Authors/Aristotle/de anima/L1

Greek	Latin	English
	P. Fiaccadori, 1866. The translation of William of Moerbeke.	Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Sylvester Humphries, O.P.
402a 1 – 403b 2		BOOK I, CHAPTER I
402a1 1. Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δ' ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν.	Bonorum honorabilium notitiam opinantes, magis autem alteram altera aut certitudine aut ex eo q[uod], meliorum quidem: & mirabiliorum, propter hæc utraque animæ historiam rationabiliter in primis ponemus.	Holding as we do that knowledge is a good and honourable thing, yet that some kinds of knowledge are more so than others, either because they are more certain or because they deal with subjects more excellent and wonderful, we naturally give a primary place, for both these reasons, to an enquiry about the soul.
402a4 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων.	Videtur autem ad veritatem cognitio ipsius multum conducere, maxime autem ad naturam. Est enim tamquam principium animalium.	Indeed an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things.
402a7 ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν,	Inquirimus autem considerare et cognoscere naturam ipsius & substantiam.	We seek then to consider and understand, first, its nature and essence,
402a8 εἶθ' ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν.	postea quaecumque accidunt circa ipsa. Quorum aliae propriae passiones animae esse videntur, aliae autem communes, et animalibus propter illam inesse.	then whatever qualities belong to it. Of these, some seem to be proper to the soul alone, others to be shared in common and to exist in animate beings on account of it.
402a10 πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινα πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς.	Omnino autem & penitus difficillimorum est accipere aliam fidem de ipsa.	To ascertain, however, anything reliable about it is one of the most difficult of undertakings.
402a11 καὶ γάρ, ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι,	Cum enim sit quaestio communis multis aliis (dico autem eam quae est circa substantiam et eam, quae quid est)	Such an enquiry being common to many topics—I mean, an enquiry into the essence, and what each thing is—
402a13 τάχ' ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην·	Fortassis alicui videbitur una quædam methodus esse de omnibus, de quibus volumus cognoscere substantiam, sicut et eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, propriorum demonstrationem; quare quaerendum utique erit methodum istam.	it might seem to some that one definite procedure were available for all things of which we wished to know the essence; as there is demonstration for the accidental properties of things. So we should have to discover what is this one method.
402a16 εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος, ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ᾖ πότερον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν·	Si autem non est una quaedam et communis methodus de eo quod quid est, amplius difficilius est negotiari. Oportebit enim accipere circa unumquodque, quis modus. Si autem manifestum sit, utrum demonstratio aliqua sit, aut divisio, aut etiam aliqua alia methodus, adhuc multas habet dubitationes, et errores, ex quibus oportet quaerere.	But if there is no one method for determining what an essence is, our enquiry becomes decidedly more difficult, and we shall have to find a procedure for each case in particular. If, on the other hand, it is clear that either demonstration, or division, or some such process is to be employed, there are still many queries and uncertainties to which answers must be found.
402a21 ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.	Alia enim aliorum principia, sicut numerorum et planorum.	For the principles in different subject matters are different, for instance in the case of numbers and surfaces.
402a22 πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν,	Primum autem fortassis necessarium est dividere in quo generum, et quid sit. Dico autem, utrum hoc aliquid et substantia sit, aut qualitas, aut quantitas, aut etiam quoddam aliud divisorum praedicamentorum.	Perhaps the first thing needed is to divide off the genus of the subject and to say what sort of thing it is,—I mean, whether it be a particular thing or substance, or a quality, or quantity, or any other of the different categories.
402a25 ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι 402b1 μικρόν.	Adhuc autem, utrum eorum quae in potentia sunt, au magis endelechia quaedam sit: differt enim non aliquid parum.	Further, whether it is among things in potency or is an actuality—no insignificant distinction.
402b1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ·	Considerandum autem et si partibilis sit aut impartibilis, et utrum sit similis speciei omnis anima, an non.	Again, whether it is divisible or indivisible, and whether every soul is of the same sort or no:
402b2 εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσα ἢ γένει.	Si autem non similis speciei, utrum specie differat, aut genere.	and if not, whether they differ specifically or generically.
402b3 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν·	Nunc quidem enim dicentes et quaerentes, de anima, de humana solum videntur intendere,	Indeed those who at present talk of and discuss the soul seem to deal only with the human soul.
402b5 εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστι, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,	Formidandum autem qua. tenus non lateat utrum una ratio ipsius est, sicut animalis, aut secundum unumquodque altera: ut equi, canis, hominis, aut Dei.	One must be careful not to leave unexplored the question whether there is a single definition of it, as of ‘animal’ in general, or a different one for each [of its kinds]: as, say, for horse, dog, man or god.
402b7 τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον,	Animal autem universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est	Now ‘animal’ as a universal is nothing real, or is secondary;
402b8 ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο·	Similiter autem et si aliquod commune aliud praedicetur.	and we must say the same of any other general predicate.
402b9 ἔτι δέ, εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων,	Amplius autem et si non multae animae, sed partes, utrum oporteat quaerere prius totam animam, aut partes. Difficile autem est determinare quaenami partes natura alterae abinvicem sint.	Further, if there are not many souls, but only many parts of a single one, we must ask whether one ought to look first at the whole or the parts. It is difficult to see what parts are by nature diverse from one another,
402b11 καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Et utrum partes oporteat quaerere primum, aut opera ipsorum, ut intelligere, aut intellectivum, et sentire, aut sensitivum. Similiter autem et in aliis.	and whether one ought to look first at the parts or their functions, for instance at the act of understanding or at the intellective power, at the act of sensing or at the sensitive faculty; and likewise in other in stances.
402b14 εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ.	Si autem opera prius, iterum utique dubitabit aliquis si objecta horum prius quaerendum, sicut sensibile sensitivo, et intelligibile intellectivo.	But if one is to examine first the operations, it might be asked whether one should not first enquire about their objects, as, in the sensitive function, the thing sensed; and in the intellectual, the thing intelligible.
402b16 ἔοικε δ' οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις (ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἢ τί γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον, πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι),	Videtur autem non solum quod quid est cognoscere, utile esse ad cognoscendas causas accidentium in substantiis, sicut in mathematicis quid rectum et quid obliquun, et quid linea, et quid planum, ad cognoscendum quod rectis trianguli anguli sunt aequales;	Now, it seems that not only does knowledge of the essence help one to understand the causes of the accidents of any substance (as in Mathematics to know what is the straight and the curved, and what is a line and what a plane enables one to discover the number of right angles to which those of a triangle are equal)
402b21 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν·	sed et econtrario accidentia conferunt magnam partem ad cognoscendum quod quid est.	but, conversely, accidental qualities contribute much to knowing, what a thing essentially is.
402b22 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα·	Cum enim habeamus tradere, secundum phantasiam, de accidentibus, aut omnibus, aut pluribus, tunc et de substantia habebimus dicere aliquid quam optime.	When we can give an account of such qualities (some or all) according to appearances, then we shall have material for dealing as well as possible with the essence.
402b25 πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καθ' ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ 403a1 συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.	Omnis enim demonstrationis principium est, quod quid est. Quare secundum quascumque definitiones non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque conjecturari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quod dialectice dictae sunt et vanae omnes.	The principle of every demonstration is what a thing is. Hence, whatsoever definitions do not afford us a knowledge of accidents, or even a fair conjecture about them, are obviously vain and sophistical.
403a 2-403 b 23
403a3 ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἔστι τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς·	Dubitationem autem habent et passiones animae, utrum sint omnes communes, et habentis, an sit aliqua, et animae propria ipsius.	The modifications of the soul present a problem: are they all shared by what has soul, or are some proper to the soul alone?
403a5 τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν·	Hoc enim accipere quidem necessarium est, non autem facile. Videtur autem plurimorum quidem, nullum sine corpore pati, neque facere, ut irasci, confidere, desiderare, et omnino sentire. Maxime autem videtur proprium ipsum intelligere.	It is necessary indeed, but not easy, to deal with this problem. For in most cases there is, apparently, no action or being acted on without the body; as in anger, desire, confidence, and sensation in general. Understanding however would seem especially proper to the soul.
403a8 εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι.	Si autem est et hoc phantasia quaedam, aut non sine phantasia, non continget utique, neque hoc sine corpore esse.	Yet if this too is a sort of imagination, or never occurs without it, not even this exists, in fact, apart from the body.
403a10 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι·	Si quidem igitur est aliquid animae operum aut passionum proprium, continget utique ipsam separari.	But if the soul has some operation or affection exclusive to itself, then it could exist as a separate entity.
403a11 εἰ δὲ μηθέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ᾗ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς [χαλκῆς] σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἅψεται οὕτως χωρισθέν τι εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινος ἐστιν.	Si vero nullum est proprium ipsius, non utique erit separabilis; sed sicut recto, inquantum rectum, multa accidunt, ut tangere aeneam sphaeram secundum punctum, non tamen tanget hoc, separatum ipsum rectum; inseparabile enim, siquidem semper cum quodam corpore est.	If, however, there is nothing thus proper to it, then it is not separable, but is like a straight line, which has, as such, many properties—such as being able to touch a bronze sphere at a given point; but straightness separated does not touch it; not being in fact separable, since it is always with a bodily subject.
403a16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν·	Videntur autem et animae passiones omnes esse cum corpore, ira, mansuetudo, timor, misericordia, confidentia, adhuc gaudium, et amare et odire.	Now all the soul’s modifications do seem to involve the body—anger, meekness, fear, compassion, and joy and love and hate.
403a18 ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.	Simul enim cum his patitur aliquid corpus.	For along with these the body also is to some degree affected.
403a19 μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται.	Indicat autem hic, aliquando quidem duris et manifestis passionibus concidentibus nihil exacerbari aut timere. Aliquando autem et a parvis et debilibus moveri, cum accendatur corpus, et sic se habeat, sicut cum irascitur.	An indication of this is that sometimes violent and unmistakable occurrences arouse no excitement or alarm; while at other times one is moved by slight and trifling matters, when the physical system is stimulated to the condition appropriate to anger.
403a22 ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν·	Adhuc autem magis hoc manifestum.	This is still more evident fearful being present,
403a23 μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου.	Non enim terribili imminente, in passionibus fiunt, his inquam quibus timens.	feelings occur as in one when, nothing who is frightened.
403a24 εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν·	Si autem sic habet, manifestum quoniam passiones rationes in materia sunt.	If this is the case, it is evident that the passions are material principles;
403a25 ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον "τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε",	Quare termini tales, ut irasci, motus quidam talis corporis, aut partis aut potentiae, ab hoc, et gratia huiusmodi.	hence such terms as ‘becoming angry’ mean a motion of such and such a body, or of a part or power proceeding from and existing for the body.
403a27 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.	Et propter hoc igitur iam physici est considerare de anima, aut omni, aut huiusmodi.	For this reason, therefore, the natural scientist ought to examine the soul, either all kinds, or this kind.
403a29 διαφερόντως δ' ἂν ὁρίσαιντο ὁ φυσικὸς [τε] καὶ ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν·	Differenter autem definiet physicus et dialecticus unumquodque ipsorum:	The natural scientist and the dialectician will define each of those modifications differently.
403a30 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος 403b1 καὶ θερμοῦ.	ut iram quid est. Hic quidem enim appetitum recontristationis, aut aliquid huiusmodi; ille autem fervorem sanguinis aut calidi circa cor.	Take the question, what is anger? The latter will say, a desire for retaliation, or something similar; the former, an effervescence of blood or heat about the heart.
403b1 τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον.	Horum autem alius quidem assignat materiam, alius vero speciem et rationem.	Of these, the natural scientist designates the matter, the dialectician, the form or idea.
403b2 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ὅδε τοῦ πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί,	Ratio quidem enim haec species rei. Necesse est autem hanc esse in materia huiusmodi,	For this ‘idea’ is the thing’s form. This however must have existence in material of the sort in question;
403b3 εἰ ἔσται· ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς ὑπ' ἀνέμων καὶ ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, ὁ δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ' ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος <οὗ> ἕνεκα τωνδί.	si erit sicut domus, ratio quidem talis quaedam, quia operimentum prohibens corruptiones a ventis et imbribus et caumatibus. Haec autem dicit et lapides et lateres et ligna. Alia vero in his, speciem propter ista.	if it is a house, one formula will be, ‘a covering to prevent destruction from wind and rain and excessive heat’; the other, ‘stones and beams and timber’; another, ‘the form; in these materials; for those reasons.
