Talk:Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
	P. Fiaccadori, 1866. The translation of William of Moerbeke.	Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Sylvester Humphries, O.P.
402a 1 – 403b 2		BOOK I, CHAPTER I
402a1 1. Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δ' ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν.	Bonorum honorabilium notitiam opinantes, magis autem alteram altera aut certitudine aut ex eo q[uod], meliorum quidem: & mirabiliorum, propter hæc utraque animæ historiam rationabiliter in primis ponemus.	Holding as we do that knowledge is a good and honourable thing, yet that some kinds of knowledge are more so than others, either because they are more certain or because they deal with subjects more excellent and wonderful, we naturally give a primary place, for both these reasons, to an enquiry about the soul.
402a4 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων.	Videtur autem ad veritatem cognitio ipsius multum conducere, maxime autem ad naturam. Est enim tamquam principium animalium.	Indeed an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things.
402a7 ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν,	Inquirimus autem considerare et cognoscere naturam ipsius & substantiam.	We seek then to consider and understand, first, its nature and essence,
402a8 εἶθ' ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν.	postea quaecumque accidunt circa ipsa. Quorum aliae propriae passiones animae esse videntur, aliae autem communes, et animalibus propter illam inesse.	then whatever qualities belong to it. Of these, some seem to be proper to the soul alone, others to be shared in common and to exist in animate beings on account of it.
402a10 πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινα πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς.	Omnino autem & penitus difficillimorum est accipere aliam fidem de ipsa.	To ascertain, however, anything reliable about it is one of the most difficult of undertakings.
402a11 καὶ γάρ, ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι,	Cum enim sit quaestio communis multis aliis (dico autem eam quae est circa substantiam et eam, quae quid est)	Such an enquiry being common to many topics—I mean, an enquiry into the essence, and what each thing is—
402a13 τάχ' ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην·	Fortassis alicui videbitur una quædam methodus esse de omnibus, de quibus volumus cognoscere substantiam, sicut et eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, propriorum demonstrationem; quare quaerendum utique erit methodum istam.	it might seem to some that one definite procedure were available for all things of which we wished to know the essence; as there is demonstration for the accidental properties of things. So we should have to discover what is this one method.
402a16 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος, ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ᾖ πότερον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν·	Si autem non est una quaedam et communis methodus de eo quod quid est, amplius difficilius est negotiari. Oportebit enim accipere circa unumquodque, quis modus. Si autem manifestum sit, utrum demonstratio aliqua sit, aut divisio, aut etiam aliqua alia methodus, adhuc multas habet dubitationes, et errores, ex quibus oportet quaerere.	But if there is no one method for determining what an essence is, our enquiry becomes decidedly more difficult, and we shall have to find a procedure for each case in particular. If, on the other hand, it is clear that either demonstration, or division, or some such process is to be employed, there are still many queries and uncertainties to which answers must be found.
402a21 ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.	Alia enim aliorum principia, sicut numerorum et planorum.	For the principles in different subject matters are different, for instance in the case of numbers and surfaces.
402a22 πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν,	Primum autem fortassis necessarium est dividere in quo generum, et quid sit. Dico autem, utrum hoc aliquid et substantia sit, aut qualitas, aut quantitas, aut etiam quoddam aliud divisorum praedicamentorum.	Perhaps the first thing needed is to divide off the genus of the subject and to say what sort of thing it is,—I mean, whether it be a particular thing or substance, or a quality, or quantity, or any other of the different categories.
402a25 ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι 402b1 μικρόν.	Adhuc autem, utrum eorum quae in potentia sunt, au magis endelechia quaedam sit: differt enim non aliquid parum.	Further, whether it is among things in potency or is an actuality—no insignificant distinction.
402b1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ·	Considerandum autem et si partibilis sit aut impartibilis, et utrum sit similis speciei omnis anima, an non.	Again, whether it is divisible or indivisible, and whether every soul is of the same sort or no:
402b2 εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσα ἢ γένει.	Si autem non similis speciei, utrum specie differat, aut genere.	and if not, whether they differ specifically or generically.
402b3 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν·	Nunc quidem enim dicentes et quaerentes, de anima, de humana solum videntur intendere,	Indeed those who at present talk of and discuss the soul seem to deal only with the human soul.
402b5 εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστι, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,	Formidandum autem qua. tenus non lateat utrum una ratio ipsius est, sicut animalis, aut secundum unumquodque altera: ut equi, canis, hominis, aut Dei.	One must be careful not to leave unexplored the question whether there is a single definition of it, as of ‘animal’ in general, or a different one for each [of its kinds]: as, say, for horse, dog, man or god.
402b7 τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον,	Animal autem universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est	Now ‘animal’ as a universal is nothing real, or is secondary;
402b8 ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο·	Similiter autem et si aliquod commune aliud praedicetur.	and we must say the same of any other general predicate.
402b9 ἔτι δέ, εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων,	Amplius autem et si non multae animae, sed partes, utrum oporteat quaerere prius totam animam, aut partes. Difficile autem est determinare quaenami partes natura alterae abinvicem sint.	Further, if there are not many souls, but only many parts of a single one, we must ask whether one ought to look first at the whole or the parts. It is difficult to see what parts are by nature diverse from one another,
402b11 καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Et utrum partes oporteat quaerere primum, aut opera ipsorum, ut intelligere, aut intellectivum, et sentire, aut sensitivum. Similiter autem et in aliis.	and whether one ought to look first at the parts or their functions, for instance at the act of understanding or at the intellective power, at the act of sensing or at the sensitive faculty; and likewise in other in stances.
