Authors/Aristotle/de anima/L2

Greek	Latin	English
ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Α' 412a 1 –412b 9]		BOOK II, CHAPTER I
412a1 1. Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς.	[p40/57] Quae igitur a prioribus tradita de anima sint, prius diximus. Iterum autem nunc tamquam ex principio redeamus, conantes determinare quid sit anima, et quae sit communissima ratio ipsius.	Hitherto we have spoken of what our predecessors handed down to us about the soul. But let us now re-open the enquiry from the beginning and endeavour to determine what the soul is and what is its most comprehensive definition.
412a6 2. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μέν, ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ' αὑτὸ οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων.	Dicimus itaque unum quoddam genus eorum, quae sunt substantia. Huius autem, aliud quidem sicut materiam, quae secundum se quidem non est hoc aliquid. Aliud autem formam, & speciem secundum quam iam dicitur hoc aliquid, & tertium quae ex his.	Now, we say that one of the kinds of things that are is substance. Of this, there is one element, matter, which of itself is no particular thing; another, the form or species according to which it is called ‘this particular thing’; and a third, that which is from both of these.
412a9 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ' εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν.	Est autem materia quidem potentia, species autem endelechia. Et hoc dupliciter: hoc quidem sicut scientia, illud autem sicut considerare.	Matter is, indeed, potency, and the form, act; and this latter has two modes of being, one, like knowledge possessed, the other, like the act of knowing.
412a11 3. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.	Substantiae autem maxime esse videntur corpora, et horum physica, haec enim aliorum principia. Physicorum autem alia quidem habent vitam, alia autem non habent. Vitam auteni habere dicimus, id quod per seipsum, alimentum, et augmentum et decrementum habet.	Bodies especially seem to be substances; and, among these, natural bodies, for these are the principles of the others. Of natural bodies, some possess vitality, others do not. We mean by ‘possessing vitality’, that a thing can nourish itself and grow and decay.
412a15 ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ' οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη.	Quare omne corpus physicum, participans vita, substantia erit. Substantia autem sit sicut composita.	Therefore every natural body sharing in life will be a substance, and this substance will be in some way composite.
412a16 4. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόνδε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη σῶμα ἡ ψυχή·	Quoniam autem corpus est tale, nempe vitam habens, non utique erit corpus, anima. Non enim eorum, quae in subjecto sunt, corpus.	Since, however, it is a body of such and such a nature, i.e. having vitality, the soul will not itself be the body.
412a17 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.	Magis autem sicut subjectum et materia est. Necesse est ergo animam substantiam esse, sicut speciem corporis physici potentia vitam habentis.	For the body is not one of the factors existing in the subject; rather, it is as the subject and the matter. It is necessary, then, that the soul be a substance in the sense of the specifying principle of a physical body potentially alive.
412a21 ἡ δ' οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.	Substantia autem actus; huiusmodi igitur corporis actus.	Now, substance [in this sense] is act; it will therefore be the act of a body of this sort.
412a22 5. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν·	Hic autem dicitur dupliciter. Alius quidem sicut scientia, alius autem, sicut considerare. Manifestum ergo quod sicut scientia. Nam existente in corpore anima ipsa, et somnus et vigilia est. Proportionale autem vigilantia quidem ipsi considerare, somnus autem, ipsi habere, et non operari.	Now this can mean one of two things: one, as is the possession of knowledge; another, as is the act of knowing. It is plain that it is like knowledge possessed. For the soul remains in the body whether one is asleep or awake. Being awake is comparable to the act of knowing, sleep to possession without use.
412a26 προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.	Prior antem generatione in eodem scientia est.	Now knowledge possessed is prior in the order of generation, in one and the same thing.
412a27 διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.	Unde anima est actus primus corporis physici, potentia vitam habentis	The soul, therefore, is the primary act of a physical body capable of life.
412a28 6. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανι412b1κόν. (ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν.)	Tale autem quod sit organicum. Organa autem, et plantarum partes sunt, sed penitus simplices, ut folium, fructiferi cooperimentum. Fructiferum autem, fructus. Radices vero ori similes sunt: utraque enim trahunt alimentum.	Such a body will be organic. Parts of plants, indeed, are organs, though very elementary—the leaf is the covering of the pericarp and the pericarp of the fruit: roots, too, are like mouths, for both draw in nourishment.
412b4 εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.	Si autem aliquid commune de omni anima oportet dicere, erit utique primus actus corporis physici organici.	If then there is anyone generalisation to be made for any and every soul, the soul will be the primary act of a physical bodily organism.
412b6 7. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.	Unde non oportet quaerere, an unum sunt anima et corpus, sicut neque cera et figura, neque omnino uniuscuiusque materia, et id cuius materia. Unum enim et esse cum multipliciter dicantur, quod proprie est, actus est.	Hence it is unnecessary to enquire whether the soul and body be one, any more than whether the wax and an impression made in it are one; or in general, the matter of anything whatever, and that of which it is the matter. For while one and being are predicated in many ways, that which is properly so is actuality,
412b 9 –413a 10
412b9 8. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο·	[p43/60] Universaliter igitur dictum est quid sit anima. Substantia enim est, quae secundum rationem. Haec autem est quod quidem est esse huiusmodi corporis: sicut si aliquid organorum physicum esset corpus, ut dolabra. Erat enim dolabrae esse substantia ipsius: et anima, haec.	It has been stated, then, what the soul in general is. It is ‘substance’ as definable form; and this means what is the essence of such a kind of body. If some utensil, for example an axe, were a natural body, then ‘being an-axe’ [axeishness] would be its substance, and this would be its soul.
412b14 χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὁμωνύμως, νῦν δ' ἔστι πέλεκυς. οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδί, ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ.	Separata autem hac, non utique amplius dolabra esset, nisi aequivoce ; nunc autem est dolabra. Non enim hujuscemodi corporis quod quid est esse et ratio, anima, sed physici talis, habentis in seipso principium motus et status.	Apart from this, it would no longer be an axe, save equivocally. As it is, it is really an axe. And the soul is not the essence or ‘what-it-is’ of such a body as this, but of a natural body, such as has in itself the principle of motion and rest.
412b17 9. θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις·	Considerare autem & in partibus oportet, quod dictum est. Si enim esset oculus animal, anima utique ipsi visus esset, hic enim est substantia oculi.	Now what has been said should be considered with respect to parts. For if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul.
412b19 αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον (ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη ὄψεως), ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκέτ' ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος.	Quae secundum rationem, oculus autem materia visus est, quo deficiente non est amplius oculus, nisi aequivoce, sicut lapideus, aut depictus.	For this is the substance, in the sense of the definable form, of the eye. The eye is the matter of sight, and apart from this it is an eye no longer save equivocally, as with a painted or stone eye.
412b22 δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ' ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον.	Oportet igitur accipere quod est in parte, in toto vivente corpore proportionaliter nanque habet sicut pars ad partem, totus sensus ad corpus sensitivum secundum quod huiusmodi.	What, therefore, holds of a part, we ought to apply to the whole living body: for the relation of a part [of the soul] to part [of the body] corresponds to that of sensitivity as a whole to the whole sensitive body, considered as such.
412b25 10. ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον· τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ δυνάμει τοιονδὶ σῶμα. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἡ τμῆσις καὶ ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις ἐντελέχεια, 413a1 ὡς δ' ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, ἡ ψυχή· τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν·	Est autem non abiiciens animam, potentia ens, ut vivat ; sed quod habens. Semen autem et fructus, potentia tale corpus est. Sicut igitur incisio et visio, sic et vigilantia actus. Ut autem visus et potentia organi, anima. Corpus autem, quod potentia est.	Not that which has cast off its soul is ‘capable of life’, but that which possesses it. But seed and fruit are only in potency such a body. As cutting or seeing is act, so is consciousness. The soul is like sight and the capacity of a tool; the body, like the thing in potency.
413a2 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄψις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ζῷον.	Sed sicut oculus est pupilla et visus, et ibi anima et corpus, animal.	But as an eye is a pupil together with the power of sight, so is there a living thing where there are both body and soul.
413a4 11. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν.	Quod quidem igitur non sit anima separabilis a corpore, aut partes quaedam ipsius, si partibilis naturaliter est, non immanifestum est. Quarumdam enim actus partium est ipsarum.	Therefore it is evident enough that the soul is inseparable from the body—or certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts; for it is of certain bodily parts themselves that it is the act.
413a6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔνιά γε οὐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας.	At vero secundum quosdam nihil prohibet, propter id quod nullius corporis sunt actus.	But with respect to certain of its parts there is nothing to prevent its being separated, because these are acts of nothing bodily.
413a8 12. ἔτι δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ ψυχὴ <ἢ> ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου. τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς.	Amplius autem immanifestum si sit corporis actus anima, sicut pauta navis. Figuraliter quidem igitur haec definita de anima sint, atque descripta.	Furthermore, it is not clear that the soul is not the ‘act’ of the body in the way that a sailor is of his ship. Let these remarks serve to describe and define the soul, in outline.
413a 11 –413b 13
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β'		BOOK II, CHAPTER II
413a11 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίνεται τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον, πειρατέον πάλιν οὕτω γ' ἐπελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς·	[p45/62] Quoniam autem ex incertis quidem, sed tamen manifestioribus, certum fit id quod est secundum rationem notius, tentandum est iterum sic aggredi de ipsa.	Since it is from the less clear, though more obvious, facts that what is certain and more evident to thought emerges, let us attempt to approach the matter afresh.
413a13 οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνεσθαι.	Non enim solum quod sit, oportet definitivam rationem ostendere, sicut plures terminorum dicunt, sed et causam inesse, et apparere.	For it is not enough that a defining principle should merely show a fact, as do most formulae, but also there should be contained and made plain the causes involved.
413a16 νῦν δ' ὥσπερ συμπεράσμαθ' οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὅρων εἰσίν·	Nunc autem sicut conclusiones rationes terminorum sunt,	Usually the constituent terms are like conclusions:
413a17 οἷον τί ἐστιν ὁ τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἴσον ἑτερομήκει ὀρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος·	ut quid est tetragonismus? aequale altera parte longiori, orthogonium esse aequilaterale. Talis autern terminus ratio conclusionis.	for instance, what is a square that is equal to an oblong? An equilateral orthogon. Such a term is of the nature of a conclusion.
413a19 ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς μέσης εὕρεσις τοῦ πράγματος λέγει τὸ αἴτιον.	Dicens autem quod tetragonismus est mediae inventio, rei causam dicit.	But to say that a square is the discovery of a mean line states the reason why.
413a20 2. λέγομεν οὖν, ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν.	Dicamus igitur, principium accipientes intentionis rei, determinari animatum ab inanimato in vivendo.	Going back, then, to the beginning of our enquiry, let us say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by being alive.
413a22 πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις.	Multipliciter autem ipso vivere dicto, etsi unum aliquod horum insit solum, vivere ipsum dicimus, ut intellectus et sensus, motus, et status secundum locum. Adhuc autem motus, et status secuudum alimentum, et decrementum, et augmentum.	To live, however, is predicated in several ways; and even if one only of these is present, we say there is life; as, for example, intellection, sensation, or movement and rest in place; as well as the movement and rest involved in nourishment, and growth and decay.
413a25 3. διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι' ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ, ὅσα ἀεὶ τρέφεταί τε καὶ ζῇ διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.	Unde et vegetabilia omnia videntur vivere. Videntur autem in seipsis habentia potentiam, et principium huiusmodi, per quod, augmentum et decrementum suscipiunt secundum contrarios locos. Non enim sursum quidem augentur, deorsum autem non, sed similiter ad utraque; et in omnes partes continue aluntur, et vivunt, quousque possunt accipere alimentum.	Hence all plants seem to live. They appear to have in themselves a power and principle of this kind, by which they increase or decay in various directions—that is to say, they do not grow up but not down, but alike either way; and in all their parts they are continually nourished, and they live so long as they can take nourishment.
413a31 4. χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν τοῖς θνητοῖς. φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν φυομένων· οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη 413b1 ψυχῆς.	Separari autem hoc ab aliis possibile est, alia autem ab hoc, impossibile est in rebus mortalibus. Manifestum est autem in his quae vegetantur. Neque enim una inest ipsis potentia alia animae.	It is possible for this power to exist apart from the others; but for the others to exist apart from it is impossible, at least in mortal beings. This is evident in plants; for there is in them no other soul-power.
413b1 τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι,	Vivere igitur, propter hoc principium jest omnibus viventibus.	To live by this principle, then, is common to all living things.
413b2 τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν, ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.	Animal autem propter sensum, primum. Et namque quae nou moventur, neque mutant locum, habent autem sensum, animalia dicimus, et non vivere solum. Videntur autem et huiusmodi multa esse animalium; manentia autem cum sint natura, habent solum sensum.	But an animal is such primarily by sensation. For we also call animals things that do not move or change their place, provided they have sensation, and do not merely live. There seem to be many of this sort: by nature they stay in one place, but they have one of the senses.
413b4 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἁφή· ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων (θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει), τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα·	Sensuum autem, primo inest omnibus tactus. Sicut autem vegetativum potest separari a tactu et omni sensu, sic et tactus ab aliis sensibus. Vegetativum autem dicimus huiusmodi partem animae, qua et vegetabilia participant. Animalia autem omnia videntur tangendi sensum habentia.	Touch is in all, primarily. As the vegetative powers can be separated from touch and all sensation as a whole, so can touch from the other senses. (We give the name ‘vegetative’ to that part of the soul in which plants participate). All animals are seen to possess the sense of touch.