403b7 τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ τὸν λόγον μόνον;	Quae igitur naturalis harum? utrum quae circa materiam, rationem autem ignorans, aut quae circa rationem solum,	Which is the physical definition? That which states the matter and ignores the idea? Or that which states the idea only?
403b8 ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; ἐκείνων δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος;	aut magis quae est ex utrisque? Illorum autem quis uterque?	Or rather, the compound of both? What then of the other two?
403b9 ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστὰ μηδ' ᾗ χωριστά, ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα καὶ πάθη, ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός,	At vero non est aliquis, qui circa passiones materiae non separabiles, et quatenus non separabiles versetur: sed physicus circa omnes talis corporis eft talis materiae actiones et passiones versatur. Quaecumque autem non quatenus talia, alius. Ut de quibusdam quidcm est artifex si contingat, ut instructor, aut medicus.	Now there is no one who deals with inseparable qualities of matter, precisely as inseparable from it; but he who is concerned with the affections and activities of the special matter of this or that body is the natural scientist; whereas whatever things are not specifically such, another considers; in certain matters it may perchance be a technical expert, a carpenter or physician.
403b14 τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ᾗ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου σώματος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός, ᾗ δὲ κεχωρισμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος;	At non separabilium quidem, inquantum autem nori talis corporis passiones, sed ex remotione, mathematicus. Secundum autem quod separatae, primus philosophus.	Concerning however what is inseparable from matter, and yet as not involved in the specific qualities of this or that body, but abstracted from any, the mathematician; and concerning what is separable, the ‘first philosopher’.
403b16 ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν ὁ λόγος. ἐλέγομεν δὴ ὅτι τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων, ᾗ γε τοιαῦθ' ὑπάρχει <οἷα> θυμὸς καὶ φόβος, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.	Sed redeundum esl unde sermo. Dicebamos autem, quod passiones animae non separabiles a physica materia animalium, inquantum tales existunt furor, et timor, et non sicut linea et planum.	To return from our digression. We were saying that the passions, of the soul are not separable from the physical material of animals (anger and fear having this kind of existence), and yet also that they differ, in this, from the line and the surface.
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β'		BOOK I, CHAPTER II
403b20 Ἐπισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ἅμα διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ προελθόντας, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, εἰ δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτ' εὐλαβηθῶμεν.	Intendentes autem de anima, necesse est, simul dubitantes de quibus bene dubitare oportet pertranseuntes, priorum opiniones comprehendere, quicumque aliquid de ipsa enuntiaverunt; ut bene quidem dicta accipiamus; si vero aliquid non bene, hoc vereamur.	Investigating the soul, it is necessary, while suspending judgment on matters which should be held uncertain, that we study the opinions of certain thinkers who have dealt with the subject, so as to take note of anything they said pertinently, whilst avoiding their mistakes.
403b 24 –404b 7]
403b24 ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυσὶ μάλιστα διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλήφαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς·	Principium autem quaestionis praeponere quae maxime videntur ipsi inesse secundum naturam. Animatum igitur ab inanimato in duobus maxime differre videtur, motu et sensu. Accipimus autem et a progenitoribus fere duo haec de anima.	Our enquiry must begin with a statement of what seems most to belong by nature to the soul. The animated being would appear to differ from the inanimate in two primary respects: by motion and by sense-perception. And these two notions are roughly what our predecessors have handed down to us concerning the soul.
403b28 φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν, οἰηθέντες δὲ τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον, τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.	Dicunt enim quidam et maxime et primo animam esse id quod est movens. Existimantes autem, quod non movetur ipsum non contingere movere alterum aliquid eorum quae moventur, animam sic arbitrati sunt esse.	For some say that the soul is principally and primarily what moves. Holding that what does not itself move moves no other moving thing, they thought that the soul too was thus.
403b31 ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν 404a1 πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν αὐτὴν εἶναι·	Unde Democritus ignem quemdam, aut calorem dicit esse ipsam.	Hence Democritus, said it was a kind of fire or heat.
404a1 ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει (οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν), ὧν τὴν μὲν πανσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος),	Infinitis enim existentibus figuris, et atomis, quae speciei rotundae, ignem et animam dicit, ut in aere mota corpora, quae vocantur decisiones, quae videntur per portas in radiis, quarum omne semen, elementa dicit totius naturae. Similiter autem et Leucippus.	There exist an infinite number of shapes and atoms, and those of the spherical kind are, he said, fire and soul: like the dust-motes in the air called ‘atomies’ seen in the rays of the sun in doorways; and of all the seeds of these, he said, are the elements of all Nature. Leucippus had a similar opinion.
404a5 τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς τοιούτους ῥυσμοὺς καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπά, κινούμενα καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ παρέχον τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν·	Horum autem sphaerica, aniinam, propter id, quod maxime possunt per omne penetrare huiusmodi figurae, et movere reliqua cum moveantur et ipsa, arbitrantes animam esse efficiens in animalibus motum:	Those round in shape make the soul, because they are most able to penetrate everywhere, and since they move of themselves, they have also the power to move everything else. The soul, they maintained, is what causes movement in living things:
404a9 διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν·	unde et vivendi terminum esse respirationem.	and accordingly breathing is coterminous with living.
404a10 συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν·	Constringente enim eo quod continet corpora, et extrudente figuras praebentes animalibus motum, ex eo quod non est ipsas quiescere nullatenus, auxilium fieri de foris, ingredientibus aliis huiusmodi in respirando.	That which envelops all bodies expels by compression the atoms [within], thus causing movement in animals, for these [atoms] are never at rest. A reinforcement must come therefore [he said] from without; in that other atoms enter by respiration,
404a14 κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐκκρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον·	Prohibere enim has et quae insunt animalibus disgregari, simul prohibentes constringens et comprimens,	preventing from dispersal those that are within the animate body, and which simultaneously resist the constraining and compressing environment;
404a15 καὶ ζῆν δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται τοῦτο ποιεῖν.	et vivere autem quamdiu possunt hoc facere.	and that animals live so long as they can do this.
404a16 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν·	Videtur autem et a Pythagoricis dicta, eamdem habere intelligentiam.	The teaching of the Pythagoreans seems to have had much the same purport.
404a17 ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν, περὶ δὲ τούτων εἴρηται ὅτι συνεχῶς φαίνεται κινούμενα, κἂν ᾖ νηνεμία παντελής.	Dixerunt enim quidam ipsorum, animam esse quae sunt, in aere decisiones. Alii autem has movens. De his autem dictum est, propterea quod continue videntur moveri, et si sit tranquillitas animae.	Some of these said the soul consisted of atoms in the air; others, that it was what sets these in motion. And these atoms are mentioned. because they seem to be always moving, even if the soul be quite tranquil.
404a20 ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν·	In idem autem ferantur quicumque dicunt animam esse quod seipsum movens.	All who say that the soul is a thing that moves itself tend in the same direction;
404a21 ἐοίκασι γὰρ οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίνησιν οἰκειότατον εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτην δ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται.	Videntur autem hi omnes existimantes motum maixime proprium esse animae. Et alia quidem omnia moveri propter animam, ipsam autem a seipsa, propter nihil videre movens, quod non et ipsum moveatur.	all seem to hold that movement is what is most proper to the soul, and accordingly that all things are in motion on account of the soul, but the soul itself on its own account; because one sees nothing moving other things that is not itself moving.
404a25 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ὡς τὸ πᾶν ἐκίνησε νοῦς·	Similiter autem et Anaxagoras animam dicit esse moventem, et si aliquis alius dixit, quod omne movit intellectus.	Anaxagoras likewise said that the soul is a mover, as also did anyone else who held that a Mind moves all things.
404a27 οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ' ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος.	Non tamen penitus sicut Democritus.	But his view is not exactly Democritus’.
ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν (τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον, διὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι [τὸν] Ὅμηρον ὡς ὁ Ἕκτωρ "κεῖτ' ἀλλοφρονέων"·	Ille quidem enim simpliciter dicit idem esse animam et intellectum, verum enim esse quod videtur. Unde bene facere Homerum, quod Hector iacet aliud sapiens.	He [Democritus], asserts that intellect and soul are absolutely identical; and that what appears is the truth. And therefore that Homer aptly says of Hector that he lay ‘other-minded’.
404a30 οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν)·	Non itaque utitur intellectu tamquam potentia quadam, quae est circa veritatem: sed idem dicit animam et intellectum.	He does not use the term intellect to denote a definite faculty concerned with truth, but identifies soul and intellect.
404b1 Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν·	Anaxagoras autem minus certificat de ipsis.	Anaxagoras is less definite about these matters.
404b1 πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν τῇ ψυχῇ·	Multoties quidem enim causam eius, quod bene et recte, dicit intellectum hunc esse animam.	He often says that the cause of being right or good is intellect, and that this is the soul.
404b3 ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις·	In omnibus enim ipsum inesse animalibus magnis et parvis, et honorabilibus et inhonorabilibus.	For it is, he says, in all animals, great and small, noble and base.
404b5 οὐ φαίνεται δ' ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.	Non videtur autem secundum prudentiam dictus intellectus, omnibus similiter inesse animalibus: sed neque hominibus omnibus.	It does not seem, however, that there exists mind, in the sense of prudence, alike in all animals: nor even in all men.
404b7 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν·	Quicumque quidem igitur animatum moveri aspexerunt, quidem maxime motivum opinati sunt animam esse.	All those therefore who have regarded life from the point of view of movement have held soul to be pre-eminently a moving force.
404 b 8-404 b 29
404b8 ὅσοι δ' ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν, ταύτην,	Quicumque autem ad cognoscere, et sentire ea quae sunt, isti dicunt animam esse principia, alii quidem plura facientes haec, alii vero unum hoc.	All who have considered it as knowing and perceiving realities identify the soul with the [elemental] principles,—some making several principles, others one.
404b11 ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως,	Sicut Empedoclcs quidem ex elementis omnibus esse et unumquodque horum animam dicens,	Empedocles, for instance, says that it is composed of all elements, and that each of these is a soul, saying,
404b13 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ·	sicut terram quidem terra cognoscimus, aethere aethera divum: aquam autem aqua: sed igne ignem obscurum ac latentem, manifestum est, concordia autem concordiam: discordiam discordia tristi.	As by earth we know earth, by ether divine ether, By water water, by fire, it is clear, fire mysterious and hidden; Love by love, hate by sad hate.
404b16 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ·	Eodem autem modo, et Plato in Timaeo animam facit ex elementis.	In the same way Plato in the Timaeus constitutes the soul from the elements.
404b17 γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι.	Cognosci enim simile simili: res autem ex principiis esse.	For like [he says] is known by like; and things are made up of elements.
404b18 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως·	Similiter autem et in his, quae sunt de philosophia dicta, determinatum est: et ipsum quidem animal ex ipsa unius idea, et ex prima longitudine, et latitudine, et altitudine, alia autem simili modo.	In the lectures ‘On Philosophy’ he likewise lays it down that the animate itself is compounded of the idea of the One, together with the primary Length and Depth and Breadth; other things existing in the same manner.
404b21 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ.	Adhuc autem et aliter, intellectum quidem unum, scientiam autem duo: singulariter enim ad unum. Plani autem numerum, ad opinionem: sensum vero, eum, qui firmi.	Again, rather differently, that intellect is the One, knowledge the Two (for [this proceeds] as one to one), and the number of the Plane belongs to opinion, and that of the Solid to sensation.
404b24 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ' ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ' αἰσθήσει·	Numeri quidem enim species et principia entium dicebantur. Sunt autem ex elementis. Iudicantur autem res, aliae quidem intellectu, aliae vero scientia, aliae autem opinione, aliae vero sensu.	For he said that numbers are the specific forms and principles of beings, and are themselves constituted from elements. Some things are discerned by understanding, some by science, some by opinion, some by sensation.
