — if they are definitions, for we posit the example, not as something which is so, but as something that students might think to be so—-these two definitions are related, because whatever is signified by the second definition is signified also by the first definition
Et quia tactum est de esse exsistere, aliquantulum disgrediendo considerandum est qualiter esse exsistere se habet ad rem: utrum scilicet essentia rei et esse rei sint duo extra animam, distincta inter se.	And since being of existence (esse existentiae) has been touched on, turning aside for a little bit, we ought to consider how existence is related to a reality, that is, whether the essence of a reality and the being of the reality are two things distinct from one another outside the soul.