402b14 εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ.	Si autem opera prius, iterum utique dubitabit aliquis si objecta horum prius quaerendum, sicut sensibile sensitivo, et intelligibile intellectivo.	But if one is to examine first the operations, it might be asked whether one should not first enquire about their objects, as, in the sensitive function, the thing sensed; and in the intellectual, the thing intelligible.
402b16 ἔοικε δ' οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον, πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι),	Videtur autem non solum quod quid est cognoscere, utile esse ad cognoscendas causas accidentium in substantiis, sicut in mathematicis quid rectum et quid obliquun, et quid linea, et quid planum, ad cognoscendum quod rectis trianguli anguli sunt aequales;	Now, it seems that not only does knowledge of the essence help one to understand the causes of the accidents of any substance (as in Mathematics to know what is the straight and the curved, and what is a line and what a plane enables one to discover the number of right angles to which those of a triangle are equal)
402b21 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν·	sed et econtrario accidentia conferunt magnam partem ad cognoscendum quod quid est.	but, conversely, accidental qualities contribute much to knowing, what a thing essentially is.
402b22 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα·	Cum enim habeamus tradere, secundum phantasiam, de accidentibus, aut omnibus, aut pluribus, tunc et de substantia habebimus dicere aliquid quam optime.	When we can give an account of such qualities (some or all) according to appearances, then we shall have material for dealing as well as possible with the essence.
402b25 πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καθ' ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ 403a1 συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.	Omnis enim demonstrationis principium est, quod quid est. Quare secundum quascumque definitiones non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque conjecturari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quod dialectice dictae sunt et vanae omnes.	The principle of every demonstration is what a thing is. Hence, whatsoever definitions do not afford us a knowledge of accidents, or even a fair conjecture about them, are obviously vain and sophistical.
403a 2-403 b 23
403a3 ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἔστι τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς·	Dubitationem autem habent et passiones animae, utrum sint omnes communes, et habentis, an sit aliqua, et animae propria ipsius.	The modifications of the soul present a problem: are they all shared by what has soul, or are some proper to the soul alone?
403a5 τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν·	Hoc enim accipere quidem necessarium est, non autem facile. Videtur autem plurimorum quidem, nullum sine corpore pati, neque facere, ut irasci, confidere, desiderare, et omnino sentire. Maxime autem videtur proprium ipsum intelligere.	It is necessary indeed, but not easy, to deal with this problem. For in most cases there is, apparently, no action or being acted on without the body; as in anger, desire, confidence, and sensation in general. Understanding however would seem especially proper to the soul.
403a8 εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.	Si autem est et hoc phantasia quaedam, aut non sine phantasia, non continget utique, neque hoc sine corpore esse.	Yet if this too is a sort of imagination, or never occurs without it, not even this exists, in fact, apart from the body.
403a10 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι·	Si quidem igitur est aliquid animae operum aut passionum proprium, continget utique ipsam separari.	But if the soul has some operation or affection exclusive to itself, then it could exist as a separate entity.
403a11 εἰ δὲ μηθέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ᾗ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς [χαλκῆς] σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἅψεται οὕτως χωρισθέν τι εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινος ἐστιν.	Si vero nullum est proprium ipsius, non utique erit separabilis; sed sicut recto, inquantum rectum, multa accidunt, ut tangere aeneam sphaeram secundum punctum, non tamen tanget hoc, separatum ipsum rectum; inseparabile enim, siquidem semper cum quodam corpore est.	If, however, there is nothing thus proper to it, then it is not separable, but is like a straight line, which has, as such, many properties—such as being able to touch a bronze sphere at a given point; but straightness separated does not touch it; not being in fact separable, since it is always with a bodily subject.
403a16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν·	Videntur autem et animae passiones omnes esse cum corpore, ira, mansuetudo, timor, misericordia, confidentia, adhuc gaudium, et amare et odire.	Now all the soul’s modifications do seem to involve the body—anger, meekness, fear, compassion, and joy and love and hate.
403a18 ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.	Simul enim cum his patitur aliquid corpus.	For along with these the body also is to some degree affected.
403a19 μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται.	Indicat autem hic, aliquando quidem duris et manifestis passionibus concidentibus nihil exacerbari aut timere. Aliquando autem et a parvis et debilibus moveri, cum accendatur corpus, et sic se habeat, sicut cum irascitur.	An indication of this is that sometimes violent and unmistakable occurrences arouse no excitement or alarm; while at other times one is moved by slight and trifling matters, when the physical system is stimulated to the condition appropriate to anger.
403a22 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν·	Adhuc autem magis hoc manifestum.	This is still more evident fearful being present,
403a23 μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου.	Non enim terribili imminente, in passionibus fiunt, his inquam quibus timens.	feelings occur as in one when, nothing who is frightened.
