Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C27

Chapter 27

Greek	Latin	English
	(PL 64 0669B) CAPUT XXVIII. De abundantia propositionum.	27
43a20 Πῶς δ᾽ εὐπορήσομεν αὐτοὶ πρὸς τὸ τιθέμενον ἀεὶ συλλογισμῶν, καὶ διὰ ποίας ὁδοῦ ληψόμεθα τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχάς, νῦν ἤδη λεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἴσως δεῖ τὴν γένεσιν θεωρεῖν τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ ποιεῖν.	Quomodo autem idonei erimus semper syllogizare ad propositum, et per quam viam sumemus circa unumquodque principia, nunc dicendum. Non enim solum fortasse oportet generationem considerare syllogismorum, sed et potestatem habere faciendi. (0669C)	We must now state how we may ourselves always have a supply of syllogisms in reference to the problem proposed and by what road we may reach the principles relative to the problem: for perhaps we ought not only to investigate the construction of syllogisms, but also to have the power of making them.
Ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι τοιαῦτα ὥστε κατὰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου κατηγορεῖσθαι ἀληθῶς καθόλου (οἷον Κλέων καὶ Καλλίας καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον καὶ αἰσθητόν), κατὰ δὲ τούτων ἄλλα (καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ζῶιον ἑκάτερος τούτων ἐστί)· τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἄλλων κατηγορεῖται, κατὰ δὲ τούτων ἄλλα πρότερον οὐ κατηγορεῖται· τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ ἄλλων καὶ αὐτῶν ἕτερα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος Καλλίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ζῶιον.	Omnium igitur quae sunt, haec quidem sunt talia, ut de nullo alio praedicentur vere universaliter, ut Cleon, et Callias, et quod singulare, et sensibile, de his autem alia, nam et homo, et animal uterque horum est. Illa vero et ipsa quidem de aliis praedicantur, de illis autem alia prius non praedicantur, alia autem et ipsa de aliis, et de his alia, ut homo de Callia, et de homine animal.	Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally, e.g. Cleon and Callias, i.e. the individual and sensible, but other things may be predicated of them (for each of these is both man and animal); and some things are themselves predicated of others, but nothing prior is predicated of them; and some are predicated of others, and yet others of them, e.g. man of Callias and animal of man.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια τῶν ὄντων κατ᾽ οὐδενὸς πέφυκε λέγεσθαι, δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν σχεδὸν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι κατὰ μηδενός, πλὴν ὡς κατὰ συμ βεβηκός· φαμὲν γάρ ποτε τὸ λευκὸν ἐκεῖνο Σωκράτην εἶναι καὶ τὸ προσιὸν Καλλίαν.	Quoniam ergo quaedam eorum quae sunt de nullo nata sunt dici, palam: nam sensibilium pene unumquodque est huiusmodi, ut de nullo praedicetur, nisi, ut secundum accidens, dicimus enim quandoque album illud Socratem esse, et hoc veniens Calliam.	It is clear then that some things are naturally not stated of anything: for as a rule each sensible thing is such that it cannot be predicated of anything, save incidentally: for we sometimes say that that white object is Socrates, or that that which approaches is Callias.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω πορευομένοις ἵσταταί ποτε, πάλιν ἐροῦμεν· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστω τοῦτο κείμενον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεῖξαι κατηγορούμενον ἕτερον, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ δόξαν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κατ᾽ ἄλλων· οὐδὲ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα κατ᾽ ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα κατ᾽ ἐκείνων. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ δῆλον ὡς ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ κατ᾽ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων λεχθήσεται)· καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις εἰσὶ μάλιστα περὶ τούτων.	Quoniam autem in sursum pergentibus statur quandoque, rursum dicemus. (0669D) Nunc autem sit hoc positum, de iis ergo praedicatum aliquod non est demonstrare nisi secundum opinionem, sed haec de aliis, neque singularia de aliis, sed alia de ipsis. Quae autem in medio sunt, manifestum quoniam utrumque contingit, nam et haec de aliis, et alia de his dicuntur, et pene rationes et considerationes sunt maxime de his.	We shall explain in another place that there is an upward limit also to the process of predicating: for the present we must assume this. Of these ultimate predicates it is not possible to demonstrate another predicate, save as a matter of opinion, but these may be predicated of other things. Neither can individuals be predicated of other things, though other things can be predicated of them. Whatever lies between these limits can be spoken of in both ways: they may be stated of others, and others stated of them. And as a rule arguments and inquiries are concerned with these things.
