Authors/Thomas Aquinas/posteriorum/L1

Lecture 1 The need for pre-existent knowledge in all learning

Latin	English
	English translation by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1 Sicut dicit Aristoteles in principio metaphysicae, hominum genus arte et rationibus vivit: in quo videtur philosophus tangere quoddam hominis proprium quo a caeteris animalibus differt. Alia enim animalia quodam naturali instinctu ad suos actus aguntur; homo autem rationis iudicio in suis actionibus dirigitur. Et inde est quod ad actus humanos faciliter et ordinate perficiendos diversae artes deserviunt. Nihil enim aliud ars esse videtur, quam certa ordinatio rationis quomodo per determinata media ad debitum finem actus humani perveniant. Ratio autem non solum dirigere potest inferiorum partium actus, sed etiam actus sui directiva est. Hoc enim est proprium intellectivae partis, ut in seipsam reflectatur: nam intellectus intelligit seipsum et similiter ratio de suo actu ratiocinari potest. Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur, adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat.	As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics I (980b26), “the human race lives by art and reasonings.” In this statement the Philosopher seems to touch upon that property whereby man differs from the other animals. For the other animals are prompted to their acts by a natural impulse, but man is directed in his actions by a judgment of reason. And this is the reason why there are various arts devoted to the ready and orderly performance of human acts. For an art seems to be nothing more than a definite and fixed procedure established by reason, whereby human acts reach their due end through appropriate means. Now reason is not only able to direct the acts of the lower powers but is also director of its own act: for what is peculiar to the intellective part of man is its ability to reflect upon itself. For the intellect knows itself. In like manner reason is able to reason about its own act. Therefore just as the art of building or carpentering, through which man is enabled to perform manual acts in an easy and orderly manner, arose from the fact that reason reasoned about manual acts, so in like manner an art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 2 Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod est omnibus artibus commune); sed etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum rationis sicut circa propriam materiam.	And this art is logic, i.e., the science of reason. And it concerns reason not only because it is according to reason, for that is common to all arts, but also because it is concerned with the very act of reasoning as with its proper matter.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 3 Et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in actu rationis nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt. Oportet igitur logicae partes accipere secundum diversitatem actuum rationis.	Therefore it seems to be the art of the arts, because it directs us in the act of reasoning, from which all arts proceed. Consequently one should view the parts of logic according to the diversity among the acts of reason.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 4 Sunt autem rationis tres actus: quorum primi duo sunt rationis, secundum quod est intellectus quidam. Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro praedicamentorum. Secunda vero operatio intellectus est compositio vel divisio intellectus, in qua est iam verum vel falsum. Et huic rationis actui deservit doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro perihermeneias. Tertius vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui libri logicae.	Now there are three acts of the reason, the first two of which belong to reason regarded as an intellect. One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the intellect. To this operation of the reason is ordained the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book of Predicaments, [i.e., Categories]. The second operation of the intellect is its act of combining or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present. And this act of reason is the subject of the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book entitled On Interpretation. But the third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar to reason, namely, to advance from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the unknown. And this act is considered in the remaining books of logic.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5 Attendendum est autem quod actus rationis similes sunt, quantum ad aliquid, actibus naturae. Unde et ars imitatur naturam in quantum potest. In actibus autem naturae invenitur triplex diversitas. In quibusdam enim natura ex necessitate agit, ita quod non potest deficere. In quibusdam vero natura ut frequentius operatur, licet quandoque possit deficere a proprio actu. Unde in his necesse est esse duplicem actum; unum, qui sit ut in pluribus, sicut cum ex semine generatur animal perfectum; alium vero quando natura deficit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, sicut cum ex semine generatur aliquod monstrum propter corruptionem alicuius principii. Et haec etiam tria inveniuntur in actibus rationis. Est enim aliquis rationis processus necessitatem inducens, in quo non est possibile esse veritatis defectum; et per huiusmodi rationis processum scientiae certitudo acquiritur. Est autem alius rationis processus, in quo ut in pluribus verum concluditur, non tamen necessitatem habens. Tertius vero rationis processus est, in quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius principii defectum; quod in ratiocinando erat observandum.	It should be noted that the acts of reason are in a certain sense not unlike the acts of nature: hence so far as it can, art imitates nature. Now in the acts of nature we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature acts from necessity, i.e., in such a way that it cannot fail; in others, nature acts so as to succeed for the most part, although now and then it fails in its act. Hence in this latter case there must be a twofold act: one which succeeds in the majority of cases, as when from seed is generated a perfect animal; the other when nature fails in regard to what is appropriate to it, as when from seed something monstrous is generated owing to a defect in some principle. These three are found also in the acts of the reason. For there is one process of reason which induces necessity, where it is not possible to fall short of the truth; and by such a process of reasoning the certainty of science is acquired. Again, there is a process of reason in which something true in most cases is concluded but without producing necessity. But the third process of reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which should have been observed in reasoning was defective.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 6 Pars autem logicae, quae primo deservit processui, pars iudicativa dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientiae. Et quia iudicium certum de effectibus haberi non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia, ideo pars haec analytica vocatur, idest resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii, quae per resolutionem habetur, est, vel ex ipsa forma syllogismi tantum, et ad hoc ordinatur liber priorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo simpliciter; vel etiam cum hoc ex materia, quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessariae, et ad hoc ordinatur liber posteriorum analyticorum, qui est de syllogismo demonstrativo.	Now the part of logic which is devoted to the first process is called the judicative part, because it leads to judgments possessed of the certitude of science. And because a certain and sure judgment touching effects cannot be obtained except by analyzing them into their first principles, this part is called analytical, i.e., resolvent. Furthermore, the certitude obtained by such an analysis of a judgment is derived either from the mere form of the syllogism—and to this is ordained the book of the Prior Ana1ytics which treats of the syllogism as such—or from the matter along with the form, because the propositions employed are per se and necessary [cf. infra, Lectures 10, 13]—and to this is ordained the book of the Posterior Analytics which is concerned with the demonstrative syllogism.