413b9 δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν ἑκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. 5. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει.	Propter quam autem causam utrumque horum accidit, posterius dicemus. Nunc autem intantum dictum sit solum, quod est anima horum quae dicta sunt, principium; et his determinata est, vegetativo, sensitivo, intellectivo, et motu.	For what cause each of these facts is so we shall say later on. At present only this need be said: that soul is the principle of the qualities we have discussed, and is characterised by the vegetative, sensitive, intellective and motive powers.
413b 13 –44a28
413b13 πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι ψυχὴ ἢ μόριον ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ,	[p48/65]Utrum autem unumquodque horum sit anima, an pars animae, et si pars, utrum sic ut sit separabilis ratione solum, an etiam et loco.	We now ask whether each of these [powers] is a soul, or a part of a soul: and if a part, whether it is separable only in thought or has also a distinct place.
413b15 περὶ μὲν τινῶν τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ἔνια δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει.	De quibusdam quidem horum non est difficile videre, quaedam autem dubitationem habent.	Concerning some of these powers it is not difficult to see [the answers to our questions]; others, however, give rise to doubts.
413b16 6. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἔνια διαιρούμενα φαίνεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζόμενα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς ἐν ἑκάστῳ φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων, οὕτως ὁρῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἑτέρας διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν τοῖς διατεμνομένοις·	Sicut enim in plantis, quaedam divisa videntur vivere separata abinvicem, tamquam existente in his anima actu quidem una, in unaquaque planta, potentia autem pluribus, sic videmus, et circa alteras differentias animae accidere, ut in entomis decisis.	For, as in the case of plants some, on being divided, seem to go on living in separation from one another, as if there were in each plant one soul in act, but several in potency; so we find it happens in the case of other differentiations of soul, for instance in divided animals
413b21 καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει καὶ κίνησιν τὴν κατὰ τόπον, εἰ δ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία.	Etenim sensum utraque partium habet et motum secundum locum. Si autem sensum et phantasiam et appetitum; ubi quidem enim sensos est, et tristitia et laetitia est. Ubi autem haec sunt, ex necessitate et desiderium est.	each division has sensation and local motion; and if sensation [sensum], phantasm [phantasiam/ imaginationem] and appetition; for where there is sensation there is pleasure, and pain, and where these are there must necessarily be appetition.
413b24 7. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.	De intellectu autem et perspectiva potentia nihil adbuc manifestum est, sed videtur genus alterum animae esse; et hoc solum contingit separari, sicut aeternum a corruptibili.	But as regards intellect and the speculative faculty, nothing has so far been demonstrated; but it would seem to be another kind of soul, and alone capable of being separated, as the eternal from the perishable.
413b27 8. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ τινές φασιν·	Reliquae autem partes animae manifestum ex his, quod non separabiles sunt, sicut quidam dicunt.	It is evident, however, from the foregoing, that the other parts of the soul are not separable, as some have said.
413b29 τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν· αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ δοξάζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων.	Ratione autem, quod alterae, manifestum est. Sensitivo enim esse et opinativo alterum, siquidem et sentire ab ipso opinari. Similiter autem et aliorum unumquodque, quae dicta sunt.	By definition, however, they are obviously distinct. For if feeling is other than opining, the sense-faculty will differ from the capacity to form opinions. Likewise with each of the other powers mentioned.
413b32 9. ἔτι δ' ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τισὶ δὲ τινὰ τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἓν μόνον (τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ δια414a1 φορὰν τῶν ζῴων)·	Adhaec quibusdam animalium omnia insunt haec, quibusdam vero quaedam horum, alteris autem unum solum. Hoc autem facit differentias animalium.	Further, all these powers are in some animals; in others, some only; in yet others, only one. This makes the varieties of animal.
414a1 διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.	Propter quam autem causam sit factum, posterius intendendum est.	Why this should be so will be considered later.
414a2 παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συμβέβηκεν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει πάσας, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην, ἁφήν.	Similiter autem et circa sensus accidit. Alia enim habent omnes, alia vero quosdam, quaedam vero unum maxime necessarium, tactum.	The same obtains with regard to the senses: certain species of animal have all; certain others, some; yet others have only the one most necessary, touch.
414a4 10. ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην τὸ δὲ ψυχήν, ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων φαμὲν ἐπίστασθαι), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ [ᾧ] ὑγιαίνομεν τὸ μὲν ὑγιείᾳ τὸ δὲ μορίῳ τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλῳ,	Quoniam autem quo vivimus et sentimus dupliciter dicitur, sicut quo scimus, dicimus autem hoc quidem scientiam, illud autem animam, utroque enim horum dicimur scire. Similiter autem et quo sanamur, aliud quidem sanitas est, aliud autem pars quaedam corporis, aut etiam totum.	Since ‘that whereby we live and perceive’ can mean two things,—like ‘that by which we know’, for we name one thing knowledge, and another, the soul, though we are said to know by both of these; and likewise as ‘that by which we are healthy’; for health is one thing, while a part of the body (or the whole of it) is another;
414a8 τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ὑγίεια μορφὴ καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγιαστοῦ (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ ἡ τῶν ποιητικῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργεια),	Horum autem scientia quidem et sanitas, forma est, et species quaedam et ratio, ut actu susceptivorum, haec quidem ejus quod scientiae capax est, illa vero sanabilis. Videtur enim in patiente et disposito activorum inesse actio.	and in these cases knowledge, or health, is the form and specific essence or ratio, and, as it were, the act of such as can receive knowledge in the one case and health in the other (for the action of an agent seems to exist in the recipient or disposed material)—
414a12 ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως – ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον.	Anima autem hoc quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo. Quare ratio quaedam utique erit et species: sed non ut materia et ut subjectum.	and soul being that by which we primarily live and perceive and move and understand it follows that the soul will be a sort of species or ratio; not, as it were, a matter or substratum.
414a14 11. τριχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' αὕτη σώματός τινος.	Tripliciter enim dicta substantia, sicut diximus, haec quidem species, illud vero ut materia, aliud autem ex utrisque. Horum autem materia quidem potentia, species autem actus: postea, quod ex utrisque, animatum, neque corpus est actus animae, sed ipsa corporis cuiusdam.	Substance is predicated in three ways, as we have said: in one way as the form; in another as the matter; and in another as what is from both. Of these, matter is the potency, form the act; hence if what is from both is the animate being, the body is not the act of the soul, but the soul of the body. .
414a19 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή·	Et propter hoc bene opinantur, quibus videtur neque sine corpore esse, neque corpus aliquod, anima.	And on this account they were right who thought that the soul is neither apart from the body nor the same as the body;
414a20 σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, 12.	Corpus quidem enim non est, corporis autem aliquid est.	for it is not, indeed, the body; yet is something of the body.
414a21 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πρότερον εἰς σῶμα ἐνήρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι καὶ ποίῳ, καίπερ οὐδὲ φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ τυχόν.	Et propter hoc, in corpore est, et in corpore tali, et non sicut priores ad corpus aptabant ipsam nibil definientes in quo et quali, quamvis non videatur quodvis subjectum cuiusvis formae capax esse.	And therefore it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind; and not as some earlier thinkers made out, who related it to a body without defining at all the nature and quality of that body; despite the fact that it is apparent that not any subject whatever can receive any form at random.
414a25 13. οὕτω δὲ γίνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐντελέχειά τίς ἐστι καὶ λόγος τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.	Sic autem fit, et secundum rationem: uniuscuiusque enim actus in eo quod in potentia existit, et in propria materia apte naturaliterque fit. Quod quidem igitur actus est quidam, et ratio potentiam habentis ut tale sit, manifestum ex his est.	And that such is the case is confirmed by reason: the act of any one thing is of that which is in potency to it, and it occurs naturally and fittingly in matter appropriate to it. That the soul, then, is an actuality and formal principle of a thing in potency to exist accordingly, is evident from these considerations.
414a 28 –414b 31 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Γ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER III
414a29 1. Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ' εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν.	[p51/68] Potentiarum autem animae, quae dictae sunt, aliis quidem insunt omnes, aliis vero quaedam harum, quibusdam vero una sola. Potentias autem dicimus, vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, intellectivum.	Of the soul's powers already spoken of all are present in some, certain only are present in others, and one only in yet others. By the powers of the soul we mean the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive and the intellectual.
414a32 2. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ 414b1 τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις,	Inest autem plantis vegetativum solum, alteris autem, et hoc et sensitivum: si autem sensitivum, et appetitivum. Appetitus enim desiderium est, et ira, et voluntas.	In plants there is only the vegetative; in other living things, this and the sensitive; but if the sensitive is present, so must the appetitive be. For appetition means desire, and anger and will.
414b3 τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη.	Animalia autem omnia habent unum sensum tactum. Cui autem sensus inest, huic et laetitia, et tristitia, et dulce, et triste. Quibus autem haec, et coucupiscentia. Delectabilis enim rei appetitus est haec.	Now all animals have the sense of touch; and where sensation is found there is pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the repugnant. What has these has appetite, this being desire for a pleasurable object.
414b6 3. ἔτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἁφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις· ξηροῖς γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα, τούτων δ' αἴσθησις ἁφή, τῶν δ' ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	Adhuc autem alimenti sensum habent: tactus enim alimenti sensus. Siccis enim et humidis et calidis et frigidis aluntur omnia viventia: horum autem sensus est tactus: sed aliis sensibilibus secundum accidens aluntur.	Further; all have a sense of nutriment, inasmuch as touch is this sense. For all living beings are nourished by things dry and wet or hot and cold; and the sense of touch is of these. But they are nourished by the other sense-objects only indirectly.
414b10 οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰς τροφὴν συμβάλλεται ψόφος οὐδὲ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ὀσμή, ὁ δὲ χυμὸς ἕν τι τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστιν.	Nihil enim alimentum confert sonus, neque color neque odor. Humor autem unum aliquod est tangibilium,	Sound, colour and smell contribute nothing to nutrition; and as for savour, it is found in objects of touch.
414b11 πεῖνα δὲ καὶ δίψα ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ἡ μὲν πεῖνα ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἡ δὲ δίψα ὑγροῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ· ὁ δὲ χυμὸς οἷον ἥδυσμά τι τούτων ἐστίν.	esuries autem et sitis, est concupiscentia: et esuries quidem calidi et sicci, sitis autem frigidi et humidi: sapor vero ut delectamentum horum est.	Hunger and thirst being appetites, hunger for the hot and dry and thirst for the cold and liquid, savour is as it were the delectable in these.
414b14 διασαφητέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον, νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω, ὅτι τῶν ζώντων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπάρχει.	Certificandum autem de his posterius est. Nunc autem intantum dictum sit, quod animalibus habentibus tactum et appetitum iusit.	We must settle these questions later; for the present let us only say that animals endowed with touch have appetition also.
414b16 περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. 4. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἔστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον.	De phantasia autem immanifestum est, posterius autem intendendum est. Quibusdam autem adhuc inest et secundum locum motivum. Alteris autem, intellectivum et intellectus, ut hominibus, et si aliquod alterum huiusmodi est, aut etiam honorabilius.	The case of imagination is not clear and must be examined later. Some animals, again, have local motion; some intellect and mind—such as men and whatever other beings there are of a like nature, or of one even more excellent.
414b19 5. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε καὶ σχήματος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας.	Manifestum igitur est, quod eodem modo una utique erit ratio animae et figurae. Neque enim ibi figura est praeter triangulum, et figuras, quae consequenter sunt, neque hic anima praeter praedictas est:	It is therefore clear that the idea of soul must be one in the same way as that of figure: for as there is no figure other than the triangle and those that derive from it, so there is no soul apart from the aforesaid.
414b22 γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος.	fiet autem utique, et in figuris ratio communis, quae conveniet quidem omnibus, propria autem nullius erit figurae.	There will be, however, in the case of figures a general idea applicable to all figures, yet proper to none.
414b24 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς.	Similiter autem et in dictis animabus.	Likewise with these souls just mentioned.
414b25 διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν τοιοῦτον.	Unde ridiculum est quaerere communem rationem, et in his, et in alteris, quae nullius erit, eorum quae sunt, propria ratio, neque secundum propriam et individuam speciem tali definitione omissa.	Hence it is absurd to seek a common definition in this matter (or in any other) which will be that of no existing thing, and on the other hand, to seek to define in terms of the individual species without taking into account such a common definition.
414b28 6. (παραπλησίως δ' ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν.)	Similiter autem se habent ei, quod de figuris est, et quae secundum animam sunt. Semper enim in eo quod est consequenter, est in potentia quod prius est, et in figuris, et in animatis; ut in tetragono quidem trigonum est, in sensitivo autem vegetativum.	There is indeed an analogy between what holds of figures and what holds of the soul. For in that which is consequent there is always potential that which is primary, both in figures and in animate beings. As the triangle is contained in the square, so is the vegetative in the sensitive.
414b 32 –415a 22]
414b32 ὥστε καθ' ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου.	[p54/71] Quare et secundum unumquodque quaerendum quaenam sit uniuscuiusque anima, aut quae plantae, et quae hominis, aut bestiae.	So We must enquire in each particular case what the soul is of each: of plant, of man, of beast
414b33 7. διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τῷ 415a1 ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς.	Propter quam autem causam consequenter sic se habent, considerandum est. Sine enim vegetativo, sensitivum non est. A sensitivo autem separatur vegetativum in plantis.	It must be considered why they stand in this order: for there is no sensitive soul without the vegetative, yet in plants the vegetative exists apart from the sensitive.
