Part 1 Commentary
PART I QUESTION I: Concerning the knowledge of divine things
Article 1: Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light
Article 2: Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God
Article 3: Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind
Article 4: Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity Through Natural Reason
| Latin | English |
|---|---|
| Sancti Thomae de Aquino | Thomas Aquinas |
| Super Boetium De Trinitate | On Boethius on the Trinity |
| Textum a Bruno Decker Lugduni Batauorum 1959 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit | Questions 1-4, translated by Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946) |
| pr. 1 | |
| Ab initio nativitatis investigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Sap. 6. | "I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light" (Wis. 6:24). |
| Naturalis mentis humanae intuitus pondere corruptibilis corporis aggravatus in primae veritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest. Unde oportet ut secundum naturalis cognitionis progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora deveniat et a creaturis in Deum, Rom. 1: invisibilia ipsius a creatura mundi etc.; Sap. 13: a magnitudine speciei creaturae et cetera. Et hoc est quod dicitur Iob 36: omnes homines vident eum, scilicet Deum, unusquisque intuetur procul. | The natural intuition of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a corruptible body, cannot fix its gaze in the prime light of First Truth, in which all things are easily knowable; whence it must be that, according to the progress of its natural manner of cognition, the reason advances from the things that are posterior to those that are prior, and from creatures to God. "For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20) and "For by the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby" (Wis. 13:5); and this is what is said in Job 36:25: "All men see Him, gazing from afar." |
| Creaturae enim, per quas naturaliter cognoscitur Deus, in infinitum ab ipso distant. Sed quia in his, quae procul videntur, facile visus decipitur, idcirco ex creaturis in Deum cognoscendum tendentes in errores multiplices inciderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. 14 quod creaturae Dei sunt muscipulae pedibus insipientium et in Psalmo: defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio. Et ideo Deus humano generi aliam tutam viam cognitionis providit, suam notitiam mentibus hominum per fidem infundens. Unde dicitur 1 Cor. 2: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei, nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Et hic est spiritus, quo efficimur credentes, 2 Cor. 4: habentes eundem spiritum fidei credimus, propter quod et loquimur. | For creatures, through whom God can be known by the natural light of reason, are at an infinite distance from Him. But since, in those who look at a thing from a great distance, vision may readily be deceived, therefore those striving to attain to a knowledge of God from creatures fell into many errors: wherefore it is said: "The creatures of God are... a snare to the feet of the unwise" (Wis. 14: 11), and: "They have failed in their search" (Ps. 63:7); and therefore God has provided for the human race another safe road of cognition, bestowing upon the minds of men, by faith, a knowledge of Himself. Therefore, it is said: "The things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God: but to us God has revealed them by His Spirit" (1 Cor. 2: 11): and this is the Spirit by whom we are enabled to be believers: "Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: ‘I believed, for which cause I have spoken’ (Ps. 115: 10); we also believe, for which cause we speak also" (2 Cor, 4:13) |
| Sicut ergo naturalis cognitionis principium est creaturae notitia a sensu accepta, ita cognitionis desuper datae principium est primae veritatis notitia per fidem infusa. Et hinc est quod diverso ordine hinc inde proceditur. Philosophi enim, qui naturalis cognitionis ordinem sequuntur, praeordinant scientiam de creaturis scientiae divinae, scilicet naturalem metaphysicae. Sed apud theologos proceditur e converso, ut creatoris consideratio considerationem praeveniat creaturae. | Therefore, as the principle of our cognition is naturally the knowledge of created things, obtained by means of the senses, so the principle of supernatural cognition is that knowledge of First Truth conferred upon us, infused by faith; and hence it follows that in advancing one proceeds according to a diverse order. For philosophers, who follow along the way of natural cognition, place knowledge about created things before knowledge about divine things: natural science before metaphysics: but among theologians the procedure is in reverse order, so that study of the Creator comes before that of creatures. |
| pr. 2 | |
| Hunc ergo ordinem secutus Boethius ea quae sunt fidei tractare intendens in ipsa summa rerum origine principium suae considerationis instituit, scilicet Trinitate unius simplicis Dei. Unde ei competunt verba praemissa: ab initio nativitatis et cetera. | This order, therefore, Boethius followed: intending to treat of those things which are of faith, he took as the starting point of his study that highest origin of things, namely, the Trinity of the one, simple God. Whence it is that the above-quoted words are applicable to him: "I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of her to light." |
| In quibus circa praesens opusculum, quod ad Symmachum patricium urbis composuit, tria possunt notari, scilicet materia, modus et finis. | In these words, as regards the present opusculum, which he addressed to Symmachus, a patrician of Rome, three things can be noted: namely, the matter, the mode, and the purpose. |
| pr. 3 | |
| Materia siquidem huius operis est in una divina essentia Trinitas personarum, quae consurgit ex prima nativitate, qua divina sapientia a patre aeternaliter generatur, Prov. 8: nondum erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram; in Psalmo: ego hodie genui te. | The matter of this work is the Trinity of Persons in the one, divine Essence, that Trinity which has its source in the primal nativity in which divine wisdom is eternally generated by the Father. "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived" (Prov. 8:24), and: "This day have I begotten you" (Ps. 2:7) |
| Quae quidem nativitas initium est cuiuslibet nativitatis alterius, cum ipsa sola sit perfecte naturam capiens generantis; aliae vero omnes imperfectae sunt, secundum quas genitum aut partem substantiae generantis accipit aut substantiae similitudinem. Unde oportet quod a praedicta nativitate omnis alia nativitas per quandam imitationem derivetur, Eph. 3: ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur. Et propter hoc filius dicitur primogenitus omnis creaturae, Col. 1, ut nativitatis origo et imitatio designetur, non eadem generationis ratio. Unde convenienter dicit: ab initio nativitatis; Prov. 8: dominus possedit me in initio viarum suarum. Nec solum creaturarum est initium praedicta nativitas, sed etiam spiritus sancti, qui a generante genitoque procedit. | This nativity is the beginning of every other nativity, as it is the only one involving perfect participation in the nature of the generator: but all others are imperfect according as the one generated receives either a part of the substance of the generator, or only a similitude: from this it follows that from the aforesaid nativity, every other is derived by a kind of imitation; and thus: "Of whom all paternity in heaven and in earth is named" (Eph. 3: 15); and on this account the Son ,is called the first-born of every creature (Col. 1:15) so that the origin of nativity and its imitation might be designated, but not according to the same meaning of generation; and therefore it is aptly said: "I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth." "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways" (Prov. 8:22); for not only of creatures is the aforesaid nativity the beginning, but even of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Generator and the Generated. |
| Per hoc autem quod non dicit: initium nativitatis investigabo, sed ab initio designatur quod in hoc nativitatis initio eius perscrutatio non finitur, sed ab hoc incipiens ad alia procedit. | But in saying this, he does not say: "I will seek out the beginning of nativity," but "from the beginning" signifies that his search is not limited by initiation of this kind of nativity, but that, beginning from this, he proceeds to others, |
| pr. 4 | |
| Eius namque doctrina in tres partes dividitur. Prima namque est de Trinitate personarum, ex quarum processione omnis alia nativitas vel processio derivatur, in hoc quidem libro, qui prae manibus habetur, quantum ad id quod de Trinitate et unitate sciendum est, | for his doctrine is divided into three parts. The first part, concerning the Trinity of Persons, from the procession of whom every other nativity and procession are derived, is contained in that book which we possess at hand, so far as anything can be known about the Trinity and Unity. |
| in alio vero libro, quem ad Iohannem diaconum Ecclesiae Romanae scribit, de modo praedicandi, quo utimur in personarum Trinitate, qui sic incipit: quaero, an pater. | But in another book which he wrote to John, a deacon of the Roman Church, we find what he says about the mode of predication which we employ in the distinction of Persons and unity of essence; and this book begins: "I inquire whether the Father." |
| Secunda vero pars est de processione bonarum creaturarum a Deo bono in libro, qui ad eundem Iohannem conscribitur de hebdomadibus, qui sic incipit: postulas a me. | The second part, which is about the procession of good creatures from a good God, is in a book that is written to the same John (De hebdomadibus), and this begins: "You ask of me. |
| Tertia vero pars est de reparatione creaturarum per Christum. Quae quidem in duo dividitur. Primo namque proponitur fides, quam Christus docuit qua iustificamur, in libro qui intitulatur de fide Christiana, qui sic incipit: Christianam fidem. Secundo explanatur, quid de Christo sentiendum sit, quomodo scilicet duae naturae in una persona conveniant, et hoc in libro de duabus naturis in una persona Christi ad Iohannem praedictum conscripto, qui sic incipit: anxie te quidem. | The third part is about the separation of creatures through Christ. This is divided into two parts: For first, there is set forth the faith which Christ taught by which we are justified, in that book entitled De fide Christiana, which begins: "The Christian faith." In the second part, an explanation is given of what must be held about Christ: namely, how two natures are united in one person. This discussion of the two natures and the one person in Christ is also in a book written to the same John, which begins: "You, indeed, solicitously." |
| pr. 5 | |
| Modus autem de Trinitate tractandi duplex est, ut dicit Augustinus in I de Trinitate, scilicet per auctoritates et per rationes, quem utrumque modum Augustinus complexus est, ut ipsemet dicit. | Now the mode employed in treating of the Trinity is twofold, as St. Augustine says in I De Trinitate, namely, through truths known on the basis of authority, and through those known by reason, both of which modes Augustine combined, as he himself says. |
| Quidam vero sanctorum patrum, ut Ambrosius et Hilarius, alterum tantum modum prosecuti sunt, scilicet per auctoritates. Boethius vero elegit prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes, praesupponens hoc quod ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum. Et ideo modus huius operis designatur in hoc quod dicit: investigabo, in quo rationis inquisitio designatur, Eccli. 39: sapientiam, scilicet Trinitatis notitiam, antiquorum, scilicet quam antiqui sola auctoritate asseruerunt, exquiret sapiens, id est ratione investigabit. | Some of the holy Fathers, as Ambrose and Hilary, employed but one mode of explanation: namely, by setting forth those truths founded upon authority. But Boethius chose to proceed according to the other mode; namely, according to reasoned arguments, presupposing what had been concluded by others on the grounds of authority. Hence also the method of his work is indicated in what he says: "I shall investigate", in which an inquiry of reason is signified. In Sirach 39:1 we read: "Wisdom," namely, knowledge of the Trinity; "of all the ancients," that is, which the ancients affirmed solely on the grounds of authority; "the wise man will seek out," that is, he will investigate by reason. |
| Unde in prooemio praemittit: investigatam diutissime quaestionem. | Wherefore, in the preface he speaks of "An investigation carried on for a very long time." |
| pr. 6 | |
| Finis vero huius operis est, ut occulta fidei manifestentur, quantum in via possibile est, Eccli. 24: qui elucidant me, vitam aeternam habebunt. Et ideo dicit: ponam in lucem scientiam illius, Iob 28: profunda fluviorum scrutatus est, et abscondita produxit in lucem. | The purpose of this work is: that hidden things may be made manifest, so far as that is possible in this life. "They that explain me shall have life everlasting" (Sirach 24:31); and therefore, he says: "I will bring the knowledge of her to light" (Wis. 6:24). "The depths also of rivers he searched, and hidden things he brought forth to light" (Job 2 8: 11). |
| Pars 1 | |
| Pars 1 pr. 1 | BOETHIUS’ PREFACE (link) |
| Huic ergo operi prooemium praemittit, in quo tria facit. Primo breviter causas operis praelibat, in quo reddit auditorem docilem. Secundo excusationem subiungit, in quo reddit auditorem benevolum, ibi: idcirco stilum et cetera. Tertio ostendit sui operis originem et quasi subiectum esse doctrinam Augustini, ex quo reddit auditorem attentum, ibi: vobis tamen etiam illud inspiciendum et cetera. | To this work the author prefixes a preface, in which he does three things: First, he briefly indicates the causes of the work, in doing which he inclines his hearer to accept what he says. Secondly, he adds an excuse or explanation in which he gains the good will of his hearer, where he says: "I restrain my pen." In the third place, he points out that the source of his work and, in a certain way, its teaching, is the doctrine of St. Augustine, and in doing this he renders his hearer attentive, when he says: "You must also determine this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered from the writings of blessed Augustine, have in my work borne fruit." |
| He likewise sets forth in the first part the four causes of his work. | |
| Proponit autem quattuor causas sui operis in prima parte. Primo materialem, cum dicit: investigatam diutissime quaestionem, scilicet de Trinitate personarum unius Dei, in qua et difficultatem materiae insinuat, quae diutina investigatione indiguit, et studii diligentiam, qua ipse eam diutissime investigavit, ut intelligatur investigatam a nobis, quamvis etiam intelligi possit investigatam a pluribus, quia a principio nascentis Ecclesiae haec quaestio ingenia fidelium maxime fatigavit. | 1) First, the material cause, when he says: "the problem which has been for so long a time the subject of my investigation," that is, about the Trinity of Persons of the one God; and in these words he implies both the difficulty of the matter, because he has carried on the investigation for a very long time, and also the diligence of the study with which he has for so long a period investigated it, as "investigation" is understood by us, although it can also be understood to mean investigation by many; because from the beginning of the existence of the Church, this question has especially continued to challenge the cleverest minds of Christians. |