404b27 εἴδη δ' οἱ ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων.	Species autem, numeri hi, rerum.	But these same numbers are the specific forms of things.
404b27 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ' ἑαυτόν.	Quoniam autem et motivum videbutur anima esse, et cognoscitivum: sic quidam complexi sunt ex utrisque, enunciantes animam esse numerum moventem seipsum.	But since the soul seems to be both a moving and a knowing principle, some have made it out to be a combination of these two, stating that it is a self-moving number.
404b 30 –405b 30]
404b30 διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἱ σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσωμάτους, 405a1 τούτοις δ' οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι.	[p12/29] Differunt autem de principiis, quae et quot sunt; maxime corporea facientes et incorporea. His autem miscentes, et ab utrisque principia enunciantes.	Opinions differ however as to the elemental principles—what they are, how many they are; and the difference is greatest between those who make these corporeal and those who make them incorporeal. But some, making a mixture, have defined the principles in terms of both.
405a2 διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πλήθους·	Differunt autem et circa multitudinem:	They differ also as to the number,
405a2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν.	hi quidem enim unum, illi vero plura dicunt.	some positing one, others several.
405a3 ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων ὑπειλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως.	Consequenter autem his et animam assignant: motivum enim natura priorum existimaverunt non irrationabiliter.	And they assign a soul to these [principles] accordingly. (For they not unreasonably assumed that what by nature causes movement was primary.)
405a5 ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι·	Unde quibusdam visum est ignem esse.	Hence some have held it to be fire;
405a6 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον,	Etenim hic in partibus subtilissimus est, et maxime elementorum incorporeus.	for this is the most subtle, and much the least corporeal of the elements;
405a7 ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως.	Adhuc autem movetur: quia et movet alia primo.	moreover, it moves itself, being the first cause of movement in other things.
405a8 Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφαινόμενος διὰ τί τούτων ἑκάτερον·	Democritus autem dulcius dixit, enuncians propter quid utrumque horum.	Democritus said something which rather neatly gives the reason for either fact.
405a9 ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σωμάτων, κινητικὸν δὲ διὰ μικρομέρειαν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα· τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιροειδὲς λέγει· τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ πῦρ.	Animam quidem enim et intellectum idem esse; istud autem esse ex primis et indivisibilibus corporibus. Motivum autem propter subtilitatem partium et figuram, Figurarum autem leviter mobilissiman sphaericam dicit; huiusmodi autem esse intellectum et ignem.	He said that soul is the same as mind, and that this originates in primary indivisible particles and that it causes motion by its fineness and shape. He says that the sphere is the most light and mobile of shapes, and that fire and mind must both be of such a nature.
405a13 Ἀναξαγόρας δ' ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται δ' ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων·	Anaxagoras autem videtur quidem alterum dicere animam et intellectum, sicut diximus prius. Utitur autem utrisque sicut una natura. Verumtamen intellectum ponit principium omnium maxime,	Anaxagoras, however (as we said above), seems to speak of soul and mind as diverse, yet he employs both terms as for a single essence. Nevertheless, he posits Intellect as the principle par excellence of the Universe,
405a16 μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν.	solumque dicit ipsum eorum, quae sunt, simplicem esse, et immixtum et purum.	saying that this alone among beings is simple, unmixed and pure.
405a17 ἀποδίδωσι δ' ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.	Assignat autem utrumque eidem principio, cognoscereque et movere, dicens intellectum movere omne.	He attributes, indeed, to the same principle both knowing and moving; saying that the Intellect moves all things.
405a19 ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ·	Videtur autem et Thales, ex quibus reminiscuntur, motivum aliquid animam opinari, siquidem dixit lapidem animam habere, quoniam ferrum movet.	It seems that Thales, from what they recollect of him, was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion,—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a ‘soul’ because it attracts iron.
405a21 Διογένης δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἀέρα, τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν·	Diogenes autem, sicut et alteri quidam, aerem hunc opinans omnium subtilissimum esse et principium,	Now Diogenes, like certain others, held that air is the most subtle of all things and is their principle;
405a23 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γινώσκειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ᾗ μὲν πρῶτόν ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, ᾗ δὲ λεπτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι.	et propter hoc cognoscere et movere animam. Secundum quidem quod primum est, et ex hoc reliqua cognoscere; secundum vero quod subtilissimum est, motivum esse.	and is the cause of the soul’s knowing and moving. As primary, it is cognitive of all else: and as the most subtle thing, it is the motive force.
405a25 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί·	Heraclitus autem principium esse dicit animam, siquidem vaporem ex quo anima constat, etenim incorporalissimum esse et fluens semper.	Heraclitus, however, says that soul, as a principle, is some vapour of which it is constituted, since this is the least corporeal of substances and is always flowing;
405a27 τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι· ἐν κινήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί.	Quod vero movetur ab eo quod movetur cognosci. In motu autem esse quae sunt et ille arbitratus est et multi.	and that any moving object is known by a moving object—he and many others holding that all realities are in movement.
405a29 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς·	Similiter autem his et Alcmaeon opinari visus est de anima.	Alcmaeon seems to have held opinions on the soul similar to these.
405a30 φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις·	Dicit enim ipsam immortalem esse propter hoc quod assimilatur immortalibus.	For he said it was immortal because it bore a resemblance to immortal beings.
405a31 τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινουμένῃ· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς 405b1 ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.	Hoc autem inesse ipsi, tamquam semper motac: moveri enim et divina omnia continue semper, lunam, solem, astra et totum caelum.	And this he attributed to it because it always moves; all heavenly things seem to be in motion continually—the sun, the moon, the stars, all heaven.
405b1 τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπεφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων·	Magis autem rudium et aquam quidam existimaverunt, ut Hippo.	Some cruder thinkers, like Hippo, thought it was water.
405b3 πεισθῆναι δ' ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά. καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ οὐχ αἷμα· ταύτην δ' εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν.	Suaderi enim visi sunt ex genitura, quoniam omnium humida est. Et namque arguit sanguinem dicentes animam, quoniam genitura non est sanguis. Hanc autem esse primam animam.	They seem to have been persuaded of this because semen is liquid in all animals. For he confutes those who say the soul is the blood, on the ground that semen, which is the inchoate Soul, is not blood.
405b5 ἕτεροι δ' αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν.	Alii autem sanguinem, quemadmodum Critias, ipsum sentire, animae maxime proprium opinantes: hoc autem inesse propter naturam sanguinis.	Others, such as Critias, held it was blood; that sensation was most distinctive of the soul; and that it was due to the nature of blood that this power was in it.
405b8 πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς·	Omnia enim elementa judicem acceperunt, praeter terram.	For opinions have been given in favour of every element excepting earth:
405b9 ταύτην δ' οὐθεὶς ἀποπέφανται, πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτὴν εἴρηκεν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων ἢ πάντα.	Hanc autem nulli protulerunt: nisi aliquis dixerit ipsam ex omnibus elementis esse, aut omnia.	which no one has proposed, unless whosoever may have said it was derived from all the elements, or was identical with them, did so.
405b10 ὁρίζονται δὴ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν, κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ·	Definiunt autem omnes animam, tribus (ut est dicere) motu, sensu, et incorporeo.	All, taken together, define soul, we may say, by three things: by movement, by sensation, and by immateriality.
405b12 τούτων δ' ἕκαστον ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς.	Horum autem unumquodque reducitur ad principia.	And each of these is reduced to elemental principles.
405b12 διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν ὁριζόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν ἑνός·	Unde et in cognoscendo definientes ipsam, aut elementum, aut ex elementis faciunt, dicentes similiter invicem praeter unum.	Hence, in defining it as cognitive, they make it either an element or consist of several elements, one saying much the same as another (with a single exception).
405b15 φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ·	Dicunt enim simile cognosci simili.	For they say that anything is known by what resembles it,
405b15 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα γινώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν.	Quoniam autem anima omnia cognoscit, constituunt eam ex omnibus principiis.	and as the soul knows all things, go they constitute it of all principles:
405b17 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἕν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἓν τιθέασιν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα·	Quicumque quidem igitur unam aliquam dicunt causam et elementum unum, et animam unum ponunt, ut ignem aut aerem.	some saying that there is one cause and one element, and that the soul is a single thing—fire or water, for example;
405b18 οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν.	Plura vero dicentes principia, et animam plura dicunt.	others that there are several principles, and that the soul is multiple.
405b19 Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησιν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ κοινὸν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. τοιοῦτος δ' ὢν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος εἴρηκεν οὔτ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές ἐστιν.	Anaxagoras autem solus impassibilem dicit intellectum, et nihil commune nulli aliorum habere. Huiusmodi autem eum sit, quomodo cognoscit, et propter quam causan), neque ille dixit, neque ex his, quae dicta sunt, conspicuum est.	But Anaxagoras, standing alone, says that mind is beyond the reach of influence and has nothing in common with other things. But, granted that this be true, he, did not explain how it acquires knowledge, in virtue of what cause; nor is this made clear by anything else he said.
405b23 ὅσοι δ' ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν·	Quicumque autem contrarietates faciunt in principiis, et animam ex contrariis constituunt.	Those who posit contraries as first principles also maintain that the soul consists of such contraries,
405b24 οἱ δὲ θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων τιθέασιν.	Quicumque autem alterum contrariorum, ut calidum aut frigidum, aut aliquid huiusmodi aliud, et animam similiter unum aliquid horum ponunt.	while those who favour some one among contraries (hot or cold, or some other like these) make the soul, accordingly, one of these.
405b26 διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν, <διὰ τὸ> διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν.	Unde et nominibus consequuntur, ut calidum quidem dicentes, quia propter hoc, et hoc vivere nominatum est.	Whence also some follow names, as those who allege that it is heat, because life is due to heat and is named from it. But those who identify the soul with cold say that it is named from respiration and breathing.
405b29 τὰ μὲν οὖν παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ δι' ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν οὕτω, ταῦτ' ἐστίν.	Qui autem frigidum, propter respirationem et refrigerationem vocari animam. Tradita quidem igitur de anima, et propter quas causas dicunt sic, haec sunt.	Such then are the opinions that have been transmitted to us about the soul, together with the reasons given for them.
405b 31 –406b 14		BOOK I, CHAPTER III
405b31 Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως· ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν 406a1 φασὶν οἱ λέγοντες ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἢ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ' ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν.	Considerandum autem primum quidem de motu. Fortassis enim non solum falsum est, substantiam ipsius huiusmodi esse, qualem ajunt, dicentes animam esse quod est seipsum movens, aut possibile movere. Sed unum quiddam impossibilium inesse ipsi motum.	The first thing to be considered is movement. For perhaps it is not only false to say that this is the essence of the soul, as some mean when they say the soul is self-moving, or is able to move itself, but that there should be movement in it at all is an impossibility.
406a3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι, πρότερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός-ἢ γὰρ καθ' ἕτερον ἢ καθ' αὑτό·	Quod quidem igitur non sit, movens et ipsum moveri, prius dictum est. Dupliciter enim movetur omne. Aut enim secundum alterum, aut secundum seipsum.	It has already been stated that it is not necessary that everything that causes motion be itself moving. For everything moves in one of two ways: either by another, or of itself.
406a5 καθ' ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον πλωτῆρες·	Secundum alterum dicimus, quaecumque moventur ex esse in eo quod movetur, ut nautae.	We say, ‘by another’, of anything that moves through being in that which moves, like sailors;
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ·	Non enim similiter moventur navi.	for these are not in motion in the same way as the ship.
406a7 τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ κινεῖται, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι (δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων·	Haec quidem secundum seipsam movetur, illi autem ex esse in eo quod movetur. Manifestum autem in partibus est.	The latter moves of itself, but they through being in what moves. (This is evident if we consider their parts.