403a24 εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν·	Si autem sic habet, manifestum quoniam passiones rationes in materia sunt.	If this is the case, it is evident that the passions are material principles;
403a25 ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον "τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε",	Quare termini tales, ut irasci, motus quidam talis corporis, aut partis aut potentiae, ab hoc, et gratia huiusmodi.	hence such terms as ‘becoming angry’ mean a motion of such and such a body, or of a part or power proceeding from and existing for the body.
403a27 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.	Et propter hoc igitur iam physici est considerare de anima, aut omni, aut huiusmodi.	For this reason, therefore, the natural scientist ought to examine the soul, either all kinds, or this kind.
403a29 διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὁρίσαιντο ὁ φυσικὸς [τε] καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν·	Differenter autem definiet physicus et dialecticus unumquodque ipsorum:	The natural scientist and the dialectician will define each of those modifications differently.
403a30 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος 403b1 καὶ θερμοῦ.	ut iram quid est. Hic quidem enim appetitum recontristationis, aut aliquid huiusmodi; ille autem fervorem sanguinis aut calidi circa cor.	Take the question, what is anger? The latter will say, a desire for retaliation, or something similar; the former, an effervescence of blood or heat about the heart.
403b1 τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον.	Horum autem alius quidem assignat materiam, alius vero speciem et rationem.	Of these, the natural scientist designates the matter, the dialectician, the form or idea.
403b2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί,	Ratio quidem enim haec species rei. Necesse est autem hanc esse in materia huiusmodi,	For this ‘idea’ is the thing’s form. This however must have existence in material of the sort in question;
403b3 εἰ ἔσται· ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ' ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ' ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος <οὗ> ἕνεκα τωνδί.	si erit sicut domus, ratio quidem talis quaedam, quia operimentum prohibens corruptiones a ventis et imbribus et caumatibus. Haec autem dicit et lapides et lateres et ligna. Alia vero in his, speciem propter ista.	if it is a house, one formula will be, ‘a covering to prevent destruction from wind and rain and excessive heat’; the other, ‘stones and beams and timber’; another, ‘the form; in these materials; for those reasons.
403b7 τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον;	Quae igitur naturalis harum? utrum quae circa materiam, rationem autem ignorans, aut quae circa rationem solum,	Which is the physical definition? That which states the matter and ignores the idea? Or that which states the idea only?
403b8 ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος;	aut magis quae est ex utrisque? Illorum autem quis uterque?	Or rather, the compound of both? What then of the other two?
403b9 ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδ' ᾗ χωριστά, ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη, ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός,	At vero non est aliquis, qui circa passiones materiae non separabiles, et quatenus non separabiles versetur: sed physicus circa omnes talis corporis eft talis materiae actiones et passiones versatur. Quaecumque autem non quatenus talia, alius. Ut de quibusdam quidcm est artifex si contingat, ut instructor, aut medicus.	Now there is no one who deals with inseparable qualities of matter, precisely as inseparable from it; but he who is concerned with the affections and activities of the special matter of this or that body is the natural scientist; whereas whatever things are not specifically such, another considers; in certain matters it may perchance be a technical expert, a carpenter or physician.
403b14 τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ᾗ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώματος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, ᾗ δὲ κεχωρισμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος;	At non separabilium quidem, inquantum autem nori talis corporis passiones, sed ex remotione, mathematicus. Secundum autem quod separatae, primus philosophus.	Concerning however what is inseparable from matter, and yet as not involved in the specific qualities of this or that body, but abstracted from any, the mathematician; and concerning what is separable, the ‘first philosopher’.
403b16 ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος. ἐλέγομεν δὴ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ᾗ γε τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει <οἷα> θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.	Sed redeundum esl unde sermo. Dicebamos autem, quod passiones animae non separabiles a physica materia animalium, inquantum tales existunt furor, et timor, et non sicut linea et planum.	To return from our digression. We were saying that the passions, of the soul are not separable from the physical material of animals (anger and fear having this kind of existence), and yet also that they differ, in this, from the line and the surface.
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β'		BOOK I, CHAPTER II
403b20 Ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ἅμα διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτ' εὐλαβηθῶμεν.	Intendentes autem de anima, necesse est, simul dubitantes de quibus bene dubitare oportet pertranseuntes, priorum opiniones comprehendere, quicumque aliquid de ipsa enuntiaverunt; ut bene quidem dicta accipiamus; si vero aliquid non bene, hoc vereamur.	Investigating the soul, it is necessary, while suspending judgment on matters which should be held uncertain, that we study the opinions of certain thinkers who have dealt with the subject, so as to take note of anything they said pertinently, whilst avoiding their mistakes.
403b 24 –404b 7]
403b24 ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυσὶ μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς·	Principium autem quaestionis praeponere quae maxime videntur ipsi inesse secundum naturam. Animatum igitur ab inanimato in duobus maxime differre videtur, motu et sensu. Accipimus autem et a progenitoribus fere duo haec de anima.	Our enquiry must begin with a statement of what seems most to belong by nature to the soul. The animated being would appear to differ from the inanimate in two primary respects: by motion and by sense-perception. And these two notions are roughly what our predecessors have handed down to us concerning the soul.