| Pars 1 pr. 2 | |
| Secundo tangit causam efficientem: et proximam sive secundariam in hoc quod dicit: quantum mentis nostrae igniculum, et primam sive principalem in hoc quod dicit: illustrare lux divina dignata est. | 2) Secondly, he indicates the proximate or secondary efficient cause when he says: "the feeble spark of my mind." Moreover, he speaks also of the first or principal cause when he adds: "that the divine light has deigned to enkindle." |
| Proxima siquidem causa huius investigationis fuit intellectus auctoris, qui recte igniculus dicitur. | Now the proximate cause of this investigation is, indeed, the intellect of the author, which is rightly termed a spark. |
| Ignis enim, ut dicit Dionysius 15 c. caelestis hierarchiae, maxime competit ad significandas divinas proprietates, tum ratione subtilitatis, tum ratione luminis, tum ratione virtutis activae per calorem, tum ratione situs et motus. | "For fire," as Dionysius says (XV Coel. hier.), "especially serves to signify properties of the divinity: at once by reason of its subtlety, of its light, and also by reason of its place and motion." |
| Quae quidem Deo maxime competunt, in quo est summa simplicitas et immaterialitas, perfecta claritas, omnipotens virtus et altissima sublimitas, Angelis autem mediocriter, sed humanis mentibus infimo modo, quarum propter corpus coniunctum et puritas inquinatur et lux obscuratur et virtus debilitatur et motus in suprema retardatur; unde humanae mentis efficacia recte igniculo comparatur. | These things, in the highest degree, pertain to God, in whom exist the culmination of simplicity and of immateriality, perfect charity, almighty power, and highest majesty. To the angels, "fire" (as indicative of intellect) may be applied in a middle sense, but to human minds, with only a more restricted meaning; for by union with a body, its purity is lessened, its light is obscured, its power weakened, and its upward motion retarded: wherefore the efficacy of the human mind is rightly compared to a spark. |
| Unde nec ad huius quaestionis veritatem inquirendam sufficit, nisi divina luce illustrata, et sic divina lux est causa principalis, humana mens causa secundaria. | Hence it would not be able to investigate the truth of this question unless light were cast upon it by the divine light; and thus the divine light is the principal cause; but the human mind, a cause in the secondary order. |
| Pars 1 pr. 3 | |
| Tertio tangit causam formalem in hoc quod dicit: formatam rationibus, et tangit modum agendi quantum ad tria. | 3) Thirdly, he treats of the formal cause when he says: "arranged according to a reasoned plan," and he indicates the mode of treatment under three headings. |
| Primo quantum ad hoc quod argumentando processit; unde dicit: formatam rationibus. Quaestio namque quamdiu probabilibus rationibus sub dubio exagitatur, quasi informis est, nondum ad certitudinem veritatis pertingens, et ideo formata dicitur esse, quando ad eam ratio additur, per quam certitudo de veritate habetur. Et in hoc providit intelligentiae, quia quod credimus, debemus auctoritati, quod intelligimus, rationi, ut Augustinus dicit. | a) First, since he proceeds by argumentation, he therefore says, "arranged according to a reasoned plan." For a question discussed even over a long period according to probable reasons but still with doubt is, as it were, without form, not yet laying claim to the certitude of truth; and hence it is said to possess form when reasonable proof is added, through which certitude regarding the truth may be attained: in this process, intellect gives us vision of the truth, because what we believe, we owe to authority; but what we understand, we owe to reason, as Augustine says. |
| Secundo in hoc quod non solum verbis disseruit, sed etiam scripto mandavit, unde dicit: litterisque mandatam. In quo providit memoriae. | b) In the second place he discusses the mode of treatment, since he treats of this matter not only in words, but has incorporated it in writing, he says: "I entrust my thought to pen." In so doing, he has made provision against the weaknesses of memory. |
| Tertio in hoc quod non ad praesentes per modum doctrinae, sed ad absentes per modum epistulae conscripsit. | c) Thirdly, since he has written, not after the manner of one imparting doctrine to another present with him, but as to one absent, by means of a letter. |
| Sic enim etiam Aristoteles diversimode libros suos composuit, quosdam quidem ad praesentes, qui ab ipso audiebant - et hi libri dicuntur auditus, sicut dicitur liber de naturali auditu - quosdam autem ad absentes scribens, sicut liber de anima conscriptus esse significatur in I Ethicorum, ubi nominantur exteriores sermones, ut Commentator Graecus ibidem dicit. | Thus Aristotle also composed his books in different ways: some addressed to those who in his presence listened to him, and these books are called Auditus, as one such book is, entitled, De naturali auditu; but certain others he wrote to those absent, as we find in I Ethic. that the books De anima were so written, where the names of discourses addressed to those at a distance are given, as the Greek commentator says. |
| Unde sequitur: offerendam vobis quasi maiori ad iudicandum communicandamque curavi quasi socio ad profectum. Et in hoc iudicium requirit; unde sequitur: tam vestri cupidus iudicii quam nostri studiosus inventi. Ex hoc enim quod fuit studiosus ad inveniendum, praedictam quaestionem rationibus formavit; ex hoc vero quod fuit cupidus iudicii Symmachi, ei formatam obtulit. | Accordingly, he adds: "I have taken pains to offer and share with you, prompted by desire for your judgment," as if addressing an expert and asking his opinion in this matter. Thus, he continues: "prompted as much by desire for your judgment as by zeal for my task." Because he had been zealous for ascertaining the truth, he had ordered the aforesaid question according to reasonable arguments; and, because he was desirous of the judgment of Symmachus, he presented to him the work thus arranged in orderly fashion. |
| Pars 1 pr. 4 | |
| Quarto tangit causam finalem, cum dicit: qua in re quid mihi sit animi, id est quem finem intendam ex supra dicta re, quotiens excogitata animo de praedictis vel quibuscumque aliis stilo commendo, intelligi potest ex duobus, tum ex ipsa difficultate materiae, tum ex eo quod colloquor non multitudini, sed raris, scilicet sapientibus, id est vobis tantummodo. | 4) In the fourth place, he refers to the final cause when he says: "What my intention is," that is, what end I am striving for in regard to the above-mentioned problem: "Whenever I entrust my thought to pen" concerning the aforesaid or certain other matters, "it is possible to understand" for two reasons: "because of the difficulty of the matter" and also, "because it is only to you men that I am addressing it." |
| Non enim hunc librum scripsit, ut multitudini recitaret, quod quandoque fit propter vulgi favorem, sed tantummodo uni sapienti, unde sequitur: neque enim excitamur, scilicet ad scribendum famae iactatione, id est commendatione, et clamoribus vulgi, sicut poetae recitantes carmina in theatris, inanibus, quia tales clamores frequenter sine ratione sunt. | This book, therefore, he has not written in order to read it to the many, which would be with hope of popular acclaim, but rather, for one wise man alone; wherefore, he continues: "I am not prompted by any desire for fame or for empty popular applause," as are the poets who recite their verses before the foolish crowds in the theater, because such applause is often altogether without reason. |
| Et sic removit finem inconvenientem et subiungit finem debitum, insinuans quidem finem principalem qui est interior, scilicet perceptio divinae veritatis, et explicans finem secundarium, scilicet iudicium sapientis, unde dicit: sed si quis est fructus exterior, quasi dicat: principaliter quidem me excitat fructus interior, sed si aliquis est exterior, hic non potest aliam sperare sententiam nisi materiae similem, id est convenientem, quasi dicat: non aliud iudicium requiro pro fructu exteriori nisi qui deceat tantam materiam, de qua iudicium concedi non debet ignaviter pigris neque callide invidis, sed solum benevolo sapienti, | Thus he puts aside any unworthy end and establishes one that is honorable, implying a principal purpose, which is interior, namely, knowledge of divine truth, and, explicitly pointing out a secondary end, that is, the judgment of a wise man, when he says: "If there is any exterior reward," as if he would say: It is an interior reward that principally urges me on, but if there is any that is exterior, this can be none other than to wait and to hope for a judgment like to the matter, that is, proportionate to it: By way of exterior return I ask for nothing except what is fitting in a matter of such importance, in regard to which I have stated that a judgment of it should be neither stolidly indifferent nor the bitter one of an envious critic, but only that pronounced in good will by a wise man. |
| unde sequitur: quocumque igitur a vobis deieci oculos, scilicet ad quoscumque respexi, non ad vos tantum considerationi meae occurrit, partim, id est in aliquibus, ignava, id est stulta, segnities, id est pigritia, partim livor, id est invidia, callidus, id est astutus ad nocendum, in tantum ut contumeliam videatur irrogare divinis tractatibus, qui haec, scilicet divina, proiecerit, id est inordinate exposuerit, talibus monstris hominum - monstra dicuntur homines qui in corpore humano cor gerunt bestiale, propter peccatum bestiis similes effecti in affectu - non agnoscenda potius quam conculcanda, quia non tam quaerunt cognoscere quam vituperare quaecumque dicuntur, propter invidiam; unde dicitur Matth. 7: nolite sanctum dare et cetera. Alia littera: ne et ego si aliter facerem, videar etc. qui proiecerim et cetera. Idcirco stilum et cetera. | Accordingly, he adds: "Wherever I have directed my gaze apart from you, that is, to whomsoever I have looked, except to you alone, I have encountered on the one side, stolid indifference"; that is, lack of comprehension, "on the other side, sly envy," that is, ill will, sly only in condemnation, so that he who treated of these things, would seem to offer insult to divine treatises, that is, by inordinately explaining them "to such monsters of men." Men are called monsters who, though in human body, bear within them the heart of a beast, since vice has made them like to beasts in their affections; hence these things "would be trampled under foot by them, rather than acknowledged," because they do not so much seek to know, but—because of their envy—to revile whatever is said; wherefore, "Give not what is holy to dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet" (Matt. 7:6). Therefore, that I should not do otherwise than this, "I restrain my pen by brevity." |
| Pars 1 pr. 5 | |
| Haec est secunda pars prooemii, in qua subiungit excusationem. Et primo excusat operis difficultatem. Secundo operis imperfectionem, ibi: sed tantum a nobis et cetera. Tangit autem triplicem difficultatem, quam sponte huic operi adhibet. | This is the second part of the preface, in which he adds an explanation of his manner of writing. And first, he explains the difficulty of the task. In the second place, he excuses its imperfection. "Only so much ought one require of me as the intuition of human reason can approximate about the sublime truths of the Godhead. He refers also to a threefold difficulty which purposely he attached to it. |
| Prima est ex brevitate Scripturae, unde dicit: idcirco stilum brevitate contraho, secundum illud Horatii: brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio. | The first is by reason of the brevity of his writing; wherefore, he says, "I restrain my pen by brevity," according to that saying of Horace: "While I labor to be brief, I become obscure." |
| Secunda est ex subtilibus rationibus quas inducit, et hoc est quod dicit: ex intimis disciplinis philosophiae sumpta, quae sunt disciplinae a sensibilibus abstrahentes, quarum principiis et conclusionibus utitur, ut metaphysicae et logicae. | The second arises from the subtlety of the reasoning which he introduces; thus he says: "truths gleaned from the deepest teachings of philosophy," which are those doctrines abstracted from the senses, the principles and conclusions which metaphysics and logic make use of. |
| Tertia est ex novitate verborum, unde dicit: haec, scilicet sumpta, velo significationibus novorum verborum. Quae quidem nova dicuntur vel quantum ad materiam istam, quia alii tractatores huius quaestionis talibus verbis usi non sunt, vel quantum ad eos qui legunt, qui talibus verbis non sunt assueti. | The third difficulty arises from the newness of the words used; wherefore he says: "I veil over by the signification of new words." These words are called "new" either with reference to the matter, because others treating of this same question did not employ the same vocabulary, or with reference to those who read them, because they are unaccustomed to such terms. |
| Tres autem has difficultates addit quartae, quam supra tetigit, quae est materiae difficultas, ut ea, quae in hoc libro scribuntur, tantum sapientibus colloquatur, qui haec intelligere poterunt, sicut est auctor ipse et ille, ad quem liber conscribitur, alii vero, qui capere intellectu non possunt, a lectione excludantur. Non enim libenter leguntur quae non intelliguntur. Et quia ratio ex praecedentibus connectitur, ideo praemisit: idcirco, quod est nota conclusionis. Littera vero plana est. | These three difficulties he adds to the fourth which he had previously mentioned: that is, the difficulty of the subject; consequently, in regard to those things written in this book, the meaning is clear only to the wise, to such men as the author himself and the one to whom he has addressed it. But others who cannot comprehend it are excluded from the reading of it. For things which are not understood are not read with pleasure. And because his reason for so writing is connected with preceding statements, he introduces it ‘with "therefore," which is a sign of a conclusion. The meaning is clear. |
| Pars 1 pr. 6 | |
| Deinde cum dicit: sed tantum a nobis quaeri oportet etc., excusat operis defectum, quia scilicet non debet requiri ab eo in hoc opere plus certitudinis quam quantum humana ratio valet ad alta divinitatis conscendere. Quod probat per locum a minori in aliis artibus, in quibus iste finis unicuique artifici constituitur ut tantum faciat, quantum humana ratio sinit. Non enim medicus semper curat, sed si nihil omittat de his quae facere debet, sine culpa erit, et similiter est in aliis artibus. Unde et in hoc opere, ubi est difficillima materia sensum humanae rationis excedens, magis debet auctori venia dari, si non ad perfectam certitudinem quaestionem deducat. | "Only so much ought one require of me as the intuition of human reason can approximate about the sublime truths of the Godhead." Here he excuses a defect of the work, because, indeed, one ought not demand from him in this task any more certitude than that which the human reason, in mounting up to the divine, is capable of; a position which he justifies by reference to matters of less importance in other arts, in which only such an end is established for each craftsman as he can accomplish, one such as human reason allows. A physician does not always, indeed, effect a cure, but if he omits nothing which he ought to do, he will be without blame; and the same is true in regard to other arts. Therefore in this work, where the matter is difficult, going beyond the experience of human nature, the greater leniency ought to be granted if he does not solve the question with perfect certitude. |