415a3 πάλιν δ' ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει·	Iterum autem, sine eo quod potest tangere, aliorum sensuum nullus est. Tactus autem sine aliis est.	Again, there can be no sense apart from that of touch, but touch exists without the others;
415a5 πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων οὔτ' ὄψιν οὔτ' ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὔτ' ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν.	Multa enim animalium, neque visum neque auditum habent neque odoratus sensum.	for many animals have no sight or hearing or sense of smell.
415a6 καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν·	Et sensitivorum autem, alia quidem habent secundum locum motivum, alia vero non habent; ultimum autem, et minimum, rationem et intellectum, ut homo, aut huiusmodi aliud.	Again, among sentient beings, some. have local motion, others not. Last and least extensive of all [the species] that reasons and understands (as man and any other such).
415a8 οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.	Quibus enim inest ratiocinatio, corruptibilium, his et reliqua omnia. Quibus autem illorum unumquodque, non omnibus ratiocinatio; sed quibusdam quidem neque imaginatio; alia autem hac sola vivunt. De speculativo autem intellectu, alia ratio est.	For mortal beings which possess reason have also all the other [powers], but reason is not found in all that have any one of the latter; some indeed have not even imagination, others live by this alone. The speculative intellect is another issue.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὶ τούτων ἑκάστου λόγος, οὗτος οἰκειότατος καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δῆλον.	Quod igitur de horum unumquodque ratio haec propriissima, et de anima sit, manifestum est.	Clearly then, whatever is the most precise definition with respect to each of the above will be that also of the soul.
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Δ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER IV
415a14 1. Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν.	Necessarium autem est, debentem de his perscrutationem facere, accipere unumquodque eorum quid est; postea sic de habitis, et de aliis investigare.	It is necessary for the student of these [parts of the soul] to discover what is the nature of each, and only then to investigate habits and other matters.
415a16 εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι·	Si autem oportet dicere, quid unumquodque ipsorum, ut quid intellectivum, aut sensitivum, aut vegetativum, prius adhuc dicendum, quid sit intelligere, quid sentire.	But if one is to say what each of them is (namely the intellectual power or the sensitive or the vegetative) one must first say what it is to understand [νοεῖν] or perceive by sense;
415a18 πρότεραι γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον.	Priores enim potentiis, actus et operationes secundum rationem rationem sunt.	for actions and operations are prior to faculties in the order of thought.
415a20 εἰ δ' οὕτως, τούτων δ' ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι διορίσαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ.	Si autem sic, adhuc his priora opposita oportet considerare, de illis primum utique oportebit determinare, propter eamdem causam, ut de alimento, et sensibili, et intelligibili.	And if this is so, one ought first to consider the appropriate objects; which are prior even to the operations, and correspond to them; and thus to determine, in the first place, what these objects are—for instance, food and the sense-object and the intelligible.
415a 22 –415b 28]
415a22 2. ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.	[p56/73] Quare primum de alimento et generatione dicendum est. Vegetativa enim anima, et aliis inest, et primae: et maxime communis potentia est animae, secundum quam inest vivere omnibus, cuius sunt opera, generare et alimento uti.	We must first speak of nutrition and generation. For the vegetative soul is present in others, and is primary, and is that most general power of the soul by which life is present in anything: its operations being reproduction and the use of nutriment.
415a25 ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι· φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσιν, ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ 415b1 δύνανται·	Naturalissimum enim operum viventibus, quaecumque perfecta, et non orbata, aut generationem spontaneam habent, facere alterum quale ipsum; animal quidem animal, plantam autem plantam, quatenus ipso semper, et divino esse et immortali participent, secundum quod possunt.	For the most natural of the operations of such living beings as are mature, and not defective nor spontaneously generated, is to produce others like themselves: an animal an animal, and a plant a plant. To this extent do they participate, as far as they are able, in the imperishable and the divine.
415b1 πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν	Omnia illud appetunt, et illius causa agunt omnia, quaecumque agunt, secundum naturam.	For this all things seek after, doing all that they do by nature for the sake of this.
415b2 (τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ). ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν, ᾗ δύναται μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δ' ἧττον, καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτό, ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ' ἕν.	Id autem, cuius causa fit aliquid, dupliciter est: hoc quidem cuius, illud vero quo. Quoniam igitur communicare non possunt ipso semper, et divino, continuatione, propter id quod nihil contingit corruptibilium idem et unum numero permanere, secundum quod potest participare unumquodque, sic communicat, hoc quidem magis, illud vero minus. Et permanet, non idem, sed ut idem; numero quidem non unum, specie autem unum.	Now ‘that for the sake of which’ anything takes place, is twofold, one, the end ‘for which’, the other the end ‘in which’. Since then they cannot share by a continuous being, in the divine and everlasting (since nothing corruptible remains for ever numerically one and the same) each shares in this as far as it is able, one, however, more, and another less. And thus it endures, not the same, but as if the same; one indeed, but in species, not numerically.
415b7 3. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή. ταῦτα δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ὁμοίως δ' ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία· καὶ γὰρ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία.	Est autem anima viventis corporis causa et principium. Haec autem multipliciter dicuntur. Attamen anima secundum determinatos modos tres, causa dicitur. Etenim 1 unde motus, et cuius causa, et sicut substantia animatorum corporum, anima est causa.	The soul is the cause and principle of the living body. Now these words can be used in many ways. The soul, however, is a cause in three established senses: for it is that whence comes movement; that ‘for the sake of which’; and as the essence of living bodies.
415b12 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐσία, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία,	Quod igitur sit sicut substantia, manifestum est. Causa enim ipsius esse, omnibus substantia est.	That it is as the essence is evident. For in all things, the essence is the cause of existence.
415b13 τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτου ἡ ψυχή.	Vivere autem viventibus esse est. Causa autem et principium horum anima.	In things that live, to live is to be; and the cause and principle of this is the soul.
415b14 ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια.	Amplius autem ejus quod est in potentia, ratio actus est.	Further: of that which is in potency, the act is the [immanent] idea.
415b15 5. φανερὸν δ' ὡς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἕνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτῆς τέλος. τοιοῦτον δ' ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ φύσιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα· διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τό τε οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ.	Manifestum autem est, quod et cuius gratia anima causa est. Sicut enim intellectus, gratia huius facit, eodem modo et natura, et hoc est ipsius finis. Tale est autem in animalibus anima secundum naturam. Omnia enim physica corpora, animae instrumenta sunt, sicut animalium, sic et plantarum, tamquam gratia animae existentia. Dupliciter autem dicitur cuius gratia, et id cuius, et quod quo.	It is manifest that the soul is also a cause ‘for the sake of which’. For Nature operates for a purpose, in the same way as, as mind; and this is its end. Such is the soul in living thin according to Nature. For all natural bodies are instruments of the soul: whether of animals or of plants, they exist as for the sake of the soul. ‘For the sake of’ is a phrase used in two ways, as ‘that for which’, and ‘that in which’.
415b21 6. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, ψυχή· οὐ πᾶσι δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσιν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ αὔξησις κατὰ ψυχήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, αἰσθάνεται δ' οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ μετέχει ψυχῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ φθίσεως ἔχει·	At vero et unde principium, qui secundum locum motus, anima est: non omnibus autem viventibus inest potentia haec. Est autem et alteratio et augmentum secundum animam. Sensus enim quaedam alteratio esse videtur. Nihil autem sentit, quod non habet animam. Similiter autem, et de augmento et decremento se habet;	But also the soul is the principle whence comes local motion. Yet this power is not present in all living things. Change and growth are, however, due to a soul, while sensation seems to be a kind of alteration, and nothing senses unless it has a soul. The same holds good of growth and decay;
415b26 οὐδὲν γὰρ φθίνει οὐδ' αὔξεται φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, τρέφεται δ' οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς.	nihil enim decrementum patitur neque augmentum physice, nisi alatur; alitur autem nihil, quod non communicet vita.	for nothing undergoes growth or decay physically, unless it is nourished; and nothing is nourished which does not share in life.
415b 28 –416a 18]
415b28 7. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ' οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε τοῦτο προστιθείς, τὴν αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω μὲν συρριζουμένοις 416a1 διὰ τὸ τὴν γῆν οὕτω φέρεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ <τὸ> πῦρ ὡσαύτως.	[p58/75] Empedocles autem non bene dixit hic, addens augmentum accidere plantis, deorsum quidem radicem mittentibus, propterea quod terra sic fertur secundum naturam, sursum autem propter ignem similiter.	Empedocles is mistaken here, adding that growth occurs in plants by their sending a root downwards, because earth is by nature below, and also upwards because of fire.
416a2 οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καλῶς λαμβάνει (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ πᾶσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῷ παντί, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτως αἱ ῥίζαι τῶν φυτῶν, εἰ χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἔργοις).	Neque enim sursum et deorsum bene accipit. Non enim idem omnibus sursum et deorsum, et omni; sed sicut animalium, sic radices plantarum sunt, si congruit instrumenta dicere altera, et eadem, operibus. Nam quae ad idem opus accommodantur, eadem istrumenta esse iudicamus.	Nor did he understand aright ‘up’ and ‘down’; for these are not for all things the same as for the Universe; but roots of plants correspond to the head, in animals, if it is permissible to identify organs by their functions. For we reckon those organs to be the same which perform the same operations.
416a6 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν; διασπασθήσεται γάρ, εἰ μή τι ἔσται τὸ κωλύον· εἰ δ' ἔσται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐ- ξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι.	Adhuc autem, quod est continens ea, quae in contraria feruntur, ignem et terram? Distrahentur enim, nisi aliquid sit prohibens. Si vero erit, hoc est anima, et causa augmenti et alimenti.	Besides, what holds fire and earth together if they tend in contrary directions? They must come apart if there is nothing to prevent this. But if there is such a thing, it must be the soul; and be also the cause of growth and nourishment.
416a9 8. δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων [ἢ τῶν στοιχείων] τρεφόμενον καὶ αὐξόμενον, διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον.	Videtur autem quibusdam ignis natura, simpliciter causa augmenti et alimenti esse. Etenim ignis ipse videtur solum corporum, et elementorum, quod alitur et augetur. Unde et in plantis et in animalibus putabit utique quis hoc esse quod operatur.	Now it seems to some that the nature of fire is the sole cause of growth and nutrition; for it certainly seems to be the only one of the bodies and elements that is self-nourishing and self-increasing. Whence the notion that it is this that is operative in plants and animals.
416a13 τὸ δὲ συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον, ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης.	Hoc autem concausa quidem quodammodo est; non tamen simpliciter causa, sed magis anima. Ignis enim augmentum in infinitum est, quousque fuerit combustibile. Natura autem constantium omnium terminus est, et ratio magnitudinis et augmenti. Hoc autem est animae, sed non ignis; et rationis magis, quam materiae.	It is indeed a concomitant cause, but the cause absolutely is not fire, but rather the soul. For the increase of fire is infinite so long as there is anything combustible. But there are limitations to all things that subsist naturally, and some definite principle governs their dimensions and growth. And this belongs to the soul, not to fire, and to a specific principle rather than to matter.
416a 18 –416b 31]
416a18 9. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ καὶ γεννητική, περὶ τροφῆς ἀναγκαῖον διωρίσθαι πρῶτον· ἀφορίζεται γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ.	[p60/77] Quoniam est eadem potentia animae vegetativa et generativa, de alimento necessarium est determinare primum. Separatur enim ab aliis potentiis, opere hoc.	Since the vegetative and generative faculties of the soul are a single power, it is first necessary to fix the nature of nutrition. For it is by this operation that [this power] is distinguished from the others.
416a21 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἡ τροφὴ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, οὐ πᾶν δὲ παντί, ἀλλ' ὅσα τῶν ἐναντίων μὴ μόνον γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὔξησιν·	Videtur autem esse alimentum contrarium alito: non omne autem omni; sed quaecumque contrariorum, non solum generationem habent ex seinvicem, sed et augmentum.	It would appear that food is a contrary to that which is fed: yet not every contrariety [involves feeding]; but only such contraries as find their increase as well as their origin in each other.
416a24 γίνεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντα ποσά, οἷον ὑγιὲς ἐκ κάμνοντος. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τροφή, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τῷ πυρὶ τροφή, τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ τρέφει τὸ ὕδωρ.	Fiunt enim multa ex invicem; sed non omnia augentur, ut sanum ex laborante. Videntur autem neque illa eodem modo sibi invicem esse alimentum; sed aqua quidem igni alimentum est, ignis autem non alit aquam.	For there are many things which originate from opposites: but not all derive their increase thus; (for instance, health coming from sickness). Nor, it seems, do all that do so nourish one another in the same way. For water is a food to fire, but fire does not feed water.
416a27 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς σώμασι ταῦτ' εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα τὸ μὲν τροφὴ τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον.	In simplicibus igitur corporibus, hoc esse videtur maxime, aliud quidem alimentum, aliud vero id quod alitur.	And with uncompounded bodies this seems especially to be the case; that which feeds is one thing and that which is fed another.
416a29 10. ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει· φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ τρέφεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ αὐξάνεσθαι, τοῖς δ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν τοὔμπαλιν δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὡς ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὁμοίου ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, τὴν δὲ τροφὴν δεῖν μεταβάλλειν καὶ πέττεσθαι·	Dubitationem autem habent. Dicunt enim hi quidem simile simili ali, sicut et auger Aliis autem, sicut diximus, econtrario videtur ali contrarium contrario, tamquam impossibile sit simile a simili, alimentum autem mutari et decoqui.	But a difficulty arises here. For some say that anything is nourished by what is similar to it; just as it is increased thus. But to others, as we have said, it seems, on the contrary, that a thing is nourished by its opposite,—as though it were impossible that like [should be altered] by, like; whilst food is altered and digested.