403b28 φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.	Dicunt enim quidam et maxime et primo animam esse id quod est movens. Existimantes autem, quod non movetur ipsum non contingere movere alterum aliquid eorum quae moventur, animam sic arbitrati sunt esse.	For some say that the soul is principally and primarily what moves. Holding that what does not itself move moves no other moving thing, they thought that the soul too was thus.
403b31 ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν 404a1 πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι·	Unde Democritus ignem quemdam, aut calorem dicit esse ipsam.	Hence Democritus, said it was a kind of fire or heat.
404a1 ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει (οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν), ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος),	Infinitis enim existentibus figuris, et atomis, quae speciei rotundae, ignem et animam dicit, ut in aere mota corpora, quae vocantur decisiones, quae videntur per portas in radiis, quarum omne semen, elementa dicit totius naturae. Similiter autem et Leucippus.	There exist an infinite number of shapes and atoms, and those of the spherical kind are, he said, fire and soul: like the dust-motes in the air called ‘atomies’ seen in the rays of the sun in doorways; and of all the seeds of these, he said, are the elements of all Nature. Leucippus had a similar opinion.
404a5 τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμοὺς καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπά, κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ παρέχον τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν·	Horum autem sphaerica, aniinam, propter id, quod maxime possunt per omne penetrare huiusmodi figurae, et movere reliqua cum moveantur et ipsa, arbitrantes animam esse efficiens in animalibus motum:	Those round in shape make the soul, because they are most able to penetrate everywhere, and since they move of themselves, they have also the power to move everything else. The soul, they maintained, is what causes movement in living things:
404a9 διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν·	unde et vivendi terminum esse respirationem.	and accordingly breathing is coterminous with living.
404a10 συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν·	Constringente enim eo quod continet corpora, et extrudente figuras praebentes animalibus motum, ex eo quod non est ipsas quiescere nullatenus, auxilium fieri de foris, ingredientibus aliis huiusmodi in respirando.	That which envelops all bodies expels by compression the atoms [within], thus causing movement in animals, for these [atoms] are never at rest. A reinforcement must come therefore [he said] from without; in that other atoms enter by respiration,
404a14 κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐκκρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον·	Prohibere enim has et quae insunt animalibus disgregari, simul prohibentes constringens et comprimens,	preventing from dispersal those that are within the animate body, and which simultaneously resist the constraining and compressing environment;
404a15 καὶ ζῆν δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν.	et vivere autem quamdiu possunt hoc facere.	and that animals live so long as they can do this.
404a16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν·	Videtur autem et a Pythagoricis dicta, eamdem habere intelligentiam.	The teaching of the Pythagoreans seems to have had much the same purport.
404a17 ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν, περὶ δὲ τούτων εἴρηται ὅτι συνεχῶς φαίνεται κινούμενα, κἂν ᾖ νηνεμία παντελής.	Dixerunt enim quidam ipsorum, animam esse quae sunt, in aere decisiones. Alii autem has movens. De his autem dictum est, propterea quod continue videntur moveri, et si sit tranquillitas animae.	Some of these said the soul consisted of atoms in the air; others, that it was what sets these in motion. And these atoms are mentioned. because they seem to be always moving, even if the soul be quite tranquil.
404a20 ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν·	In idem autem ferantur quicumque dicunt animam esse quod seipsum movens.	All who say that the soul is a thing that moves itself tend in the same direction;
404a21 ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίνησιν οἰκειότατον εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτην δ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται.	Videntur autem hi omnes existimantes motum maixime proprium esse animae. Et alia quidem omnia moveri propter animam, ipsam autem a seipsa, propter nihil videre movens, quod non et ipsum moveatur.	all seem to hold that movement is what is most proper to the soul, and accordingly that all things are in motion on account of the soul, but the soul itself on its own account; because one sees nothing moving other things that is not itself moving.
404a25 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ὡς τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς·	Similiter autem et Anaxagoras animam dicit esse moventem, et si aliquis alius dixit, quod omne movit intellectus.	Anaxagoras likewise said that the soul is a mover, as also did anyone else who held that a Mind moves all things.
404a27 οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ' ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος.	Non tamen penitus sicut Democritus.	But his view is not exactly Democritus’.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον, διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι [τὸν] Ὅμηρον ὡς ὁ Ἕκτωρ "κεῖτ' ἀλλοφρονέων"·	Ille quidem enim simpliciter dicit idem esse animam et intellectum, verum enim esse quod videtur. Unde bene facere Homerum, quod Hector iacet aliud sapiens.	He [Democritus], asserts that intellect and soul are absolutely identical; and that what appears is the truth. And therefore that Homer aptly says of Hector that he lay ‘other-minded’.
404a30 οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν)·	Non itaque utitur intellectu tamquam potentia quadam, quae est circa veritatem: sed idem dicit animam et intellectum.	He does not use the term intellect to denote a definite faculty concerned with truth, but identifies soul and intellect.
404b1 Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν·	Anaxagoras autem minus certificat de ipsis.	Anaxagoras is less definite about these matters.
404b1 πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ·	Multoties quidem enim causam eius, quod bene et recte, dicit intellectum hunc esse animam.	He often says that the cause of being right or good is intellect, and that this is the soul.
404b3 ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις·	In omnibus enim ipsum inesse animalibus magnis et parvis, et honorabilibus et inhonorabilibus.	For it is, he says, in all animals, great and small, noble and base.