| Deinde cum dicit: vobis tamen, ostendit, cuius auctoritatem in scribendo sequatur, scilicet Augustini. Non ut ea tantum dicat quae in libro Augustini inveniuntur, sed quia ea quae Augustinus de Trinitate dixit, scilicet quod in absolutis divinae personae conveniunt et in relativis distinguuntur, accipit quasi semina et principia, quibus utitur ad quaestionis difficultatem enodandam. Et sic ipsa veritatis explicatio per multas rationes sunt fructus ex seminibus Augustini in ipso provenientes. Qui autem sint convenientes et uberes, ei, ad quem scribit, inspiciendum committit ad propositam quaestionem accedens. | Then, when he says: "You must also determine this: whether the seeds of speculation, gathered from the writings of the blessed Augustine, have in my work borne fruit," he adduces whose authority he follows in his work, namely, Augustine. Not that he says only those things that are to be found in the books of Augustine, but because those things which Augustine said regarding the Trinity—namely, that the divine Persons are equal in an absolute sense and are distinguished according to relationships—he accepts as seeds and principles, which he uses in resolving this difficult question; and so this explanation of truth by means of many considerations of reason is the fruit springing forth from those seeds found in the writings of Augustine himself; but whether they are acceptable and productive, he leaves to the judgment of him to whom he writes, thus coming directly to the proposed question. |
| Quaestio 1 | QUESTION I |
| Pars 1 q. 1 pr. | Concerning the Knowledge of Divine Things |
| Hic duplex quaestio incidit. Prima est de divinorum cognitione, secunda de eorum manifestatione. | Here there occurs a twofold question: concerning the knowledge of divine things, and concerning the manifestation of them. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur quattuor. | In regard to the first, four things are asked: |
| Pars 1 q. 1 pr. 1 | |
| Primo. Utrum mens humana in cognitione veritatis nova illustratione divinae lucis indigeat. | 1. Whether the human mind in order to attain to a knowledge of truth requires a new illumination of divine light. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 pr. 2 | |
| Secundo. Utrum possit ad Dei notitiam pervenire. | 2. Whether it can attain to an idea of God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 pr. 3 | |
| Tertio. Utrum Deus sit primum quod a mente cognoscitur. | 3. Whether God is the first object known by the mind. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 pr. 4 | |
| Quarto. Utrum ad divinae Trinitatis cognitionem pervenire per se sufficiat. | 4. Whether the human mind is capable of arriving at a knowledge of the divine Trinity by natural reason. |
| Articulus 1 | Article 1 Whether the Human Mind in Order to Attain to a Knowledge of Truth Requires a New Illumination of Divine Light. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1 | |
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mens humana in cognitione cuiuslibet veritatis indigeat nova illustratione divinae lucis. 2 Cor. 3: non sumus sufficientes cogitare et cetera. Sed perceptio veritatis non potest esse sine cogitatione. Ergo humana mens non potest veritatem aliquam cognoscere, nisi de novo illustretur a Deo. | 1. It seems that the human mind in attaining to any knowledge whatever requires a new illumination of divine light. "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor 3:5); but there can be no perception of truth of any kind whatever without thought; therefore the human mind cannot know any truth unless it is illuminated by a new light from God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2 | |
| Praeterea, facilius est ab alio veritatem addiscere quam per se ipsum eam inspicere. Unde qui per se ipsos sciunt praeferuntur illis, qui ab aliis addiscere possunt, in I Ethicorum. Sed homo non potest ab aliis addiscere, nisi mens eius interius doceatur a Deo, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de magistro et Gregorius in homilia Pentecostes. Ergo nec per se ipsum potest aliquis veritatem inspicere, nisi de novo mens eius illustretur a Deo. | 2. It is easier to learn any truth from another than to discover it for oneself: wherefore, those who know things by their own efforts are preferred to those who are able to learn from other men, according to I Ethic.; but man is not able to learn from another unless his mind is interiorly taught by God, as Augustine says in his book, De magistro, and Gregory in Hom. Pentec.; therefore neither can anyone discover truth of himself unless his mind is illuminated by God with a new light. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3 | |
| Praeterea, sicut se habet oculus corporalis ad corpora intuenda, ita se habet intellectus ad intelligibilem veritatem conspiciendam, ut patet in III de anima. Sed oculus corporalis non potest videre corpora nisi illustratione solis materialis superveniente. Ergo nec intellectus humanus potest veritatem inspicere, nisi lumine solis invisibilis, qui est Deus, illustretur. | 3. As the eyes of the body are related to corporeal things which they behold, so is the intellect related to the intelligible truth which it perceives, as is evident in III De anima; but the bodily eye cannot see corporeal things unless it is illuminated by the material sun; therefore neither can the intellect behold the truth unless it is illuminated by the light of the invisible sun, which is God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 4 | |
| Praeterea, illi actus in nobis esse dicuntur, ad quos exercendos principia sufficientia in nobis habemus. Sed in nobis non est cognoscere veritatem, cum quandoque multi laborent ad veritatem cognoscendam, qui eam cognoscere nequeunt. Ergo non habemus sufficientia principia in nobis ad veritatem cognoscendam. Ergo oportet ad hoc, quod eam cognoscamus, ab exteriori nos iuvari, et sic idem quod prius. | 4. Those acts are said to be in us (as our own) for the exercise of which we possess within ourselves principles that are sufficient; but in us there is not the power to know truth altogether [or absolutely] for there are many who labor to learn the truth and who, nevertheless, are unable to do so; therefore we have not in us sufficient principles for knowing truth and so it must be that to arrive at knowledge of it we require aid from outside ourselves, and so the conclusion is like the foregoing. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 5 | |
| Praeterea, magis dependet operatio mentis humanae a luce divina quam operatio creaturae sensibilis inferioris a luce corporis caelestis. Sed corpora inferiora quamvis habeant formas quae sunt principia naturalium operationum, non tamen possunt operationes suas perficere, nisi lumine solis et stellarum superveniente iuvarentur. Unde dicit Dionysius 4 c. de divinis nominibus quod lumen solis ad generationem visibilium corporum confert et ad vitam ipsa movet et nutrit et auget. Ergo nec menti humanae sufficit ad videndam veritatem naturale lumen, quod est quasi forma ipsius, nisi lumen aliud superveniat, scilicet divinum. | 5. The operation of the human mind depends more upon the divine light than does the operation of sensible or inferior beings upon the light of the material heaven; but inferior bodies, although they have forms which are principles of their natural operations, are, nevertheless, incapable of perfecting these operations unless they are aided by the influence of the light of the stars; wherefore Dionysius (De div. nom., chap. 4) says that the light of the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies and that it moves them to life and nourishes them and causes them to grow; therefore its natural light, which is, as it were, its form, would not, suffice to make truth visible to the human mind unless another light, namely, the divine, supervened to assist it. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 6 | |
| Praeterea, in omnibus causis ordinatis per se et non secundum accidens effectus non procedit a causa secunda nisi per operationem causae primae, ut patet in libro de causis. Sed mens humana ordinatur sub luce increata ordine essentiali et non accidentali. Ergo operatio mentis quae est eius effectus proprius, scilicet cognitio veritatis, non potest provenire ex ea nisi operante prima luce increata. Eius autem operatio non videtur alia esse nisi illustratio. Et sic idem quod prius. | 6. In all causes that are ordered to one another essentially, and not accidentally, no effect proceeds from a second cause unless through the operation of a first cause, as is established. in the first proposition of De causis; but the human mind is ordained beneath the uncreated light according to an order that is essential and not accidental; therefore the operation of the human mind which is its proper effect, namely, the cognition of truth, cannot proceed from it unless by reason of the operation of the first uncreated light: its operation, however, seems to indicate nothing other than illumination; therefore, etc. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 7 | |
| Praeterea, sicut se habet voluntas ad bene volendum, ita se habet intellectus ad recte intelligendum. Sed voluntas non potest bene velle, nisi divina gratia adiuvetur, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo nec intellectus potest veritatem intelligere, nisi divina luce illustretur. | 7. As the will is related to willing well, so the intellect is related to right understanding: but the will cannot will well unless it is aided by divine grace, as Augustine says; therefore neither can the intellect know the truth unless illuminated by divine light. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 8 | |
| Praeterea, illud, ad quod vires nostrae sufficiunt, irreprehensibiliter nostris viribus ascribimus, sicut currere vel aedificare. Sed reprehensibile est quod aliquis scientiam veritatis suo ascribit ingenio, quin immo iubemur illam Deo ascribere, secundum illud Eccli. ult.: danti mihi sapientiam dabo gloriam. Ergo ad cognoscendam veritatem vires nostrae non sufficiunt. Et sic idem quod prius. | 8. That for which our powers do not suffice is wrongly ascribed to our strength: but it is reprehensible that anyone should ascribe knowledge of the truth to his own ability, since indeed we are even commanded to ascribe it to God, according to this saying of Sirach 51:23: "To Him that giveth me wisdom, will I give glory"; therefore our powers do not suffice for knowledge of truth, and so the conclusion is as before. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 1 | |
| Sed contra, mens humana illustrata est divinitus lumine naturali, secundum illud Psalmi: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Si ergo hoc lumen, quia creatum est, non sufficit ad veritatem conspiciendam, sed requirit novam illustrationem, pari ratione lumen superadditum non sufficiet, sed indigebit alio lumine, et sic in infinitum, quod numquam compleri potest, et sic impossibile erit cognoscere aliquam veritatem. Ergo oportet stare in primo lumine, ut scilicet mens lumine naturali sine aliquo superaddito possit veritatem videre. | Sed contra. The human mind is divinely illuminated by its natural light, according to the saying of Psalm 4:7: "The light of Your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." Thus, therefore, if this created light is not sufficient for the knowing of truth, but there is required a new illumination, according to the same reasoning this superadded light would not suffice either, but wiluld require still another light, and so on to infinity, which cannot be encompassed; and so it would be impossible to know any truth. Therefore one must stand firm in reliance upon the first light, namely, that the mind by its natural light, without the superaddition of any other, can see the truth. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 2 | |
| Praeterea, sicut visibile in actu sufficiens est ad hoc quod moveat visum, ita intelligibile actu sufficit ad movendum intellectum, si sit proportionatum. Sed mens nostra habet in se unde possit facere intelligibile actu, scilicet intellectum agentem, et tale intelligibile est ei proportionatum. Ergo non indiget aliqua nova illustratione ad hoc quod mens veritatem cognoscat. | Again, as it suffices for what is actually visible that it should he proportionate to the sight in order to move it, so it suffices for what is intelligible that it should be proportionate to the intellect in order to move it: but our mind possesses within itself the power of making things intelligible in act, namely, the active intellect, and what is intelligible is proportionate to it; therefore it does not require another new illumination in order to know truth. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 3 | |
| Praeterea, sicut se habet lux corporalis ad visionem corporalem, ita se habet lux intellectualis ad visionem intellectus. Sed quaelibet lux corporalis quantumcumque sit parva facit aliquid videri corporaliter, ad minus se ipsam. Ergo et lux intelligibilis, quae est menti connaturalis, sufficit ad aliquam veritatem cognoscendam. | Moreover, as corporeal light is related to bodily vision, so is the intellect related to intelligible vision. But any corporeal light at all, even though it is weak, renders something corporeally visible, at least itself; therefore, the light of the intellect also, which is connatural to the mind, suffices for the understanding of some truth. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 4 | |
| Praeterea, omnia opera artificialia ex cognitione alicuius veritatis dependent, cum eorum principium sit scientia. Sed quaedam opera artificialia sunt, in quae potest liberum arbitrium per se ipsum secundum Augustinum, ut aedificare domos et huiusmodi. Ergo et in aliquam veritatem cognoscendam sufficit mens sine nova illustratione divina. | Furthermore, all things that are artificially made depend upon the cognition of some truth since the principle of them is knowledge; but it is certain that products of art do exist in which, according to Augustine, the free will is able [to act] by itself, as in building houses and the like; therefore man is sufficiently capable of knowing some truth without a new divine illumination. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 co. 1 | |
| Responsio. Dicendum quod haec est differentia inter virtutes activas et passivas quod passivae non possunt exire in actum propriae operationis, nisi moveantur a suis activis, sicut sensus non sentit, nisi moveatur a sensibili, sed virtutes activae possunt operari sine hoc quod ab alio moveantur, sicut patet in viribus animae vegetabilis. Sed in genere intellectus invenitur duplex potentia: activa, scilicet intellectus agens, et passiva, scilicet intellectus possibilis. | Response. It must be said that between potencies that are active and those that are passive there is this difference: passive potencies cannot enter on the act of their proper operation unless they are moved to do so by their own active agents, just as the senses experience no sensation unless moved by some sensible object; but active potencies are capable of operation without being moved by another, as is evident in the case of the potencies of the vegetative soul: but as regards the intellect, a twofold potency is found, an active potency, that is, the active intellect, and a passive potency, that is, the possible intellect. |