Secundo autem rationis processui deservit alia pars logicae, quae dicitur inventiva. Nam inventio non semper est cum certitudine. Unde de his, quae inventa sunt, iudicium requiritur, ad hoc quod certitudo habeatur. Sicut autem in rebus naturalibus, in his quae ut in pluribus agunt, gradus quidam attenditur (quia quanto virtus naturae est fortior, tanto rarius deficit a suo effectu), ita et in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur, secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur. Per huiusmodi enim processum, quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius, et ad hoc ordinatur topica sive dialectica. Nam syllogismus dialecticus ex probabilibus est, de quo agit Aristoteles in libro topicorum. Quandoque vero, non fit complete fides vel opinio, sed suspicio quaedam, quia non totaliter declinatur ad unam partem contradictionis, licet magis inclinetur in hanc quam in illam. Et ad hoc ordinatur rhetorica. Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem. Omnia autem haec ad rationalem philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est. Tertio autem processui rationis deservit pars logicae, quae dicitur sophistica, de qua agit Aristoteles in libro elenchorum.	To the second process of reason another part of logic called investigative is devoted. For investigation is not always accompanied by certitude. Hence in order to have certitude a judgment must be formed, bearing on that which has been investigated. But just as in the works of nature which succeed in the majority of cases certain levels are achieved—because the stronger the power of nature the more rarely does it fail to achieve its effect—so too in that process of reason which is not accompanied by complete certitude certain levels are found accordingly as one approaches more or less to complete certitude. For although science is not obtained by this process of reason, nevertheless belief or opinion is sometimes achieved (on account of the provability of the propositions one starts with), because reason leans completely to one side of a contradiction but with fear concerning the other side. The Topics or dialectics is devoted to this. For the dialectical syllogism which Aristotle treats in the book of Topics proceeds from premises which are provable. At times, however, belief or opinion is not altogether achieved, but suspicion is, because reason does not lean to one side of a contradiction unreservedly, although it is inclined more to one side than to the other. To this the Rhetoric is devoted. At other times a mere fancy inclines one to one side of a contradiction because of some representation, much as a man turns in disgust from certain food if it is described to him in terms of something disgusting. And to this is ordained the Poetics. For the poet’s task is to lead us to something virtuous by some excellent description. And all these pertain to the philosophy of the reason, for it belongs to reason to pass from one thing to another. The third process of reasoning is served by that part of logic which is called sophistry, which Aristotle treats in the book On Sophistical Refutations.
	Lecture I (71al-10) THE NEED FOR PRE-EXISTENT KNOWLEDGE IN ALL LEARNING
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 Aliis igitur partibus logicae praetermissis, ad praesens intendendum est circa partem iudicativam, prout traditur in libro posteriorum analyticorum. Qui dividitur in partes duas: in prima, ostendit necessitatem demonstrativi syllogismi, de quo est iste liber; in secunda, de ipso syllogismo demonstrativo determinat; ibi: scire autem opinamur et cetera.	Leaving aside the other parts of logic, we shall fix our attention on the judicative part as it is presented in the book of Posterior Analytics which is divided into two parts. In the first he shows the need for the demonstrative syllogism, with which this book is concerned. In the second part he comes to a decision concerning that syllogism (71b8) [Lect. 4].
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 8 Necessitas autem cuiuslibet rei ordinatae ad finem ex suo fine sumitur; finis autem demonstrativi syllogismi est acquisitio scientiae; unde, si scientia acquiri non posset per syllogismum vel argumentum, nulla esset necessitas demonstrativi syllogismi. Posuit autem Plato quod scientia in nobis non causatur ex syllogismo, sed ex impressione formarum idealium in animas nostras, ex quibus etiam effluere dicebat formas naturales in rebus naturalibus, quas ponebat esse participationes quasdam formarum a materia separatarum. Ex quo sequebatur quod agentia naturalia non causabant formas in rebus inferioribus, sed solum materiam praeparabant ad participandum formas separatas. Et similiter ponebat quod per studium et exercitium non causatur in nobis scientia; sed tantum removentur impedimenta, et reducitur homo quasi in memoriam eorum, quae naturaliter scit ex impressione formarum separatarum. Sententia autem Aristotelis est contraria quantum ad utrumque. Ponit enim quod formae naturales reducuntur in actum a formis quae sunt in materia, scilicet a formis naturalium agentium. Et similiter ponit quod scientia fit in nobis actu per aliquam scientiam in nobis praeexistentem. Et hoc est fieri in nobis scientiam per syllogismum aut argumentum quodcumque. Nam ex uno in aliud argumentando procedimus.	Now the need for anything directed to an end is caused by that end. But the end of the demonstrative syllogism is the attainment of science. Hence if science could not be achieved by syllogizing or arguing, there would be no need for the demonstrative syllogism. Plato, as a matter of fact, held that science in us is not the result of a syllogism but of an impression upon our minds of ideal forms from which, he said, are also derived the natural forms in natural things, which he supposed were participations of forms separated from matter. From this it followed that natural agents were not the causes of forms in natural things but merely prepared the matter for participating in the separated forms. In like fashion he postulated that science in us is not caused by study and exercise, but only that obstacles are removed and man is brought to recall things which he naturally understands in virtue of an imprint of separated forms. But Aristotle’s view is opposed to this on two counts. For he maintains that natural forms are made actual by forms present in matter, i.e., by the forms of natural agents. He further maintains that science is made actual in us by other knowledge already existing in us. This means that it is formed in us through a syllogism or some type of argument. For in arguing we proceed from one thing into another.