406a8 οἰκεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων·	Proprius quidem enim motus pedum, ambulatio: haec autem et hominum est.	Walking is the proper motion of the feet—and also of men—;
406a9 οὐχ ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τόδε)	Non inest autem nautis tunc.	but for the time being the sailors do not walk).
406a10 διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖσθαι νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ' αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μετέχει κινήσεως.	Dupliciter itaque dicto moveri, nunc intendimus de anima, si per seipsam movetur, et participat motu.	Movement being thus predicated in two ways, we now turn to the soul, asking whether it moves of itself and participates in motion.
406a12 τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κινοῖτ' ἂν ἢ πλείους ἢ πάσας.	Quatuor autem motus cum sint: loci mutationis, alterationis, augmenti, et decrementi: aut secundum unum horum movebitur, aut secundum plures, aut omnes.	Since there are four kinds of movement (local, by alteration, by increase, by decrease) its motion must be one of these, or some, or all.
406a14 εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ·	Si vero movetur non secundum accidens, natura inerit motus ipsi.	But if its movement is not incidental, then motion will be in it by nature:
406a15 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τόπος· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις ἐν τόπῳ.	Si autem hoc, et locus. Omnes enim dicti motus in loco sunt.	and if so, it will be [in] place; for all the aforesaid movements are in place.
406a16 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τριπήχει·	Si autem est substantia animae, movere seipsam, non secundum accidens moveri ipsi inerit, sicut albo et tricubito;	If it is the essence of the soul to move itself, to be in motion will not be in it incidentally, as in what is white or three cubits long;
406a19 κινεῖται γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός·	moventur enim et haec, sed secundum accidens.	for these also participate in movement, but incidentally.
406a20 ᾧ γὰρ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν·	Cui enim haec insunt, movetur illud corpus. Unde non est locus ipsorum.	For what moves is the body in which these inhere; hence of themselves they have no place;
406a21 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει κινήσεως μετέχει.	Animae autem erit: siquidem natura motu participat.	but the soul has it, if indeed it naturally participates in motion.
406a22 ἔτι δ' εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ κινηθείη·	Amplius autem si natura movetur, et violentia movebitur;	Further, if it moves by nature, so it will move by force;
406a23 κἂν εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἠρεμίας·	et si violentia, et natura. Eodem autem modo se habet de quiete.	and if by force, then, by nature. And its rest will be in the same way.
406a24 εἰς ὃ γὰρ κινεῖται φύσει, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ φύσει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται βίᾳ, καὶ ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ βίᾳ.	In quod enim movetur natura, in hoc natura quiescit. Similiter autem et ad quod movetur violentia, et quiescit in hoc violentia.	Whithersoever it moves by nature, there it will come to rest by nature; and likewise wheresoever it is moved by force, there it will come to rest by force.
406a26 ποῖαι δὲ βίαιοι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν βουλομένοις ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι.	Quales autem violenti motus animae erunt, et quietes? neque fingere volentibus facile est reddere.	But what kind of enforced motions and rests will there be in the soul? To find an answer is not easy, nor, even to imagine one!
406a27 ἔτι δ' εἰ μὲν ἄνω κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ· τούτων γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξύ.	Amplius, si quidem sursum movebitur, ignis erit; si vero deorsum, terra. Horum enim corporum motus hi sunt. Eadem autem ratio et de mediis.	Again, if it moves upwards, it will be fire; and if downwards, earth; for such are the movements of these bodies; and the same holds of the intermediate [elements].
406a30 ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, ταύτας εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις ἃς καὶ αὐτὴ κινεῖται. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἣν τὸ 406b1 σῶμα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή.	Quoniam autem videtur movere corpus, rationabile est his movere motibus, quibus et ipsa movetur, Si autem hoc, et convertentibus erit dicere verum, quod secundum quod corpus movetur, hoc et ipsa.	Since it seems to move the body, it would seem reasonable [to say] that it does so by the same motions as those by which it moves itself. If so, then it is true to say, conversely, that just as the body moves, the soul also moves.
406b1 τὸ δὲ σῶμα κινεῖται φορᾷ·	Corpus autem movetur secundum loci mutationem:	Now the body moves by change of place;
406b2 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἢ ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη.	quare et anima movebitur secundum corpus, aut tota, aut secundum partes translata.	hence the soul too will move in accordance with the body, either the whole or the parts being transposed.
406b3 εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄν· τούτῳ δ' ἕποιτ' ἂν τὸ ἀνίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων.	Si autem hoc contingit, et exeuntem iterum ingredi continget (l). Ad hoc autem sequetur, resurgere mortua animalium.	If this is so, then it might happen that after leaving the body it could return to it. (But it is utterly impossible that the dead rise again.) And it would follow that dead animals could rise again.
406b5 τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ' ἑτέρου κινοῖτο·	Motum autem secundum accidens, si ab altero moveatur.	If it does move, however, by something else, its motion will be incidental;
406b6 ὠσθείη γὰρ ἂν βίᾳ τὸ ζῷον. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθ' ὑπ' ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ δι' αὑτό, τὸ μὲν δι' ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἑτέρου ἕνεκεν.	Depelletur enim utique violentia animal. Non oportet autem cui a seipso moveri inest in substantia, hoc ab alio moveri, nisi secundum accidens, sicut neque quod secundum se bonum, aut propter seipsum, hoc quidem propter aliud esse, hoc autem alterius causa.	for certainly an animal can be driven by force. But what has self-movement as of its essence cannot be moved by another, save incidentally; as that which is good in itself or for its own sake cannot exist for the sake of another, or on account of another.
406b10 τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαίη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῖται.	Animam autem maxime dicet aliquis utique a sensibilibus moveri, siquidem movetur.	One might certainly say that, if the soul is moved at all, it is moved by the objects of sensation.
406b11 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ κινεῖ γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ κινοῖτ' ἄν, ὥστ' εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἔκστασίς ἐστι τοῦ κινουμένου ᾗ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτ' ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἑαυτὴν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτήν.	At vero si movet ipsa seipsam, et ipsa movetur utique. Quare si omnis motus ex distantia est ab eo quod movetur, secundum quod movetur, et anima distabit utique a substantia ipsius secundum seipsam, nisi secundum accidens seipsam moveat: sed est motus substantiae ipsius per se.	But if it moves itself it also is in motion. Hence if all motion is a displacement of the moved as such, then the soul must be displaced from its own essence by itself, unless its movement be incidental; but [in fact] this is a self-movement of its essence.
406b 15 –407a 2]
406b15 ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν ᾧ ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον Δημόκριτος, παραπλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ·	[p19/36] Quidam autem et movere animam dicunt corpus in quo est sicut ipsa movetur, ut Democritus, similiter dicens Philippo comoediarum didascalo.	Some say that a soul moves the body in which it dwells just as it moves itself; as did Democritus, who spoke like Philip the comic poet;
406b18 φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν ξυλίνην Ἀφροδίτην, ἐγχέαντ' ἄργυρον χυτόν·	Refert enim Daedalum mobilem fecisse ligneam Venerem, cum illi infudisset argentum fusile.	for the latter relates that Daedalus made a wooden Venus mobile by pouring quicksilver into it.
406b20 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος λέγει· κινουμένας γάρ φησι τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους σφαίρας, διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι μηδέποτε μένειν, συνεφέλκειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα πᾶν.	Similiter autem et Democritus dicit. Motas enim inquit indivisibiles sphaeras propter id quod aptae natae sunt nusquam manere, contrahereque, et movere corpus omne.	Democritus, then, spoke in like manner, saying that there are in movement indivisible globules of which the nature is to be never at rest, and which therefore draw together and move the whole body.
406b22 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ ἠρέμησιν ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτό·	Nos autem interrogabimus, si et quiescere facit hoc.	Now, what we would ask is, whether this is also the cause of coming to rest?
406b23 πῶς δὲ ποιήσει, χαλεπὸν ἢ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν.	Quomodo autem faciet, hoc difficile aut impossibile dicere.	How it could be, on this hypothesis, is difficult to see, indeed impossible.
406b24 ὅλως δ' οὐχ οὕτω φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως.	Omnino autem non sic videtur anima movere animal, sed per voluntatem quamdam et intellectum.	The soul seems, in general, not to move the animate being in this way, but rather by a sort of choice and understanding.
406b25 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα·	Eodem autem modo et Timaeus physiologizat animam movere corpus.	In the same way, the Timaeus sets out a physical theory as to how the soul moves the body.
406b27 τῷ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς αὐτό.	Ex eo enim quod ipsa movetur, etiam corpus ipsum movet, propterea quod cum eo connexa est.	For, from the fact that the soul moves itself, it moves the body, as a result of its connection with the body.
406b28 συνεστηκυῖαν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ μεμερισμένην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς ἀριθμούς, ὅπως αἴσθησίν τε σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχῃ καὶ τὸ πᾶν φέρηται συμφώνους φοράς,	Constitutam autem ex elementis, et dispartitam secundum harmonicos numeros, quatenus connaturalem sensum harmoniae habeat, et ut omne feratur secundum consonantes motus.	‘Being compounded of the elements and divided according to harmonic numbers, so that it have a connatural sense of harmony, and the whole be borne along with well attuned motions,
406b31 τὴν εὐθυωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν·	Aspectum rectum in circulum reflexit: et eum dividendo,	[God] bent the straight line into a circle,
406b32 καὶ διελὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς δύο κύκλους δισσαχῇ συνημμένους 407a1 πάλιν τὸν ἕνα διεῖλεν εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους, ὡς οὔσας τὰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φορὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.	ex uno fecisset duos circulos dupliciter coordinatos: iterum unum divisit in septem circulos, tamquam essent caeli motus animae motus.	and, dividing it, made out of one two circles, adjusted at two points; and, again, he divided one of these into seven circles, as though the heavenly motions were the soul’s motions.”
407a 2 –407b 25]
407a2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι·	[p21/38] Primum quidem igitur non bene dicitur, animam magnitudinem esse.	Now in the first place it is not correct to say, that the soul is a magnitude.
407a3 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς δῆλον ὅτι τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς (οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷόν γ' ἡ αἰσθητική, οὐδ' οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυμητική· τούτων γὰρ ἡ κίνησις οὐ κυκλοφορία)·	Eam enim, quae omnis, talem esse vult, qualis est aliquando vocatus intellectus. Non enim velut sensitiva est, neque ut desiderativa. Harum enim motus non circulatio est;	For that of the Whole he (Plato) regards as of the same nature as what is sometimes called mind, not as the sensitive or the appetitive soul; for the movement of these is not circular.
407a6 ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν, ὡς ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος·	intellectus autem unus et continuus sicut et intelligentia est. Intelligentia autem conceptiones. Haec autem eo quod consequenter unum, sicut numerus, sed non sicut magnitudo:	Now mind is one and continuous, as is the act of understanding, which in turn consists of thoughts. But these have unity by succession, like number, not like extension.
407a9 διόπερ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς μέγεθός τι συνεχής.	propter quod quidem neque intellectus sic continuus, sed aut impartibilis, aut non sic ut magnitudo aliqua continuus est.	Therefore neither is mind thus continuous; but it is either indivisible, or not continuous in the way that anything extended is.
407a10 πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νοήσει, μέγεθος ὤν, πότερον ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὑτοῦ, μορίων δ' ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν;	Qualiter autem intelliget, magnitudo cum sit: utrum universaliter, an qualibet partium suiipsius? partium autem aut secundum magnitudinem, aut secundum punctum, si oportet et hoc partem dicere.	How would it understand, if it were an extended quantity? As a whole, or by each of its parts? If by its parts, then by an extended part or by a point, if one may call a point a part.
407a12 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμήν, αὗται δ' ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν·	Siquidem igitur secundum punctum, haec autem infinita, manifestum est, quoniam nunquam pertransibit.	If by a point (of which there is an infinite, number) it is evident that it will never complete the process.
407a14 εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον.	Si vero secundum magnitudinem, multoties et infinities intelliget idem. Videtur autem et semel contingere.	If by an extended part, it will understand the same thing many times over, even to infinity. Yet it seems to do so once for all.