| Quidam vero posuerunt quod solus intellectus possibilis erat potentia animae, intellectus vero agens erat quaedam substantia separata. Et haec est opinio Avicennae, secundum quam opinionem sequitur quod anima humana non possit in actum propriae operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, exire, nisi exteriori lumine illustretur, illius scilicet substantiae separatae, quam dicit intellectum agentem. | Now, there are certain philosophers who maintained that the possible intellect alone is a faculty of the soul, while the active intellect is a separate substance; and this is the opinion of Avicenna. According to this opinion, it follows that the human soul would not be capable of entering upon its proper operation, which is knowledge, unless illuminated by an exterior light, namely, by the light of that separate substance which they call the active intellect. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 co. 2 | |
| Sed quia verba philosophi in III de anima magis videntur sonare quod intellectus agens sit potentia animae et huic etiam auctoritas sacrae Scripturae consonat, quae lumine intelligibili nos insignitos esse profitetur, cui philosophus comparat intellectum agentem, ideo in anima ponitur respectu intelligibilis operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, et potentia passiva et potentia activa. Unde sicut aliae potentiae activae naturales suis passivis coniunctae sufficiunt ad naturales operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se potentiam activam et passivam sufficit ad perceptionem veritatis. | But because the words of the Philosopher (III De anima) seem to proclaim more convincingly that the active intellect is a potency belonging to the soul—and with this the authority of Scripture agrees, which declares that we are distinguished by that intellectual light to which the Philosopher compares the active intellect—therefore it is held that there is in the soul, fitting it for intelligible operation, that is, for undertaking the cognition of truth, a potency which is active and another which is passive. Wherefore, as some powers which are naturally active, when conjoined with those which are their passive complements, suffice for the carrying on of their natural operations, so also the soul of man, having in itself an active and a passive potency, is sufficient for perception of the truth. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 co. 3 | |
| Cum autem quaelibet virtus activa creata finita sit, est eius sufficientia ad determinatos effectus limitata. Unde in alios effectus non potest, nisi nova virtus addatur. Sic ergo sunt quaedam intelligibiles veritates, ad quas se extendit efficacia intellectus agentis, sicut principia quae naturaliter homo cognoscit et ea quae ab his deducuntur; et ad haec cognoscenda non requiritur nova lux intelligibilis, sed sufficit lumen naturaliter inditum. | Since, however, the power of any created thing is but finite, its efficacy will be limited to certain determined effects. Consequently it cannot attain to certain other effects unless new power is added to it; but there are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the active intellect does extend, as, for example, those first principles which man naturally knows, and those truths which are deduced from them; and for such knowledge no new light of intelligence is required, but the light with which the mind is naturally endowed suffices. |
| Quaedam vero sunt ad quae praedicta principia non se extendunt, sicut sunt ea quae sunt fidei, facultatem rationis excedentia, et futura contingentia et alia huiusmodi; et haec cognoscere mens humana non potest, nisi divinitus novo lumine illustretur superaddito lumini naturali. | But there are other truths to which the aforesaid first principles do not extend; e.g., the truths of faith and things that exceed the faculty of reason, such as knowledge of future contingent events, and the like; and such things the human mind cannot know unless it is divinely illuminated by a new light, superadded to that which it naturally possesses. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 co. 4 | |
| Quamvis autem non requiratur novi luminis additio ad cognitionem eorum ad quae ratio naturalis se extendit, requiritur tamen divina operatio. Praeter operationem enim qua Deus rerum instituit naturas, singulis formas et virtutes proprias tribuens, quibus possent suas operationes exercere, operatur etiam in rebus opera providentiae omnium rerum virtutes ad actus proprios dirigendo et movendo. Ita enim universa creatura divinae gubernationi subicitur, sicut instrumenta subduntur gubernationi artificis et qualitates naturales virtutibus animae nutritivae, ut dicitur in II de anima. Unde sicut ex calore naturali sequitur opus digestionis secundum regulam, quam imponit calori vis digestiva, et omnes virtutes inferiorum corporum operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur ex virtutibus corporum caelestium, ita omnes virtutes activae creatae operantur, secundum quod moventur et diriguntur a creatore. | For, although it does not require the addition of new light for knowledge of those things to which reason naturally extends, it does require divine operation: for over and above that operation by which God created the natures of thingsgiving to each its proper form and ability, by which they are able to exercise their proper operation. He also operates in things the works of Providence, directing and moving the capabilities of all things to their proper acts. For in this way the whole universe of creatures is subject to the divine governance, as instruments are subject to the direction of the workman and as natural qualities are subject to the power of the nutritive soul, as is said in II De anima. Therefore, as the work of digestion is accompanied by a natural heat, according to the measure which the digestive function imposes upon heat, and as all the inferior powers of the body operate according as they are directed and moved by virtue of the heavenly bodies, so all the active created powers are governed and moved by the Creator. |
| Sic ergo in omni cognitione veritatis indiget mens humana divina operatione, sed in naturalibus cognoscendis non indiget nova luce, sed solo motu et directione eius, in aliis autem etiam nova illustratione. Et quia de talibus Boethius hic loquitur, ideo dicit: quantum divina lux et cetera. | Thus, therefore, in all cognition of truth, the human mind requires the divine operation. In the realm of naturally known truths, however, it requires no new light, but only the divine motion and direction; for the knowledge of other (supernatural) truths it needs also a new illumination. And because it is of such things that Boethius speaks, he says: "To the extent that the divine light has deigned to enkindle the feeble spark of my mind." |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 | |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quamvis nihil simus sufficientes cogitare ex nobis sine Dei operatione, non tamen oportet quod in qualibet nostra cognitione novum lumen nobis infundatur. | 1. Although we are in no way sufficient of ourselves, as from ourselves, to know anything without the operation of God, yet it is not necessary that for every operation of ours a new light should be given to us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2 | |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum hoc Deus nos interius docet in naturalibus cognitis, quod lumen naturale in nobis causat et ipsum dirigit in veritatem, in aliis vero etiam novum lumen infundendo. | 2. In matters of natural cognition God teaches us interiorly in this way: that He is the cause of the natural light which is in us, and He directs it to the truth; but in other (supernatural) matters He further teaches us by the infusion of a new light. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 | |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod oculus corporalis ex illustratione solis materialis non consequitur lumen aliquod sibi connaturale, per quod possit facere visibilia in actu, sicut consequitur mens nostra ex illustratione solis increati. Et ideo oculus semper indiget exteriori lumine, non autem mens. | 3. The eye of the body, when illuminated by the light of the material sun, does not respond to a light which is in any way natural (i.e., intrinsic) to itself, by means of which it makes things to be actually visible; even as is the case with the mind when it is illuminated by the uncreated Light; and therefore the eye always requires an exterior light, but not the mind. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4 | |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen intelligibile, ubi est purum sicut in Angelis, sine difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter demonstrat, ita quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere. In nobis autem lumen intelligibile est obumbratum per coniunctionem ad corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non libere possit veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem inspicere, secundum illud Sap. 10: corpus quod corrumpitur et cetera. Et exinde est quod non est omnino in nobis veritatem cognoscere, scilicet propter impedimenta. Sed unusquisque magis vel minus habet hoc in potestate, secundum quod lumen intelligibile est in ipso purius. | 4. Where there is pure light of intellect, as in the angels, it makes,evident without difficulty all things known in the natural order, so that in them there is cognition of all objects naturally intelligible to them: in us, however, this light is obscure, being overshadowed as it were by reason of conjunction with the body and with corporeal powers, and on this account it ii hindered so that it cannot freely and naturally behold that truth which is itself knowable, as is said in the Book of Wisdom (9:15): "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul; and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things." From this it follows that on account of the impediment (of the body) it is not in our power to know truth altogether in its fullness. But each one possesses more or less the power to know in proportion to the purity of the intellectual light which is in him. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 5 | |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod corpora inferiora, quamvis indigeant ad hoc quod operentur ut moveantur a corporibus caelestibus, non tamen indigent ad proprias operationes efficiendas quod novas formas ab eis recipiant. Et similiter non oportet quod mens humana, quae movetur a Deo ad cognoscendum naturaliter cognita, nova luce perfundatur. | 5. Although inferior bodies have need of superior bodies for their operation, to the extent that they must be moved by them; nevertheless, for the perfect accomplishment of their proper functions, they do not need to receive from these superior bodies any new forms, And in like manner it is not necessary that the human mind, which is moved by God, should be endowed with any new light in order to understand those things which are within its natural field of knowledge. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 6 | |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus VIII super Genesim, sicut aer illuminatur a lumine praesente, quod si fuerit absens continuo tenebratur, ita et mens illuminatur a Deo. Et ideo etiam lumen naturale in anima semper Deus causat, non aliud et aliud, sed idem; non enim est causa fieri eius solum, sed etiam esse illius. In hoc ergo continue Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et ipsum dirigit, et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in operationem suam procedit. | 6. As Augustine says (VIII Super Gen. ad litteram), as the air is illuminated by the presence of light, but straightway grows dark if the light should be removed, so the mind is illuminated by God, and so also it is God who continually causes the natural light in the soul, not one kind now and another kind at another time, but the same (natural light); for He is the cause not only of its coming to be, but of its continued existence in us. In this way, therefore, God continually operates in the mind since He causes and governs the natural light in it, and thus the mind does not carry on its own function without the operation of the First Cause. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 7 | |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod voluntas numquam potest bene velle sine divino instinctu, potest autem bene velle sine gratiae infusione, sed non meritorie. Et similiter intellectus non potest sine divino motu veritatem quamcumque cognoscere, potest autem sine novi luminis infusione, quamvis non ea quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt. | 7. The will never can will the good without divine incitement: nevertheless it can will the good without infusion of grace, though not meritoriously. And likewise the intellect, without divine influence, is incapable of knowing any truth whatever; it can, however, know without infusion of new light, though not those truths which exceed natural cognition. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 1 ad 8 | |
| Ad octavum dicendum quod eo ipso quod Deus in nobis lumen naturale conservando causat et ipsum dirigit ad videndum, manifestum est quod perceptio veritatis praecipue sibi debet ascribi, sicut operatio artis magis attribuitur artifici quam serrae. | 8. From the very fact that God causes the natural light in us by conserving it and directing it to seeing, it is manifest that perception of the truth must be ascribed principally to Him, just as the producing of a work of art is ascribed to the artist rather than to the thing produced. |
| Articulus 2 | Whether the Human Mind Can Arrive at an Idea of God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1 | |
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullo modo possit cognosci a nobis. Illud enim, quod in summo gradu nostrae cognitionis nobis ignotum remanet, nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibile. Sed in perfectissimo gradu nostrae cognitionis Deo non coniungimur nisi quasi ignoto, ut dicit Dionysius 1 c. mysticae theologiae. Ergo Deus nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibilis. | 1. It seems that in no way can God be known ,by us. For that which in the highest degree of our knowledge remains unknown to us, in no manner is knowable: but in the most perfect degree of our cognition we are not united with God, except as with One who is, as it were, unknown, as Dionysius says (Theologia mystica, chap. 1); therefore God is in no way knowable by us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 | |
| Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur per aliquam formam cognoscitur. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, Deus omnem formam nostri intellectus subterfugit. Ergo nullo modo est a nobis cognoscibilis. | 2. Anything that is known is known through some other form; but, as Augustine says, God escapes (by transcending) every form of our intellect; therefore in no way is He knowable by us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 | |