404b5 οὐ φαίνεται δ' ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.	Non videtur autem secundum prudentiam dictus intellectus, omnibus similiter inesse animalibus: sed neque hominibus omnibus.	It does not seem, however, that there exists mind, in the sense of prudence, alike in all animals: nor even in all men.
404b7 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν·	Quicumque quidem igitur animatum moveri aspexerunt, quidem maxime motivum opinati sunt animam esse.	All those therefore who have regarded life from the point of view of movement have held soul to be pre-eminently a moving force.
404 b 8-404 b 29
404b8 ὅσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην,	Quicumque autem ad cognoscere, et sentire ea quae sunt, isti dicunt animam esse principia, alii quidem plura facientes haec, alii vero unum hoc.	All who have considered it as knowing and perceiving realities identify the soul with the [elemental] principles,—some making several principles, others one.
404b11 ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως,	Sicut Empedoclcs quidem ex elementis omnibus esse et unumquodque horum animam dicens,	Empedocles, for instance, says that it is composed of all elements, and that each of these is a soul, saying,
404b13 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ·	sicut terram quidem terra cognoscimus, aethere aethera divum: aquam autem aqua: sed igne ignem obscurum ac latentem, manifestum est, concordia autem concordiam: discordiam discordia tristi.	As by earth we know earth, by ether divine ether, By water water, by fire, it is clear, fire mysterious and hidden; Love by love, hate by sad hate.
404b16 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ·	Eodem autem modo, et Plato in Timaeo animam facit ex elementis.	In the same way Plato in the Timaeus constitutes the soul from the elements.
404b17 γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι.	Cognosci enim simile simili: res autem ex principiis esse.	For like [he says] is known by like; and things are made up of elements.
404b18 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως·	Similiter autem et in his, quae sunt de philosophia dicta, determinatum est: et ipsum quidem animal ex ipsa unius idea, et ex prima longitudine, et latitudine, et altitudine, alia autem simili modo.	In the lectures ‘On Philosophy’ he likewise lays it down that the animate itself is compounded of the idea of the One, together with the primary Length and Depth and Breadth; other things existing in the same manner.
404b21 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ.	Adhuc autem et aliter, intellectum quidem unum, scientiam autem duo: singulariter enim ad unum. Plani autem numerum, ad opinionem: sensum vero, eum, qui firmi.	Again, rather differently, that intellect is the One, knowledge the Two (for [this proceeds] as one to one), and the number of the Plane belongs to opinion, and that of the Solid to sensation.
404b24 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ' ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ' αἰσθήσει·	Numeri quidem enim species et principia entium dicebantur. Sunt autem ex elementis. Iudicantur autem res, aliae quidem intellectu, aliae vero scientia, aliae autem opinione, aliae vero sensu.	For he said that numbers are the specific forms and principles of beings, and are themselves constituted from elements. Some things are discerned by understanding, some by science, some by opinion, some by sensation.
404b27 εἴδη δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων.	Species autem, numeri hi, rerum.	But these same numbers are the specific forms of things.
404b27 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ' ἑαυτόν.	Quoniam autem et motivum videbutur anima esse, et cognoscitivum: sic quidam complexi sunt ex utrisque, enunciantes animam esse numerum moventem seipsum.	But since the soul seems to be both a moving and a knowing principle, some have made it out to be a combination of these two, stating that it is a self-moving number.
404b 30 –405b 30]
404b30 διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, 405a1 τούτοις δ' οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι.	[p12/29] Differunt autem de principiis, quae et quot sunt; maxime corporea facientes et incorporea. His autem miscentes, et ab utrisque principia enunciantes.	Opinions differ however as to the elemental principles—what they are, how many they are; and the difference is greatest between those who make these corporeal and those who make them incorporeal. But some, making a mixture, have defined the principles in terms of both.
405a2 διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους·	Differunt autem et circa multitudinem:	They differ also as to the number,
405a2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν.	hi quidem enim unum, illi vero plura dicunt.	some positing one, others several.
405a3 ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως.	Consequenter autem his et animam assignant: motivum enim natura priorum existimaverunt non irrationabiliter.	And they assign a soul to these [principles] accordingly. (For they not unreasonably assumed that what by nature causes movement was primary.)
405a5 ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι·	Unde quibusdam visum est ignem esse.	Hence some have held it to be fire;
405a6 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον,	Etenim hic in partibus subtilissimus est, et maxime elementorum incorporeus.	for this is the most subtle, and much the least corporeal of the elements;
405a7 ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως.	Adhuc autem movetur: quia et movet alia primo.	moreover, it moves itself, being the first cause of movement in other things.
405a8 Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον·	Democritus autem dulcius dixit, enuncians propter quid utrumque horum.	Democritus said something which rather neatly gives the reason for either fact.
405a9 ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητικὸν δὲ διὰ μικρομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα· τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει· τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ.	Animam quidem enim et intellectum idem esse; istud autem esse ex primis et indivisibilibus corporibus. Motivum autem propter subtilitatem partium et figuram, Figurarum autem leviter mobilissiman sphaericam dicit; huiusmodi autem esse intellectum et ignem.	He said that soul is the same as mind, and that this originates in primary indivisible particles and that it causes motion by its fineness and shape. He says that the sphere is the most light and mobile of shapes, and that fire and mind must both be of such a nature.