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 9 Ad ostendendum igitur necessitatem demonstrativi syllogismi, praemittit Aristoteles quod cognitio in nobis acquiritur ex aliqua cognitione praeexistenti. Duo igitur facit: primo, ostendit propositum; secundo, docet modum praecognitionis; ibi: dupliciter autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo, inducit universalem propositionem propositum continentem, scilicet quod acceptio cognitionis in nobis fit ex aliqua praeexistenti cognitione. Et ideo dicit: omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina, non autem omnis cognitio, quia non omnis cognitio ex priori cognitione dependet: esset enim in infinitum abire. Omnis autem disciplinae acceptio ex praeexistenti cognitione fit. Nomen autem doctrinae et disciplinae ad cognitionis acquisitionem pertinet. Nam doctrina est actio eius, qui aliquid cognoscere facit; disciplina autem est receptio cognitionis ab alio. Non autem accipitur hic doctrina et disciplina secundum quod se habent ad acquisitionem scientiae tantum, sed ad acquisitionem cognitionis cuiuscumque. Quod patet, quia manifestat hanc propositionem etiam in disputativis et rhetoricis disputationibus, per quas non acquiritur scientia. Propter quod etiam non dicit ex praeexistenti scientia vel intellectu, sed universaliter cognitione. Addit autem intellectiva ad excludendum acceptionem cognitionis sensitivae vel imaginativae. Nam procedere ex uno in aliud rationis est solum.	Therefore, in order to show the need for demonstrative syllogism Aristotle begins by stating that some of our knowledge is acquired from knowledge already existing. Hence he does two things. First, he states his thesis. Secondly, he explains the character of prior knowledge (71a11) [Lect. 2]. Concerning the first he does two things. First (71a1), he asserts a universal proposition containing his thesis, namely, that the production of knowledge in us is caused from knowledge already existing; hence he says, “Every doctrine and every discipline...” He does not say, “all knowledge,” because not all knowledge depends on previous knowledge, for that would involve an infinite process: but the acquisition of every discipline comes from knowledge already possessed. For the names “doctrine” and “discipline” pertain to the learning process, doctrine being the action exerted by the one who makes us know, and discipline the reception of knowledge from another. Furthermore, “doctrine” and “discipline” are not taken here as pertaining only to the acquisition of scientific knowledge but to the acquiring of any knowledge. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that he explains the proposition even in regard to dialectical and rhetorical disputations, neither of which engenders science. Hence this is another reason why he did not say, “from pre-existent science or intuition,” but “knowledge” universally. However he does add, “intellectual,” in order to preclude knowledge acquired by sense or imagination. For reason alone proceeds from one thing into another.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 10 Secundo, cum dicit: mathematicae enim etc., manifestat propositionem praemissam per inductionem. Et primo, in demonstrativis in quibus acquiritur scientia. In his autem principaliores sunt mathematicae scientiae, propter certissimum modum demonstrationis. Consequenter autem sunt et omnes aliae artes, quia in omnibus est aliquis modus demonstrationis, alias non essent scientiae.	Then (71a3) he employs induction to prove his thesis; and first of all in regard to those demonstrations in which scientific knowledge is acquired. Of these the best are the mathematical sciences because of their most certain manner of demonstrating. After them come the other arts, because some manner of demonstrating is found in all of them; otherwise they would not be sciences.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 11 Secundo, cum dicit: similiter autem etc., manifestat idem in orationibus disputativis sive dialecticis, quae utuntur syllogismo et inductione: in quorum utroque proceditur ex aliquo praecognito. Nam in syllogismo accipitur cognitio alicuius universalis conclusi ab aliis universalibus notis. In inductione autem concluditur universale ex singularibus, quae sunt manifesta quantum ad sensum.	Secondly (71a4), he proves the same thing in regard to disputative, i.e., dialectical, arguments, because they employ syllogism and induction, in each of which the process starts from something already known. For in a syllogism the knowledge of some universal conclusion is obtained from other universals already known; in induction, however, a universal is concluded from singulars made known in sense-perception.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 12 Tertio, cum dicit: similiter autem rhetoricae etc., manifestat idem in rhetoricis, in quibus persuasio fit per enthymema aut per exemplum; non autem per syllogismum vel inductionem completam, propter incertitudinem materiae circa quam versatur, scilicet circa actus singulares hominum, in quibus universales propositiones non possunt assumi vere. Et ideo utitur loco syllogismi, in quo necesse est esse aliquam universalem, aliquo enthymemate; et similiter loco inductionis, in qua concluditur universale, aliquo exemplo, in quo proceditur a singulari, non ad universale, sed ad singulare. Unde patet quod, sicut enthymema est quidam syllogismus detruncatus, ita exemplum est quaedam inductio imperfecta. Si ergo in syllogismo et inductione proceditur ex aliquo praecognito, oportet idem intelligi in enthymemate et exemplo.	Thirdly (71a8), he manifests the same thing in rhetorical arguments, in which persuasion is produced through an enthymeme or example but not through a syllogism or complete induction because of the uncertainty attending the matters discussed, namely, the individual acts of men in which universal propositions cannot be truthfully assumed. Therefore, in place of a syllogism in which there must be something universal, an enthymeme is employed in which it is not necessary to have something universal. Similarly, in place of induction in which a universal is concluded, an example is employed in which one goes from the singular not to the universal but to the singular. Hence it is clear that just as the enthymeme is an abridged syllogism, so an example is an incomplete induction. Therefore, if in the case of the syllogism and induction one proceeds from knowledge already existing, the same must be granted in the case of the enthymeme and example.