| Praeterea, cognoscentis et cognoscibilis oportet esse aliquam proportionem, sicut et potentiae cuiuslibet ad suum obiectum. Sed inter intellectum nostrum et Deum nulla potest esse proportio, sicut nec inter finitum et infinitum. Ergo intellectus nullo modo potest Deum cognoscere. | 3. Between the knower and the thing known must be some kind of proportion, as in the case of any potency and its object; but between our intellect and God there can be no proportion, as there can be none between the infinite and the finite; therefore our intellect can in no way know God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 4 | |
| Praeterea, cum potentia et actus reducantur in idem genus, utpote quae dividunt omnia genera entis, nulla potentia potest in actum, qui est extra genus suum, sicut sensus non potest cognoscere substantiam intelligibilem. Sed Deus est extra omne genus. Ergo non potest aliquo intellectu cognosci qui sit in aliquo genere. Sed noster intellectus est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera. | 4. Since potency and act are reduced to the same genus, inasmuch.as they divide all classes of being, no potency can be in act which is outside its own genus: just as the senses are incapable of knowing intelligible substance; but God is outside every genus; therefore He cannot be known by any intellect that is in a genus; but our intellect is of this kind.therefore, etc. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 arg. 5 | |
| Praeterea, remoto primo necesse est omnia consequentia removeri. Sed primum intelligibile est quiditas rei; unde quod quid est dicitur esse obiectum proprium intellectus in III de anima, et quid est est medium demonstrandi an est et omnes alias rei condiciones. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo nihil de illo possumus cognoscere. | 5. If that which stands first is done away with, everything consequent upon it is likewise put aside: but what is first intelligible about a thing is its quiddity; hence that which a thing is, is said to be the proper object of the intellect (III De anima); and what is serves as a medium of demonstrating whether it exists, and all the other conditions of the thing. But concerning God, we are unable to know what He is, as Damascene says. Therefore, we can know nothing of God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 1 | |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. 1: invisibilia Dei et cetera. | But on the contrary is the saying of Rom. 1:20: "For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the worla, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity." |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 2 | |
| Praeterea, Ier. 10: in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur scire et nosse me. Sed hoc esset inanis gloria, nisi eum cognoscere possemus. Ergo Deum cognoscere possumus. | According to Jer. 9:24: "But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me"; but this would be empty glory unless we were able to know Him; therefore we can know God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 3 | |
| Praeterea, nihil diligitur nisi cognitum, ut patet per Augustinum in libro de Trinitate. Sed Deum diligere iubemur. Ergo eum cognoscere possumus; non enim nobis praecipitur impossibile. | Nothing is loved unless it is known, as is evident from Augustine (II De Trinitate); but we are commanded to love God; therefore we are capable of knowing Him, since the impossible is not enjoined by precept. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 co. 1 | |
| Responsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter aliqua res cognoscitur. Uno modo per formam propriam, sicut oculus videt lapidem per speciem lapidis. Alio modo per formam alterius similem sibi, sicut cognoscitur causa per similitudinem effectus et homo per formam suae imaginis. | Response. I answer: It must be said that there is a twofold way in which anything is known. One manner is through its proper form, as the eye sees a stone through the species of the stone. Another way is through some other form similar to it, as a cause is known through the similitude of its effect, just as man is known through the form of his image. |
| Per formam autem suam aliquid dupliciter videtur. Uno modo per formam quae est ipsa res, sicut Deus se cognoscit per essentiam suam et etiam Angelus se ipsum. Alio modo per formam quae est ab ipso, sive sit abstracta ab ipso, quando scilicet forma immaterialior est quam res, sicut forma lapidis abstrahitur a lapide; sive sit impressa intelligenti ab eo, utpote quando res est simplicior quam similitudo per quam cognoscitur, sicut Avicenna dicit quod intelligentias cognoscimus per impressiones earum in nobis. | Moreover, through its own form a thing is also known in two ways. One way is the following: when knowledge is through the form which is the thing itself, as with God who eternally knows His own essence, and as an angel knows itself. According to another mode, knowledge is through a form which is other than the thing: either when the form has been abstracted from a thing—in which case the form is more immaterial than the thing itself, as is the form of a stone abstracted from the stone itself— or when the form is impressed on the intellect by a thing, as occurs when the thing is more immaterial than the similitude by which it is known; thus, as Avicenna says, we know intellectual beings through their impression in us. |
| Quia igitur intellectus noster secundum statum viae habet determinatam habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu abstrahuntur, cum comparetur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in III de anima, non potest ipsum Deum cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic cognoscetur in patria a beatis. | Therefore, since our intellect has, in our present state of wayfaring, a determined relation to forms abstracted from sensible things (since it is dependent upon phantasms in the same way as sight is upon colors, as is said in III De anima), it cannot know God in this life through that form which is His essence; though it is in this way that He is known by the blessed in heaven. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 co. 2 | |
| Similitudo etiam quaecumque impressa ab ipso in intellectum humanum non sufficeret ad hoc quod faceret eius essentiam cognosci, cum in infinitum excedat quamlibet formam creatam, ratione cuius intellectui per formas creatas pervius non potest esse Deus, ut Augustinus dicit. Nec etiam in statu huius viae cognoscitur Deus a nobis per formas pure intelligibiles, quae sint aliqua similitudo ipsius propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad phantasmata, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod solummodo per effectus formam cognoscatur. | No similitude, however, of whatever kind impressed by Him upon the human intellect, would suffice to make His essence known, since He infinitely transcends every created form; consequently God cannot be made accessible to the mind through created forms, as Augustine says. Nor, in this present state, can God become known to us even through the species of things which are purely intelligible, which have in a certain way a likeness to Him, because our intellect is connaturally related to phantasms, as has been said. Therefore it remains certain that it is only through the forms of His effects that He is known. |
| Effectus autem est duplex: quidam, qui adaequatur virtuti suae causae, et per talem effectum cognoscitur plenarie virtus causae, et per consequens quiditas ipsius; alius effectus est, qui deficit a praedicta aequalitate, et per talem effectum non potest comprehendi virtus agentis et per consequens nec essentia eius; sed cognoscitur tantum de causa quod est. Et sic se habet cognitio effectus ut principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est, sicut se habet quiditas ipsius causae, cum per suam formam cognoscitur. Hoc autem modo se habet omnis effectus ad Deum. Et ideo non possumus in statu viae pertingere ad cognoscendum de ipso nisi quia est. | There are, moreover, two kinds of effects: those which adequate the power of a cause, and through such an effect the power of a cause is fully known, and consequently the essence of the cause; and another kind of effect which is not completely equal to its cause. Through this latter kind of effect it is not possible to comprehend the power of the agent, and consequently not its essence either; but regarding the cause it can be known only that it exists. Thus the knowledge of an effect stands as a principle whereby the existence of its cause is known, just as does the quiddity of the cause when it is known through its own form. Now, it is according to this second mode that every effect stands in relation to God; and hence we are not able in this life to attain to any knowledge of Him, except that He is. |
| Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est alio perfectius cognoscit, quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanto per effectum magis apprehenditur habitudo causae ad effectum. | Nevertheless, of those knowing that He is, one will know Him more perfectly than another, because a cause is more perfectly understood from its effect the more perfectly the relation of the cause to its effect is apprehended. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 co. 3 | |
| Quae quidem habitudo in effectu non pertingente ad aequalitatem suae causae attenditur secundum tria, scilicet secundum progressionem effectus a causa et secundum hoc quod effectus consequitur de similitudine suae causae et secundum hoc quod deficit ab eius perfecta consecutione. Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei, quamvis ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat, sed an est solum. | And in this relation of an effect not reaching in equality to its cause, three things are noted: namely, the progression of the effect from its cause; secondly, the consequent similitude of the effect to its cause; and thirdly, the failure on the part of the effect to attairt to a perfect likeness of its cause. Thus the human mind grows in the knowledge of God, even though it cannot attain to a knowledge of what He is, but only to a knowledge that He is, in three ways. |
| Primo, secundum quod perfectius cognoscitur eius efficacia in producendo res. Secundo, prout nobiliorum effectuum causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis eminentiam eius commendant. Tertio in hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur elongatus ab omnibus his, quae in effectibus apparent. | Thus, in the first place, God is known as His productiveness and efficacy are more perfectly known. Secondly inasmuch as He is known as the Cause of the nobler of His effects, since ihose creatures which display being of a higher mode in their resemblance to Him manifest His eminence more than others. In the third place, He is better recognized as differenhated from all those things which appear in His effects. |
| Unde dicit Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus quod cognoscitur ex omnium causa et excessu et ablatione. | Hence, in De divinis nominibus, Dionysius says that God is known inasmuch as He is the cause of all things, by His transcending eminence in comparison to all things, and by denial (of all created imperfection). |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 co. 4 | |
| In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen eius naturale nova illustratione confortatur; sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et intellectus, per quod mens in contemplatione supra se elevari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit Deum esse supra omne id, quod naturaliter comprehendit. Sed quia ad eius essentiam videndam penetrare non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodammodo ab excellenti lumine reflecti, et hoc est quod dicitur Gen. 32 super illud: vidi dominum facie ad faciem, in Glossa Gregorii: visus animae, cum in Deum intenditur, immensitatis coruscatione reverberatur. | Moreover, in the attempt to arrive at some knowledge of God, the human mind is greatly assisted when its natural light is fortified by a new illumination: namely, the light of faith and that of the gifts of wisdom and of understanding, by which the mind is elevated above itself in contemplation, inasmuch as it knows God to be above anything which it naturally apprehends. But because even this new light does not suffice to penetrate to a vision of His essence, it is said to be, in a certain way, turned back upon itself by His excellent light; and this is what is said in Gregory’s gloss regarding the statement in Gen. 32:30 ("I have seen God face to face"): "When the vision of the soul is directed to God, it is reflected back upon itself, overwhelmed by the brilliance of His immensity." |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 | |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum hoc dicimur in fine nostrae cognitionis Deum tamquam ignotum cognoscere, quia tunc maxime mens in cognitione profecisse invenitur, quando cognoscit eius essentiam esse supra omne quod apprehendere potest in statu viae, et sic quamvis maneat ignotum quid est, scitur tamen quia est. | 1. It is answered: God as an unknown is said to be the terminus of our knowledge in the following respect: that the mind is found to be most perfectly in possession of knowledge of God when it is recognized that His essence is above everything that the mind is capable of apprehending in this life; and thus, although what He is remains unknown, yet it is known that He is. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 ad 2 | |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus omnem formam intellectus subterfugit, apparet quod non potest cognosci quid est, sed solum an est, ut dictum est. | 2. It may be said: From the fact that the divine essence escapes any form of our intellect, evidently it is not possible to know what He is, but only that He exists. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 ad 3 | |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod proportio nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitudo duorum ad invicem convenientium in aliquo, secundum hoc quod conveniunt aut differunt. Possunt autem intelligi esse convenientia dupliciter. | 3. It is answered: Proportion is nothing other than the mutual relation of two things associated by something in respect to which they either agree or differ. Now, agreement may be of two kinds. |
| Uno modo ex hoc quod conveniunt in eodem genere quantitatis aut qualitatis, sicut habitudo superficiei ad superficiem aut numeri ad numerum, in quantum unum excedit aliud aut aequatur ei, vel etiam caloris ad calorem, et sic nullo modo potest esse proportio inter Deum et creaturam, cum non conveniant in aliquo genere. | In one way, things may be associated as belonging to the same genus of quantity or quality, as is the relation of one surface to another or of one number to another inasmuch as one excels the other or is equal to it, or even as heat is related to heat; and according to this mode of relation there is no possible proportion between God and creature, since there is no agreement in any genus. |