405a13 Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται δ' ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων·	Anaxagoras autem videtur quidem alterum dicere animam et intellectum, sicut diximus prius. Utitur autem utrisque sicut una natura. Verumtamen intellectum ponit principium omnium maxime,	Anaxagoras, however (as we said above), seems to speak of soul and mind as diverse, yet he employs both terms as for a single essence. Nevertheless, he posits Intellect as the principle par excellence of the Universe,
405a16 μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν.	solumque dicit ipsum eorum, quae sunt, simplicem esse, et immixtum et purum.	saying that this alone among beings is simple, unmixed and pure.
405a17 ἀποδίδωσι δ' ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.	Assignat autem utrumque eidem principio, cognoscereque et movere, dicens intellectum movere omne.	He attributes, indeed, to the same principle both knowing and moving; saying that the Intellect moves all things.
405a19 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ·	Videtur autem et Thales, ex quibus reminiscuntur, motivum aliquid animam opinari, siquidem dixit lapidem animam habere, quoniam ferrum movet.	It seems that Thales, from what they recollect of him, was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion,—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a ‘soul’ because it attracts iron.
405a21 Διογένης δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν·	Diogenes autem, sicut et alteri quidam, aerem hunc opinans omnium subtilissimum esse et principium,	Now Diogenes, like certain others, held that air is the most subtle of all things and is their principle;
405a23 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ᾗ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, ᾗ δὲ λεπτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι.	et propter hoc cognoscere et movere animam. Secundum quidem quod primum est, et ex hoc reliqua cognoscere; secundum vero quod subtilissimum est, motivum esse.	and is the cause of the soul’s knowing and moving. As primary, it is cognitive of all else: and as the most subtle thing, it is the motive force.
405a25 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί·	Heraclitus autem principium esse dicit animam, siquidem vaporem ex quo anima constat, etenim incorporalissimum esse et fluens semper.	Heraclitus, however, says that soul, as a principle, is some vapour of which it is constituted, since this is the least corporeal of substances and is always flowing;
405a27 τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι· ἐν κινήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί.	Quod vero movetur ab eo quod movetur cognosci. In motu autem esse quae sunt et ille arbitratus est et multi.	and that any moving object is known by a moving object—he and many others holding that all realities are in movement.
405a29 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς·	Similiter autem his et Alcmaeon opinari visus est de anima.	Alcmaeon seems to have held opinions on the soul similar to these.
405a30 φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις·	Dicit enim ipsam immortalem esse propter hoc quod assimilatur immortalibus.	For he said it was immortal because it bore a resemblance to immortal beings.
405a31 τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς 405b1 ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.	Hoc autem inesse ipsi, tamquam semper motac: moveri enim et divina omnia continue semper, lunam, solem, astra et totum caelum.	And this he attributed to it because it always moves; all heavenly things seem to be in motion continually—the sun, the moon, the stars, all heaven.
405b1 τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων·	Magis autem rudium et aquam quidam existimaverunt, ut Hippo.	Some cruder thinkers, like Hippo, thought it was water.
405b3 πεισθῆναι δ' ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά. καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ οὐχ αἷμα· ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν.	Suaderi enim visi sunt ex genitura, quoniam omnium humida est. Et namque arguit sanguinem dicentes animam, quoniam genitura non est sanguis.	They seem to have been persuaded of this because semen is liquid in all animals. For he confutes those who say the soul is the blood, on the ground that semen, which is the inchoate Soul, is not blood.
405b5 ἕτεροι δ' αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν.	Hanc autem esse primam animam. Alii autem sanguinem, quemadmodum Critias, ipsum sentire, animae maxime proprium opinantes: hoc autem inesse propter naturam sanguinis.	Others, such as Critias, held it was blood; that sensation was most distinctive of the soul; and that it was due to the nature of blood that this power was in it.
405b8 πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς·	Omnia enim elementa judicem acceperunt, praeter terram.	For opinions have been given in favour of every element excepting earth:
405b9 ταύτην δ' οὐθεὶς ἀποπέφανται, πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτὴν εἴρηκεν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων ἢ πάντα.	Hanc autem nulli protulerunt: nisi aliquis dixerit ipsam ex omnibus elementis esse, aut omnia.	which no one has proposed, unless whosoever may have said it was derived from all the elements, or was identical with them, did so.
405b10 ὁρίζονται δὴ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ·	Definiunt autem omnes animam, tribus (ut est dicere) motu, sensu, et incorporeo.	All, taken together, define soul, we may say, by three things: by movement, by sensation, and by immateriality.
405b12 τούτων δ' ἕκαστον ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς.	Horum autem unumquodque reducitur ad principia.	And each of these is reduced to elemental principles.
405b12 διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὁριζόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνός·	Unde et in cognoscendo definientes ipsam, aut elementum, aut ex elementis faciunt, dicentes similiter invicem praeter unum.	Hence, in defining it as cognitive, they make it either an element or consist of several elements, one saying much the same as another (with a single exception).