Lecture 2 Extent and order of the pre-existent knowledge required for obtaining science

Latin	English
	Lecture 2 (71a11-23) EXTENT AND ORDER OF THE PRE-EXISTENT KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED FOR OBTAINING SCIENCE
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quod omnis disciplina ex praeexistenti fit cognitione nunc ostendit quis sit modus praecognitionis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, determinat modum praecognitionis quantum ad illa quae oportet praecognoscere ut habeatur cognitio conclusionis, cuius scientia quaeritur; secundo, determinat modum praecognitionis ipsius conclusionis, cuius scientia per demonstrationem quaeritur; ibi: antequam sit inducere et cetera. In praecognitione autem duo includuntur, scilicet cognitio et cognitionis ordo. Primo ergo, determinat modum praecognitionis quantum ad cognitionem ipsam; secundo, quantum ad cognitionis ordinem; ibi: est autem cognoscere et cetera.	After showing that every discipline is developed from knowledge already existing, the Philosopher shows what is the extent of this preexisting knowledge. Concerning this he does two things. First, he determines the extent of pre-existing knowledge in regard to the things that must be known in order to attain knowledge of the conclusion, of which scientific knowledge is sought. Secondly, he determines the extent of pre-existing knowledge of the conclusion, of which scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration (71a24) [L.3]. Now two things are included in pre-existing knowledge, namely, the knowledge and the order of the knowledge. First, therefore, he determines the extent of pre-existing knowledge so far as the knowledge itself is concerned. Secondly, so far as the order of the knowledge is concerned (71a16).
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 2 Circa primum sciendum est quod id cuius scientia per demonstrationem quaeritur est conclusio aliqua in qua propria passio de subiecto aliquo praedicatur: quae quidem conclusio ex aliquibus principiis infertur. Et quia cognitio simplicium praecedit cognitionem compositorum, necesse est quod, antequam habeatur cognitio conclusionis, cognoscatur aliquo modo subiectum et passio. Et similiter oportet quod praecognoscatur principium, ex quo conclusio infertur, cum ex cognitione principii conclusio innotescat.	In regard to the first it should be noted that the object of which scientific knowledge is sought through demonstration is some conclusion in which a proper attribute is predicated of some subject, which conclusion is inferred from the principles. And because the knowledge of simple things precedes the knowledge of compound things, it is necessary -that the subject and the proper attribute be somehow known before knowledge of the conclusion is obtained. In like manner it is required thatthe principle be known from which the conclusion is inferred, for the conclusion is made known from a knowledge of the principle.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 3 Horum autem trium, scilicet, principii, subiecti et passionis est duplex modus praecognitionis, scilicet, quia est et quid est. Ostensum est autem in VII metaphysicae quod complexa non definiuntur. Hominis enim albi non est aliqua definitio et multo minus enunciationis alicuius. Unde cum principium sit enunciatio quaedam, non potest de ipso praecognosci quid est, sed solum quia verum est. De passione autem potest quidem sciri quid est, quia, ut in eodem libro ostenditur, accidentia quodammodo definitionem habent. Passionis autem esse et cuiuslibet accidentis est inesse subiecto: quod quidem demonstratione concluditur. Non ergo de passione praecognoscitur quia est, sed quid est solum. Subiectum autem et definitionem habet et eius esse a passione non dependet; sed suum esse proprium praeintelligitur ipsi esse passionis in eo. Et ideo de subiecto oportet praecognoscere et quid est et quia est: praesertim cum ex definitione subiecti et passionis sumatur medium demonstrationis.	Now the extent of pre-existent knowledge of these three items, i.e., of the principle, of the subject, and of the proper attribute, is limited to knowing two things about them, namely, that each is and what each is. But, as stated in Metaphysics VII, complex things are not defined. For there is no definition of “white man,” much less of an enunciation [proposition]. Hence since a principle is an enunciation, there cannot be preexisting knowledge of what it is but only of the fact that it is true. But in regard to the proper attribute, it is possible to know what it is, because, as is pointed out in the same book, accidents do have some sort of definition. Now the being of a proper attribute and of any accident is being in a subject; and this fact is concluded by the demonstration. Consequently, it is not known beforehand that the proper attribute exists, but only what it is. The subject, too, has a definition; moreover, its being does not depend on the proper attribute—rather its own being is known before one knows the proper attribute to be in it. Consequently, it is necessary to know both what the subject is and that it is, especially since the medium of demonstration is taken from the definition of the subject of the proper attribute.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 4 Propter hoc ergo dicit philosophus quod dupliciter necessarium est praecognoscere: quia duo sunt quae praecognoscuntur de his, quorum praecognitionem habemus, scilicet quia est et quid est. Et quod alia sunt de quibus necesse est primo cognoscere quia sunt, sicut principia de quibus postea exemplificat, ponens in exemplo primum omnium principiorum, scilicet quod de unoquoque est affirmatio vel negatio vera.	This, therefore, is why the Philosopher says (71a11) that it is necessary to know beforehand in two ways; because two items are known beforehand concerning things of which we have pre-existing knowledge, namely, that it is and what it is. [Then he goes on to say] that there are some things concerning which it is necessary first to know that they are, such as principles, concerning which he then gives examples, citing as one example the first of all principles, namely, “There is true affirmation or negation about everything.”
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 5 Alia vero sunt, de quibus oportet praeintelligere quid est quod dicitur, idest quid significatur per nomen, scilicet de passionibus. Et non dicit quid est simpliciter, sed quid est quod dicitur, quia antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitiones. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen. Propter quod etiam philosophus in IV metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia docet incipere a significatione nominum. Exemplificat autem de triangulo, de quo oportet praescire quoniam nomen eius hoc significat, quod scilicet in sua definitione continetur.	Again, there are other things, namely, proper attributes, concerning which it is necessary to know what is said to be predicated, i.e., what is signified by their name. And he does not say unqualifiedly, “what it is,” but “what is said to be predicated,” because one cannot properly know of something what it is before it is known that it is. For there are no definitions of non-beings. Hence the question, whether it is, precedes the question, what it is. But “whether a thing is” cannot be shown unless it is known beforehand what is signified by its name. On this account the Philosopher teaches in Metaphysics IV that in disputing against those who deny principles one must begin with the meanings of names. An example of this is “triangle,” concerning which one must know beforehand that its name signifies such and such, namely what is contained in its definition.