| Alio modo possunt intelligi convenientia ita quod conveniant in aliquo ordine, et sic attenditur proportio inter materiam et formam, faciens et factum et alia huiusmodi, et talis proportio requiritur inter potentiam cognoscentem et cognoscibile, cum cognoscibile sit quasi actus potentiae cognoscentis. Et sic etiam est proportio creaturae ad Deum ut causati ad causam et cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, sed propter infinitum excessum creatoris super creaturam non est proportio creaturae ad creatorem, ut recipiat influentiam ipsius secundum totam virtutem eius, neque ut ipsum perfecte cognoscat, sicut ipse se ipsum perfecte cognoscit. | In another way beings are said to be related when they are associated in a certain order; and in this way there is proportion between matter and form, between the maker and the thing made. This also is the kind of proportion required between knower and knowable, since what is knowable is, in a certain way, the act of the knowing power. Such, too, is the proportion of a creature to God: that of caused to its cause, and of knower to the knowable; but according as the excellence of the Creator transcends the creature, there is no proportion of the creature to the Creator which makes it possible to receive from Him an influx proportionate to His complete power, or to know Him perfectly, even as He perfectly knows Himself. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 ad 4 | |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus et intelligibile sunt unius generis, sicut potentia et actus. Deus autem, quamvis non sit in genere intelligibilium, quasi sub genere comprehensum, utpote generis naturam participans, pertinet tamen ad hoc genus ut principium. Eius etiam effectus non sunt extra genus intelligibilium, unde et hic per effectus et in patria per essentiam cognosci potest. Praeterea, intelligibile videtur magis dici per remotionem quam per positionem. Ex hoc enim est unumquodque intelligibile quod est a materia immune vel separatum. Negationes autem in divinis verificantur, quamvis affirmationes sint incompactae, ut Dionysius dicit 2 c. caelestis hierarchiae. | 4. It may be said: The intellect and the intedligible object are of one genus, as potency and act. God, however, although not in the genus of intelligible things, as if comprehended under a genus participating in its nature, nevertheless is related to this genus as its principle. For His effects are not outside every genus of intelligible beings; wherefore even here, He can be known through His effects, and in heaven, through His essence. Moreover, a thing seems to be called "intelligible" more by negation than by, affirmation; for a thing is said to be intelligible inasmuch as it is either immune from matter or separated from it. Hence, negations may be stated in regard to divine things with truth; though affirmations are inadequate in expressing agreement, as Dionysius says (Coel. hier., chap. 2). |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5 | |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod quando aliquid non cognoscitur per formam suam, sed per effectum suum, forma effectus supplet locum formae ipsius rei; nam ex ipso effectu scitur an causa sit. | 5. It may be answered: When a thing is known, not through its own form, but through an effect, the form of that effect takes the place of the form of the thing itself, and therefore from the effect it is possible to know whether the cause exists. |
| Articulus 3 | Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Mind. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1 | |
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum, quod a mente cognoscitur, sit Deus. Illud enim, in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur et per quod de omnibus quae cognoscimus iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis, sicut lux est primo nota oculo quam ea, quae per lucem videntur, et principia intellectui prius quam conclusiones. Sed omnia in prima veritate cognoscuntur et per ipsam de omnibus iudicamus, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trinitate et de vera religione. Ergo prima veritas, scilicet Deus, est id quod primo a nobis cognoscitur. | 1. It seems that the first object known or perceived by the mind must be God Himself. For, that in which all other things are known and through which we form judgments of what we know from all other things, is the first thing known by us, just as light is known by the eye prior to what is seen by the light; and as principles are understood before conclusions: but all things are known in the First Truth, and through that Truth we judge of all things, as Augustine says in De Trinitate and in De vera religione; therefore the First Truth is first known by us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2 | |
| Praeterea, quando sunt plures causae ordinatae, prima causa prius influit in causatum quam causa secunda et ultimo dimittit ipsum, ut habetur in libro de causis. Sed cum scientia humana sit causata a rebus, scibile vel intelligibile est menti humanae causa intelligendi. Ergo primum intelligibilium primo influet in ipsam. Sed influxus intelligibilis in intellectum, in quantum huiusmodi, est ut intelligatur. Ergo Deus, qui est primum intelligibilium, ab intellectu nostro primo intelligitur. | 2. When there are many ordered causes, the influx of the first cause into the thing caused is prior to that of the second cause, and it is the last to leave the effect, as is said in Liber de causis: but since human knowledge is caused by things, the knowable or the intelligible is the cause of the mind’s intellection; therefore the first intelligible is the first to influence it: but the influence of the intelligible on the mind, as such ‘ is that it be understood; therefore God is the first object known by our intellect, since He is the first intelligible. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 | |
| Praeterea, in omni cognitione, in qua ea quae sunt priora et simpliciora primo cognoscuntur, id, quod est primum et simplicissimum, primo cognoscitur. Sed in cognitione humana ea, quae prius occurrunt, sunt priora et simpliciora, ut videtur, quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit; esse autem est primum inter creata. Ergo cognitioni humanae primo occurrit Deus, qui est simpliciter primum et simplicissimum. | 3. In all cognition, in which those things that are prior and simpler are first known, what is first and simplest is known first: but in human cognition. those things that are first experienced are things prior to others and simpler, as is evident, since being is that of which first the human mind forms a concept, as Avicenna says; being, moreover, is first among created things; therefore also, God first comes to the knowledge of the human mind, since He is absolutely first and most simple being. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 4 | |
| Praeterea, finis, qui est ultimus consecutione, est primus in intentione. Sed Deus est ultimus finis humanae voluntatis, ad quem omnes alii fines ordinantur. Ergo est primus in intentione. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi sit cognitus. Ergo illud quod primo occurrit cognoscendum est Deus. | 4. That end which is the last in attainment is the first in intention: but God is the last end of the human will, to whom all other ends are ordained; and He is, therefore, the first in intention. But this could not be unless He were known; therefore God must be the first object of knowledge. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5 | |
| Praeterea, illud, quod non indiget aliqua praecedenti operatione ad hoc quod circa ipsum sit operatio alicuius operantis, prius cadit sub operatione illius operantis quam hoc quod indiget aliqua operatione alia, sicut lignum iam dolatum prius cadit sub operatione facientis scamnum quam lignum adhuc dolandum. Sed res sensibiles indigent quod abstrahantur a materia per intellectum agentem, antequam intelligantur ab intellectu possibili. Deus autem per se ipsum est maxime a materia separatus. Ergo ipse prius intelligitur ab intellectu possibili quam res sensibiles. | 5. That which requires no preliminary preparation in order to be fitted to the need of the workman is the first chosen for his task, rather than that which needs some labor in order to be made ready, just as one making a bench selects wood already cut rather than uncut wood: but sensible things need to be abstracted from matter by the active intellect befctre they can be understood by the possible intellect. God, on the other hand, is by His very nature altogether separate from matter: therefore He is understood by the possible intellect prior to sensible things. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 arg. 6 | |
| Praeterea, naturaliter cognita et quae non possunt intelligi non esse sunt illa quae primo nostrae cognitioni occurrunt. Sed cognitio exsistendi Deum naturaliter est omnibus inserta, ut dicit Damascenus. Nec potest Deus cogitari non esse, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur. | 6. Those things that are naturally known, and that cannot be thought of as non-existing, are what first occur to our cognition: but an idea of the existence of God is naturally implanted in all minds, as Damascene says. Neither is it possible to think of God as non-existent, as Anselm states; therefore God is the first being known by us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 1 | |
| Sed contra, secundum philosophum omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet. Sed Deus est maxime remotus a sensu. Ergo ipse non est a nobis primo, sed ultimo cognitus. | On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, everything known by us takes its origin from sense knowledge: but God is absolutely remote from sense experience; therefore He is not first known by us, but is known last. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 2 | |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum ea, quae sunt posteriora secundum naturam, sunt priora quoad nos, et minus nota secundum naturam sunt magis nota quoad nos. Sed creaturae sunt posteriores et minus notae secundum naturam quam ipse Deus. Ergo Deus est posterius notus quoad nos. | Again, according to the Philosopher, those things that are posterior, according to nature, are first known as far as we are concerned; and those things which are less knowable in themselves are better known as far as we are concerned. But created things are posterior and less knowable by nature than is God Himself; therefore, by us, He is known after creatures. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 3 | |
| Praeterea, illud quod promittitur ut ultimum praemium non est primum quod praecedit omnia merita. Sed cognitio Dei promittitur nobis ut ultimum praemium omnis cognitionis et actionis. Ergo Deus non est primo a nobis cognitus. | Again, what is promised as an ultimate reward does not come first, preceding everything done to deserve it: but knowledge of God is promised to us as the ultimate reward of all cognition and action; therefore God is not the first object known by us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 co. 1 | |
| Responsio. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et per hoc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc apparet esse falsum, quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse. | Response. I answer that it must be said: There are those who declare that the first object known by the human mind even in this life is God Himself, who is first truth and the one through whom all other things are known. But this is evidently false, since to know God through His essence constitutes the beatitude of man; wherefore it would follow that every man would be blessed. |
| Et praeterea, cum in divina essentia omnia quae dicuntur de ipsa sint unum, nullus erraret circa ea, quae de Deo dicuntur, quod experimento patet esse falsum. Et iterum ea, quae sunt primo in cognitione intellectus, oportet esse certissima, unde intellectus certus est se ea intelligere, quod patet in proposito non esse. | Moreover, since in the divine essence all things said of it are one, no one would err in regard to anything he said concerning God—a thing which from experience is evidently false; furthermore, since things first in the comprehension of the intellect ought to be most certainly known, the intellect would be certain that it knew them; but it is clear that this is not the case in the proposition (as to knowing God). |
| Repugnat etiam haec positio auctoritati Scripturae quae dicit Exodi 3: non videbit me homo et vivet. | This position is also repugnant to the authority of Scripture (Exod. 33:20): "Man shall not see Me and live." |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 co. 2 | |
| Unde alii dixerunt quod essentia divina non est primo cognitum a nobis in via, sed influentia lucis ipsius, et secundum hoc Deus est primum quod a nobis cognoscitur. | Hence there are others who say that the divine essence is not the first thing known by us in this life, but the influx of its light is, and in this way God is the first object known by us. |
| Sed hoc etiam stare non potest, quia prima lux divinitus influxa in mente est lux naturalis per quam constituitur vis intellectiva. Haec autem lux non est primo cognita a mente neque cognitione qua sciatur de ea quid est, cum multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus; neque cognitione qua cognoscitur an est, quia intellectum nos habere non percipimus, nisi in quantum percipimus nos intelligere, ut patet per philosophum in IX Ethicorum. Nullus autem intelligit se intelligere, nisi in quantum intelligit aliquod intelligibile. Ex quo patet quod cognitio alicuius intelligibilis praecedit cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se intelligere et per consequens cognitionem qua aliquis cognoscit se habere intellectum, et sic influentia lucis intelligibilis naturalis non potest esse primum cognitum a nobis, et multo minus quaelibet alia influentia lucis. | But this claim cannot be held; for the first influx of divine light in the mind is the natural light by which the power of intellectual life is constituted. This light, however, is not at first known by the mind; neither by cognition by which is known what this light is, since much investigation is required to know the essence of the intellect; nor by cognition by which is known whether such a light exists; for we do not perceive that we possess intellect, except inasmuch as we perceive that we understand, as is clear from the Philosopher’s words in IX Ethic. For no one knows that he understands anything, save inasmuch as he understands something intelligible. From this it is evident that cognition of an intelligible object-precedes cognition by which one knows that he himself understands, and consequently precedes the cognition by which he knows that he possesses an intellect; and so the influx of the natural light of intelligence cannot be the first thing known by us; and much less can any other kind of influx of light be the first thing known. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 co. 3 | |
| Et ideo dicendum est quod primo cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem diversarum potentiarum aut secundum ordinem obiectorum in una potentia. | Therefore it must be said that "the first thing known to man" is a phrase which can be understood in two ways: either according to the order of diverse potencies, or according to the order of objects in some one potency. |
| Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu, illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet singulare vel sensibile intelligibili. | According to the first way, since all the knowledge of our intellect is derived from sense experience, what is made known to us by our senses is known prior to what is known by the intellect; and this is the singular, or the sensibleintelligible. |
| Alio modo, scilicet secundum alium modum cuilibet potentiae est cognoscibile primo suum proprium obiectum. Cum autem in intellectu humano sit potentia activa et passiva, obiectum potentiae passivae, scilicet intellectus possibilis, erit illud, quod est actum per potentiam activam, scilicet intellectum agentem, quia potentiae passivae debet respondere proprium activum. | According to the other meaning, that is, according to the order of objects in any one potency, the proper object of each potency is what is first knowable by it. Since, however, in the human intellect there is an active potency and a passive one, the object of the passive potency, namely, the possible intellect, will be that which is in act through the active potency, that is, through the active intellect, since to the passive potency there must correspond that which activates it. |
| Intellectus autem agens non facit intelligibilia formas separatas quae sunt ex se ipsis intelligibiles, sed formas quas abstrahit a phantasmatibus, et ideo huiusmodi sunt, quae primo intellectus noster intelligit. | The active intellect, however, does not render intelligible separate forms, which are of themselves intelligible, but those forms which it abstracts from phantasms; and hence forms of this kind are those which our intellect knows. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 co. 4 | |
| Et inter haec illa sunt priora, quae primo intellectui abstrahenti occurrunt. Haec autem sunt quae plura comprehendunt vel per modum totius universalis vel per modum totius integralis, et ideo magis universalia sunt primo nota intellectui et composita componentibus, ut diffinitum partibus diffinitionis. | And among these forms, the ones that first come to be abstracted by the intellect hold the place of priority. These, furthermore, are the forms that comprehend more notes—either after the manner of a total universal or after the manner of an integral whole—therefore the more universal things are first known to the intellect; a composite is known before its component parts, and a definition before the parts of the definition. |
| Et secundum quod quaedam imitatio intellectus est in sensu, qui etiam quodammodo abstracta a materia recipit, etiam apud sensum singularia magis communia sunt primo nota, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal. | In this respect there is a certain imitation of the intellect found in the sense powers, which also receive as their objects things which in a certain way are abstracted from matter. For even in the case of the senses, singular things of a more general nature are the first known, as "this body" is known sooner than "this animal." |
| Unde patet quod Deus et aliae substantiae separatae nullo modo possunt esse prima intellecta, sed intelliguntur ex aliis, ut dicitur Rom. 1: invisibilia et cetera. | Thus it is evident that God and other separate substances cannot in any way be the first objects of our intellection, but are understood from other things, as is said in Rom. 1:20: "For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 1 | |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex verbis illis Augustini et similibus non est intelligendum quod ipsa veritas increata sit proximum principium, quo cognoscimus et iudicamus, sed quia per lumen, quod est eius similitudo, nobis inditum cognoscimus et iudicamus. Nec hoc lumen habet aliquam efficaciam nisi ex prima luce; sicut in demonstrationibus secunda principia non certificant nisi ex virtute primorum. Nec tamen oportet quod etiam ipsum lumen inditum sit primo a nobis cognitum. Non enim eo alia cognoscimus sicut cognoscibili quod sit medium cognitionis, sed sicut eo quod facit alia esse cognoscibilia. Unde non oportet quod cognoscatur nisi in ipsis cognoscibilibus, sicut lux non oportet quod primo videatur ab oculo nisi in ipso colore illustrato. | 1. It may be said: From the words of Augustine and from other similar sayings, it is not to be understood thai the uncreated truth itself is the proximate principle by which we know and judge of things, but that through the light conferred upon us, which is a similitude of that truth, we have cognition and judgment. Nor would this light have any efficacy except from the First Light: just as in methods of demonstration second principles would have no certitude unless founded upon the truth of first principles. Nevertheless it should not be thought that even this (natural) light is the first thing known by us. For we do not know other things by means of it, as if it were a medium for cognition of the knowable, but because (as agent) it makes other things knowable. Wherefore it could not itself be known unless it were contained among knowable things; even as light could not be seen by the eye unless manifested in color itself. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2 | |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnium causarum ordinatarum est influentia unius rationis in ultimum effectum. Unde non oportet quod primum intelligibile hoc modo influat in intellectum nostrum quod intelligatur, sed quod praestet intelligendi virtutem. Vel dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit in ordine intelligibilium primum simpliciter, non tamen est primum in ordine intelligibilium nobis. | 2. It may be answered: In the case of a plurality of ordered causes, the influx into the ultimate effect is not always of the same nature. Therefore it need not be that the first intelligible so influence our intellect as to be Himself an object of our knowledge; but it is only necessary that as cause He bestow the power of intellection. Or it may be said that although in the order of intelligible things God is first absolutely, yet He is not first in the order of things that are intelligible to us. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 | |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quamvis illa, quae sunt prima in genere eorum quae intellectus abstrahit a phantasmatibus, sint primo cognita a nobis, ut ens et unum, non tamen oportet quod illa quae sunt prima simpliciter, quae non continentur in ratione proprii obiecti, sicut et ista. | 3. It may be said: Although those things which are first in the genus of things abstracted by the intellect from phantasms are first known by us, as ens and unum, nevertheless it does not follow that those which are first absolutely (simpliciter), which are not contained in the genus of any proper object, should be classed with the former [i.e., things abstracted from phantasms]. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4 | |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis Deus sit ultimus finis in consecutione et primus in intentione appetitus naturalis, non tamen oportet quod sit primus in cognitione mentis humanae quae ordinatur in finem, sed in cognitione ordinantis, sicut et in aliis quae naturali appetitu tendunt in finem suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens appetit se bene esse et bene vivere, quod tunc solum est ei, cum Deum habet. | 4. Answer is made: Although God is the last end in attainment and first in the intention of the natural appetancy, it is not necessary that He be first in the cognition of the human mind, which is ordained to its end, but first in the mind of the One ordaining it, as is the case in other things which by natural appetancy tend toward their own end. Nevertheless, the end is known from the beginning and intended in a certain general way, inasmuch as the mind desires its own well-being and welfare, which is possible to it only on condition that it (ultimately) possess God. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 5 | |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod substantiae separatae quamvis abstractione non indigeant ad hoc quod intelligantur, tamen non sunt intelligibiles per lumen intellectus agentis, unde non primo ab intellectu nostro cognoscuntur. Intelligibile enim per huiusmodi lumen est obiectum intellectus, sicut visibile per lumen corporale est obiectum visus. | 5. It may be answered: Although a process of abstraction is not required for the understanding of separate substances, they are not intelligible through the light of the active intellect; wherefore they are not the first objects of knowledge as far as our intellect is concerned. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 3 ad 6 | |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod Deum esse, quantum est in se, est per se notum, quia sua essentia est suum esse - et hoc modo loquitur Anselmus - non autem nobis qui eius essentiam non videmus. Sed tamen eius cognitio nobis innata esse dicitur, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse. | 6. It may be said: The existence of God, considered in itself, is a thing knowable in itself, since His essence is His existence; and in this way Anselm stated the matter. Nevertheless, to us, who do not behold His essence, it is not self-evident that He exists; though cognition of it may be said to be innate inasmuch as it is through principles which are innate in us that we are easily able to perceive that God exists. |
| Articulus 4 | Whether the Human Mind Is Capable of Arriving at a Knowledge of the Divine Trinity Through Natural Reason. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1 | |
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod per rationem naturalem mens ad cognitionem divinae Trinitatis sufficiat. Quidquid enim convenit enti in quantum ens, oportet maxime in primo ente inveniri. Sed Trinitas convenit enti in quantum ens, cum in omnibus entibus inveniatur, eo quod omnia habeant modum, speciem et ordinem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo naturali ratione sciri potest quod in Deo sit Trinitas. | 1. It appears that the human mind is sufficiently capable of attaining to a knowledge of the divine Trinity through natural reason. Whatever belongs to being inasmuch as it is being ought especially to be found in first being: but a trinity does belong to being inasmuch as it is being, since such is found in everything, in this way: that all things have species, mode, and order, as Augustine says; therefore it is possible to know by natural reason that in God there is a Trinity. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2 | |
| Praeterea, nulla perfectio Deo est subtrahenda. Sed ternarius est numerus perfectionis omnis rei, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Ergo Trinitas Deo est attribuenda, et sic idem quod prius. | 2. No perfection can be wanting in God: but three is the number of every perfect thing, as is said in I De coelo et mundo: therefore Trinity must be attributed to God, and thus the conclusion is like that of the previous argument. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3 | |
| Praeterea, omnis inaequalitas ad aequalitatem reducitur priorem sicut multitudo ad unitatem. Sed inter Deum et primum ens creatum est inaequalitas. Ergo oportet praecedere aliquam aequalitatem, quae cum non sit nisi plurium, oportet esse aliquam pluralitatem in divinis. | 3. All inequality is reducible to prior equality, as multitude is reducible to unity: but between God and first created being there is inequality; there must, therefore, be some preceding equality, but this could be no other than that of a plurality; therefore there must be some plurality in the Divine Being. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 4 | |
| Praeterea, omne aequivocum reducitur ad univocum. Sed exitus creaturae a Deo est aequivocus. Ergo oportet ante hunc ponere processionem univocam, qua Deus procedit a Deo, ex qua Trinitas personarum consequitur. | 4. Anything that is equivocal is reducible to what is univocal: but the issuing forth of creatures from God isequivocal; it is needful, therefore, to presume as prior to it a univocal procession, by which God proceeds from God, by reason of which a Trinity of persons ensues. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 5 | |
| Praeterea, nullius boni sine consortio potest esse iucunda possessio. Sed in Deo est ab aeterno iucundissima boni possessio. Ergo habet aeternum consortium, quod non est nisi divinarum personarum, quia nulla creatura est aeterna. Ergo oportet in deitate personas plures ponere. | 5. Without companionship, there can be no joy in the possession of any good: but in God there is from all eternity a most joyful possession of good; therefore, He possesses eternal companionship; but this could be no other than the companionship of divine persons, since no creature is eternal. Therefore, it is necessary to suppose a plurality of persons in the Deity. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 6 | |
| Praeterea, quod Deus sit intelligens, ratione naturali haberi potest. Sed ex hoc quod est intelligens sequitur quod verbum concipiat, quia hoc est omni intelligenti commune. Ergo naturali ratione cognosci potest quod sit filii generatio et eadem ratione amoris processio. | 6. It is possible to know from natural reason that God is intelligent; but from the fact that He is intelligent it follows that He conceives the Word, since this is common to every intelligence; therefore by natural reason it is possible to know of the generation of the Son and, in the same way, of the procession of love (between Father and Son: the Holy Spirit). |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 7 | |
| Praeterea, Richardus de sancto Victore dicit in I de Trinitate: credo sine dubio quoniam ad quorumlibet explanationem, quae necesse est esse, non modo probabilia, verum etiam necessaria argumenta non deerunt. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est necesse, quia est aeternum. Ergo ad hoc sunt etiam rationes necessariae. Et sic idem quod prius. | 7. Richard of St. Victor in his De Trinitate says: "I believe without any doubt that in the case of whatever things are necessary there cannot be wanting reasons to explain them, not only probable arguments, but necessary ones"; but that God is three and one is a necessary truth, since He is eternal; therefore in proof of this there are necessary arguments of reason, and so the conclusion is as the previous one. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 8 | |
| Praeterea, Platonici non habuerunt notitiam de Deo nisi per rationem. Sed ipsi posuerunt ad minus duas personas, scilicet Deum patrem et mentem ab ipso genitam, quae omnium rerum rationes continet, quod nos de filio dicimus. Ergo ratione naturali potest pluralitas personarum cognosci. | 8. The Platonists had no knowledge of God except through reason: but they held that there were at least two persons: namely, the Father and the Mind generated by the Father, and this Mind contained the ideas of all things—a truth which we claim in regard to the Son; therefore by natural reason a plurality of persons can be known. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 9 | |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I caeli et mundi: per hunc quidem numerum adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare Deum creatorem. Et sic idem quod prius. | 9. The Philosopher at the beginning of De coelo et mundo says: "Through this same number (three) we ourselves are accustomed to call upon God the Creator"; and so the conclusion is the same. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 arg. 10 | |