416a33 ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἢ τὸ μεταξύ.	Mutatio autem omnibus contrarium est, aut medium.	Change in all things is either [to] an opposite or to a mean state.
416a34 ἔτι πάσχει τι ἡ τροφὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῆς 416b1 11. τροφῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ τέκτων ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἐκεί- νου αὕτη· ὁ δὲ τέκτων μεταβάλλει μόνον εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐξ ἀργίας.	Adhuc autem patitur aliquid alimentum ab eo quod alitur, sed non hoc ab alimento, sicut nec faber a materia; sed ab illo haec; faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.	Moreover nutriment is acted upon by that which is nourished: not the latter by the nourishment; any more than a craftsman by his material; but this is acted on by him—the craftsman changing only from repose to activity.
416b3 πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τροφὴ τὸ τελευταῖον προσγινόμενον ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἔχει διαφοράν. εἰ δ' ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἄπεπτος ἡ δὲ πεπεμμένη, ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τὴν τροφὴν λέγειν· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἄπεπτος, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ τρέφεται, ᾗ δὲ πεπεμμένη, τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ.	Utrum autem sit alimentum, quod ultimo advenit, aut quod primo, habet differentiam. Si vero utrumque, sed hoc quidem non coctum, illud autem coctum, certe utroque modo continget alimentum dicere: quatenus enim non coctum, eatent contrarium contrario alitur; quatenus autem coctum, simile simili nutritur.	It makes all the difference indeed whether food is considered as what it is at first or as what it becomes finally. But if as both, in the one sense as undigested, in the other as digested, then certainly both the [above] theories of food can be upheld: for as it is undigested, one of two contraries is nourished by the other: but in so far as it is digested, one of two similars is nourished by the other.
416b7 ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι λέγουσί τινα τρόπον ἀμφότεροι καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς.	Quare manifestum, quod dicunt quodammodo utrique, et recte et non recte.	Whence it is clear that both parties speak in one way rightly, and in another way wrongly.
416b9 12. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν τρέφεται μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς, τὸ ἔμψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα τὸ τρεφόμενον, ᾗ ἔμψυχον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	Quoniam autem nihil alitur, non participans vitam, animatum utique erit corpus, quod alitur, quatenus animatum; quare et alimentum ad animatum est, et non secundum accidens.	Since only what is alive is nourished, what is nourished is the animate body as such. Wherefore nutriment means something related to what is animate, and this not incidentally only.
416b12 ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ποσόν τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, αὐξητικόν, ᾗ δὲ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία, τροφή (σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ἔστιν ἕως ἂν τρέφηται),	Est autem alterum, alimento et activo esse. Secundum enim quod quantum aliquod animatum, est activum; secundum autem quod hoc aliquid, et substantia, alimentum est; salvat enim substantiam, et eo usque hoc fit, quousque alatur.	To be nutritive and to be active are two distinct things. In so far as the living being is quantitative, food is active; but in so far as it is substantial, food is nutritive. It preserves the substance, and this just so long as it is fed.
416b15 καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ τρεφόμενον· ἤδη γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ σώζει.	Et generationis autem factivum, non ejus quod alitur, sed talis quale id est quod alitur. Iam enim est ipsa substantia. Generat autem nihil ipsum seipsum, sed salvat.	And it is productive of generation, not of the one nourished, but of such a one as the one nourished—for this latter is already a substance; and nothing generates itself, it only maintains itself in being.
416b17 ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν οἵα σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ᾗ τοιοῦτον, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν· διὸ στερηθὲν τροφῆς οὐ δύναται εἶναι.	Quare tale animae principium, potentia est potens salvare suscipiens ipsam, secundum quod est huiusmodi. Alimentum autem praeparat operationem, unde privatum alimento non potest esse.	Wherefore, this soul-principle is a power able to preserve what possesses it as a thing of such a kind; and food is preparatory to the operation; hence the being cannot continue, deprived of food.
416b20 13. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή.]	Quoniam autem sunt tria, quod alitur, et quo alitur, et alens: alens quidem est prima anima, quod vero alitur, est habens hanc corpus; quo vero alitur, alimentum.	Since there are three factors: what is nourished; that by which it is nourished; and that which nourishes; what nourishes is the primary soul, that which is nourished is the body containing it, and that by which it is nourished is food.
416b23 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό.	Quoniam autem a fine appellari omnia, justum est, finis autem est, et generasse quale ipsum est: utique prima anima et generativa talis quale est ipsum.	Since all things are rightly named from their end and the end [of this soul] is to have generated another being like itself, then the primary soul is generative of what is like itself.
416b25 ἔστι δὲ ᾧ τρέφει διττόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾧ κυβερνᾷ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ τὸ πηδάλιον, τὸ μὲν κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον μόνον. πᾶσαν δ' ἀναγκαῖον τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, ἐργάζεται δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ θερμόν· διὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἔχει θερμότητα.	Est autem id quo alitur, duplex: sicut, et quo gubernatur, et manus, et temo, hoc quidem movens et motum, illud autem movens solum. Omne autein alimentum, necessarium est tale esse, ut concoqui possit. Operatur autem decoctionem, calidum. Unde one animatum habet calorem.	‘That by which’ in nourishment is twofold, as ‘that by which’ in steering is the hand or the rudder: the one moving and moved, the other moving only. Now of necessity all food must be such that it can be digested, and what effects digestion is heat. Hence every animate being has heat.
416b30 τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ἡ τροφὴ τί ἐστιν εἴρηται· διασαφητέον δ' ἐστὶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις λόγοις.	Figuraliter quidem igitur alimentum quid sit, dictum est: certificandum autem est posterius de ipso, in propriis rationibus.	In outline, then, we have stated what nutriment is: the subject must be further examined later in a special discussion.
416b 32 –417a 21 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ε'		BOOK II, CHAPTER V
416b32 1. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως. ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι. φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. 417a1 τοῦτο δὲ πῶς δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.	[p63/80] Determinatis autem his, dicamus communiter de omni sensu. Sensus autem in moveri aliquid et pati accidit, sicut dictum est. Videtur enim quaedam alteratio esse. Aiunt autem quidam, et simile a simili pati. Hoc autem quomodo possibile aut impossibile, dictum est in universalibus rationibus, de agere et pati.	These questions being settled, let us speak of sensation in general. As has been said, sensation occurs in a being moved and acted upon; for it appears to be a kind of alteration. Some say, ‘like is acted on by like’. How far this is possible or impossible has been stated in our general discussion of activity and passivity.
417a2 2. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν διὰ τί καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν οὐ γίνεται αἴσθησις, καὶ διὰ τί ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω οὐ ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνόντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ' αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις.	Habet autem dubitationem, propter quid sensuum ipsorum non sit sensus; et quare sine his, quae sunt extra, non faciunt sensum inexistente igne et terra, et aliis elementis, quorum est sensus per se, aut per ea quae accidunt ipsis.	It may be asked why there is no sensation of the senses themselves; and why they do not produce sensation without something extraneous, seeing that they contain within themselves fire and earth and the other elements that give rise to sensation, either of themselves or through their accidental qualities.
417a6 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, διὸ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ τὸ καυστὸν οὐ καίεται αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἄνευ τοῦ καυστικοῦ· ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν ἐδεῖτο τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος.	Manifestum igitur est, quod sensitivum non est actu, sed potentia tantum, unde non sentit, sicut combustibile non comburitur ipsum a seipso, sine combustivo. Combureret enim seipsum, neque indigeret igne actu existente.	It becomes evident that the sensitive power is not an actuality, but is only potential; which explains why it does not sense [without an exterior object] as the combustible does not bum of itself without something to make it burn. Otherwise it would burn itself, and not need a fire already alight.
417a9 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς (τό τε γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον καὶ ὁρῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν τύχῃ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν ὡς δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τό τε δυνάμει ὂν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ.	Quoniam autem sentire dicimus dupliciter (potentia enim audiens et videns, audire et videre dicimus, etiam si forte dormiat: et quod iam operatur): dupliciter utique dicetur et sensus: hic quidem, sicut potentia, ille vero sicut actu. Similiter autem et sentire, et quod potentia est, et quod actu.	But as we speak of sensing in two ways, (for we say that one who sees and hears in potency sees and hears, even when he happens to be asleep; and also that one does so actually) so we may speak of ‘sense’ in two ways,—as in potency and as in act. Likewise, to perceive is both potential and actual.
417a14 3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν λέγωμεν· καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται.	Primum igitur, tamquam sit idem pati et moveri et agere et movere dicimus. Et namque motus est actus quidam, imperfectus tamen, sicut in aliis dictum est.	To start with then, let us speak as if being acted upon and moved were the same as action and moving. For movement is a kind of activity, though imperfect, as has been stated elsewhere.
417a17 πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.	Omnia autem patiuntur et moventur ab activo, et actu ente. Unde est quidem tamquam a simili pati, est autem ut a dissimili, sicut dicimus. Patitur enim quod dissimile, passum autem simile est.	All things are moved and affected by an agent, or something in act. Hence it is, that a thing is affected both by its similar and also by its dissimilar, as we have said. What is being affected is dissimilar: what has been affected is similar.
417a 21–417b 17]
417a21 4. διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας· νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.	[p65/82] Distinguendum est autem et de potentia et actu. Nunc enim simpliciter dicimus de ipsis.	Distinctions however must be made concerning potency and act; for at present we are speaking of these in one sense only.
417a22 ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιστῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην· ἔστι δ' ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν·	Est enim sic ut sciens aliquid; sicut si dicamus hominem scientem esse, quoniam homo ex eorum numero est quae scientiam habere possunt. Est autem sicut iam esse dicimus scientem, habentem grammaticam.	For there is such a thing as ‘a knower’, in one sense, as when we say that man is ‘a knower’ because man is of the class of beings able to have knowledge. But also as when we speak of a, man as ‘knowing’ because he possesses the science of grammar.
417a26 ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ' ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν·	Uterque autem horum non eodem modo potens est. Sed hic quidem quoniam genus huiusmodi et materia est; ille autem, quia volens, potest considerare, nisi aliquid prohibeat externum.	These two are not capable in the same way; but the former’s power is, as it were, generic and comparable to matter; whereas the latter has the power to consider at will, so long as no extraneous obstacle intervenes.
417a28 ὁ δ' ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὢν καὶ κυρίως ἐπιστάμενος τόδε τὸ Α.	Iam autem considerans actu est, et proprie sciens hanc literam A.	Yet again, only he who is actually attending to (say) the letter A, is in the strictest sense knowing.
417a30 ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι, κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες <ὄντες, ἐνεργείᾳ γίνονται ἐπιστήμονες,> ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, ὁ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 417b1 ἢ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἄλλον τρόπον.	Ambo igitur primi, secundum potentiam scientes sunt. Sed hic quidem per doctrinam alteratus est, et multoties ex contrario mutatus habitu: hic autem ex eo quod habet sensum aut grammaticam, non agit autem ex eo quod ad agendum excitatur, verum alio modo, atque antea cum nondum habitum esset adeptus.	Therefore the first two are knowing in potency. But one has undergone a change through being taught, and is often altered from the contrary state, whereas the other is moved to action from simply having sense or grammar without acting [accordingly]; but in a different way from formerly when he had not yet acquired any habit [of knowing].
417b2 5. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἁπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν·	Non est autem simplex neque ipsum pati; sed aliud quidem corruptio quaedam a contrario, aliud autem salus magis ejus quod potentia est ab eo quod est actu, et a simili, atque ita se habente, sicut potentia se habet ad actum.	Nor is ‘being acted on’ a simple term. It is one thing to be somehow destroyed by a contrary; quite another when what is in potency is maintained by what is in act, and is of a similar nature, being related to the latter as potency to act.
417b5 θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὑτὸ γὰρ ἡ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως.	Speculans enim fit. habens scientiam: quod certe, aut non est alterari (in ipsum enim additio est, et in actum) aut alterum genus alterationis est.	For when a man possessed of knowledge becomes actually thinking, there is certainly either no ‘alteration’—there being a new perfection in him, and an increase of actuality;—or it is some novel kind of alteration.
417b8 διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγειν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος [κατὰ] τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν οὐ διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δίκαιον·	Unde non bene habet dicere sapientem, cum sapiat alterari, sicut nee aedificatorem, cum aedificat. In actum igitur ducens, ex potentia ente secundum intelligere et sapere, non doctrinam appellare, sed alteram habere denominationem iustum est.	Hence it is as misleading a statement to say that a man is ‘altered’ when he thinks, as to say this of the builder when he builds. The process from being in potency to understand and think to actually doing so should not be called instruction, but has by rights some other name.
417b12 τὸ δ' ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον, [ὥσπερ εἴρηται,] ἢ δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν.	Ex potentia autem ente, addiscens, et accipiens scientiam ab eo qui actu, et doctus est, et docet: aut neque pati dicendum (sicut dictum est); aut duos esse modos alterationis; et eam, quae in privativas dispositiones est, mutationem, et eam, quae est in habitus et naturam.	The change from being in potency, in one who learns and receives instruction from another (who actually has learning and teaches) either should not be called a ‘being acted upon’ (as we have said), or there are two modes of alteration, one a change to a condition of privation, the other to possession and maturity.
417b 16 –418a 25]
417b16 6. τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ μὲν πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος, ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, ἔχει ἤδη, ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.	[p67/84] Sensitivi autem prima quidem mutatio fit a generante. Cum autem generatum est, habet iam sicut scientiam, et sentire secundum actum: similiter dicitur ipsi considerare.	The first change in the sensitive being is caused by the parent. When it is born it is already endowed as with knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the act of thinking.