Cum enim accidentia quodam ordine ad substantiam referantur, non est inconveniens id quod est accidens in respectu ad aliquid, esse etiam subiectum in respectu alterius. Sicut superficies est accidens substantiae corporalis: quae tamen superficies est primum subiectum coloris. Id autem quod est ita subiectum, quod nullius est accidens, substantia est. Unde in illis scientiis, quarum subiectum est aliqua substantia, id quod est subiectum nullo modo potest esse passio, sicut est in philosophia prima, et in scientia naturali, quae est de subiecto mobili.	But since accidents are referred to their subjects in a definite order, it is not impossible for something which is an accident in relation to one thing to be a subject in relation to something else: for example, a surface is an accident in relation to a bodily substance, but in relation to color it is the first subject. However, that which is a subject in such a way as never to be an accident of anything else is a substance. Hence in those sciences whose subject is a substance, that which is the subject can never be a proper attribute, as in first philosophy and in natural science, which treats of mobile being.
In illis autem scientiis, quae sunt de aliquibus accidentibus, nihil prohibet id, quod accipitur ut subiectum respectu alicuius passionis, accipi etiam ut passionem respectu anterioris subiecti. Hoc tamen non in infinitum procedit. Est enim devenire ad aliquod primum in scientia illa, quod ita accipitur ut subiectum, quod nullo modo ut passio; sicut patet in mathematicis scientiis, quae sunt de quantitate continua vel discreta. Supponuntur enim in his scientiis ea quae sunt prima in genere quantitatis; sicut unitas, et linea, et superficies et alia huiusmodi. Quibus suppositis, per demonstrationem quaeruntur quaedam alia, sicut triangulus aequilaterus, quadratum in geometricis et alia huiusmodi. Quae quidem demonstrationes quasi operativae dicuntur, ut est illud, super rectam lineam datam triangulum aequilaterum constituere. Quo adinvento, rursus de eo aliquae passiones probantur, sicut quod eius anguli sunt aequales aut aliquid huiusmodi. Patet igitur quod triangulus in primo modo demonstrationis se habet ut passio, in secundo se habet ut subiectum. Unde philosophus hic exemplificat de triangulo ut est passio, non ut est subiectum, cum dicit quod de triangulo oportet praescire quoniam hoc significat.	But in those sciences which bear upon accidents, nothing prevents a same thing from being taken as a subject in reference to one proper attribute, and as an attribute in reference to a more basic subject. Nevertheless, this must not develop into an infinite process, for one must arrive at something which is first in that science and which is taken as a subject in such a way that it is never taken as a proper attribute, as is clear in the mathematical sciences, which treat of continuous or discrete quantity. For in these sciences those things are postulated which are first in the genus of quantity; for example, unit and line and surface and the like. Once these are postulated, certain other things are sought through demonstration, such as the equilateral triangle and the square and so on in geometry. In these cases the demonstrations are said to be, as it were, operational, as when it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on a given straight line. But once it has been constructed, certain proper attributes are proved about it; for example, that its angles are equal, or something of that sort. It is clear, therefore, that in the first type of demonstration “triangle” behaves as a proper attribute, and in the second type as a subject. Hence the Philosopher is using “triangle” as a proper attribute and not as a subject when he says by way of example, “We must assume that triangle means so and so” (71a14).
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 6 Dicit etiam quod quaedam sunt de quibus oportet praescire utrunque, scilicet quid est et quia est. Et exemplificat de unitate quae est principium in omni genere quantitatis. Etsi enim aliquo modo sit accidens respectu substantiae, tamen in scientiis mathematicis, quae sunt de quantitate, non potest accipi ut passio, sed ut subiectum tantum, cum in hoc genere nihil habeat prius.	He says, ‘furthermore, that there are certain things about which we must know beforehand both what each is and whether it is. And he uses the example of “one,” which is the principle in every genus of quantity. For although it is somehow an accident in reference to substance, yet in the mathematical sciences, which treat of quantity, it cannot be taken as a proper attribute but only as a subject, since in this genus [quantity] it has nothing prior to it.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 7 Rationem autem huiusmodi diversitatis ostendit, quia non est similis modus manifestationis praedictorum, scilicet principii, passionis et subiecti. Non enim est eadem ratio cognitionis in ipsis: nam principia cognoscuntur per actum componentis et dividentis; subiectum autem et passio per actum apprehendentis quod quid est. Quod quidem non similiter competit subiecto et passioni: cum subiectum definiatur absolute, quia in definitione eius non ponitur aliquid, quod sit extra essentiam ipsius; passio autem definitur cum dependentia ad subiectum, quod in eius definitione ponitur. Unde, ex quo non eodem modo cognoscuntur, non est mirum si eorum diversa praecognitio sit.	The reason for this difference is shown by the fact that the manner in which the aforesaid, namely, principle, proper attribute and subject, are manifested is not the same. For the way in which they are known is not the same: for principles are known through the act of composing and dividing, but subject and proper attribute by the act of apprehending the essence. And this, too, does not belong in similar fashion to a subject and to a proper attribute, since a subject is defined absolutely, for nothing outside its essence is mentioned in its definition; but a proper attribute is defined with dependence on the subject which is mentioned in its definition. Therefore, since they are not known in the same way, it is not surprising if they are not foreknown in the same way.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: est autem cognoscere etc., determinat modum praecognitionis ex parte ipsius ordinis, quem praecognitio importat. Est enim aliquid prius altero et secundum tempus et secundum naturam. Et hic duplex ordo in praecognitione considerandus est. Aliquid enim praecognoscitur sicut prius notum tempore. Et de his dicit quod alia contingit cognoscere aliquem cognoscentem ea prius tempore, quam illa quibus praecognosci dicuntur. Quaedam vero cognoscuntur simul tempore, sed prius natura. Et de his dicit quod quorundam praecognitorum simul tempore est accipere notitiam, et illorum quibus praecognoscuntur.	Then (7a16) he determines the extent of foreknowledge on the part of the order which foreknowing implies. For something is prior to another both in the order of time and in the order of nature. And this twofold order must be considered in regard to pre-existent knowing. For something is known before something else in the sense of being known prior in time. Concerning such things he says that someone could know certain things by knowing them prior to the time when he knows the things to which they are said to be foreknown. But certain others are known at one and the same time, although one is prior by nature to the other. Concerning these he says that one acquires a knowledge of some of these foreknown things at the same time that knowledge of the things to which they are foreknown is acquired.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9 Quae autem sint ista manifestat subdens quod huiusmodi sunt quaecumque continentur sub aliquibus universalibus, quorum habent cognitionem, idest de quibus notum est ea sub talibus universalibus contineri.	He indicates what these are when he adds that they are the things contained under certain universals of which we have knowledge, i.e., of which it is known that they are contained under such universals.
