User talk:Edward Ockham
Looks interesting [1]. A list of incipits. Edward Ockham 01:35, 12 June 2011 (CDT)
Contents
- 1 Books
- 2 Ockham
- 3 Argument from design
- 4 Plato Dialogues
- 5 Latin logical phrases
- 6 Buridan
- 7 Test
- 8 Scotus
- 9 Appellatio
- 10 code
- 11 other
- 12 Square
- 13 Antioch
- 14 MS list
- 15 Oxen
- 16 British Academy
- 17 Definition of white and St Patrick
- 18 Paul of Venice book
- 19 Plagiarism
- 20 replace n with n
- 21 individual difference
- 22 Maxims
- 23 miracles
Books
Ockham
- detailed bibliography
- Opera politica IV. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1997). An edition of five of the shorter political writings of the medieval philosopher William Ockam: Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico, De imperatorum et pontificum potestate, the Compendium errorum and two texts for which Ockham's authorship is uncertain - Allegationes de potestate imperiali and De electione Caroli quarti. 500p (British Academy/ Oxford UP 1997) Ed. H. S. Offler. Auctores Britannici medii aevi, 14. Oxford, British Academy, 1997. XVIII+486 p.
Argument from design
Plato Dialogues
Latin logical phrases
- A maiore ad minus
- A priori and a posteriori
- Non sequitur
- Reductio ad absurdum
- Post hoc ergo propter hoc
- Sensus compositionis
- Syllogismus utilis
- Syllogismus regulatus
- De dicto
Buridan
- Buridan 1509 Reprinted by Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt 1964.
Test
Sample text with span here End span
Scotus
Different versions of his proof of the existence of God are at Lectura 1, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 38-135; Ordinatio 1, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 39-190; Reportatio 1, d. 2, q. 1; and De primo principio
"Scotus argues that the human intellect is capable of achieving certainty in its knowledge of the truth simply by the exercise of its own natural powers, with no special divine help. He therefore opposes both skepticism, which denies the possibility of certain knowledge, and illuminationism, which insists that we need special divine illumination in order to attain certainty. He works out his attack on both doctrines in the course of a reply to Henry of Ghent in Ordinatio 1, d. 3, pars 1, q. 4.
Appellatio
"Some authors, especially before the second half of the thirteenth century, add to RA a clause which stipulates that if the supposition of the subject does not include existent things (appellata), it shall take aboard non-existent ones, that is, falsifiers. In other words, no empty supposition is allowed: in order to make a proposition false, you need things that will make it false. Two mechanisms are at play here. The first relies on the idea that since supposition delimits the set of things among which you have to find your truth-makers or your falsity-makers, it shall not be empty if you want a truth-value. The second mechanism defines emptiness as the absence of _appellata_ - which is not necessarily an absence of _supposita_, as the author of our text will show. [Argues that appellatio as distinct from suppositio not merely a 12C relic. Refers to Lambert and to our anonymous Parisian] "What makes the proposition false is not the incompleteness of its subject term's reference in itself, but the fact that the void is filled with non-existent _supposita_; and the void is a void of _appelleta_, rather than _supposita_. " p.316, you need quantification in the present tense to be freed from RA, i.e. for omnis to quantify at a given time over things which do not really exist at that time.