417b18 [καὶ] τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.	Differunt tamen, quia activa sensitivae operationis, extra sunt, nempe visibile et audibile; similiter autem et reliqua sensibilium.	They differ, however. For the actuation of sense-operations is from without; namely from the visible, the audible, and so on for the other senses.
417b22 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου·	Causa autem est, quoniam singularium quidem secundum actum sensus, scientia autem universalium.	The cause [of the difference] is that sensation, even in act, is of particulars: whereas scientific knowledge is of universals.
417b23 ταῦτα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ.	Haec enim in ipsa quodammodo sunt anima;	For the latter are, in a way, within the soul itself;
417b24 διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ἔχει κἀν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, 417b27 ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν.	unde intelligere in ipsa est, cum velit. Sentire autem non est in ipsa. Necessarium est enim ad esse sensibile. Similiter autem et hoc se habet, in scientiis sensibilium, et propter eamdem causam, quia sensibilia singularia sunt, et externa.	hence the act of the intellect is interior and at will; whereas sensation is not from within the soul, and requires that a sense-object be presented. The same holds good of the sciences which concern sense-objects, and for the same reason, i.e. that sense objects are singulars and are external.
417b28 7. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασαφῆσαι καιρὸς γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ εἰςαῦθις·	Sed de his quidem certificare, tempus erit rursum.	But there will be time later to deal with these more conclusively.
417b29 νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει [418a] τὸ αἰσθητικόν.	Nunc autem tantum sit definitum, quod cum non simpliciter sit id quod potentia dicitur; sed aliud quidem, sicut si dicimus, puerum posse militare, aliud autem, sicut in aetate existentem. sic habet et sensitivum.	For the present it is sufficiently established that ‘in potency’ is not univocally predicated; but it means one thing when, for example, we say that a child is able to be a soldier, and quite another thing when we say this of an adult. The same holds of the sensitive power.
417b32 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνώνυμος 418a1 αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά, διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ πῶς ἕτερα, χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν.	Quoniam autem innominata est ipsorum differentia: determinatum est autem de his, quod altera sunt, et quomodo altera: ut necesse est ipso pati, et alterari, tamquam propriis nominibus.	Since, however, this distinction has no name, and yet it is settled that the [two stages] differ, and in what way, it is necessary to use the expressions ‘to be acted upon’ and ‘to be altered’ as if they were precise terms.
418a3 τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ' ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.	Sensitivum autem potentia tale est quale iam actu est sensibile, sicut dictum est. Patitur igitur non simile existens; passum autem assimilatum est; et est tale, quale illud.	The sensitive power is potentially that which the sense-object is actually, as we have said. It is acted upon in so far as it is not like: it becomes like, in being acted upon; and is then such as is the other.
418a 6 –418a 26 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ς'		BOOK II, CHAPTER VI
418a7 1. Λεκτέον δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν καθ' αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ δυοῖν τὸ μὲν ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν.	[p69/86] Dicendum autem est secundum unumquemque sensum, de sensibilibus primo. Dicitur autem sensibile tripliciter: quorum duo quidem dicimus per se sentiri, unum autem per accidens. Duorum autem, aliud quidem proprium est uniuscuiusque sensus, aliud autem commune omnium.	In treating of each sense we must first discuss sense-objects. We speak of a sense-object in three ways: two [kinds of sense-objects] are perceptible essentially; one incidentally. Of the two former, one is proper to each sense, the other common to all.
418a11 2. λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ, ἡ δ' ἁφὴ πλείους [μὲν] ἔχει διαφοράς, ἀλλ' ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ.	Dico autem proprium quidem, quod non contingit altero sensu sentiri, et circa quod non contingit errare, ut visus coloris, et auditus soni, et gustus saporis. Tactus autem plures habet differentias. Sed unusquisque sensus judicat de his, et non decipitur, neque visus, quoniam color, neque auditus, quoniam sonus sit; sed quid est coloratum, aut ubi, aut quid sonans.	Now, I call that the proper object of each sense which does not fall within the ambit of another sense, and about which there can be no mistake,—as sight is of colour, and hearing of sound, and taste of savour; while touch has several different objects. Each particular sense can discern these proper objects without deception; thus sight errs not as to colour, nor hearing as to sound; I though it might err about what is coloured, or where it is, or about what is giving forth a sound.
418a16 τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστης,	Huiusmodi igitur dicuntur propria uniuscuiusque sensus objecta.	This, then, is what is meant by the proper objects of particular senses.
418a17 3. κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις· καὶ γὰρ ἁφῇ κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει.	Communia autem sunt motus, quies, numerus, figura, magnitudo: huiusmodi enim nullius sensus sunt propria, sed communia omnibus. Tactu enim motus aliquis sensibilis, et visu: per se igitur sunt sensibilia haec.	Now the sense-objects in common are movement, rest, number, shape, dimension. Qualities of this kind are proper to no one sense, but are common to all; thus a movement is perceptible both by touch and by sight. These, then, are the essential objects of sensation.
418a20 4. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός·	Secundum accidens autem dicitur sensibile, ut si album sit Diari filius.	To be a sense-object ‘incidentally’ is said, for example, of a white object that is the son of Diares.
418a21 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο, οὗ αἰσθάνεται· διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ᾗ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως.	Secundum accidens etenim hic sentitur, quoniam album esse huic accidit quod sentitur: unde sensus nihil patitur a sensibili, quatenus tale est. Sensibilium autem secundum se ea proprie propria sensibilia sunt, et ad quae substantia uniuscuiusque sensus est naturaliter accommodata.	This is perceived incidentally because whiteness happens to belong to what is perceived: but the sense, is unaffected by that object as such. Of objects essentially sense-perceptible, the proper are properly such; and to these the essence of each sense is naturally adapted.
418a 26 –418b 26 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER VII
418a26 1. Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν, ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμά τε καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν·	[p71/88] Cuius quidem est visus, hoc est visibile : visibile autem est color quidem, et id quod oratione quidem dicere possumus, innominatum autem est.	That of which there is sight is the visible; and the visible is colour, and also something which, though it has no name, we can state descriptively.
418a28 δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι.	Manifestum autem erit, quod dicemus ubi longius erimus progressi.	It will be evident what we mean when we have gone further into the matter.
418a29 τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν.	Visibile enim est color: hic autem est, de quo visibile per se praedicatur, secundum se autem, non ratione, sed quoniam in seipso habet causam essendi visibile.	For the visible is colour, and it is this of which visibility is predicated essentially; not, however, by definition, but because it has in itself the cause of being visible.
418a31 πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα 418b1 κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις· διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται. διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστιν.	Omnis enim color motivus est ejus quod secundum actum est, diaphani, et haec est ipsius natura: unde nihil est visibile sine lumine, sed omuino anusquisque color per lumen visibilis est. Quapropter de lumine primo dicendum est quid sit.	For every colour is a motivating force upon the actually transparent: this is its very nature. Hence nothing, is visible without light; but by light each and every colour can be seen. Wherefore, we must first decide what light is.
418b4 2. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν·	Est igitur aliquid diaphanum. Diaphanum autem dico, quod est quidem visibile, non autem secundum se visibile, ut simpliciter est dicere, sed propter extraneum colorem.	There is, accordingly, something transparent. By transparent I mean that which is, indeed, visible, yet not of itself, or absolutely, but by virtue of concomitant colour.
418b7 οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ᾗ ἀὴρ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστι τις φύσις ἐνυπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι.	Huiusmodi autem est aer, et aqua, et multa solidorum. Non enim secundum quod aqua, neque secundum quod aer, diaphanum est; sed quoniam est natura eadem in his utrisque, et in perpetuo superno corpore.	Air and water and many solids are such. But transparency does not depend on either air or water as such, but on the same quality being found in both, and in the eternal sphere above as well.
418b9 φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. δυνάμει δέ, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστί, καὶ τὸ σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν.	Lumen autem actus est huiusmodi diaphani, secundum quod est diaphanum. Potentia autem, in quo, hoc est et tenebra. Lumen autem, ut color est diaphani, secundum quod actu diaphanum ab igne, aut huiusmodi, ut quod sursum est corpus. Etenim huic aliquid inest unum et idem.	Light is the act of this transparency, as such: but in potency this [transparency] is also darkness. Now, light is a kind of colour of the transparent, in so far as this is actualised by fire or something similar to the celestial body; which contains indeed something of one and the same nature as fire.
418b13 τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὔθ' ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ' ἀπορροὴ σώματος οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ οὕτως), ἀλλὰ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ·	Quid quidem igitur diaphanum, et quid lumen, dictum est; quia neque ignis est, neque omnino corpus, neque defluxus corporis alius. Esset enim utique aliquod corpus, et sic aut ignis, aut huiusmodi alicuius praesentia in diaphano.	We have then indicated what the transparent is, and what light is; that light is not fire or any bodily thing, nor any emanation from a body—[if it were this last,] it would be a sort of body, and so be fire or the presence of something similar in the transparent.
418b17 οὔτε γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι,	Neque enim possibile est duo corpora simul in eodem esse.	For it is impossible for two bodies to exist in the same place at the same time.
418b18 3. δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστιν.	Videtur autem lumen contrarium esse tenebrae. Est autem tenebra, privatio huius habitus ex diaphano. Quare palam est quod et huius praesentia lumen est.	Light seems to be the contrary of darkness; and the latter is the privation of this quality in the transparent. So it is plain that the presence of this is light.
418b20 καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος·	Et non recte Empedocles, neque si aliquis alius sic dixit quod feratur lumen, et extendatur in medio terrae et continentis, nos autem lateat.	Empedocles (or anyone else who may have said the same) was wrong when he said that light was borne along and extended between the earth and its envelope, unperceived by us.
418b23 τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα· ἐν μικρῷ μὲν γὰρ διαστήματι λάθοι ἄν, ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς δ' ἐπὶ δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα.	Hoc enim est et extra eam, quae in ratione, veritatem, et extra ea quae videntur. In parvo enim spatio lateret nos posse. Ab oriente autem in occidens latere, magna admodum quaestio est.	This is in contradiction alike to sound reasoning and to appearance. Such a thing might happen unobserved over a small space: but that it should remain unnoticed from the, east to the west is a very extravagant postulate.
418b 26 –419b 27
418b26 4. ἔστι δὲ χρώματος μὲν δεκτικὸν τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. ἄχρουν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον, οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν.	[p74/91] Est autem coloris susceptivum, quod sine colore: soni autem absonum, Sine colore autem diaphanum, et invisibile, aut quod vix videtur, ut quod tenebrosum est.	Now that only can receive colour which has none, as only that which is soundless, can receive sound. What is without colour is the transparent and the invisible, or what is barely seen, being dark.
418b29 τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅταν δυνάμει· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς	Huiusmodi autem diaphanum quidem est, non cum sit actu diaphanum, sed cum potentia. Eadem enim natura quandoque quidem tenebra, quandoque autem lumen est.	The transparent is precisely of this nature when it is not in act, but in potency. For the same substance is sometimes dark, sometimes light.
419a1 ἐστιν. οὐ πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑκάστου τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα·	Non omnia autem visibilia sunt in lumine, sed solum uniuscuiusque proprius color.	Not all visible things, however, are visible in light, but only the colour proper to each.
419a2 ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ἐν δὲ τῷ σκότει ποιεῖ αἴσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα καὶ λάμποντα (ἀνώνυμα δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἑνὶ ὀνόματι), οἷον μύκης, κρέας, κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων καὶ λεπίδες καὶ ὀφθαλμοί·	Quaedam enim in lumine quidem non videntur, in tenebris autem faciunt sensum, ut quae ignea videntur, et lucentia. Non autem nominata sunt haec uno nomine, ut quercus putredo, cornu, capita piscium, et squamae, et oculi.	There are certain things which are, indeed, not seen in light, but which produce a sensation in darkness, such as those which burn or are luminous. These are not called by any one term. Such are the fungi of certain trees, horn, fish-heads, scales, and eyes.
419a6 ἀλλ' οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται τούτων τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ταῦτα ὁρᾶται, ἄλλος λόγος·	Sed nullius horum videtur proprius color. Propter quam igitur causam haec videntur, alia ratio.	But the colour proper to each of these is not perceived. Why these things are thus seen is matter for another enquiry.
419a7 5. νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐν φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα (διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται ἄνευ φωτός·	Nunc autem intantum manifestum est, quoniam quod quidem in lumine videtur, colorem esse; unde non videtur sine lumine;	At present what is dear is that what is seen in light is colour; [and that] therefore it is not seen without light.
419a9 τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι, τὸ κινητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς), ἡ δ' ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου φανερόν· ἐὰν γάρ τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται·	hoc enim erat ipsi colori esse, motivum esse, secundum actum diaphani, actus autem diaphani lumen est. Signum autem huius manifestum. Siquis enim ponat habens colorem super ipsum visum, non videbitur.	For to be colour is to be able to move the transparent into act; and this act of the transparent is light. A plain proof whereof is that if one places on the sight itself a coloured object, it is not seen.
419a13 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ διαφανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον.	Sed color movet diaphanum, puta aerem. Ab hoc autem iam continuo existente, movetur quod sensitivum est.	But colour moves the transparent medium (say, air); and the sensitive organ is moved by this extended continuum.
419a15 6. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος, οἰόμενος, εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι ἂν ἀκριβῶς καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη·	Non enim bene hoc dicit Democritus opinatus, si esset vacuum medium, perspici utique exacte, et si formica in caelo esset:	Democritus put forward the erroneous opinion that if the medium were a vacuum, perception would be everywhere exact, even of an ant in the sky.