407a15 εἰ δ' ἱκανὸν θιγεῖν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων, τί δεῖ κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι, ἢ καὶ ὅλως μέγεθος ἔχειν;	Si autem sufficiens qualibet partium tangere, quid oportet circulo moveri, aut et omnino magnitudinem habere?	But if it is sufficient that it make contact with any one of its parts, why should it move in a circle or have any magnitude at all?
407a17 εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον νοῆσαι τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ θιγόντα, τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις;	Si autem necessarium intelligere toto circulo tangentem, quis est partibus tactus?	But if it is necessary that it understand by contact with the whole of its circumference, what is the contact it makes by its parts?
407a18 ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ μεριστὸν ἀμερεῖ ἢ τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ;	Amplius quomodo intelliget partibile impartibili, aut impartibile partibili?	Again, how can the divisible be understood by the indivisible, or the indivisible by the divisible?
407a19 ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον· νοῦ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις νόησις κύκλου δὲ περιφορά· εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις περιφορά, καὶ νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ κύκλος οὗ ἡ τοιαύτη περιφορὰ νόησις.	Necessarium autem est circulum intellectum hunc. Intellectus quidem enim motus, intelligentia, circuli autem circulatio. Si ergo intelligentia, circulatio, et intellectus utique erit circulus, cuius talis circulatio sit intelligentia.	It is necessary that intellect, be this circle; for as the movement of the intellect is to understand, and that of the circle is to revolve, if, then, understanding is a revolving, the intellect must be a circle whose revolving is thinking.
407a22 ἀεὶ δὲ δὴ τί νοήσει (δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ ἀΐδιος ἡ περιφορά); τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν), αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται·	Semper autem aliquid intelliget, oportet enim siquidem perpetua sit circulatio. Praticarum quidem enim intelligentiarum termini sunt, omnes enim alterius causa sunt. Speculativa autem rationibus terminantur similiter.	But then it will always think something—since revolving goes on for ever. Practical thoughts, however, have limits, each being for the sake of something else; while speculative thinking likewise is limited by ideas
407a25 λόγος δὲ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις· αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔχουσαί πως τέλος, τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ τὸ συμπέρασμα (εἰ δὲ μὴ περατοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσί γε πάλιν ἐπ' ἀρχήν, προσλαμβάνουσαι δ' ἀεὶ μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυποροῦσιν·	Ratio autem omnis definitio est, aut demonstratio. Demonstrationes vero, et a principio sunt, et habent quodammodo finem syllogismum aut conclusionem. Si autem non concludantur, sed non reflectuntur iterum in principium accipientes semper medium et ultimum, recte procedunt:	and every idea is either a definition or a demonstration. But demonstrations begin from principles, and have as their term a conclusion or an inference. Even if they do not reach a conclusion, they do not come round again to their starting-point; they always take a new middle term and conclusion, and proceed straight forward.
407a29 ἡ δὲ περιφορὰ πάλιν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνακάμπτει)·	sed circulatio iterum in principium reflectitur.	But revolving returns again to the beginning.
407a30 οἱ δ' ὁρισμοὶ πάντες πεπερασμένοι.	Definitiones autem omnes finitae sunt.	Definitions too are all finite.
407a31 ἔτι εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ περιφορὰ πολλάκις, δεήσει πολλάκις νοεῖν τὸ αὐτό.	Amplius autem, si eadem circulatio multoties est, oportebit multoties intelligere idem.	Further, if the same revolving occurs many times over, there will be a multiple understanding of the same thing.
407a32 ἔτι δ' ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ συλλογισμός.	Adhuc autem, intelligentia assimilatur cuidam statui et quieti magis quam motui; eodem autem modo, et syllogismus.	Moreover, intelligence is better compared with stillness and rest than with motion,—and the same holds of logical deduction.
407a34 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μακάριόν γε τὸ μὴ 407b1 ῥᾴδιον ἀλλὰ βίαιον· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς ᾗ οὐσία, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν κινοῖτο.	At vero neque beatum, quod non facile, sed violentum. Si autem est motus ipsius non substantia, extra naturam utique movebitur.	Again, that will not be content which is not at ease but in a state of strain. But if movement is not of the essence of the soul, it will only move unnaturally.
407b2 ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμῖχθαι τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴπερ βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴωθέ τε λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ.	Laboriosum autem est commisceri animam corpori, nec possibile absolvi. Et adhuc fugiendum: siquidem melius est intellectui, non cum corpore esse, quemadmodum et consuetum est dici, et multis videtur.	It must be burdensome for the soul to be entangled with the body without possibility of release; and indeed this should be shunned if it is better for the mind not to dwell in the body as is commonly said, and as seems true to many.
407b5 ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ αἰτία· οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω κινεῖται,	Immanifesta autem et circulo ferri caeli causa. Neque enim animae substantia, causa circulariter ferri animam; sed secundum accidens sic movetur.	It is not clear why the Heavens move by circular movement; for the essence of the soul is not the cause of the soul moving in a circle, for such movement is only incidental to soul.
407b8 οὔτε τὸ σῶμα αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον ἐκείνῳ.	Neque corpus causa, sed, anima magis illi.	Still less is the body the cause, but rather the soul a cause for the body.
407b9 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται· καίτοι γ' ἐχρῆν διὰ τοῦτο τὸν θεὸν κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δ' οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως.	At vero neque quia melius dicitur, et tamen oportebat propter hoc Deum facere circulariter ferri animam, quia diguius sit ipsi moveri quam manere, moveri autem sic quam aliter.	Nor is this alleged as for the best; yet the reason why God made the soul revolve must have been because it is more worthy for it to move than to remain stationary, and to move in this way rather than in any other.
407b12 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη σκέψις ἑτέρων λόγων οἰκειοτέρα, ταύτην μὲν ἀφῶμεν τὸ νῦν.	Quoniam autem huiusmodi intentio est alteris rationibus magis propria, hanc quidem dimittamus nunc.	But this speculation is better suited to other contexts, so let us now dismiss it.
407b13 ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμβαίνει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν περὶ ψυχῆς·	Illud autem inconveniens accidit. et huic rationi. et pluribus. quae de anima.	Another absurdity arises in this argument and in many others dealing with the soul.
407b15 συνάπτουσι γὰρ καὶ τιθέασιν εἰς σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίσαντες διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ σώματος.	Copulant enim et ponunt in corpus animam nihil determinantes propter quam causam, et quomodo habente corpore.	They conjoin body and soul, placing the soul in the body without stating anything definite as to the cause of this, or how the body is disposed.
407b17 καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν τοῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει καὶ τὸ μὲν κινεῖται τὸ δὲ κινεῖ, τούτων δ' οὐθὲν ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν.	Et tamen videtur hoc utique necessarium esse, propter enim communitatem hoc quidem agit, hoc autem patitur, et hoc quidem movet, illud autem movetur. Horum autem nihil inest adinvicem quibuscumque.	Yet this explanation is surely necessary, for it is in virtue of something in common that one is an agent, the other acted upon, one moves and the other is moved. No such correlations are to be found at random.
407b20 οἱ δὲ μόνον ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι σῶμα.	Hi autem solum conantur dicere quale quid sit anima, de susceptivo autem corpore nihil adhuc determinant; tanquam contingens sit, secundum pythagoricas fabulas, quamlibet animam in quodlibet corpus ingredi.	These thinkers only endeavour to state what the soul is, without determining anything about the body which receives it, as if it happened that any soul entered any body, as in the fables of the Pythagoreans.
407b23 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶδος καὶ μορφήν, παραπλήσιον δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.	Videtur enim unumquodque propriam habere speciem et formam. Simile itaque aliquid dicunt, sicut si aliquis dicat tectonicam in fistulas ingredi. Oportet enim artem quidem uti organis, animam autem corpore.	For each body seems to have its own proper form and species. It is like saying that carpentry enters into flutes; for each art must use its tools, and the soul its body.
		BOOK I, CHAPTER IV
407b27 Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγον δ' ὥσπερ εὐθύνοις δεδωκυῖα κἀν τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γεγενημένοις λόγοις.	[p25/42]Alia autem quaedam opinio tradita est de anima, credibilis quidem multis, et nulla inferior earum, quae dictae sunt, rationibus tamen tamquam poenis castigata, atque damnata, et in iis qui in communi fiunt sermonibus.	There is another opinion handed down about the soul, acceptable to many, and in no way inferior to the theories already discussed, yet chastised, as it were, and condemned, even in public discussions.
407b30 ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσι·	Harmoniam enim quamdam dicunt.	For some call the soul a kind of harmony.
407b30 καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων.	Etenim harmoniam temperamentum, et compositionem esse contrariorum, et corpus componi ex contrariis.	And they say that harmony is a composition or tempering of opposites, and that the body is compounded of opposites.
407b32 καίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν τ' εἶναι τούτων.	Et quidem harmonia quaedam ratio mixtorum est, aut compositio; animam autem neutrum possibile est esse horum.	Yet a harmony is either a proportion in the components [of a compound] or the composition itself; and the soul cannot be either of these.
407b34 ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁρμονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ 408a1 πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ' ὡς εἰπεῖν.	Amplius autem movere non est harmoniae: animae autem attribuunt hoc omnes.	Further [active] movement, which all attribute to the soul, does not pertain to harmony.
408a1 ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγιείας λέγειν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ' εἴ τις ἀποδιδόναι πειραθείη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἁρμονίᾳ τινί· χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν.	Congruit autem magis de sanitate dicere harmoniam, et omnino de corporeis virtutibus quam de anima. Manifestum autem, si aliquis tentaverit reddere passiones et opera animae harmonia quadam: difficile enim adaptare.	It would be more appropriate to call health a harmony, and in general the powers of the body, rather than of the soul. This is evident if one tries to explain the passions and operations of the soul by some harmony: it is difficult indeed to correlate these!
408a5 ἔτι δ' εἰ λέγομεν τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μέν, τῶν μεγεθῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν, τὴν σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν οὕτω συναρμόζωσιν ὥστε μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν μεμιγμένων λόγον-οὐδετέρως μὲν οὖν εὔλογον, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν εὐεξέταστος.	Amplius autem dicimus harmoniam in duo respicientes, maxime quidem propriam magnitudinum in habentibus motum et positionem, compositionum ipsarum, cum sic congruant, ut nullum congeneum praetermittatur. Hinc autem et eorum, quae commiscentur, rationem. Neutro quidem igitur modo rationabile.	Further, we speak of harmony with two considerations in mind. Primarily as a correctly proportioned measurement, in what has motion and position, of component parts, so that nothing is missing that is becoming to them. secondly, the ratio of this composition. In neither way is this [predication of harmony to the soul] reasonable.
408a11 πολλαί τε γὰρ αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλαχῶς· τίνος οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν νοῦν χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι, ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ὀρεκτικόν;	Compositio autem partium corporis multum investigabilis est. Multae enim compositiones partium, et multipliciter sunt. Cuius igitur et quomodo congruit opinari, intellectum compositionem esse, aut et sensitivum et appetitivum?	The composition of the parts of the body is very easy to examine, for there are many and various such compositions. Of what and how can one suppose the mind to be a composition? Or sensation? Or appetite?
408a13 ὁμοίως δὲ ἄτοπον καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον τῆς μίξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἡ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων καθ' ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ' ἣν ὀστοῦν. συμβήσεται οὖν πολλάς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ὁ δὲ τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἁρμονία καὶ ψυχή.	Similiter autem et inconveniens et rationem mixtionis esse animam. Non enim eamdem habet rationem commixtio elementorum, secundum quam caro, et secundum quam os: accidet igitur multas animas babere. Et secundum omne corpus, siquidem omnia, ex elementis commixtis sunt, commixtionis autem ratio harmonia et anima.	It is no less absurd to account the soul the ratio of a composition. The synthesis of elements for bone is not the same as that for flesh. There would have to be many souls [in one body]; and indeed [a soul] for every body, if each is a mixture of elements, and the ratio of the mixture a harmony and a soul.
