Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c3

Chapter 3

Greek	Latin	English
εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ [30] μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν [31] μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Sunt autem quidam qui dicunt, ut Megarici, quando operatur solum posse, et quando non operatur non posse, ut non ↵ edificantem non posse edificare, sed edificantem quando edificat; similiter autem et in aliis.	Chapter 3. There are some who say, as the Megaric school does, that a thing can act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it cannot act, e.g. that he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so in all other cases.
οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτ᾽ οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ [35] εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναί ἐστιν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, [1047α] [1] καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ: οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστιν), ὅταν παύσηται, οὐχ ἕξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ᾽ εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;	Quibus accidentia inconvenientia ƿ non est difficile videre. Palam enim quia non est edificator si ↵ non edificet; nam edificatori esse est esse potentem edificare. Similiter autem et in aliis artibus. Si igitur impossibile est tales habere artes non discentem ali↵quando et accipientem, et non habere non abicientem aliquando (aut enim oblivione aut passione aliqua aut tempore; non enim utique re corrupta, semper enim est): quando cessaverit, non habebit artem, iterum qui statim edificabit aliqualiter accipiens.	It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view. For it is clear that on this view a man will not be a builder unless he is building (for to be a builder is to be able to build), and so with the other arts. If, then, it is impossible to have such arts if one has not at some time learnt and acquired them, and it is then impossible not to [47a] have them if one has not sometime lost them (either by forgetfulness or by some accident or by time; for it cannot be by the destruction of the object, for that lasts for ever), a man will not have the art when he has ceased to use it, and yet he may immediately build again; how then will he have got the art?
καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως: οὔτε γὰρ [5] ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων: ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς.	Et inanimata utique similiter. Neque enim ↵ frigidum neque calidum neque dulce * neque omnino sensibile nihil erit non sentientibus; quare Protagore rationem eis dicere continget.	And similarly with regard to lifeless things; nothing will be either cold or hot or sweet or perceptible at all if people are not perceiving it; so that the upholders of this view will have to maintain the doctrine of Protagoras.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἕξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται μηδ᾽ ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἔτι ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ [10] τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί.	At vero nec sensum habebit nihil, si non sentiat nec operetur. Si ergo cecum non habens visum, aptum vero natum et quando aptum natum est * et adhuc ens, iidem ↵ ceci erunt saepe die * et surdi.	But, indeed, nothing will even have perception if it is not perceiving, i.e. exercising its perception. If, then, that is blind which has not sight though it would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and when it still exists, the same people will be blind many times in the day-and deaf too.
ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔσται γενέσθαι: τὸ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν. [15] ἀεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἑστηκὸς ἑστήξεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται: οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζηται: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔσται ἀναστῆναι ὅ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστῆναι.	Amplius si impossibile quod privatum est potentia, quod non fit impossibile erit factum esse. Sed quod impossibile est factum esse dicens aut esse aut futurum esse, mentietur; nam impossibile hoc significavit. Quare hae rationes auferunt ↵ motum et generationem. Semper enim stans stabit et sedens sedebit, non enim surget si sedet; impossibile namque erit surgere quod non potest surgere.	Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable of happening either that it is or that it will be will say what is untrue; for this is what incapacity meant. Therefore these views do away with both movement and becoming. For that which stands will always stand, and that which sits will always sit, since if it is sitting it will not get up; for that which, as we are told, cannot get up will be incapable of getting up.
εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν, φανερὸν ὅτι δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια ἕτερόν ἐστιν (ἐκεῖνοι δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ταὐτὸ [20] ποιοῦσιν, διὸ καὶ οὐ μικρόν τι ζητοῦσιν ἀναιρεῖν), ὥστε ἐνδέχεται δυνατὸν μέν τι εἶναι μὴ εἶναι δέ, καὶ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι εἶναι δέ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν δυνατὸν βαδίζειν ὂν μὴ βαδίζειν, καὶ μὴ βαδίζειν δυνατὸν ὂν βαδίζειν.	Si ergo non contingit haec dicere, palam quia potentia et actus alterum sunt (ille vero ↵ rationes potentiam et actum idem faciunt, propter quod et non parvum aliquid quaerunt destruere). Quare contingit possibile ƿ quidem aliquid esse, non esse autem, et possibile non esse, esse autem. Similiter autem et in aliis cathegoriis: possibile vadere ens non vadere, et non vadens possibile esse vadere.	But we cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are different (but these views make potency and actuality the same, and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate), so that it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not he, and capable of not being and yet he, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate; it may be capable of walking and yet not walk, or capable of not walking and yet walk.
ἔστι δὲ δυνατὸν τοῦτο ᾧ ἐὰν ὑπάρξῃ [25] ἡ ἐνέργεια οὗ λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνδέχεται καθῆσθαι, τούτῳ ἐὰν ὑπάρξῃ τὸ καθῆσθαι, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον: καὶ εἰ κινηθῆναι ἢ κινῆσαι ἢ στῆναι ἢ στῆσαι ἢ εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ γίγνεσθαι, ὁμοίως.	Est autem possibile hoc cui si extiterit actus cuius dicitur habere poten↵tiam, nihil erit impossibile. Dico autem puta si possibile sedere et contingit sedere, huic si inest sedere, nihil erit impossibile; et aut moveri aut movere aut statui aut statuere aut esse aut fieri aut non esse aut non fieri, similiter.	And a thing is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity. I mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable of being moved or moving, or of standing or making to stand, or of being or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be.
[30] ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοὔνομα, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν συντιθεμένη, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων μάλιστα: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια μάλιστα ἡ κίνησις εἶναι, διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀποδιδόασι τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄλλας δέ τινας κατηγορίας, οἷον διανοητὰ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὰ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα, [35] κινούμενα δὲ οὔ, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσονται ἐνεργείᾳ. [1047β] [1] τῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ἔνια δυνάμει ἐστίν: οὐκ ἔστι δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν.	Venit autem actus * nomen, qui ad endelichiam compositus, ↵ et ad alia ex motibus maxime; videtur enim actus maxime motus esse. Quapropter et non existentibus non assignant moveri, alias autem quasdam cathegorias: puta intellectualia et concupiscibilia esse non entia, mota vero non. Hoc ↵ autem, quia non entia actu erunt actu. Non entium enim quae↵dam potentia sunt; non sunt autem, quia non endelichia sunt.	The word actuality , which we connect with complete reality , has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement. And so people do not assign movement to non-existent things, though they do assign some other predicates. E.g. they say that non-existent things are objects of thought and desire, but not that they are moved; and this because, while ex hypothesi they do not actually exist, they would have to exist actually if they [47b] were moved. For of non-existent things some exist potentially; but they do not exist, because they do not exist in complete reality.