419a17 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πάσχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν·	hoc enim impossibile est. Patiente enim aliquid sensitivo, fit ipsum videre.	This is, however, impossible; for only when the sensitive faculty is affected does vision occur.
419a18 ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὁρωμένου χρώματος ἀδύνατον·	Ab ipso igitur, qui videtur colore, impossibile est.	This cannot, however, be effected by the colour seen, in itself.
419a19 λείπεται δὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξύ, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ· κενοῦ δὲ γενομένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται.	Relinquitur autem quod a medio. Quare necesse est aliquod esse medium. Vacuo autem facto, non aliquid certe, sed omnino nihil videbitur.	It must therefore be due to the medium. If there were a vacuum, a thing, so far from being perceived clearly, would not be seen at all.
419a21 7. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶσθαι, εἴρηται.	Propter quam quidem igitur causam, colorem necesse est in lumine videri, dictum est.	We have stated, then, why it is necessary that colour be seen in light.
419a23 πῦρ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, καὶ ἐν σκότει καὶ ἐν φωτί, καὶ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὸ γὰρ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται διαφανές.	Ignis autem in utrisque videtur, et in tenebris, et in lumine, et hoc ex necessitate.	But fire is seen in both darkness and light: necessarily, for the transparent is made light by it.
419a25 8. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς ἐστιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου τὸ μεταξὺ κινεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑκάτερον·	Diaphanum enim ab hoc lucidum fit. ladem autem ratio est et de sono et de odore. Nihil enim ipsorum tangens sensitivum, facit sensum. Sed ab odore quidem et sono, medium movetur, ab hoc autem ensitivorum utrumque.	The same account holds for both sound and smell. No sensation is produced when either of these touches the organ: but a medium is affected by sound and smell, and the sense organ of one or the other sense by the medium.
419a28 ὅταν δ' ἐπ' αὐτό τις ἐπιθῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν αἴσθησιν ποιήσει. περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν ὁμοίως, οὐ φαίνεται δέ·	Cum autem super ipsum sensitivum aliquis apponit olens aut sonans, nullum sensum faciet. De tactu autem et gustu habet se similiter, non autem videtur.	But if one places an object that sounds or smells upon the sense-organ itself, no sensation occurs. The same holds good of touch and taste, although this is not obvious.
419a31 δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἔσται δῆλον.	Propter quam autem causam, posterius erit manifestum.	The reason for this will be made clear later.
419a32 9. τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς δ' ἀνώνυμον· κοινὸν γάρ τι πάθος ἐπ' ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος ἔστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ διαφανὲς χρώματι, οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχει τούτοις·	Medium autem soni quidem, aer est. Odoris autem, innominatum est. Communis enim quaedam passio est aeri et aquae, sicut diaphanum colori, sic est habenti odorem, alia quaedam passio est communis utrisque his.	The medium of sound is air; that of smell has no special name. For as there is a common quality for colour, to wit, the transparent, in air and water, so there is a common quality in them for smell.
419a35 φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων 419b1 ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν πεζῶν ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ' αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον λεχθήσεται.	Videntur enim animalia aquatica habere odoris sensum. Sed homo et pedibus ambulantium quaecumque respirant, impossibilia sunt odorare, nisi respirantia. Causa autem de his posterius dicetur.	For it seems that aquatic animals possess a sense of smell. But man, and whatever living things breathe, are unable to smell except when breathing. The cause of this will be dealt with later.
419b 4 -419b 33 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Η'		BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII
419b4 1. Νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς διορίσωμεν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργειά τις, ὁ δὲ δύναμις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὔ φαμεν ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ δ' ἔχειν, οἷον χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύναται ψοφῆσαι (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐμποιῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ)·	[p77/94] Nunc autem primo de sono, et auditu, determinemus. Est autem duplex sonus. Hic quidam enim actu, quidam autem potentia. Alia enim non dicimus habere sonum, spongiam, lauam, pilos; quaedam autem habent, ut aes, et quaecumque plana et lenia sunt, quoniam possunt sonare. Hoc autem est, ipsius medii et auditus facere sonum actu.	Now let us start by treating of sound and hearing. Sound is twofold: the sort that is actual, and the sort that is potential. For certain things, we say, have no sound, such as sponges, wool and fur; while others, such as bronze and all other smooth and hard things, have sound, because they are able to produce it, i.e. to cause actual sound in the medium and in the hearing.
419b9 2. γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος ἀεί τινος πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι·	Fit autem qui secundum actum sonus semper alicuius ad aliquid, et in aliquo.	Sound in act is always of something, on something, in something:
419b10 πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα.	Percussio enim est faciens.	for it is caused by percussion.
419b11 διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς.	Unde impossibile est, cum sit unum, fieri sonum. Alterum enim est verberans, et quod verberatur. Quare sonans, ad aliquid sonat. Tangit enim aliquid. Cum autem ictu tangitur, sonat. Ictus autem non fit sine motu.	Hence it is impossible for anything by itself, as a single thing, to produce sound. For there must be one thing that strikes and another that is struck; hence whatever emits sound does so ‘on something’. i.e. by contact with something—which, when touched with a blow, sounds. And the blow necessarily implies movement.
419b13 ὥσπερ δ' εἴπομεν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος· οὐθένα γὰρ ποιεῖ ψόφον ἔρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ χαλκὸς καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα·	Sicut autem diximus, non quorumlibet ictus sonus est: nullum enim faciunt sonum pili, et si percutiantur; sed aes et quaecumque lenia et concava sunt.	As we said before, it is not a blow upon anything whatever that gives sound: wool makes no sound, although it be struck; but bronze, or anything smooth and hollow, is such.
419b16 ὁ μὲν χαλκὸς ὅτι λεῖος, τὰ δὲ κοῖλα τῇ ἀνακλάσει πολλὰς ποιεῖ πληγὰς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν τοῦ κινηθέντος.	Aes quidem, quoniam lene est. Concava autem ex repercussione faciunt multos ictus post primum non potente exire, quod motum est.	Bronze because it is smooth; whilst hollow things by repercussion produce many ‘blows’ after the first, since what is set in motion cannot find an outlet.
419b18 3. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι, κἀν ὕδατι, ἀλλ' ἧττον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα.	Amplius auditur in aere, et in aqua, sed minus in aqua. Non est autem soni proprius aer, neque aqua; sed oportet solidorum percussionem fieri ad seinvicem et ad aera.	Further: sound is heard in air and water, but less in water. It is, however, neither air nor water that, properly, sounds; there must be a percussion of solid objects on each other, and on air.
419b21 τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῇ. διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ· δεῖ γὰρ φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἢ ὁρμαθὸν ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμενον ταχύ.	Hoc autem, si permaneat percussus aer, et non dissolvatur: unde si velociter et fortiter percutiatur, sonat. Oportet enim praeoccupare motum ferientis, fracturam aeris; sicut si congregationem aut cumulum lapillorum percutiat aliquis latum velociter.	This happens if air is confined when struck, and cannot disperse. Hence if the striking is rapid and violent sound results. For the movement of what strikes must be sudden, if it is to out-run the breaking-up of the air; just as if one were to strike a rapidly-moving heap of sand or pile of stones.
419b25 4. ἠχὼ δὲ γίνεται ὅταν, ἀέρος ἑνὸς γενομένου διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν θρυφθῆναι, πάλιν ὁ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα.	Echo autem fit, cum ab aere uno facto propter vas deferminans, et prohibens diffundi, iterum aer repellitur, sicut sphaera.	Echo arises when air rebounds like a ball against air rendered a compact unity by a restraining vessel that prevents its dispersion.
419b27 ἔοικε δ' ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι ἠχώ, ἀλλ' οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε ἐπὶ τοῦ ψόφου καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτός·	Videtur autem semper fieri echo, sed non certa; quia accidit in sono, sicut et in lumine.	It seems there is always some echo, but not always a clear one. For the same occurs with sound as with light;
419b29 καὶ γὰρ τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο πάντῃ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἔξω τοῦ ἡλιουμένου), ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται ὥσπερ ἀφ' ὕδατος ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου τῶν λείων, ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν, ᾗ τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν.	Etenim lumen semper repercutitur: neque enim fieret penitus lumen, sed tenebra extra locum a sole illuminatum. Sed non sic repercutitur, sicut ab aqua aut aere aut et ab aliquo alio lenium, ut umbram facial, qua lumen determinamus.	which also is always, reflected: otherwise it would not spread to every part, but beyond the area illuminated by the sun there would be darkness. Still, it is not [always] reflected as it is reflected by water or bronze or other smooth things; hence it makes the shadow by which we discern the boundaries of light.
419b 33 - 420b 5
419b33 5. τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ὁ ἀήρ, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς καὶ εἷς.	[p79/96] Vacuum autem recte dicitur proprium audiendi. Videtur enim esse vacuum aer. Hic autem est faciens audire cum moveatur continuus et unus.	Empty space is rightly said to be necessary for hearing,—for by that is meant air which, when moved as a simple continuum, causes hearing.
419b35 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ψαθυρὸς 420a1 εἶναι οὐ γεγωνεῖ, ἂν μὴ λεῖον ᾖ τὸ πληγέν.	Sed propter id, quod fragilis est, non sonat, nisi lene sit quod percutitur;	On account of its ‘instability, however, it gives no sound unless what is struck be smooth;
420a1 τότε δὲ εἷς γίνεται ἅμα διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον·	tunc autem unus fit. Simul enim propter planum,	then it has the required unity, holding together on account of the even surface,
420a2 ἓν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ λείου ἐπίπεδον.	unum enim est lenis planum.	for the surface of a smooth thing is uniform.
420a3 6. ψοφητικὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς.	Sonativum est igitur id, quod motivum est unius aeris, continuitate usque ad auditum.	The sonorous, therefore, is that which moves a compact mass of air continuous as far as the organ of hearing.
420a4 ἀκοῇ δὲ συμφυὴς <ἔστιν> ἀήρ· διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω ὁ εἴσω κινεῖται. διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ τὸ ζῷον ἀκούει, οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ ἀήρ· οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ ἔχει ἀέρα τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον.	Auditus autem connaturalis est aeri: propter id autem quod in aere est moto exteriori, et qui intus est, movetur. Propter quod nou ubique audit animal, neque ubique pertransit aer. Non enim ubique habet aerem movenda pars, et animatum, sicut pupilla humidum.	Hearing is naturally conjoined with air; and because it is in air, therefore by a movement in the air outside is caused an interior movement also. Hence an animal does not hear all over its body, nor does air pass through every member. For the animate body and the part to be set in motion have not air throughout (as [also liquid is only in the eyeball]).
420a7 αὐτὸς μὲν δὴ ἄψοφον ὁ ἀὴρ διὰ τὸ εὔθρυπτον·	Per se igitur insonabilis aer, propter id, quod facile frangibilis est, accedit.	Of itself air is soundless; for, being mobile, it easily yields.
420a8 ὅταν δὲ κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι, ἡ τούτου κίνησις ψόφος.	Cum vero prohibeatur diffluere huiusmodi motus, sonus est.	But when its motion cannot be diffused a sound arises.
420a9 ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητος εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς διαφορὰς τῆς κινήσεως.	Hic autem est in auribus aedificatus iu hoc, ut immobilis sit, quatenus exacte sentiat omnes differentias motus.	There is air, built into the ears, so as to be immobile; and it accordingly registers every variety of motion with exactitude.
420a11 διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσέρχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν συμφυῆ ἀέρα·	Propter hoc autem et in aqua audimus, quoniam non ingreditur ad ipsum connaturalem aerem,	On this account therefore we hear also in water, for this does not penetrate to that inner air,
420a12 ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς τὸ οὖς, διὰ τὰς ἕλικας.	sed neque in aurem, propter reflexiones ipsius.	nor, by reason of its many convolutions, into the ear.
420a13 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ, οὐκ ἀκούει· οὐδ' ἂν ἡ μῆνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα [ὅταν κάμῃ].	Cum autem hoc accidat, non audit. Neque si meninga laboret. Sicuti neque tum videmus, cum ea pellis, quae pupillam tegit, morbo quodam laborat.	Should it do so, one would not hear; nor if the eardrum were ailing—just as we do not see if the cornea of the pupil is diseased.
420a15 ἀλλ' οὐ σημεῖον τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ μὴ τὸ ἠχεῖν τὸ οὖς ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας· ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰκείαν τινὰ κίνησιν ὁ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσίν, ἀλλ' ὁ ψόφος ἀλλότριος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος.	Sed signum est audiendi, aut non, sonare semper aurem, sicut cornu. Semper enim quodam proprio motu aer movetur in auribus, sed sons extraneus, et non proprius.	A test of good hearing on the contrary is whether there is a continual ringing in the ear, like a horn. For then the air in the ear is perpetually moving by a motion of its own; whereas sound is from without, and is not the ear’s own.
420a18 καὶ διὰ τοῦτό φασιν ἀκούειν τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἠχοῦντι, ὅτι ἀκούομεν τῷ ἔχοντι ὡρισμένον τὸν ἀέρα.	Et propter hoc dicunt nos audire vacuo et sonanti, quia audimus habente determinatum aerem.	And for this reason they say that we hear by a “resounding vacuum” because we hear by what holds air in constraint.
420a19 7. πότερον δὲ ψοφεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω, τρόπον δ' ἕτερον; ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν λείων, ὅταν τις κρούσῃ.	Utrum autem sonet verberans, an quod verberatur? an utrumque, modo autem altero. Est euim sonus motus possisibilis moveri hoc modo, quo quidem saltantia a laevibus cum aliquis ea traxerit.	Is it that which strikes, or that which is struck, which sounds? Or both, but in different ways? For sound is a movement of something that can move in the way that a bouncing body flies off a smooth surface one flings it at.