408a18 ἀπαιτήσειε δ' ἄν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ τινί φησιν εἶναι· πότερον οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ μᾶλλον ἕτερόν τι οὖσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέρεσιν;	Investigabit autem hoc utique aliquis ab Empedocle unumquodque enim horum in ratione quadam dicit esse. Utrum igitur haec ratio anima est, an magis alterum aliquid, cum sic in membris ingeneratur?	One might at this point question Empedocles. He says that each of these exists in virtue of a proportion. Is this proportion then the soul; or is soul some other thing, thus inborn in the members?
408a21 ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἡ φιλία τῆς τυχούσης αἰτία μίξεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον,	Amplius autem, utrum concordia cuiuslibet mixtionis causa, an ejus quae secundum rationem?	Or further: is concord the cause of any chance combination, or only of one based on some ratio?
408a22 καὶ αὕτη πότερον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἕτερόν τι; ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας.	Et hoc utrum ratio est, an alterum aliquid praeter rationem? Haec quidem igitur habent huiusmodi dubitationes.	And whether this concord is the ratio of the composition or something else? These are the kinds of problem involved in this, hypothesis.
408a24 εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου;	Si vero alterum est a mixtione anima: quid igitur simul cum carnis esse interimitur, et esse aliis partibus animalis?	But if the soul is other than the composition, why does it perish together with the essence of flesh and of other parts of the body?
408a26 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἴπερ μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψυχὴν ἔχει, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς μίξεως, τί ἐστιν ὃ φθείρεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπολιπούσης;	Adhuc antem siquidem unaquaeque partium habet animam, si non est anima ratio compositionis, quid est quod corrumpitur anima digressa?	Moreover, granted that each of these parts has a soul, if the soul is not the ratio of the whole composition, what is it that is, corrupted when the soul departs?
408a29 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔθ' ἁρμονίαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν οὔτε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι, καὶ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οἷον κινεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς·	Quod quidem igitur neque harmoniam possibile est esse animam, neque circulariter moveri, manifestum est ex dictis. Secundum accidens autem moveri est, et movere seipsam, ' ut moveri quidem in quo est, hoc autem moveri ab anima.	It is evident, then, from what has been said, that the soul cannot be a harmony, or move by revolving. It can, however, be moved and move itself, incidentally, in so far as what it dwells in moves and is moved by the soul.
408a33 ἄλλως δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον αὐτήν.	Aliter autem non est possibile moveri secundum locum ipsam,	In no other way can it move in place.
408a 34 –408b 31]
408a34 εὐλογώτερον δ' ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς 408b1 κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας· φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι,	[p27/44] Rationabilius autem dubitabit utique aliquis de ipsa tamquam quae movetur, in huiusmodi respiciens. Dicimus enim animam tristari, gaudere, confidere, timere.	One might with more reason enquire about the soul as in movement by considering such facts as these: that it is, as we say, sad, pleased, confident, frightened;
408b2 ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.	Amplius autem irasci, et sentire, et intelligere. Haec autem omnia motus esse videntur,	or again, that it is angry, feels and understands. All these seem to be movements;
408b4 ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι·	unde opinabitur aliquis ipsam moveri.	from which one might suppose that the soul moves.
408b5 τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαί τι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὡδὶ κινεῖσθαι,	Hoc autem non est necesse. Si enim et quam maxime gaudere, aut dolere. aut intelligere, motus sunt, et unumquodque moveri aliquid; moveri autem est ab anima, ut irasci aut timere, in co quod corpus (1) quodammodo movetur.	This, however, is not a necessary conclusion. Even if feeling pain or being glad or understanding are in the fullest sense movements, and each of these is a ‘being moved’ (e. a. being angry or fearful occurs by some movement of the heart), this being moved is from the soul.
408b8 τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι,	Intelligere autem aut tale est, aut forsitan alterum aliquid.	But as for understanding, it is either of such a nature or perhaps something other.
408b9 τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φοράν τινων κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν (ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος), τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν·	Horum autem accidunt alia quidem, secundum loci mutationem quibusdam motis; alia vero secundum alterationem. Qualia autem et quomodo, alterius rationis est. Dicere autem irasci animam, simile est, et si aliquis dicat eam texere vel aedificare.	Of these, however, some occur with a change of place in that which moves; others with an alteration,—of what sort or how is another question. To say that the soul is angry is like saying it builds or weaves.
408b13 βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ·	Melius enim fortassis est non dicere animam misereri, aut addiscere, ant intelligere, sed hominem anima.	For it is perhaps better to say, not that the soul is compassionate, or learns, or understands, but a man by his soul.
408b15 τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ' ἀνάμνησις ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.	Haec autem non tamquam motu in illa existente, sed aliquando quidem usque ad illam, aliquando autem ab illa. Ut sensus quidem ab his, reminiscentia vero ab illa, ad motus qui sunt in sensibilibus organis, aut quietes.	These modifications occur by movements not so much in the soul as, in some cases, proceeding to it, and in others, proceeding from it, as sensation proceeds from things, whilst remembering proceeds from the soul to the motions or rests which occur in the sensitive organs. .
408b18 ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει·	Intellectus autem videtur innasci substantia quaedam existens et non corrumpi. Maxime enim corrumperetur utique ab ea, quae est in senio, debilitate. Nunc autem quemadmodum in sensitivis accidit.	But intellect [νοῦς/intellectus] would seem to be a subsisting essence implanted in the soul, and not to corrupt. For it would corrupt [if it did], principally through the debility accompanying old age. But in fact what happens is similar to the case of the sensitive powers.
408b21 εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις.	Si enim accipiat senex oculum juvenis, videbit sicut et juvenis: quare senium non est in sustinendo aliquid animam, sed in quo, sicut in ebrietatibus et infirmitatibus.	If an old man could acquire the eye of a young man, I he would see as a young man; hence, senility is not an affliction of the soul, but of that which it inhabits, like drunkenness or disease.
408b24 καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.	Intelligere igitur et considerare marcescunt alio quodam interius corrupto; ipsum autem impassibile est.	Understanding and thinking, then, decay with the decay of something else within. Understanding itself cannot be affected.
408b25 τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.	Cogitare autem, et amare, et odire, non sunt illius passiones, sed huius, habentis illud, secundum quod illud habet. Quare et hoc corrupto, non reminiscitur, neque amat. Non enim illius erant, sed communis, quod quidem destructum est. Intellectus autem fortassis divinius aliquid et impassibile est.	But reasoning and loving and hating are not affections of the intellect, but of that which has it, precisely in so far as it has it. Wherefore, when this decays, the soul ceases to remember or love. For these proceeded, not from it, but from what was common, which has disintegrated. But perhaps intellect is something more godlike and unalterable.
408b30 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· εἰ δ' ὅλως μὴ κινεῖται, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς.	Quod quidem igitur non possibile moveri animam, manifestum ex his. Si autem penitus non movetur, manifestum quod neque a seipsa.	Therefore, that the soul cannot be moved is manifest from these arguments. But if it cannot be moved, it is evident that it cannot be self-moving.
408b 32 –409b 18
408b32 πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν κινοῦνθ' ἑαυτόν·	[p30/47] Multo autem his, quae dicta sunt, irrationabilissimum dicere animam esse numerum seipsum moventem.	Much the most unreasonable thing said about the soul is that it is a number moving itself.
408b33 ὑπάρχει γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι συμβαίνοντα, ἴδια δ' ἐκ τοῦ [409a λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν.	Insunt enim his impossibilia. Primo quidem ea, quae ex eo accidunt, quod animam moveri asserunt. Propria autem ex eo quod dicunt ipsam esse numerum.	In this there are several impossibilities. First, what follows upon ‘being moved’, as they say; and then the special difficulties that follow their assertion that it is a number.
409a1 πῶς γὰρ χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινουμένην, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, καὶ πῶς, ἀμερῆ καὶ ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν;	Quomodo enim oportet intelligere unitatem motam, et a quo, et quomodo impartibilem, et indifferentem existenten?	How is one to conceive a unity, indivisible and undifferentiated in itself, as moving? Or by what? Or in what way?
409a3 ᾗ γάρ ἐστι κινητικὴ καὶ κινητή, διαφέρειν δεῖ.	Si namque est mota et mobilis, differre oportet.	For if it is both moved and mover, there must be some difference in itself.
409a3 ἔτι δ' ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν, στιγμὴν δὲ γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις γραμμαὶ ἔσονται· ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν ἔχουσα, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι καὶ θέσιν ἔχει.	Amplius quoniam dicunt lineam motam planum facere, punctum autem lineam, et unitatum motus lineae erunt. Punctum autem unitas est, positionem habens. Numerus autem animae iam alicubi est, et positionem habet.	Further, since they say that a line, being moved, makes a plane, and a point, being moved, a line, the movements of the units will be lines. Now a point is unit having position; so that the number of a soul must be in some place and have position.
409a7 ἔτι δ' ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός· τὰ δὲ φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ καὶ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ εἴδει.	Amplius autem a numero si auferat aliquis numerum aut unitatem, relinquitur alius numerus. Plantae autem et animalium multa divisa vivunt, et videntur eamdem habere animam specie.	Further, if one subtracts from a number a number or a unit, another number is left. Plants, however, and many animals, live on after being divided, and seem to retain specifically the same soul.
409a10 δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐθὲν διαφέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια μικρά· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν γένωνται στιγμαί, μόνον δὲ μένῃ τὸ ποσόν, ἔσται [τι] ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ κινούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ·	Videbitur autem utique nihil differre dicere unitates, aut corpora parva. Et namque ex Democriti sphaeris, si fiant puncta, solum autem mancat quantitas, erit aliquid in ipso, hoc quidem movens, illud autem quod movetur, sicut in magnitudine.	It would seem to be a matter of indifference whether one says ‘units’ or ‘small bodies’. For if the spheres of Democritus were to become points, and only quantity remained, there would remain in them a moving and a moved, as in extended matter.
409a14 οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεγέθει διαφέρειν ἢ μικρότητι συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ποσόν· διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸ κινῆσον τὰς μονάδας. εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον.	Non enim propter hoc quod est magnitudine differre, aut parvitate, accidit quod dictum est, sed quia quantum. Unde necesse est aliquid esse motivum unitatum, Si autem in animali quod movens, anima est, et in numero: quare non movens et quod movetur, est anima, sed movens solum.	For the distinction spoken of is not due to largeness or smallness, but to quantity as such. Hence there must necessarily be something moving the units. But if it is the soul which moves the animal, so also in the case of number: then the soul is not a moving thing, which is also moved, but a mover only.
409a18 ἐνδέχεται δὲ δὴ πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι; δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αὐτῇ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, στιγμῆς δὲ μοναδικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις; εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἕτεραι αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες καὶ αἱ στιγμαί, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες·	Contingit autem quodammodo hanc unitatem esse. Oportet enim ipsi inesse quamdam differentiam ad alias. Puncti autem solitarii, quae utique differentia erit nisi positio? Siquidem igitur sunt alterae in corpore unitates et puncta, in eodem erunt unitates: obtinebit enim locum puncti:	Now this would have somehow to be a unit. If so, it must have some principle of differentiation from other units. But how can one isolated point differ from others, but in position? But if there are many different units and points in a body, they will be units in the same subject, and will occupy space as points.
409a23 καθέξει γὰρ <ἑκάστη> χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἄπειρα; ὧν γὰρ ὁ τόπος ἀδιαίρετος, καὶ αὐτά.	tamen et quid prohibet in eodem esse, si duae sunt, et infinitas? Quorum enim locus est indivisibilis, et ipsa.	But, if there are two in the same place, what is there to prevent an infinity of them together? That of which the place is indivisible is itself such.
409a25 εἰ δ' αἱ ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμαὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; στιγμαὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι.	Si autem ea quae in corpore puncta sunt numerus animae, aut si eorum quae in corpore sunt punctorum numerus, est animae, quare non omnia habent animam corpora? Puncta enim in omnibus videntur esse, et infinita.	But if the points in the body are the ‘numbers’ of the soul, or if the ‘number’ of body-points is that of the soul, why are there not souls in all bodies? For in all things there seem to be points, even to infinity.