| Praeterea, de Deo nullatenus in statu viae possumus cognoscere quid est, sed solum an est. Cognoscimus autem aliquo modo Deum esse trinum et unum, quia per fidem. Ergo hoc non pertinet ad quid est Dei, sed ad an est. Sed an est de Deo possumus ratione naturali ostendere. Ergo et Deum esse trinum et unum ratione naturali sciri potest. | 10. In this life we can in no way know what God is but only that He is: but there is a way in which we know that God is three and one, since we know it by faith; therefore this truth does not pertain to a quidditative knowledge of God, but only to an entitative knowledge. But by natural reason we can know God entitatively; therefore it is possible by natural reason to know that God is three and one. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 1 | |
| Sed contra, fides est de non apparentibus rationi, ut patet Hebr. 11. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum est articulus fidei. Ergo ad hoc videndum ratio non sufficit. | Faith is of things that are not apparent to reason, as is clear from Heb. 11:1; but that God is three and one is an article of faith; therefore reason does not suffice for knowing this. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 2 | |
| Praeterea, omnis ratio naturalis ex primis principiis naturaliter cognitis efficaciam habet. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum non potest deduci ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, quae a sensu accipiuntur, cum in sensibilibus nihil simile inveniatur, ut sint tria supposita unius essentiae. Ergo Deum esse trinum et unum non potest sciri per rationem. | Again, natural reason has its efficacy from first principles of natural cognition: but that God is three and one cannot be deduced from principles naturally known, for these are derived from sense experience, and in sensible things there is found nothing like to three supposita of one essence; therefore God cannot be known as three and one from reason. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 3 | |
| Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: mihi impossibile est generationis scire secretum, mens deficit, vox silet non solum mea, sed et Angelorum. Ergo ratio naturalis non sufficit ad cognoscendam generationem divinam, et per consequens nec Trinitatem personarum. | Moreover, according to the words of Ambrose: "It is impossible for anyone to know the secret of generation; the mind fails; the voice is silent; not only mine, but even that of the angels"; therefore natural reason does not suffice for knowledge of divine generation, and consequently for knowledge of the Trinity of persons. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 co. | |
| Responsio. Dicendum quod Deum esse trinum et unum est solum creditum, et nullo modo potest demonstrative probari, quamvis ad hoc aliquales rationes non necessariae nec multum probabiles nisi credenti haberi possint. Quod patet ex hoc quod Deum non cognoscimus in statu viae nisi ex effectibus, ut ex praedictis patere potest. Et ideo naturali ratione de Deo cognoscere non possumus nisi hoc quod percipitur de ipso ex habitudine effectuum ad ipsum, sicut illa quae designant causalitatem ipsius et eminentiam super causata et quae removent ab ipso imperfectas condiciones effectuum. Trinitas autem personarum non potest percipi ex ipsa causalitate divina, cum causalitas sit communis toti Trinitati. Nec etiam dicitur secundum remotionem. Unde nullo modo demonstrative probari potest Deum esse trinum et unum. | Response. I answer that the truth that God is three and one is altogether a matter of faith; and in no way can it be demonstratively proved. For, although certain reasons can be found (by way of demonstration ad hoc), they are not necessary, or even very probable except to one who believes it. This is evident from the fact that in this life we know God only from His effects, as previous statements have proved. Hence, according to natural cognition, we can know nothing of God except what we can derive concerning Him from viewing the relationship of effects to Him. Thus there are things that designate His causality and His eminence over creatures and that deny in Him any of the imperfections found in effects. The existence of a Trinity of persons, however, cannot be perceived from a consideration of divine causality, since causality is common to the whole Trinity. Nor can it be known from His lacking any imperfection. Therefore in no way can it be demonstratively proved that God is three and one. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 1 | |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea, quae in creaturis sunt plura, in Deo sunt unum secundum rem. Et ideo quamvis in quolibet ente creato inveniatur aliqua Trinitas, ex hoc tamen non potest necessario concludi quod in Deo sint aliqua tria nisi secundum rationem, et haec pluralitas non sufficit ad personarum distinctionem. | 1. It may be said: Those things which are many among created beings are in fact one in God: and therefore, although in every creature there is found a certain kind of trinity, it cannot be necessarily concluded from this that there is such a trinity in God, except logically, and this kind of plurality is not sufficient to prove a distinction of persons. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 2 | |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectio ternarii invenitur in Deo etiam secundum essentiae unitatem, non quod ipsa essentia numeretur, sed quia virtute continet omnis numeri perfectionem, ut dicitur in arithmetica Boethii. | 2. It may be answered: The perfection of the number three is found in God according even to the unity of His essence, not because His essence is subject to numeration, but because in it there is contained virtually the perfection of every number, as is said in the Arithmetica of Boethius. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 3 | |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam remota distinctione personarum est aequalitas in divinis, secundum quod eius potentia suae sapientiae adaequatur. Vel potest dici quod in aequalitate est duo considerare, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, inter quae attenditur relatio, et unitatem quantitatis quae est ratio aequalitatis. Reductio ergo inaequalitatis ad aequalitatem non fit ratione pluralitatis suppositorum, sed ratione causae, quia sicut unitas est causa aequalitatis, ita inaequalitatis causa est pluralitas. Et ideo oportet quod causa aequalitatis sit ante causam inaequalitatis, non quod ante quaelibet inaequalia sint aliqua aequalia. Alias oporteret in ordine numerorum esse aliquid ante unitatem et dualitatem, quae sunt inaequalia, vel in ipsa unitate inveniri pluralitatem. | 3. It may be said: Apart from any distinction of persons, there is equality in the Divinity, inasmuch as Its wisdom is equal to Its power. Or it can be said that in regard to equality there are two points of consideration, namely, plurality of supposita, among whom equality exists, and unity of quantity, which is the cause of equality. The reduction of inequality to equality, therefore, does not occur by reason of the plurality of supposita, but by reason of the cause; for just as unity is the cause of equality, so inequality is the cause of plurality. Hence it must be that the cause of equality precedes the cause of inequality, but not that any kind of inequality is preceded by some kind of equality: otherwise it would be necessary in an order of numbers that there should be something before unity and duality, which are unequals; or that in unity itself there should be found plurality. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 4 | |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quamvis omne aequivocum reducatur ad univocum, non tamen oportet quod generatio aequivoca reducatur ad generationem univocam, sed ad generans quod est in se univocum. In rebus enim naturalibus videmus quod generationes aequivocae sunt priores generationibus univocis, eo quod causae aequivocae habent influentiam supra totam speciem, non autem causae univocae, sed solum supra unum individuum, unde sunt quasi instrumenta causarum aequivocarum, sicut corpora inferiora corporum caelestium. | 4. It must be said: Although anything equivocal is reducible to what is univocal, it is not necessary that equivocal generation should be reduced to univocal generation, but that it should be reduced to a generator which is univocal in itself. Now, in natural things we see that equivocal generations are prior to univocal because equivocal causes have an influx extending to the total species, whereas univocal causes have not, their influence extending only to one individual; and thus they are quasi-instruments of equivocal causes, just as inferior bodies are of superior. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 5 | |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod ex hoc homo non potest habere vitam iucundam sine consortio, quia non habet in se unde sibi quantum ad omnia sufficiat. Et propter hoc animalia, quae habent in se singula, unde sibi sufficiant, consortium vitae non requirunt, sed sunt solitaria. Deus autem maxime est sibi sufficiens, unde remota distinctione personarum adhuc manet in eo summa iucunditas. | 5. It is answered: It is not possible for man to have a joyous life without companionship because he has not within himself that which makes him all-sufficient; whereas, for the same reason, animals that are self-sufficient require no association with others for preservation of life, but are solitaries. God, however, is supremely self-sufficient; wherefore, even though there were no distinction of persons, infinite joy would still be His. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 6 | |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod in Deo idem est intelligens et intellectum, et ideo non oportet quod ex hoc quod intelligit ponatur in ipso aliquid conceptum realiter distinctum ab ipso, sicut est in nobis. Trinitas autem personarum requirit realem distinctionem. | 6. It may be said: In God, intellect and object of intellect are the same; and therefore, from the fact that He is intelligent, it need not be supposed that in Him there is any concept really distinct from Himself, as is the case with us: Trinity of persons, however, requires real distinction. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 7 | |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod intellectus illius verbi apparet ex hoc quod sequitur: quamvis contingat nostram industriam latere. Omnia ergo necessaria in se ipsis sunt vel per se ipsa nota vel per alia cognoscibilia, non tamen oportet quod ita sit quoad nos. Unde non possumus ad omnia necessaria probanda secundum nostram industriam rationem necessariam invenire. | 7. It may be answered: Understanding of this passage is clarified by that which follows: "Although they (these truths) are of such kind as to escape all our endeavors." All things that are necessary in themselves, therefore, are either known in themselves or are knowable through other things: yet not in such a way that they are necessarily apparent to us. Therefore we cannot, even as a result of all our industry, discover necessary arguments of reason sufficient to prove all necessary truths. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 8 | |
| Ad octavum dicendum quod Platonicorum positio nihil facit ad propositum secundum rei veritatem, quamvis videatur facere secundum verba. Non enim posuerunt Platonici quod illa mens esset eiusdem essentiae cum Deo patre, sed quod esset quaedam alia substantia separata ab ipso procedens, et tertiam ponebant animam mundi, ut patet per Macrobium. Et quia omnes substantias separatas deos nominabant, inde est quod has dicebant tres deos, ut dicit Augustinus X de civitate Dei. Quia tamen non ponebant aliquid spiritui sancto simile, sicut patri et filio - anima enim mundi non est nexus aliorum duorum secundum eos, sicut spiritus sanctus patris et filii - ideo dicuntur in tertio signo defecisse, id est in cognitione tertiae personae. Vel dicendum, sicut communiter dicitur, quod cognoverunt duas personas quantum ad appropriata potentiae et sapientiae, non quantum ad propria. Bonitas autem, quae spiritui sancto appropriatur, maxime respicit effectus quos illi non cognoverunt. | 8. It may be said: The position of the Platonists affords no argument as regards the truth of this matter, even though it appears to do so according to words. For they did not hold that this Mind was of the same essence with God the Father, but that it was another substance proceeding from the first, and separate; and they also supposed that there was a third substance, the Soul-of-the-World, as is evidenced by Macrobius. And because all these separate substances they called "gods," it came about that they called upon or spoke of three gods, as Augustine says in De civitate Dei (chap. 10); because they did not hold that there was anything like to the Holy Ghost, as there was to the Father and the Son. For the Soulof-the-World is not the nexus of the other two, according to their doctrine, as is the Holy Spirit between the Father and the Son; therefore they are said to have lacked the third sign, that is, knowledge of the Third Person. Or it may be said, as the more common explanation has it, that they knew two persons according to the things appropriated to power and wisdom, but not according to the things proper to them. But goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit especially, has as its effects things which they did not know. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 9 | |
| Ad nonum dicendum quod Aristoteles non intendit dicere quod Deus esset magnificandus ut trinus et unus, sed quia ternario sacrificiorum et orationum ab antiquis honorabatur propter ternarii numeri perfectionem. | 9. It may be said: Aristotle did not have any intention of saying that God should be worshiped as three in one, but that He was honored by the ancients by the number three in their sacrifices and prayers because of the perfection of three as a number. |
| Pars 1 q. 1 a. 4 ad 10 | |
| Ad decimum dicendum quod omnia, quae in Deo sunt, sunt una eius simplex essentia, sed ea, quae in ipso sunt unum, in intellectu nostro sunt multa, et propter hoc intellectus noster potest apprehendere unum istorum sine altero. Inde est quod in statu viae de nullo eorum possumus cognoscere quid est, sed solum an est, et contingit quod cognoscatur, an est unum eorum et non alterum; sicut si aliquis cognosceret, an sit sapientia in Deo, non autem an in ipso sit omnipotentia. Et similiter potest ratione naturali sciri an Deus sit, non tamen an sit trinus et unus. | 10. It may be answered: All things in God are of one, simple essence; but those things that in Him are one, are many in our intellem, and on this account our intellect can apprehend one of these things without the other. Therefore in this life we are able to understand the quiddity of none of these things, but only their existence; and thus it happens that one of them may be known to exist and not another: just as one might know that there is ‘ wisdom in God, but not know that there is also omnipotence; and likewise it is possible, by natural reason to know that God exists, but not that He is a Trinity, and one God. |
THE LOGIC MUSEUM
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