420a23 οὐ δὴ πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ψοφεῖ τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον, οἷον ἐὰν πατάξῃ βελόνη βελόνην, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ὁμαλὸν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸν ἀέρα ἀθροῦν ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι.	Non igitur, sicut dictum est, omne sonat, quod verberatur, et verberans, ut si objiciatur acus acui; sed oportet quod percutitur, planum lene regulare esse, ut aer subito dissiliat, et moveatur.	As has been said, not everything that strikes or is struck gives a sound, for instance one needle struck against another. But what is struck must have a plane surface smooth and regular so that the air rebound and be set in motion instantaneously.
420a26 8. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψοφούντων ἐν τῷ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφῳ δηλοῦνται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐχ ὁρᾶται τὰ χρώματα, οὕτως οὐδ' ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ.	Differentiae autem sonantium, in sono secundum actum ostenduntur. Sicut enim non videntur colores sine lumine, sic neque sine sono acutum et grave.	Differences in sonorous things are apparent in the act of sounding. For just as colours are not seen without light, so there is no high or low note apart from sounding.
420a29 ταῦτα δὲ λέγεται κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν·	Haec autem dicuntur secundum metaphoram ab illis quae tanguntur.	These terms are used by metaphor from things perceived by touch.
420a30 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ' ὀλίγον.	Acutum enim movet sensum in pauco tempore multum. Grave autem in multo paucum.	A high note moves the sense-organ much in a brief space of time; the low note, little, in a longer time.
420a31 οὐ δὴ ταχὺ τὸ ὀξύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραδύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν διὰ τὸ τάχος ἡ κίνησις τοιαύτη, τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα,	Neque tamen velox est acutum, grave autem tardum: Sed fit illius quidem propter velocitatem talis motus, huius autem propter tarditatem.	But this does not mean that the fast is the high and the slow the low; rather, the former arises because of swiftness of motion, the latter because of slowness.
420b1 καὶ ἔοικεν ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τῷ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ὀξεῖ καὶ ἀμβλεῖ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀμβλὺ οἷον ὠθεῖ, διὰ τὸ κινεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ δὲ ἐν πολλῷ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ δὲ βραδὺ εἶναι.	Et videntur similitudinem habere circa tactum cum acuto et hebeti. Acutum enim quasi pungit, hebes quasi pellit, propter id quod movet, hoc quidem in pauco, illud autem in multo. Quare accidit hoc quidem velox, illud autem tardum esse.	So there seems to be an analogy with the tangible, as sharp and blunt. For the ‘sharp’ pierces, while the ‘blunt’ thuds; and the reason is that the one moves in a brief period, the other in a greater. Hence it comes about that the former is swift, the latter slow.
420b4 9. περὶ μὲν οὖν ψόφου ταύτῃ διωρίσθω.	De sono igitur sic determinatum sit.	Let this serve to define sound.
420b 5 –42a6
420b5 ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς ἐστιν ἐμψύχου· τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγεται φωνεῖν, οἷον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἀψύχων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον. ἔοικε γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ταῦτ' ἔχει.	[p81/98] Vox autem sonus quidam est animati. İnanimatorum enim nullum vocat; sed secundum similitudinem dicuntur vocare, ut tibia, et lyra, et quaecumque alia inanimatorum, extensionem habent, et melos, et locutionem. Assimilantur enim quia et vox haec habet.	Voice is the sound of a living thing. No inanimate being utters voice, though, by analogy, the flute and the harp are said to ‘speak’; and so, too, other inanimate objects which sound with duration, harmony and significance. The resemblance arises from voice also having these qualities.
420b9 πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες (καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως, εἴπερ ἀέρος κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος), ἀλλ' οἱ λεγόμενοι φωνεῖν, οἷον <οἱ> ἐν τῷ Ἀχελῴῳ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς βραγχίοις ἤ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ,	Multa autem animalium vocem non habent, ut quae sunt sine sanguine, et sanguinem habentium pisces. Et hoc rationabiliter: siquidetu motus sonus est. Sed qui dicuntur vocem habere, ut qui in Acheloo, sonant branchiis, aut quodam altero huiusmodi.	Many animals have no voice, such as the bloodless, and, among those with blood, fish. And this is reasonable if, in fact, sound is a movement. But the fish that are said to have voice, such as those in the Achelous, make a sound through their gills, or in some other such way.
420b13 10. φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τύπτοντός τινος καί τι καὶ ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα.	Vox autem sonus animalis est, et non qualibet parte. Sed quoniam omne sonat verberante aliquo, et aliquid, et in aliquo; hoc autem est aer; rationabiliter utique vocem habebunt haec sola, quaecumque suscipiunt aerem.	Voice is a sound made by an animal, but not from any part of its frame. Since all things sound by something striking another in a medium. (which is air), it is reasonable that those only will have voice which inhale air.
420b16 τῷ γὰρ ἤδη ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα-καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερ- μότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον <ὄν> (τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ.	Iam enim aere respirato utitur natura ad duo opera, sicut lingua: et ad gustum, et locutionem. Quorum quidem, gustus necessarius est, unde et pluribus inest. Interpretatio autem est propter bene esse. Sic et spiritu, et ad: calorem interiorem, quod est necessarium ( causa autem in aliis dicetur,) et ad vocem, ut sit bene.	For Nature employs air, inhaled for two operations; as it does the tongue for both taste and speech; of which one, taste, is a necessity; whence it exists in more species; while the other, self-expression, is for well-being. So with breath: it [regulates] interior heat—and this is necessary to existence (the reason for this will be stated elsewhere); and it also serves voice, which is for well-being.
420b22 11. ὄργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ μόριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, πνεύμων·	Organum autem respirationis, vocalis arteria est. Cuius autem causa haec pars, est pulmo.	Now the organ of respiration is the windpipe, and the purpose of this organ is to serve the lungs.
420b24 τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλέον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος.	Hae enim parte plus habent caloris, pedibus gradientia, aliis. Indiget autem respiratione, et circa cor locus primus.	Quadrupeds have more heat in this part than in others, so respiration is needed, and first of all around the heart.
420b26 διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ἀναπνεόμενον εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν	Unde necesse est interius respirante, ingredi aerem. Quare percussio respirati aeris ab anima, quae est in his partibus, ad vocalem arteriam, vox est.	Hence it is necessary that air enter when [an animal] draws breath. Hence a striking by the soul (in these parts) upon air inhaled through the windpipe is voice.
420b29 (οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες-ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός·	Non enim omnis sonus animalis, vox est, sicuti diximus. Est enim et lingua sonare, et sicut tussientes. Sed oportet, et animatum verberans, et cum imaginatione aliqua.	For not every animal sound is voice, as we have said; there is clicking the tongue, and the noise made by coughing. There is needed a living being to utter the sound, and some accompanying phantasm.
420b32 σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή)· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, 421a1 ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν.	Significativus enim quidam sonus est vox, et non respirati aeris, sicut tussis; sed isto verberat eum aerem qui est in arteria, ad ipsam.	For voice is a significant sound; not that (merely) of air respired, as coughing is; rather, with it the air in the windpipe is struck against the windpipe.
421a1 12. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μηδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων.	Signum autem est non posse vocem formare respirantem, neque expirantem, sed detinentem. Movet enim isto retinens.	A sign of this is that we cannot produce voice while inhaling air nor while exhaling it, but only while retaining it. For what holds the air also sets it in motion.
421a3 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μόριον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν ἀέρα οὐδ' ἀναπνέουσιν. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος.	Manifestum autem et cur pisces sint sine voce. Non enim habent guttur. Hanc autem partem non habent, quia non recipiunt aerem, neque respirant. Sed qui dicunt sic, peccant: propter quam igitur causam, altera ratio est.	It is thus clear why fish have no voice; for they have no windpipe. They lack this member because they do not inhale air or breathe. Those who say otherwise are wrong. The cause of this, however, is another question.
421a 7 –421b 7 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Θ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER IX
421a7 1. Περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ ὀσφραντοῦ ἧττον εὐδιόριστόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ὀσμή, οὕτως ὡς ὁ ψόφος ἢ τὸ χρῶμα. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων·	[p84/101] De odore autem, et olfactibili, minus bene determinabile est dictis. Non enim manifestum est quale quid sit odor, sicut sonus, aut visibile, aut lumen. Causa autem est, quia sensum bune non habemus certum, sed pejorem multis animalibus.	It is not so easy to come to conclusions about odour and the odorous as about the sense-objects already discussed. What odour is is less obvious than what sound is, or the visible or light; the reason being that our sense of smell lacks precision; it is inferior to that of many animals.
421a10 φαύλως γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου.	Prave enim odorat homo, et nihil odorat odorabilium sine laetitia et tristitia, tamquam non existente certo eo quo sentimus.	For man smells but feebly, discerning nothing odorous save with some special pleasure or disgust, as though our organ for the perception of smells were defective.
421a13 2. εὔλογον δ' οὕτω καὶ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν χρωμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διαδήλους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ ἀφόβῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.	Rationabile est autem sicut et fortes oculis colores sentire, et non permanifestas ipsis esse differentias colorum, nisi terrentium et non terrentium, sic et odores, hominum genus.	It is arguable indeed that, as hard-eyed animals see colour, yet so that delicate differences are not sharply defined to them, except as these cause fear or not, so are smells to the human species.
421a16 ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν, καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ' ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦσιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν ἁφήν τινα, ταύτην δ' ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην·	Videtur enim et olfactus analogiam habere ad gustum, et similiter species humorum cum his quae sunt odoris. Sed certiorem habemus gustum, propter id quod ipse quidam tactus est, hunc autem sensum habet homo certissimum.	For it seems that while smell has an analogy with taste, and the species of savour with odours, yet we have a sharper perception of taste, because this is a sort of touch,—the sense which man possesses to the highest degree of precision.
421a20 ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις λείπεται πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ·	In aliis enim deficit ab animalibus multis. Secundum autem tactum, longe excellentius certiusque quam caetera animalia judicat;	Whereas in the other senses he is inferior to many animals, by touch he can discriminate with exactness far beyond the rest of the animal world.
421a22 διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων.	unde et prudentissimum animalium est.	Hence man is the most sagacious of animals.
421a23 σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.	Signum autem, in genere hominum secundum sensum hunc, ingeniosos esse, et non ingeniosos, secundum alium autem nullum. Duri enim carne inepti mente; molles autem carne, bene apti.	A sign of this is that within the human race, men are gifted or not intellectually in virtue of this sense, and of no other. For coarse-bodied people are mentally inert, whilst the tenderly-fleshed are quick of understanding.
421a26 3. ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω καὶ ὀσμαί, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν, λέγω δὲ οἷον γλυκεῖαν ὀσμὴν καὶ γλυκὺν χυμόν, τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον.	Est autem sicut humor, hic quidem dulcis, ille vero inarus, sic et odores sunt. Sed alia quidem habent proportionaliter odorem et humorem. Dico autem dulcem odorem et dulcem humorem; alia vero contrarium.	As some flavours are sweet, some bitter, so with odours. But some things are analogously endowed with savour and odour: I mean, have a pleasant taste and pleasant smell. In others, however, these qualities are contrary.
421a29 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά ἐστιν ὀσμή. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα διαδήλους εἶναι τὰς ὀσμὰς ὥσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, [ἀπὸ τούτων] εἴληφε τὰ 421b1 ὀνόματα καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ μὲν γλυκεῖα κρόκου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Similiter autem, et acer, et austerus, et acutus, et pinguis est odor; sed sicut diximus, propter id quod non multum manifesti sunt odores, sicut humores, ab his acceperunt nomina secundum similitudinem rerum. Dulcis enim a croco et melle, acer autem a thymo, et huiusmodi. Eodem modo et in aliis.	Likewise odours are pungent, harsh, sharp or oily: but since, as we have said, odours are not very distinct, whereas flavours are, they take their names from the latter, according to resemblance. For a sweet smell comes from saffron and honey: a pungent smell from thyme; and so in other cases.
421b3 4. ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ καὶ ἀνοσφράντου.	Adhuc autem, sicut auditus, et unusquisque sensuum hic quidem audibilis et non audibilis, ille vero visibilis et non visibilis, sic et olfactus odorabilis et non odorabilis.	Furthermore, as hearing (and the same obtains in each of the senses) bears on the audible and the inaudible (and sight on the visible and the invisible), so smell is of the odorous and the odourless.
421b6 ἀνόσφραντον δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὰ τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον <εἶναι> ἔχειν ὀσμήν, τὸ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχον καὶ φαύλην. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄγευστον λέγεται.	Non odorabile autem, aliud quidem secundum id quod omnino impossibile est habere odorem, aliud vero parvum habens et pravum; similiter autem et non gustabile dicitur.	The odourless is either that which simply cannot have a smell at all, or that which has smell but a poor one and feeble in quality. The same can be said of the tasteless.
421b 8 –422a 7]
421b8 5. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα γινόμενα.	[p86/103] Est autem et olfactus per media, ut aerem, aut aquam. Et namque aquatica videntur odorem sentire, similiter autem et quaecumque cum sanguine et sine sanguine, sicut quae in aere. Etenim horum quaedam a longe occurrunt ad alimentum, quae ab odore moventur.	Smelling also takes place through a medium, which is either air or water. For aquatic animals seem also to perceive odours, both those with blood and those without, like animals that live in the air; for some of them traverse long distances for their food, being drawn to it by smell.