John Pagus, Appellationes ~38 (238) "Post hoc quaeritur utrum huic regulae 'terminus communis' etc. debeat apponi 'habens sufficientiam appellatorum'". The problem and the theory in its full-fledged form are evidenced as well in ~39 of the same text (238): "Et dicitur quod sic. Dicitur enim quod terminus communis non habens sufficientiam appellatorum recurrit ad non existentia et non coartatur ad praesentia. Et dicitur esse sufficientia in ternario et insufficientia in paucioribus". [A. de Libera, 'Les Appellationes' de Jean le Page', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge, 51 [59] (1984) 193-255, p. 224
William, in logicam. Nota [/Contra] quod suppositum quandoque est aliquid ens, quandoque non ens, appellat[um] autem semper ens, et sic suppositum et appellatum quandoque sunt idem quandoque non, et ad hoc sciendum dicitur haec regula: Terminus communis non restrictus habens sufficientiam appellatorum supponens verbo de praesenti non habenti vim ampliandi supponit tantum pro hiis quae sunt, et apponitur hoc membrum restrictus quia si sit restrictus potest supponere pro non ente ut hic ‘homo qui fuit est non ens’. Introductiones_in_logicam/Chapter_5 n51 Intellige quod sufficientia appellatorum in tribus consistit ad minus. Unde, si non sit sufficientia appellatorum, potest terminus pro non-ente supponere, ut, si sint tantum duo homines, haec est falsa ‘omnis homo est’. (n52)
"Et propter quod ponatur in re quod nullus homo sit et tunc dicatur ‘omnis homo est’, dicitur quod li ‘homo’ supponit pro non entibus et non significat esse, sicut enim quod patuit. Nam cum appellata non haberet, recurreret ad non existentia, sed rebus se habentibus ut nunc subiectum habet vere appellata et vere existentia, et ideo non oportet ipsum recurrere ad non existentia. Unde pro nihilo fuerunt moti qui posuerunt pro regula quod “cum signum non inveniat sufficientiam appellatorum in subiecto[38] recurrit ad non entia”; et hoc intelligendum est quod cum nullum suppositum reperit existentem in subiecto" Omnis_homo_est [Cf. Roger Bacon, Summa de soph, et dist.; Steele 144; ANON., Introductiones parisienses; De Rijk 372, 8-9 (et supra); William of Sherwood, Introductiones 5.3.4.; Lohr 272, 33-273, 54; Lambert of Auxerre, Summa log., VIII: De appellatione; Libera 260-261 (cum nota).
Terminus communis supponens vel apponens verbo praesentis temporis etc. restringitur ad supponendum pro his quae sunt et si non sunt recurrit ad non entia”[19], sicut patet secundum eos [qui] dant illam regulam in hoc termino ‘Phoenix’. Omnis_homo_de_necessitate_est_animal_(2) [19.↑ Cf. John le Page, Appellationes II, n. 9; Libera 228; Lambert of Auxerre, Summa log., VIII: De appellatione; Libera 256, 14-257, 2; ANON., Album fuit disputaturum, NL 16135, f. 13ra; ANON., Omnis Phoenix est, NL 16135, f. 14vb.]
code
Sub AddSectionNumbers() Dim n As Integer n = 0
With ActiveDocument.Content.Find .ClearFormatting
' .Text = "|- valign=top^p|"
.Text = "|- valign = top^p|" 'The Do...Loop statement repeats a series of ' actions each time this style is found. Do While .Execute(Forward:=True, Format:=True) = True With .Parent .InsertAfter "[n" & n & "]" 'If the found text is the last ' paragraph in the document... If .End = ActiveDocument.Content.End Then .StartOf Unit:=wdParagraph, Extend:=wdMove Exit Do 'If the found text is *not* the last ' paragraph in the document... Else .StartOf Unit:=wdParagraph, Extend:=wdMove .Move Unit:=wdParagraph, Count:=1 End If End With n = n + 1 'Goes back to the beginning of the Do...Loop statement. Loop End With
End Sub
Sub AddAnchors()
'
Selection.Find.ClearFormatting Selection.Find.Replacement.ClearFormatting With Selection.Find .Text = "\[n([0-9]{1,})\]" .Replacement.Text = "[n\1] <span id=""n\1"" />" .Forward = True .Wrap = wdFindContinue .Format = False .MatchCase = False .MatchWholeWord = False .MatchAllWordForms = False .MatchSoundsLike = False .MatchWildcards = True End With Selection.Find.Execute Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End Sub