↵ Δεῖ δὴ τὰς προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστον οὕτως ἐκλαμβάνειν, ὑποθέμενον αὐτὸ πρῶτον καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς τε καὶ ὅσα ἴδια τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, εἶτα μετὰ τοῦτο ὅσα ἕπεται τῶι πράγματι, καὶ πάλιν οἷς τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶι ὑπάρχειν. οἷς δ᾽ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, οὐκ ἐκληπτέον διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν τὸ στερητικόν.	Oportet ergo propositiones circa unumquodque horum sic sumere supponentem, ipsum primum et definitiones, et quaecunque propria sunt rei, deinde post hoc quaecunque sequuntur rem. Et rursum quae res sequitur, et quaecunque non contingit ipsi inesse, quibus autem ipsa non contingit, non sumendum, eo quod convertitur privativa.	We must select the premisses suitable to each problem in this manner: first we must lay down the subject and the definitions and the properties of the thing; next we must lay down those attributes which follow the thing, and again those which the thing follows, and those which cannot belong to it. But those to which it cannot belong need not be selected, because the negative statement implied above is convertible.
διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων ὅσα τε ἐν τῶι τί ἐστι καὶ ὅσα ἴδια καὶ ὅσα ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποῖα δοξαστικῶς καὶ ποῖα κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν· ὅσωι μὲν γὰρ ἂν πλειόνων τοιούτων εὐπορῆι τις, θᾶττον ἐντεύξεται συμπεράσματι, ὅσωι δ᾽ ἂν ἀληθεστέρων, μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει.	(0670A) Dividendum autem est, et eorum quae sequuntur, quaecunque in eo quod quid est, et quaecunque ut propria, et quaecunque ut accidentia praedicantur, et horum quae secundum opinionem, et quae secundum veritatem. Quanto enim plurium talium abundaverit quis, citius inveniet conclusionem, quanto autem veriorum, magis demonstrabit.	Of the attributes which follow we must distinguish those which fall within the definition, those which are predicated as properties, and those which are predicated as accidents, and of the latter those which apparently and those which really belong. The larger the supply a man has of these, the more quickly will he reach a conclusion; and in proportion as he apprehends those which are truer, the more cogently will he demonstrate.
Δεῖ δ᾽ ἐκλέγειν μὴ τὰ ἑπόμενα τινί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ὅλωι τῶι πράγματι ἕπεται, οἷον μὴ τί τινὶ ἀνθρώπωι ἀλλὰ τί παντὶ ἀνθρώπωι ἕπεται· διὰ γὰρ τῶν καθόλου προτάσεων ὁ συλλογισμός. ἀδιορίστου μὲν οὖν ὄν τος ἄδηλον εἰ καθόλου ἡ πρότασις, διωρισμένου δὲ φανερόν. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἐκλεκτέον καὶ οἷς αὐτὸ ἕπεται ὅλοις, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.	Oportet autem eligere non quae sequuntur aliquam, sed quaecunque totam rem sequuntur, ut non quod aliquem hominem, sed quod omnem hominem sequitur, per universales enim propositiones fit syllogismus. Cum autem est indefinitum, incertum si universalis est propositio, cum vero definitum, manifestum. Similiter autem eligendum et quae ipsum sequitur tota, propter dictam causam.	But he must select not those which follow some particular but those which follow the thing as a whole, e.g. not what follows a particular man but what follows every man: for the syllogism proceeds through universal premisses. If the statement is indefinite, it is uncertain whether the premiss is universal, but if the statement is definite, the matter is clear. Similarly one must select those attributes which the subject follows as wholes, for the reason given.