405b15 φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ·	Dicunt enim simile cognosci simili.	For they say that anything is known by what resembles it,
405b15 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα γινώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.	Quoniam autem anima omnia cognoscit, constituunt eam ex omnibus principiis.	and as the soul knows all things, go they constitute it of all principles:
405b17 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἕν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἓν τιθέασιν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα·	Quicumque quidem igitur unam aliquam dicunt causam et elementum unum, et animam unum ponunt, ut ignem aut aerem.	some saying that there is one cause and one element, and that the soul is a single thing—fire or water, for example;
405b18 οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν.	Plura vero dicentes principia, et animam plura dicunt.	others that there are several principles, and that the soul is multiple.
405b19 Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησιν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ κοινὸν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. τοιοῦτος δ' ὢν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος εἴρηκεν οὔτ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές ἐστιν.	Anaxagoras autem solus impassibilem dicit intellectum, et nihil commune nulli aliorum habere. Huiusmodi autem eum sit, quomodo cognoscit, et propter quam causan), neque ille dixit, neque ex his, quae dicta sunt, conspicuum est.	But Anaxagoras, standing alone, says that mind is beyond the reach of influence and has nothing in common with other things. But, granted that this be true, he, did not explain how it acquires knowledge, in virtue of what cause; nor is this made clear by anything else he said.
405b23 ὅσοι δ' ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν·	Quicumque autem contrarietates faciunt in principiis, et animam ex contrariis constituunt.	Those who posit contraries as first principles also maintain that the soul consists of such contraries,
405b24 οἱ δὲ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων τιθέασιν.	Quicumque autem alterum contrariorum, ut calidum aut frigidum, aut aliquid huiusmodi aliud, et animam similiter unum aliquid horum ponunt.	while those who favour some one among contraries (hot or cold, or some other like these) make the soul, accordingly, one of these.
405b26 διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν, <διὰ τὸ> διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν.	Unde et nominibus consequuntur, ut calidum quidem dicentes, quia propter hoc, et hoc vivere nominatum est.	Whence also some follow names, as those who allege that it is heat, because life is due to heat and is named from it. But those who identify the soul with cold say that it is named from respiration and breathing.
405b29 τὰ μὲν οὖν παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ δι' ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν οὕτω, ταῦτ' ἐστίν.	Qui autem frigidum, propter respirationem et refrigerationem vocari animam. Tradita quidem igitur de anima, et propter quas causas dicunt sic, haec sunt.	Such then are the opinions that have been transmitted to us about the soul, together with the reasons given for them.
405b 31 –406b 14		BOOK I, CHAPTER III
405b31 Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως· ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν 406a1 φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ' ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν.	Considerandum autem primum quidem de motu. Fortassis enim non solum falsum est, substantiam ipsius huiusmodi esse, qualem ajunt, dicentes animam esse quod est seipsum movens, aut possibile movere. Sed unum quiddam impossibilium inesse ipsi motum.	The first thing to be considered is movement. For perhaps it is not only false to say that this is the essence of the soul, as some mean when they say the soul is self-moving, or is able to move itself, but that there should be movement in it at all is an impossibility.
406a3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρότερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός-ἢ γὰρ καθ' ἕτερον ἢ καθ' αὑτό·	Quod quidem igitur non sit, movens et ipsum moveri, prius dictum est. Dupliciter enim movetur omne. Aut enim secundum alterum, aut secundum seipsum.	It has already been stated that it is not necessary that everything that causes motion be itself moving. For everything moves in one of two ways: either by another, or of itself.
406a5 καθ' ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες·	Secundum alterum dicimus, quaecumque moventur ex esse in eo quod movetur, ut nautae.	We say, ‘by another’, of anything that moves through being in that which moves, like sailors;
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ·	Non enim similiter moventur navi.	for these are not in motion in the same way as the ship.
406a7 τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ κινεῖται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι (δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων·	Haec quidem secundum seipsam movetur, illi autem ex esse in eo quod movetur. Manifestum autem in partibus est.	The latter moves of itself, but they through being in what moves. (This is evident if we consider their parts.
406a8 οἰκεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων·	Proprius quidem enim motus pedum, ambulatio: haec autem et hominum est.	Walking is the proper motion of the feet—and also of men—;
406a9 οὐχ ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τόδε)	Non inest autem nautis tunc.	but for the time being the sailors do not walk).
406a10 διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖσθαι νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ' αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μετέχει κινήσεως.	Dupliciter itaque dicto moveri, nunc intendimus de anima, si per seipsam movetur, et participat motu.	Movement being thus predicated in two ways, we now turn to the soul, asking whether it moves of itself and participates in motion.
406a12 τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κινοῖτ' ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας.	Quatuor autem motus cum sint: loci mutationis, alterationis, augmenti, et decrementi: aut secundum unum horum movebitur, aut secundum plures, aut omnes.	Since there are four kinds of movement (local, by alteration, by increase, by decrease) its motion must be one of these, or some, or all.
406a14 εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ·	Si vero movetur non secundum accidens, natura inerit motus ipsi.	But if its movement is not incidental, then motion will be in it by nature:
406a15 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τόπος· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ.	Si autem hoc, et locus. Omnes enim dicti motus in loco sunt.	and if so, it will be [in] place; for all the aforesaid movements are in place.