other
ALBUM FUIT DISPUTATURUM . [n1] Circa istud sophisma multa quaerabantur. Primum fuit an ista acceptio, quod fuit album fuit disputaturum sit possibilis in hanc, album fuit disputaturum, et hoc est quaer ere utrum ly album possit supponere pro praeteritis in eodem. Similiter cum hoc quaesitum fuit, utrum ista acceptio fuerit possibilis, quod erit album. Et hoc est quaerere utrum ly album possit supponere pro futuris. [n2] 2º quaeritur supposito quod ista acceptio quod fuit album &c fierit~ possibilis de veritate ipsius. [n3] 3º utrum ista acceptia quod fuit album &c inferat veritatem in prima propositione, et est quaerere de probatione. [n4] Ultimo quaeretur de ista consequentia, quicquid fuit disputaturum &c album fuit &c, et hoc est quaerere de improbatione [n5] Circa primum proceditur sic, et probatur quod ista acceptio non potest habere, quod fuit album &c, supposito quod subiectum aliquo modo accipiat modum supponendi a praedicato. Hoc non est a quocumque, sed a praedicato principali. Sed praedicatum principali in proposito est participium de futuro, ergo subiectum accipiet modum supponendi ab illo. Ipsum autem non potest conferre subiecto stare nisi pro futuris. Cum nihil debet nisi quod habet, ergo impossibile est quod subiectum stet pro praeteritis. [n6] Ad istud ca~~a fuit duplex responsio. Uno modo dicetur quod participium non est praedicatum principale, sed res verbi et illa est de praeterito. Aliter tangetur dicendo quod non est necesse quod subiectum accipiat modum supponendi a principali praedicato, sed bene potest accipere ab aliquo intellecto cum principali praedicato. [n7] Tertio modo tangetur quod quia terminus apponens apposit in extrema~ consignificationem verbi, et in proposito apponit participium de futuro verbo de praeterito, ideo ipsum fiat pro praeterito et per consequens totum copulat tempus de praeterito. Sed contra illud ultimum primo arguetur quod ex dictis sequeretur plane falsitas istius propositionis quod tunc nihil aliud esset dictum, quam album disputavit et ista propositio falsa est, retento tan~.
Square
Antioch
MS list
http://archive.org/stream/rogerbaconessays00litt/rogerbaconessays00litt_djvu.txt
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Optics_from_Roger_Bacon's_De_multiplicatone_specierum.jpg
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jSPHMKbjYkQC&pg=PR24#v=onepage&q&f=false
Medieval Manuscripts in British Libraries: Volume V: Indexes and Addenda By Neil Ker [2]
Oxen
*The Economics of Horses and Oxen in Medieval England
British Academy
Definition of white and St Patrick
Thomas L7 l4 n14. See also Thomas L7 l3 n14.
- [Aquinas] lib. 7 l. 3 n. 14 Quod autem aliquid dicatur alteri esse unum per accidens, est dupliciter, ut uno modo homo est albus, et alio modo album est homo. Horum enim aliud quidem est ex additione, aliud vero non. In definitione enim hominis non est necessarium quod addatur definitio albi, vel nomen eius; in definitione vero albi necesse est quod ponatur homo, vel nomen hominis, vel eius definitio, si homo proprium subiectum eius est, vel aliquid aliud quod est eius proprium subiectum.
Paul of Venice book
(Good pictures)
Plagiarism
The origins of European scholarship : the Cyprus Millennium international conference / Ioannis Taifacos (ed.) (NAF 80)
This is where the comment is
Hot Zone Text Pop-up text
Anchoring
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\<span id="(.*)".*'''\[(.*)\]''' {{a|$1|$1}} Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D1/Q1
\<span id=n(.*)\>.*'''\[(.*)\]''' {{a|$1|$1}}
replace n with n
{{a\|([0-9]*)\|([0-9]*)}} {{a|n$1|$2}}
individual difference
Thisness: http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D17B/Q2#n251
Chinese room, name of God: http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D22#n8
Maxims
http://www.catholicapologetics.info/catholicteaching/philosophy/axiomata.htm
Janet Brooks Gerloff -Emmaus