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἑπόμενον οὐ ληπτέον ὅλον ἕπεσθαι, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἀνθρώπωι πᾶν ζῶιον ἢ μουσικῆι πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἁπλῶς ἀκολουθεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ προ τεινόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ ἄχρηστον θάτερον καὶ ἀδύνατον, οἷον πάντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι πᾶν ζῶιον ἢ δικαιοσύνην ἅπαν ἀγαθόν. ἀλλ᾽ ὧι ἕπεται, ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου τὸ παντὶ λέγεται.	(0670B) Ipsum autem quod sequitur, non est sumendum totum sequi, dico ut hominem omne animal, aut musicam, omnem disciplinam, sed simpliciter solum sequi quemadmodum et praetendimus, etenim inutile alterum et impossibile, ut omnem hominem esse omne animal, vel iustitiam omne bonum, sed cui consequens est, in illo omni esse dicitur.	But that which follows one must not suppose to follow as a whole, e.g. that every animal follows man or every science music, but only that it follows, without qualification, and indeed we state it in a proposition: for the other statement is useless and impossible, e.g. that every man is every animal or justice is all good. But that which something follows receives the mark ‘every’.
ὅταν δ᾽ ὑπό τινος περιέχηται τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὧι τὰ ἑπόμενα δεῖ λαβεῖν, τὰ μὲν τῶι καθόλου ἑπόμενα ἢ μὴ ἑπόμενα οὐκ ἐκλεκτέον ἐν τούτοις (εἴληπται γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις· ὅσα γὰρ ζώιωι, καὶ ἀνθρώπωι ἕπεται, καὶ ὅσα μὴ ὑπάρχει, ὡσαύτωσ), τὰ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια ληπτέον· ἔστι γὰρ ἄττα τῶι εἴδει ἴδια παρὰ τὸ γένος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῖς ἑτέροις εἴδεσιν ἴδια ἄττα ὑπάρχειν.	Quando autem ab aliquo continetur subiectum, cuius consequentia oportet sumere, quae universale quidem sequuntur, vel non sequuntur, non eligendum in his, sumpta enim sunt in illis quaecunque animal et hominem sequuntur, et quaecunque non animali insunt, similiter. Quae autem in unoquoque sunt propria, sumendum: sunt enim quaedam speciei propria praeter genus, necesse est enim diversis speciebus propria quaedam inesse.	Whenever the subject, for which we must obtain the attributes that follow, is contained by something else, what follows or does not follow the highest term universally must not be selected in dealing with the subordinate term (for these attributes have been taken in dealing with the superior term; for what follows animal also follows man, and what does not belong to animal does not belong to man); but we must choose those attributes which are peculiar to each subject. For some things are peculiar to the species as distinct from the genus; for species being distinct there must be attributes peculiar to each.
οὐδὲ δὴ τῶι καθόλου ἐκλεκτέον οἷς ἕπεται τὸ περι εχόμενον, οἷον ζώιωι οἷς ἕπεται ἄνθρωπος· ἀνάγκη γάρ, εἰ ἀνθρώπωι ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ζῶιον, καὶ τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀκολουθεῖν, οἰκειότερα δὲ ταῦτα τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐκλογῆς. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἑπόμενα καὶ οἷς ἕπεται· τῶν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προβλημάτων καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προτάσεων, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τινῶν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἑκάστου τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. ἔτι τὰ πᾶσιν ἑπόμενα οὐκ ἐκλεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν. δι᾽ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ἔσται δῆλον.	(0670C) Neque autem universale eligendum iis quae sequitur quod continetur, ut animal iis quae sequitur homo, necesse est enim si hominem sequitur animal, et haec omnia sequi, convenientiora autem haec hominis electioni. Sumendum autem et quae plerumque sequuntur ea quae consequuntur, nam et problematibus quae plerumque, et syllogismus ex propositionibus, quae plerumque aut in omnibus, aut aliquibus, similis enim est uniuscuiusque conclusio principiis. Amplius quae omnibus sequentia sunt, non eligendum, non enim erit syllogismus ex ipsis, ob quam autem causam, in sequentibus erit manifestum.	Nor must we take as things which the superior term follows, those things which the inferior term follows, e.g. take as subjects of the predicate ‘animal’ what are really subjects of the predicate ‘man’. It is necessary indeed, if animal follows man, that it should follow all these also. But these belong more properly to the choice of what concerns man. One must apprehend also normal consequents and normal antecedents, for propositions which obtain normally are established syllogistically from premisses which obtain normally, some if not all of them having this character of normality. For the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. We must not however choose attributes which are consequent upon all the terms: for no syllogism can be made out of such premisses. The reason why this is so will be clear in the sequel.