406a16 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τριπήχει·	Si autem est substantia animae, movere seipsam, non secundum accidens moveri ipsi inerit, sicut albo et tricubito;	If it is the essence of the soul to move itself, to be in motion will not be in it incidentally, as in what is white or three cubits long;
406a19 κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·	moventur enim et haec, sed secundum accidens.	for these also participate in movement, but incidentally.
406a20 ᾧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν·	Cui enim haec insunt, movetur illud corpus. Unde non est locus ipsorum.	For what moves is the body in which these inhere; hence of themselves they have no place;
406a21 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει κινήσεως μετέχει.	Animae autem erit: siquidem natura motu participat.	but the soul has it, if indeed it naturally participates in motion.
406a22 ἔτι δ' εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ κινηθείη·	Amplius autem si natura movetur, et violentia movebitur;	Further, if it moves by nature, so it will move by force;
406a23 κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἠρεμίας·	et si violentia, et natura. Eodem autem modo se habet de quiete.	and if by force, then, by nature. And its rest will be in the same way.
406a24 εἰς ὃ γὰρ κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ φύσει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται βίᾳ, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ βίᾳ.	In quod enim movetur natura, in hoc natura quiescit. Similiter autem et ad quod movetur violentia, et quiescit in hoc violentia.	Whithersoever it moves by nature, there it will come to rest by nature; and likewise wheresoever it is moved by force, there it will come to rest by force.
406a26 ποῖαι δὲ βίαιοι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι.	Quales autem violenti motus animae erunt, et quietes? neque fingere volentibus facile est reddere.	But what kind of enforced motions and rests will there be in the soul? To find an answer is not easy, nor, even to imagine one!
406a27 ἔτι δ' εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ· τούτων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξύ.	Amplius, si quidem sursum movebitur, ignis erit; si vero deorsum, terra. Horum enim corporum motus hi sunt. Eadem autem ratio et de mediis.	Again, if it moves upwards, it will be fire; and if downwards, earth; for such are the movements of these bodies; and the same holds of the intermediate [elements].
406a30 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις ἃς καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἣν τὸ 406b1 σῶμα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή.	Quoniam autem videtur movere corpus, rationabile est his movere motibus, quibus et ipsa movetur, Si autem hoc, et convertentibus erit dicere verum, quod secundum quod corpus movetur, hoc et ipsa.	Since it seems to move the body, it would seem reasonable [to say] that it does so by the same motions as those by which it moves itself. If so, then it is true to say, conversely, that just as the body moves, the soul also moves.
406b1 τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται φορᾷ·	Corpus autem movetur secundum loci mutationem:	Now the body moves by change of place;
406b2 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἢ ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη.	quare et anima movebitur secundum corpus, aut tota, aut secundum partes translata.	hence the soul too will move in accordance with the body, either the whole or the parts being transposed.
406b3 εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄν· τούτῳ δ' ἕποιτ' ἂν τὸ ἀνίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων.	Si autem hoc contingit, et exeuntem iterum ingredi continget (l). Ad hoc autem sequetur, resurgere mortua animalium.	If this is so, then it might happen that after leaving the body it could return to it. (But it is utterly impossible that the dead rise again.) And it would follow that dead animals could rise again.
406b5 τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινοῖτο·	Motum autem secundum accidens, si ab altero moveatur.	If it does move, however, by something else, its motion will be incidental;
406b6 ὠσθείη γὰρ ἂν βίᾳ τὸ ζῷον. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθ' ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ δι' αὑτό, τὸ μὲν δι' ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν.	Depelletur enim utique violentia animal. Non oportet autem cui a seipso moveri inest in substantia, hoc ab alio moveri, nisi secundum accidens, sicut neque quod secundum se bonum, aut propter seipsum, hoc quidem propter aliud esse, hoc autem alterius causa.	for certainly an animal can be driven by force. But what has self-movement as of its essence cannot be moved by another, save incidentally; as that which is good in itself or for its own sake cannot exist for the sake of another, or on account of another.
406b10 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαίη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῖται.	Animam autem maxime dicet aliquis utique a sensibilibus moveri, siquidem movetur.	One might certainly say that, if the soul is moved at all, it is moved by the objects of sensation.
406b11 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ κινεῖ γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ κινοῖτ' ἄν, ὥστ' εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἔκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ᾗ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτ' ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἑαυτὴν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτήν.	At vero si movet ipsa seipsam, et ipsa movetur utique. Quare si omnis motus ex distantia est ab eo quod movetur, secundum quod movetur, et anima distabit utique a substantia ipsius secundum seipsam, nisi secundum accidens seipsam moveat: sed est motus substantiae ipsius per se.	But if it moves itself it also is in motion. Hence if all motion is a displacement of the moved as such, then the soul must be displaced from its own essence by itself, unless its movement be incidental; but [in fact] this is a self-movement of its essence.
406b 15 –407a 2]
406b15 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ·	[p19/36] Quidam autem et movere animam dicunt corpus in quo est sicut ipsa movetur, ut Democritus, similiter dicens Philippo comoediarum didascalo.	Some say that a soul moves the body in which it dwells just as it moves itself; as did Democritus, who spoke like Philip the comic poet;