Et hoc ulterius manifestat per exemplum. Cum enim ad conclusionem inferendam duae propositiones requirantur, scilicet maior et minor, scita propositione maiori, nondum habetur conclusionis cognitio. Maior ergo propositio praecognoscitur conclusioni non solum natura, sed tempore. Rursus autem si in minori propositione inducatur sive assumatur aliquid contentum sub universali propositione, quae est maior, de quo manifestum non sit quod sub hoc universali contineatur, nondum habetur conclusionis cognitio, quia nondum erit certa veritas minoris propositionis. Si autem in minori propositione assumatur terminus, de quo manifestum sit quod continetur sub universali in maiori propositione, patet veritas minoris propositionis: quia id quod accipitur sub universali habet eius cognitionem, et sic statim habetur conclusionis cognitio. Ut si sic demonstraret aliquis, omnis triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, ista cognita, nondum habetur conclusionis cognitio: sed cum postea assumitur, haec figura descripta in semicirculo, est triangulus, statim scitur quod habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Si autem non esset manifestum quod haec figura in semicirculo descripta est triangulus, nondum statim inducta assumptione sciretur conclusio; sed oporteret ulterius aliud medium quaerere, per quod demonstraretur hanc figuram esse triangulum.	Then he clarifies this with an example. For since two propositions are needed for inferring a conclusion, namely, a major and a minor; when the major proposition is known, the conclusion is not yet known. Therefore, the major proposition is known before the conclusion not only in nature but in time. Further, if in the minor proposition something is introduced or employed which is contained under the universal proposition which is the major, but it is not evident that it is contained under this universal, then a knowledge of the conclusion is not yet possessed, because the truth of the minor proposition will not yet be certain. But if in the minor proposition a term is taken about which it is clear that it is contained under the universal in the major proposition, the truth of the minor proposition is clear, because that which is taken under the universal shares in the same knowledge, and so the knowledge of the conclusion is had at once. Thus, suppose that someone should begin to demonstrate by stating that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. When this is known, the knowledge of the conclusion is not yet known. But when it is later assumed that this figure inscribed in a semicircle is a triangle, he knows at once that it has three angles equal to two right angles. However, if it were not clear that this figure inscribed in the semicircle is a triangle, the conclusion would not be known as soon as the minor was stated; rather, it would be necessary to search for a middle through which to demonstrate that this figure is a triangle.
Exemplificans ergo philosophus de his quae cognoscuntur ante conclusionem prius tempore, dicit quod aliquis per demonstrationem conclusionis cognitionem accipiens, hanc propositionem praescivit etiam secundum tempus, scilicet, quod omnis triangulus habet tres angulos duobus rectis aequales. Sed inducens hanc assumptionem, scilicet, quod hoc quod est in semicirculo sit triangulus, simul, scilicet tempore, cognovit conclusionem, quia hoc inductum habet notitiam universalis, sub quo continetur, ut non oporteat ulterius medium quaerere. Et ideo subdit quod, quorundam est hoc modo disciplina, idest eorum accipitur cognitio per se, et non oportet ea cognoscere per aliquod aliud medium, quod sit ultimum in resolutione, qua mediata ad immediata reducuntur. Vel potest legi sic: quod ultimum, idest extremum, quod accipitur sub universali medio, non oportet ut cognoscatur esse sub illo universali per aliquod aliud medium. Et quae sint ista, quae semper habent cognitionem sui universalis, manifestat subdens quod huiusmodi sunt singularia, quae non dicuntur de aliquo subiecto: cum inter singularia et speciem nullum medium possit inveniri.	In giving this example of things which are known at a time prior to the conclusion the Philosopher says that a person obtaining a knowledge of the conclusion through demonstration foreknew this proposition even according to time, namely, that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. But inducing this assumption, namely, that this figure in the semicircle is a triangle, he knew the conclusion at the same time, because this induction shares in the evidence of the universal under which it is contained, so that there is no need to search for another middle. He adds, therefore, that “some things are only learnt in this way” (71a23), i.e., learnt in virtue of themselves, so that it is not necessary to learn them through some other middle which is the ultimate reached by analysis in which the mediate is reduced to the immediate. Or it can be read in such a way that the “ultimate,” i.e., the extreme, which is subsumed under the universal middle does not need a further middle to show that it i contained under that universal. And he manifests what those things are which always share the knowledge of their universal, saying that they are the singulars, which are not predicated of any subject, since no middle can be found between singulars and their species.