409a28 ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;	Amplius autem quomodo possibile est separari puncta et absolvi a corporibus? siquidem non dividantur lineae in puncta.	Furthermore, how is it possible for these points to be separated and released from the body? Since lines cannot be divided up into points?
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ε'.		BOOK I, CHAPTER V
409a31 1. Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ λέγειν τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, τῇ δ', ὥσπερ 409b1 Δημόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἄτοπον.	Accidit autem, sicut diximus, partim quidem, idem dicere corpus quoddam subtilium partium ipsam ponentibus, partim autem sicut Democritus dicit ab animia moveri, proprium inconveniens.	This amounts to saying (as we said before), either, under one aspect, the same as those who posit the soul. as a body of very refined elements, or, under another aspect, what Democritus said of the movement of the soul,—a thing intrinsically absurd.
409b2εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή·	Si enim est anima in omni eo quod sentit corpore: necesse est duo in eodem esse corpora, si corpus aliquod anima.	For if the soul is in all the body as sentient, there must be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is some sort of body.
409b4 τοῖς δ' ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολλὰς στιγμάς, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρων τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν· συμβαίνει τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ Δημόκριτον αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν κινεῖν·	Numerum autem dicentibus, in uno puncto puncta multa, aut omne corpus animam habere, nisi quidam numerus differens fiat et alius ab his quae in corpore sunt punctis. Accidit autem animal moveri a numero, sicut et Democritus dixit ipsum movere.	And for those who say it is a number, there are many points in one point, or else every body has a soul; unless the soul’s ‘number’ be other than that of the points in the body. The animal would then come to be moved by a number, precisely as Democritus said.
409b9 τί γὰρ διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν μικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγάλας, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας.	Quid enim est differt dicere sphaeras parvas aut unitates magnas aut omnino unitates ferri? Utrobique enim necesse est movere animal, in eo quod moventur ipsae.	What difference does it make whether one says small spheres or large units, or, in general, that units are in motion? In any case it must needs be that the animal moves when these are moving.
409b11 τοῖς δὴ συμπλέξασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὁρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. δῆλον δ' εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς, αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα·	Complectentibus igitur in unum, numerum et motum, et haec accidunt et multa alia huiusmodi. Non enim solum diffinitionem animae impossibile est huiusmodi esse, sed et accidens. Manifestum est autem siquis conatus fuerit ex ratione hac, passiones et opera animae reddere, ut cogitationes, sensus laetitias, tristitias, et quaecumque alia huiusmodi.	These and many other consequences result for those who would combine number and movement in a single principle. It is impossible for such to be not only a definition of the soul, but even one of its accidents-as is clear if one attempts by this procedure to account for the soul’s activities and modifications, such as pleasure, pain and so forth.
409b17 ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν πρότερον, οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι ῥᾴδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν.	Sicut enim diximus prius, neque divinare est facile ex ipsis.	As we said before, on these principles it is not easy even to hazard a conjecture.
409b 18 –411a 7
409b18 τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων καθ' οὓς ὁρίζονται τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ μὲν τὸ κινητικώτατον ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ σῶμα τὸ λεπτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατον τῶν ἄλλων.	[p33/50] Tribus autem modis traditis, secundum quos definiunt animam, alii quidem maxime motiva enuntiaverunt, in movendo seipsam, Alii autem corpus subtilissimum, aut incorporalissimum aliorum.	There are, then, three ways in which men have defined the soul: some declaring that it is the principal mover, being self-moving; some, that it is the most subtle of bodies, or the least corporeal of things
409b21 ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει, διεληλύθαμεν σχεδόν· λείπεται δ' ἐπισκέψασθαι πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶναι. λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, ἵν' αἰσθάνηταί τε τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαίνειν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ.	Haec autem quas dubitationes et contrarietates habent praeterivimus fere. Relinquitur autem considerare, quomodo dicitur ex elementis ipsam esse. Dicunt euim quatenus sentiat ea quae sunt, et unumquodque cognoscat. Necessarium autem est accidere multa et impossibilia rationi.	(what contradictions and problems these views entail we have briefly reviewed); so what is left for us to consider is how it is said to be constituted from the elements. They say this is so because the soul perceives things that are and knows each one. But many irrational consequences follow upon this.
409b26 τίθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες.	Ponunt enim cognoscere simile simili, tanquam si animam res ipsas esse ponant.	For they suppose that like is known by like, as if they meant to identify things themselves with the soul.
409b28 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἐκ τούτων.	Non sunt autem haec sola, multa vero et alia. Magis autem fortassis infinita numero quae sunt ex his.	But those [elements] are not the only things; there are many others, perhaps infinite in number, derived from them.
409b29 ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ αἰσθήσεται, οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 410a1 ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων·	Ex quibus igitur est unumquodque horum, esto cognoscere animam et sentire: sed compositum non cognoscet aut sentiet, ut quid Deus, aut homo aut caro, aut os, similiter autem quodlibet aliud compositorum.	Granted, then, that the soul knows and perceives the elements of which each of these is formed, yet it will not know or perceive wholes, such as what a divinity is, or a man, or flesh, or bone, or anything else compounded.
410a1 οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθάπερ φησὶ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν·	Non enim quolibet modo se habentia elementa horum unumquodque, sed ratione quadam et compositione, sicut Empedocles dicit os.	For the elements of these are not interrelated at random, but by some ratio or principle of composition, as Empedocles said of bone,
410a4 ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν τὼ δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης, τέσσαρα δ' Ἡφαίστοιο· τὰ δ' ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο.	Terra autem adamabilis, in amplis receptaculis, “duas ex octo partibus sortita est aquae luminis, quatuor autem vulcani, ossa autem alba facta sunt”,	The earth all gracious in its ample caverns Took two parts out of eight of water and light, But four from the god of fire, and then White bone was made.
410a7 οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις·	nulla igitur utilitas est elementa in anima esse, nisi et rationes erunt et compositio.	So it is no use supposing elements to be in the soul unless there are in it also principles and co-ordination.
410a8 γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δ' ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσειεν εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος;	Cognoscet enim unumquodque simile. Os autem aut hominem nihil, nisi et haec inerunt. Hoc autem quod impossibile sit, nihil oportet dicere. Quis enim dubitabit, an insit in anima lapis aut homo?	Let each know its like, it will not know bone or man unless these be in it. It is hardly necessary to say, however, that this is impossible; who would ever think of enquiring if there is a stone in the soul, or a man?
410a11 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	similiter autem et bonum et non bonum, eodem modo et de aliis.	Likewise, the good or the not-good; and similarly with other things.
410a13 ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος (σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ καί τινα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν) πότερον ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ;	Amplius autem, cum multipliciter dicatur id quod est, significat enim aliud quidem hoc aliquid, aliud autem quantitatem aut qualitatem, aut et quoddam aliud divisorum praedicamentorum, utrum ex omnibus erit anima, an non?	Further, ‘that which is’ can be predicated in several ways: in one way, substance, in another, quality, in another, quantity; and in any other way according to the categories that have been distinguished. Will the soul be made up of all these or no?
410a16 ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. ἆρ' οὖν ὅσα τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἐκ τούτων μόνον; πῶς οὖν γινώσκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον; ἢ φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας, ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν συνεστάναι; ἔσται ἄρα ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία.	Sed non videntur communia omnium esse elementa. Nun igitur quaecumque substantiarum sunt, ex his solum? Quomodo igitur cognoscet et aliorum unumquodque? An dicet uniuscuiusque generis esse elementa et principia propria, ex quibus animam constare? Erit ergo qualitas et quantitas et substantia.	But it does not seem that there are elements common to all these. is it from those of substance only? How then will it know anything of the other kinds? Or is one to say that there are elements and principles proper to each category of which the soul is composed? then there will be quality and quantity and substance in the soul.
410a20 ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων οὐσίαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποσόν. τοῖς δὴ λέγουσιν ἐκ πάντων ταῦτά τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα συμβαίνει.	Sed impossibile est ex quantitatis elementis esse substantiam, et non quantitatem. Dicentibus itaque ex omnibus, haec et huiusmodi alia accidunt.	But it is impossible that of the elements of quantity be derived substance, and not quantity. For those who hold that the soul is composed of all things, these (and other such) difficulties arise.
410a23 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ γινώσκειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον·	Inconveniens autem est dicere quidem impassibile esse simile a simili, sentire autem simile simili, et cognoscere saule simili.	It is unreasonable to say that one thing cannot be acted on by its like, and yet that sensation and knowledge is ‘like by like’.
410a25 τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν τι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τιθέασιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ γινώσκειν.	Sentire autem pati aliquid et moveri ponunt, similiter autem cognoscere et intelligere.	For they posit sensation as being moved and affected, and knowing and understanding likewise.
410a27 πολλὰς δ' ἀπορίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἔχοντος τοῦ λέγειν, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς στοιχείοις ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται, καί, πρός, τῷ ὁμοίῳ, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν·	Multas autem dubitationes et difficultates habente ipso dicere, sicut Empedocles, quod corporeis elementis singula cognoscuntur, et ad simile testatur quod nunc dictum est.	What has now been said witnesses to the many difficulties and doubts to be faced by one who, with Empedocles, says that each thing is known through its corporeal elements and [their relation] to its likeness.
410a30 ὅσα γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς, οἷον 410b1 ὀστᾶ νεῦρα τρίχες, οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμοίων· καίτοι προσῆκεν.	Quaecumque enim insunt in animalium corporibus simpliciter terrae, ut ossa, nervi, pili, nihil sentire videntur; quare neque similia; et tamen conveniret.	For whatever things in the body are obviously earthy (bones, sinews, hair) seem to perceive nothing; nor therefore even their likenesses; and yet they ought [on this hypothesis].
410b2 ἔτι δ' ἑκάστῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἄγνοια πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ὑπάρξει· γνώσεται μὲν γὰρ ἓν ἑκάστη, πολλὰ δ' ἀγνοήσει· πάντα γὰρ τἆλλα.	Amplius autem unumquodque principiorum ignorantia plus. quam intelligentia existet. Cognoscet quidem enim quodlibet, multa autem ignorabit: omnia enim alia.	Again, each one of the principles will have more ignorance than understanding. For it will know a single principle and be ignorant of many others, indeed of all others.
410b4 συμβαίνει δ' Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν· μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα· ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον.	Accidet autem et Empedocli insipientissimum esse Deum. Solus enim elementorum unum non cognoscet, discordiam. Mortalia autem, omnia. Ex omnibus enim unumquodque est.	Further, for Empedocles, the Divinity must be the least knowing of all things, for he alone will not know one of the elements, namely Strife; but mortals, all; for every individual is composed of all.
410b7 ὅλως τε διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν οὐχ ἅπαντα ψυχὴν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἤτοι στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείου ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἢ πάντων; ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γινώσκειν ἢ τινὰ ἢ πάντα.	Omnino autem propter quam causam non omnia habent animam quae sunt? Quoniam omnia aut elementum aut ex elemento, aut uno, aut pluribus, aut omnibus. Necesse enim est, unum aliquod cognoscere, aut quaedam, aut omnia.	In general then, why is it that everything has not a soul? For all things are either elements or are made of one, or of several, or of all. They ought accordingly to know one, or several, or all.
410b10 ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά· ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα, κυριώτατον δ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν·	Dubitabit autem utique aliquis, et quid est unum faciens ipsa. Materiae enim comparantur elementa. Maxime autem proprium est illud continens, quodcumque est.	One might wonder what gives unity to them. For the elements are comparable to matter, and that which holds them together, whatever it is, is the most essential principle.
410b12 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον· ἀδυνατώτερον δ' ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ·	Anima autem aliquid esse melius et quod principatum obtineat impossibile est. Impossibilius autem adhuc, intellectu.	That it should have a higher function or be more excellent than the soul is impossible; still more impossible that it be higher than intellect.