Lecture 3 Pre-existent knowledge of the conclusion

Latin	English
	Lecture 3 (71a24-b9) PRE-EXISTENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONCLUSION
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam ostendit philosophus quomodo oportet praecognoscere quaedam alia, antequam de conclusione cognitio sumatur, nunc vult ostendere quomodo ipsam conclusionem contingit praecognoscere, antequam cognitio sumatur de ea per syllogismum vel inductionem. Et circa hoc duo facit.	Having shown the manner in which certain other things must be known before knowledge of the conclusion is obtained, the Philosopher now wishes to show how we know even the conclusion beforehand, i.e., before knowledge of it is obtained through a syllogism or induction. Concerning this he does two things.
Primo namque determinat veritatem, dicens quod, antequam inducatur inductio vel syllogismus ad faciendam cognitionem de aliqua conclusione, illa conclusio quodammodo scitur, et quodammodo non: simpliciter enim nescitur, sed scitur solum secundum quid. Sicut si debeat probari ista conclusio, triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; antequam demonstraretur, ille qui per demonstrationem accipit scientiam eius, nescivit simpliciter, sed scivit secundum quid. Unde quodammodo praescivit, simpliciter autem non. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia, sicut iam ostensum est, oportet principia conclusioni praecognoscere. Principia autem se habent ad conclusiones in demonstrativis, sicut causae activae in naturalibus ad suos effectus (unde in II physicorum propositiones syllogismi ponuntur in genere causae efficientis). Effectus autem, antequam producatur in actu, praeexistit quidem in causis activis virtute, non autem actu, quod est simpliciter esse. Et similiter antequam ex principiis demonstrativis deducatur conclusio, in ipsis quidem principiis praecognitis praecognoscitur conclusio virtute, non autem actu: sic enim in eis praeexistit. Et sic patet quod non praecognoscitur simpliciter, sed secundum quid.	First (71a24), he establishes the truth of the fact, saying that before an induction or syllogism is formed to beget knowledge of a conclusion, that conclusion is somehow known and somehow not known: for, absolutely speaking, it is not known; but in a qualified sense, it is known. Thus, if the conclusion that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles has to be proved, the one who obtains science of this fact through demonstration already knew it in some way before it was demonstrated; although absolutely speaking, he did not know it. Hence in one sense he already knew it, but in the full sense he did not. And the reason is that, as has been pointed out, the principles of the conclusion must be known beforehand. Now the principles in demonstrative matters are to the conclusion as efficient causes in natural things are to their effects; hence in Physics II the propositions of a syllogism are set in the genus of efficient cause. But an effect, before it is actually produced, pre-exists virtually in its efficient causes but not actually, which is to exist absolutely. In like manner, before it is drawn out of its demonstrative principles, the conclusion is pre-known virtually, although not actually, in its self-evident principles. For that is the way it pre-exists in them. And so it is clear that it is not pre-known in the full sense, but in some sense.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 2 Secundo; ibi: si vero non etc., excludit ex veritate determinata quandam dubitationem, quam Plato ponit in libro Menonis, sic intitulato ex nomine sui discipuli. Est autem dubitatio talis. Inducit enim quendam, omnino imperitum artis geometricae, interrogatum ordinate de principiis, ex quibus quaedam geometrica conclusio concluditur, incipiendo ex principiis per se notis: ad quae omnia ille, ignarus geometriae, id quod verum est respondit: et sic deducendo quaestiones usque ad conclusiones per singula verum respondit. Ex hoc igitur vult habere, quod etiam illi, qui videntur imperiti aliquarum artium, antequam de eis instruantur, earum notitiam habent. Et sic sequitur quod vel homo nihil addiscat, vel addiscat ea quae prius novit.	Secondly (71a28), in virtue of this established fact, he settles a doubt which Plato maintained in the book, Meno, which gets its title from the name of his disciple. The doubt is presented in the following manner: A person utterly ignorant of the art of geometry is questioned in an orderly Way concerning the per se known principles from which a geometric conclusion is concluded. By starting with principles that are per se known, to each of which this person ignorant of geometry gives a true answer, Aid leading him thus by questions to the conclusion, he gives the true Answer step by step. From this, therefore, he would have it that even those who seem to be ignorant of certain arts really have a knowledge of them before being instructed in them. And so it follows that either a man learns nothing or he learns what he already knew.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 3 Circa hoc ergo quatuor facit. Primo enim, proponit quod praedicta dubitatio vitari non potest, nisi supposita praedeterminata veritate, scilicet quod conclusio, quam quis addiscit per demonstrationem vel inductionem, erat nota non simpliciter, sed secundum quod est virtute in suis principiis: de quibus aliquis, ignarus scientiae, interrogatus, veritatem respondere potest. Secundum vero Platonis sententiam, conclusio erat praecognita simpliciter; unde non addiscebatur de novo, sed potius per deductionem aliquam rationis in memoriam reducebatur. Sicut etiam de formis naturalibus Anaxagoras ponit, quod ante generationem praeexistebant in materia simpliciter. Aristoteles vero ponit quod praeexistunt in potentia et non simpliciter.	In dealing with this problem he [Aristotle] does four things. First, he suggests that it cannot be settled unless we grant the truth established above, namely, that the conclusion which a person learns through demonstration or induction was already known, not absolutely, but as it was virtually known in its principles concerning which a person ignorant of a science can give true answers. However, according to Plato’s theory the conclusion was pre-known absolutely, so that no one learns afresh but is led to recall by some rational process of deduction. This is similar to Anaxagoras’ position on natural forms, namely, that before they are generated, they already pre-existed in the matter absolutely, whereas Aristotle says that they pre-exist in potency and not absolutely.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 4 Secundo, cum dicit: non enim sicut etc., ponit falsam quorundam obviationem ad dubitationem Platonis: qui scilicet dicebant quod conclusio antequam demonstraretur vel quocunque modo addisceretur, nullo modo erat cognita. Poterat enim eis obiici secundum dubitationem Platonis hoc modo: si quis interrogaret ab aliquo imperito: nunquid tu scis quod omnis dualitas par est? Et dicente eo, idest concedente se scire, afferret quandam dualitatem, quam ille interrogatus non opinaretur esse, puta illam dualitatem quae est tertia pars senarii; concluderetur quod sciret tertiam partem senarii esse numerum parem: quod erat ei incognitum, sed per demonstrationem inductam addiscit. Et sic videtur sequi quod vel non hoc addisceret vel addisceret quod prius scivit. Ut igitur hanc dubitationem evitarent, solvebant dicentes, quod ille qui interrogatus respondit se scire quod omnis dualitas sit numerus par, non dixit se cognoscere omnem dualitatem simpliciter, sed illam, quam scivit esse dualitatem. Unde cum ista dualitas, quae est allata, fuerit ab eo penitus ignorata, nullo modo scivit quod haec dualitas esset numerus par. Et sic sequitur quod apud cognoscentem principia nullo modo conclusio sit praecognita, nec simpliciter, nec secundum quid.	Secondly, he shows that the way some have answered Plato’s problem is false, namely, by saying that a conclusion is not in any sense known before it is demonstrated or learned by some method or other. For they might face the following objection based on Plato’s problem: If an unlearned person were asked by someone, “Do you know that every duo (pair) is an even number?” and, if upon answering that he does know this, he were presented with a duo which the person interrogated did not know existed, for example, the duo which is one third of six, the conclusion would be that he knew one third of six to be an even number, a fact which had not been known by him but which he learned through the demonstration proposed to him. And so it seems to follow that he either did not freshly learn this or that he learned what he already knew. To avoid this dilemma, they would answer that the person who was questioned and who answered that he knew every duo to be an equal number did not say that he knew every duo absolutely, but those he knew to be duo’s. Hence, since that duo which was proposed was utterly unknown to him, he did not in any sense know that this duo was an even number. And so it follows that when one knows the principles, the conclusion is not in any sense pre-known, either absolutely or in a qualified sense.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5 Tertio, ibi: et etiam sciunt etc., improbat hanc solutionem hoc modo. Illud scitur de quo demonstratio habetur, vel de quo de novo accipitur demonstratio. Et hoc dicitur propter addiscentem, qui incipit scire. Addiscentes autem non accipiunt demonstrationem de omni dualitate de qua sciunt, sed de omni simpliciter, et similiter de omni numero aut de omni triangulo. Non ergo verum est quod sciat de omni numero, quem scit esse numerum, aut de omni dualitate, quam scit esse dualitatem, sed de omni simpliciter. Quod autem non sciat de omni numero, quem scit esse numerum, sed de omni simpliciter, probat; ibi: neque enim una propositio etc.: conclusio cum praemissis convenit in terminis: nam subiectum et praedicatum conclusionis sunt maior et minor extremitas in praemissis; sed in praemissis non accipitur aliqua propositio de numero aut de recta linea, cum hac additione, quam tu nosti, sed simpliciter de omni; neque ergo conclusio demonstrationis est cum additione praedicta, sed simpliciter de omni.	Thirdly (71bl), he refutes this solution in the following way: That is known, concerning which a demonstration is had, or concerning which a demonstration is for the first time received. And this is said on account of those learners who begin to know scientifically. But learners do not obtain a demonstration touching every duo they happen to know but every duo absolutely; and the same applies to every number or every triangle. Therefore, it is not true that he knows something about every number which he knows to be a number, or of every duo which he knows to be a duo, but he knows it about every one absolutely. And that he knows it not only of every number he happens to know is a number, but of every number absolutely, is proved at (71b5) on the ground that the conclusion agrees with the premises in its terms. For the subject and predicate of the conclusion are the major and minor extremes in the premises. But in the premises no proposition concerning number or straight line is stated with the addition, “which you know,” but it is stated of all without qualification. Neither, therefore, is the conclusion of the demonstration asserted with the aforesaid qualification, but it is asserted of all without reservation.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6 Quarto, ibi: sed nihil etc., ponit veram solutionem dubitationis praedictae secundum praedeterminatam veritatem, dicens quod illud quod quis addiscit, nihil prohibet primo quodammodo scire et quodammodo ignorare. Non enim est inconveniens si aliquis quodammodo praesciat id quod addiscit; sed esset inconveniens si hoc modo praecognosceret, secundum quod addiscit. Addiscere enim proprie est scientiam in aliquo generari. Quod autem generatur, ante generationem neque fuit omnino non ens neque omnino ens, sed quodammodo ens et quodammodo non ens: ens quidem in potentia, non ens vero actu: et hoc est generari, reduci de potentia in actum. Unde nec id quod quis addiscit erat omnino prius notum, ut Plato posuit, nec omnino ignotum, ut secundum solutionem supra improbatam ponebatur; sed erat notum potentia sive virtute in principiis praecognitis universalibus, ignotum autem actu, secundum propriam cognitionem. Et hoc est addiscere, reduci de cognitione potentiali, seu virtuali, aut universali, in cognitionem propriam et actualem.	Fourthly (71b5), he presents the true solution of the problem under discussion in terms of the truth already established, saying that there is nothing to prevent a person from somehow knowing and somehow not knowing a fact before he learns it. For it is not a paradox if one somehow already knows what he learns, but it would be, if he already knew it in the same way that he knows it when he has learned it. For learning is, properly speaking, the generation of science in someone. But that which is generated was not, prior to its generation, a being absolutely, but somehow a being and somehow non-being: for it was a being in potency, although actually non-being. And this is what being generated consists in, namely, in being converted from potency to act. In like fashion, that which a person learns was not previously known absolutely, as Plato preferred; but neither was it absolutely unknown, as they maintained whose answer was refuted above. Rather it was known in potency, i.e., virtually, in the pre-known universal principles; however, it was not actually known in the sense of specific knowledge. And this is what learning consists in, namely, in being brought from potential or virtual or universal knowledge to specific and actual knowledge.