410b14 εὔλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι.	Rationabilissimum autem esse hune antiquissimum, nobilissimum, et divinum secundum naturam. Elementa autem dicunt esse prima entium.	For that this is the primordial and most exalted and godlike thing by nature is in full accord with reason. Yet these men say that the elements have priority among beings.
410b16 πάντες δὲ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὰ ὄντα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων λέγοντες αὐτήν, καὶ οἱ τὸ κινητικώτατον, οὐ περὶ πάσης λέγουσι ψυχῆς.	Omnes autem et qui ex eo quod cognoscit et sentit anima ea quae sunt, ex elementis dicunt ipsam, et quam maxime motivum, non de omni dicunt anima.	Not one of those who maintain that the soul is constituted from elements because it perceives and knows realities, and that it is primary among moving forces, considers every kind of soul.
410b18 οὔτε γὰρ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα πάντα κινητικά (φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναί τινα μόνιμα τῶν ζῴων κατὰ τόπον· καίτοι δοκεῖ γε ταύτην μόνην τῶν κινήσεων κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον)·	Neque enim sensitiva omnia motiva. Videntur enim esse quaedam animalium, mauentia in loco, et tamen videtur hoc solo motu movere anima animal.	For not all sentient beings move; for certain species of animals are observed to remain in one place, although it would seem that the soul moved the animal with this one motion only [i.e. locally].
410b21 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιοῦσιν. φαίνεται γὰρ τά τε φυτὰ ζῆν οὐ μετέχοντα [φορᾶς οὐδ'] αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τῶν ζῴων <τὰ> πολλὰ διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν.	Similiter autem et quicumque intellectivum et sensitivum elementis faciunt. Videntur enim plantae vivere, non participantes loci mutatione, neque sensu, et animalium multa intelligentiam non habere.	Likewise with those who would make of elements the sensitive and intellectual powers; for plants seem to live, but are not endowed with local motion or perception; and many animals lack intelligence.
410b24 εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παραχωρήσειε καὶ θείη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδεμιᾶς.	Si autem aliquis et haec segregaverit, posueritque intellectum partem aliquam animae, similiter autem et sensitivum, neque utique sic dicent de omni anima, neque de tota, neque utique de una.	Even setting this fact on one side, and admitting that intellect is a part of the soul, and the sensitive power likewise, they would not be speaking of every soul, nor of the whole of any soul, nor of one [entire soul].
410b27 15. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς καλουμένοις ἔπεσι λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων, οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαίνειν οὐδὲ 411a1 τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνέουσιν· τοῦτο δὲ λέληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφότας.	Hoc autem sustinuit et quae est in Orphicis carminibus ratio. Dicit enim animam extoto ingredi, respirantibus a ventis. Non possibile itaque plantis hoc accidere, neque animalium quibusdam, siquidem non omnia respirant. Hoc autem latuit sic opinantes.	The same objection tells against a notion expressed in the Orphic hymns, where it is said, ‘The soul enters from the universe, breathed in by the winds.’ This cannot occur in the case of plants and certain animals: unless, indeed, all use respiration; a fact overlooked by those who put forward this view.
411a2 16. (εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν, οὐθὲν δεῖ ἐξ ἁπάντων· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. καὶ γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον γινώσκομεν· κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών, τὸ δὲ καμπύλον οὔθ' ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος.)	Si vero ex elementis animam facere oportet, nihil oportet ex omnibus. Sufficiens enim est altera pars contrarietatis, seipsam dijudicare et oppositam. Recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus. Iudex enim utrorumque canon est. Obliquum autem neque suiipsius, neque recti.	But if one must constitute the soul from the elements, there is no need to use them all; for one term of contraries suffices for the discernment of itself and its opposite; thus by the straight line we know both itself and the oblique; the criterion of both is the rule, but the curved is a criterion neither of itself nor of the straight.
411a 7 –411a 25
411a7 17. καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δή τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.	[p36/53] Et in toto autem quidem ipsam mistam esse dicunt. Unde fortassis et Thales opinatus est omnia esse plena diis.	And some say that the soul is intermingled generally with the Universe. That is perhaps why Thales thought that the whole world was full of divinities.
411a9 18. τοῦτο δ' ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀέρι ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ ποιεῖ ζῷον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μικτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι δοκοῦσα;	Hoc autem habet quasdam dubitationes. Propter quam enim causam, in aere aut in igne anima cum sit non facit animal, in mistis autem facit, et haec in his melior esse putata?	This, however, involves several difficulties. For why does the soul in fire and air not result in an animated being, whereas it does so in composite beings?—and that, even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former.
411a11 19. (ἐπιζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα.)	Quaeret enim utique aliquis, quam ob causam quae in aere anima, ea quae in animalibus, melior et immortalior.	(And one might well query why the soul in the air should be nobler and more enduring than that in animals.)
411a13 20. συμβαίνει δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ λέγειν ζῷον τὸ πῦρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα τῶν παραλογωτέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ λέγειν ζῷα ψυχῆς ἐνούσης ἄτοπον.	Arcidit autem utrobique inconveniens et irrationabile. Et namque diceret animal, ignem aut aerem, magis irrationabilium est; et nou dicere animalia, cum anima insit, inconve niens est.	On either count the theory is absurd and unreasonable. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the most wanton of absurdities; and if there is a soul in them, it is inconsistent not to call them animals.
411a16 21. ὑπολαβεῖν δ' ἐοίκασιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐν τούτοις ὅτι τὸ ὅλον τοῖς μορίοις ὁμοειδές· ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ τοῖς μορίοις εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαί τι τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ζῷα γίνεται.	Opinari autem videntur animam esse in his, quoniam totum partibus similis speciei ; quare necessarium ipsis dicere et animam similis speciei partibus esse, si propter intercipi aliquid continentis in animalibus, animata animalia fiunt.	They seem to have held that there was a soul in these on the ground that the Universe is made up of homogeneous parts; so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element, they must say that the soul [of the Whole] is homogeneous with its parts.
411a20 εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώμενος ὁμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνομοιομερής, τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι, τὸ δ' οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν αὐτὴν ἢ ὁμοιομερῆ εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ παντός.	Si autem aer quidem discerptus, similis speciei est, anima autem dissimilis partis, haec quidem ipsius existet, aliud autem non existet. Necesse est igitur ipsam, aut similium partium esse, aut non esse in qualibet parte omnis.	If then the air, divided off thus, be homogeneous, but the soul be composed of heterogeneous parts, something of it [the soul] will exist and something not. It is necessary then, either that it be of homogeneous parts, or that it be not in any and every part of the whole.
411a24 22. φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ γινώσκειν ὑπάρχει τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς οὐδ' ἀληθῶς λέγεται.	Manifestum igitur ex dictis est, quod neque cognoscere inest animae, propter id quod est ex elementis; neque moveri ipsam, bene, neque vere dicitur.	It is evident then, from what has been said, that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements; and that it is neither true nor apposite to say that it is in motion.
411a 26 –41lb 30
411a26 23. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν,	Quoniam autem cognoscere animae est, et sentire et opinari,	Since knowledge pertains to the soul, and sensation, and thinking,
411a28 ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως αἱ ὀρέξεις, γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔτι δ' αὔξη τε καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ φθίσις, πότερον ὅλῃ 411b1 τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων ἕκαστον ὑπάρχει, καὶ πάσῃ νοοῦμέν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχομεν, ἢ μορίοις ἑτέροις ἕτερα;	adhuc autem concupiscere, et deliberare, et omnino appetitiones; fit autem et secundum locum motus ab anima in animalibus, adhuc autem et augmentum, et status et decrementum: utrum toti animae unumquodque horum insit, et tota anima intelligamus et sentiamus, et aliorum unumquodque faciamus et patiamur, aut partibus alteris altera.	as well as desiring and deliberating—in a word, all appetition; and as in animate beings there also occur local motion, and growth, and preservation, and decay, all from the soul, is each of these in the whole soul, and do we understand and perceive and do and undergo every particular experience, with the whole soul? Or does each require a different part?
411b3 καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ πότερον ἔν τινι τούτων ἐστὶν ἑνὶ ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον;	Et vivere igitur utrum in aliquo horum sit uno, aut pluribus, aut in omnibus, an et aliqua alia causa.	And is life itself in any one of these? Or in several? Or in all? Or is it from some quite distinct cause?
411b5 24. λέγουσι δή τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν.	Dicunt itaque quidam partibilem ipsam, et alio autem intelligere, alio quidem concupiscere.	Some say the soul is divisible, understanding by one part and desiring by another.
411b6 τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα·	Quid igitur continet animam, si partibilis est suapte natura? Non enim utique corpus.	If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly:
411b7 δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται.	Videtur enim contrarium magis, animam corpus continere. Nam, ea egressa, expirat corpus et marcescit.	much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes.
411b9 εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν;	Si igitur alterum aliquid unam ipsam facit, illud maxime utique erit anima. Oportebit autem iterum et illud quaerere, utrum unum aut multarum partium sit. Si enim unum est, propter quid non mox et animam unum esse dicimus?	If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway?
411b12 εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.	Si vero divisibile, iterum ratio quaeret, quid est continens illud, et sic utique procedet in infinitum.	But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.
411b14 25. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς, τίν' ἔχει δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ σώματι. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὅλη ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει, προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ σώματος. τοῦτο δ' ἔοικεν ἀδυνάτῳ·	Dubitabit autem aliquis et de ipsius partibus, quam potentiam habeat unaquaeque in corpore. Si enim tota anima omne corpus continet, convenit et partium unamquamque continere aliquid corporis. Hoc autem assimilatur impossibili.	A further query arises about the soul’s parts: what power has each in the body? if the whole soul holds together the whole body, it would be fitting if each of the parts controlled some part of the body. But this looks like an impossibility.
411b18 ποῖον γὰρ μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλάσαι.	Qualem enim partem, aut quomodo, intellectus continebit, grave est et fingere.	It is difficult even to imagine what part the intellect would hold together, or how.
411b19 26. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῆν καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ·	Dicuntur autem et plantae vivere divisae, et animalium quaedam incisorum, tamquam eamdem habentia animam specie, etsi non numero.	It is also held that plants live after being divided, and certain divided animals also; as if they had a soul specifically one, but not numerically.
411b21 ἑκάτερον γὰρ τῶν μορίων αἴσθησιν ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον ἐπί τινα χρόνον. εἰ δὲ μὴ διατελοῦσιν, οὐθὲν ἄτοπον· ὄργανα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὥστε σώζειν τὴν φύσιν.	Unaquaeque quidem enim partium sensum habet et movetur secundum locum in quoddam tempus. Si autem non permanent, nullum inconveniens est. Instrumenta enim non habent quibus salvent naturam.	For each of these parts is endowed with sensation and moves locally for a certain time. If they are not long-lived, that is no objection: they have not the organs. requisite for the preservation of their natures.
411b24 ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων ἅπαντ' ἐνυπάρχει τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοειδῆ ἐστιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ, ἀλλήλοις μὲν ὡς οὐ χωριστὰ ὄντα, τῇ δ' ὅλῃ ψυχῇ ὡς οὐ διαιρετῇ οὔσῃ.	Sed nihilominus in utraque partium omnes inexistunt partes animae, et similis speciei sunt adinvicem, et toti. Adinvicem quidem, sicut quae non separabiles sunt. Toti autem animae tamquam indivisibili existente.	Nevertheless, in each of the parts are to be found all the parts of the soul; and those separated parts are specifically the same as each other and as the whole; as each other, as if they were not separable; as the whole, as having an indivisible unity.
411b27 27. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή τις εἶναι· μόνης γὰρ ταύτης κοινωνεῖ καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά, καὶ αὕτη μὲν χωρίζεται τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀρχῆς, αἴσθησιν δ' οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει.	Videtur autem et quae in plantis est principium anima quaedam esse. Hanc enim solam communem habent cum animalibus plantae. Et ipsa quidem separatur a sensitivo principio, sensum autem nullum sine hoc habet.	It would seem that the principle in plants is some sort of soul. Plants have only this in common with animals, and while this is independent of the sensitive principle, nothing has sensation without having this.