421b13 6. διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὀσμᾶται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων μέν, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἀλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ·	Unde et dubium videtur, si omnia quidem quae sub odore fiunt similiter odorent, homo autem respirans odorat, non respirans autem sed expirans, aut retinens spiritum, non odorat, neque a longe, neque a prope, neque si in nasum intus apponatur.	So there seems to be a difficulty. If operations of smell are of the same type, yet man smells by inhaling: when exhaling or holding his breath he smells nothing, neither from a distance, nor close at hand, not even if the object is placed inside the nose.
421b17 καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων·	Et hoc quidem in ipso organo positum, quo sentitur, insensibile esse, omuibus commune est; sed sine respiratione non sentire proprium est hominum.	(That a thing should be imperceptible when placed on the very organ of sensation, is indeed common to all, but to be unable to perceive without breathing is peculiar to man.
421b19 δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις· ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἄν τιν' αἴσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας.	Manifestum autem est tentantibus. Quare sanguinem non habentia quoniam non respirant, alterum utique quemdam sensum habent, praeter eos, qui dicti sunt.	This is evident to those who. make the experiment). Since then, bloodless animals do not breathe, they would seem to have some other sense besides those which have been spoken of.
421b21 ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὄσφρησίς ἐστιν.	Sed impossibile est: siquidem odorem sentiunt. Odorabilis enim sensus, et mali odoramenti et boni odoramenti olfactus est.	But this is impossible, if it is odour they perceive. For the sense for odours, good odours or bad, is smell.
421b23 ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα.	Amplius autem, et corrumpi videntur a fortibus odoribus a quibus homo corrumpitur, ut asphalto, sulphure, et huiusmodi. Olfactum quidem igitur habere necessarium etiam non respirantia.	Furthermore, they seem to be overcome by the same strong odours as man, such as asphalt; brimstone and the like. Therefore, even if they do not breathe, they must smell.
421b26 7. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων-τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μηδ' ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ·	Videtur autem in hominibus differre hoc sensitivum ad ea, quae aliorum animalium, sicut oculi ad ea, quae durorum oculorum sunt. Hi enim habent phragma, et sicut velamen, palpebras, quas aliquis non movens neque retrahens, non videt.	Now this sense seems to differ as between man and other animals, as human eyes differ from the hard eyes of some animals. The former have a covering or protection, the eye-lids, and unless these are moved or withdrawn, one does not see.
421b30 τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ-οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν 422a1 ἀκαλυφὲς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεται, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων.	Fortia autem oculis, nihil huiusmodi habent, sed mox vident quae fiunt in diaphano. Sic igitur, et organum odoratus, aliis quidem sine operculo est, sicut oculus; aliis vero aerem recipientibus, habere cooperimentum, quod respirantibus discooperitur, ampliatis venis et poris.	Hard-eyed animals have nothing like, this; they see at once whatever happens to be present in the transparent medium. In the same way, then, the organ of smell is in some animals like an eye with no covering; in others, which inhale air, it has a covering that is withdrawn when they respire and so distend the veins and pores.
422a3 8. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύσαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.	Et propter hoc respirantia non odoraut in aqua. Necessarium enim est ea odorem pati respirando, hoc autem facere in humido im. possibile est. Est autem odor, sicci, sicut humor humidi.	And for this reason animals that breathe do not smell in water. For they must respire if they are to be affected by odour, and they cannot do this in a liquid.
422a6 ἔστι δ' ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ (ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ), τὸ δὲ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον.	Odorativum autem sensitivum, potentia huiusmodi est tale,	Odour is of dry things as savour of liquid; and the sense-organ of smell is such in potency.
422a 8 –422b 17 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ι'		BOOK II, CHAPTER X
422a8 1. Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἁπτόν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῇ ἁφῇ.	[p87/104] Gustabile autem est quoddam tangibile; et hoc est causa, quare non sit sensibile per medium extraneum corpus. Neque enim lactus.	The tasteable is a sort of tangible; hence, it is not perceptible through an extraneous body as medium, any more than the object of touch.
422a10 καὶ τὸ σῶμα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, τὸ γευστόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ ὡς ὕλῃ· τοῦτο δ' ἁπτόν τι.	Et corpus, in quo est humor, quod est gustabile, est in humido sicut in materia. Hoc autem quiddam tangibile.	And the body in which is savour, i.e. the tasteable, is in liquid as its material, which is tangible.
422a11 διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν ὕδατι ἦμεν, ᾐσθανόμεθ' ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος, οὐκ ἦν δ' ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μιχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτοῦ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ μίγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις.	Unde et si in aqua essemus, sentiremus utique appositum dulce; non autem esset tunc nobis sensus per medium, sed ex eo, quod misceretur humido, sicut in potu. Color autem non sic videtur ex eo quod miscetur, neque de fluxionibus.	Hence, if we were in water, we should taste a sweet thing put into it; not that the sensation would then operate through a medium, but because the savour would be mixed with the water, as in a drink. (Colour, however, is not thus seen because of any mixture or efflux.)
422a15 ὡς μὲν οὖν τὸ μεταξὺ οὐθὲν ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός.	Ut quidem igitur medium nihil est. Ut autem color, visibile, sic gustabile humor est.	There is then nothing corresponding to a medium [in tasting]. As colour is the visible, so savour is the tasteable.
422a17 οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθησιν ἄνευ ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ ἁλμυρόν· εὔτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης.	Non autem facit humoris sensum, sine humiditate, sed habet actu, aut potentia humiditatem, ut saliva. Bene enim liquida ipsa, et est liquefactiva linguae.	It causes no sensation of taste except in liquid; but it must be moist, actually or potentially; as [with] saliva which is very liquid and moistens the tongue.
422a20 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τε τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους),	Sicut autem visus, et visibilis est, et invisibilis, tenebra autem invisibilis est, judicat autem et ipsam visus; adhuc autem et valde splendidi est, etenim hoc invisibile est, alio autem modo, quam tenebra.	As sight is of the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, and sight discerns this also, as it does, in addition, the extremely bright, which is also invisible, but in quite another way);
422a23 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ' οὐκ ἀκουστόν, καὶ μεγάλου ψόφου καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ (ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μικρὸς ψόφος ἀνήκουστος, τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ὁ μέγας τε καὶ ὁ βίαιος),	Similiter autem, et auditus, sonique, et silentii, quorum aliud audibile, aliud non audibile, et magni soni, sicut visus est splendidi. Sicut enim parvus sonus inaudibilis quodammodo, sic et magnus et violentus.	[and as] the same holds of hearing, which is of sound and silence, one being audible, the other inaudible, and [the latter includes] excess of sound, which is to hearing as brilliance is to sight; for as a feeble sound is in a way inaudible, so, in another way, is an extremely violent one.
422a26 ἀόρατον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλων τὸ ἀδύνατον, τὸ δ' ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄπουν καὶ τὸ ἀπύρηνον-οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ γευστοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεύστου, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν ἢ φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως.	Invisibile autem, aliud quidem omnino dicitur, sicut et in aliis impossibile, aliud autem quamvis aptum natum, non habet, aut prave, sicut quod sine pedibus est, et sine gradu dicitur. Sic autem gustus, gustabilisque, et non gustabilis. Hoc autem est parvum, aut pravum habens humorem, aut corruptivum gustus.	(‘Invisible’ indeed can mean either what is absolutely such, or [the term may also be used] as in other cases of ‘the impossible’ where [this concept] is applied both to what lacks what it ought to have by nature, and to what has this defectively,—as we say of a footless [animal] that it is motionless.) So, in the same way, taste is of the savourable and the non-savourable, the latter being what has either only a faint savour, or one altogether destructive of the taste.
422a31 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ ἄποτον (γεῦσις γάρ τις ἀμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν φαύλη καὶ φθαρτική [τῆς γεύσεως], τοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν)·	Videtur autem principium esse potabile et iion potabile. Gustus enim quidam ambo. Sedhoc quidem, ut parvum, et corruptivum gustus, illud autem secundum naturam;	It would seem that the principle of this is the drinkable or the non-drinkable; and taste is of both, but the latter as either a faint taste or one that destroys the sense: whilst the ‘former is according to nature.
422a33 ἔστι δὲ κοινὸν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως τὸ ποτόν.	est autem commune tactus et gustus, potabile.	The drinkable is common to taste and touch.
422a34 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑγρὸν τὸ γευστόν, 422b1 ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι· πάσχει γάρ τι ἡ γεῦσις ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ, ᾗ γευστόν.	Quoniam autem humidum quidem est gustabile, necesse est sensitivum ipsius, neque humidum esse actu, neque im. possibile fieri humidum. Patitur enim aliquid guastus a gu stabili secundum quod gustabile est.	Since what is tasteable is liquid, it is necessary that the sense-organ be neither liquid actually, nor incapable of becoming so. For taste is affected by the savourable thing as such.
422b3 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ὑγρανθῆναι τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζόμενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον.	Necessarium est ergo humectatum esse, quod possibile humectari salvatum, non huniidum autem gustativum sensitivum.	It is therefore necessary that the sensorium be moistened, yet in such a way that it keeps its potentiality thereto; the tasting sense being non-humid.
422b5 σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν τὴν γλῶτταν αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν·	Signum autem neque siccam existentem linguam sentire, neque multum humidam.	There is a sign of this in that the tongue cannot perceive taste either when it is dry or when it is too moist.
422b6 αὕτη γὰρ ἁφῇ γίνεται τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευματίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου, καὶ οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνεσθαι.	Hic enim tactus fit primi humidi; sicut cum aliquis qui ante gustavit fortem humorem, gustet alterum, et ut laborantibus amara omnia videntur, propter id, quod lingua plena huiusmodi humiditate sentit.	In the latter case contact takes place with the original moisture; as when one who has first tasted a very strong flavour then tastes another, or those burdened [with fever] taste all things as bitter because the tongue is saturated in a liquid of that sort.
422b10 2. τὰ δ' εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἁλμυρόν· μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ·	Species autem humorum, sicut et in coloribus, simplices quidem contrariae sunt, sicut dulce et amarum. Habitae autem sunt cum hac quidem pingue, cum illa vero salitum: media autem humorum acre, et austerum, et ponticum et acutum.	The species of savour are, like colours, the simple contraries; sweet and bitter. Adjoining these, however, are, with the former, the succulent, with the latter, the saline. Then there are the intermediary flavours: pungent, harsh, stringent and piquant.
422b14 σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευστικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.	Fere enim hae videntur esse humorum differentiae. Quare gustativum est potentia huiusmodi. Gustabile autem est factivum actu huius.	These seem to be about all the varieties of savour that exist; to which taste, as such, therefore, is in potency; the savourable being what reduces it to act.
422b 17 –423a 22 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER XI
422b17 1. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ μὴ μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἀλλὰ πλείους, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω εἶναι.	[p90/107] De tangibili autem et tactu eadem ratio. Si enim tactus non est unus sensus, sed plures, necessarium et tangibilia sensibilia plura esse.	The same reasoning holds for the tangible and touch. If touch is not one sense, but several, then the tangible sense-objects must necessarily be several.
422b19 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν πότερον πλείους εἰσὶν ἢ μία, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ, πότερον ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν ἐστι τὸ μεταξύ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐντός.	Habet autem dubitationem, utrum plures sint, aut unus. Et quid est sensitivum tangibile, utrum caro, et in aliis proportionale, aut non, sed hoc quidem est medium, primum autem sensitivum aliud quiddam est intus.	But it is a problem whether it is one sense or several: and what the organ is—whether it is the flesh, or what corresponds to flesh in other [animals], or not; and if not, then this [flesh] would be the medium, while the primary sense organ would be something else within.
422b23 2. πᾶσα γὰρ αἴσθησις μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, καὶ ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, καὶ γεῦσις πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος·	Omnis etenim sensus unius contrarietatis esse videtur, ut visus albi et nigri, auditus gravis et acuti, gustus amari et dulcis.	For every sense seems to be of a single contrariety, as sight of white and black, hearing of high and low, taste of sweet and bitter.
422b25 ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα.	In tangibili autem multae insunt contrarietates, calidum frigidum, humidum siccum, durum molle, et alioram quaecumque sunt huiusmodi.	But in the tangible order there are several contrarieties, hot and cold, dry and wet, hard and soft, and the like.
422b27 ἔχει δέ τινα λύσιν πρός γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων εἰσὶν ἐναντιώσεις πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης, καὶ λειότης καὶ τραχύτης φωνῆς, καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα.	Habet antem solutionem quamdam ad hanc dubitationem, et quod in aliis sensibus sunt contrarietates plures, ut in voce non solum acumen et gravitas, sed et magnitudo et parvitas, et lenitas et asperitas vocis, et similia alia. Sunt et circa colorem differentiae huiusmodi alterae.	Here is a partial solution of this problem: that in other senses also there are several contraries; as in voice there is not only high and low but also loud and soft, smooth and rough, and other such qualities. There is also a like variety of differences in colour.
422b31 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἓν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος, οὕτω τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔνδηλον.	Sed quod sit unum subjectum, sicut auditui sonus, sic tactui, non est manifestum.	But it is not clear what is the underlying unity of touch, as sound is of hearing.
422b34 3. πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐντός, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' 423a1 εὐθέως ἡ σάρξ, οὐδὲν δοκεῖ σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα θιγγανομένων.	Utrum autem est seusitivum intus, aut non, sed mox caro, nullum videtur esse signum fieri sensum simul cum tactu.	It is not evidence as to whether the sense-organ is interior or is the flesh, immediately, that the sensation arises simultaneously with contact.
423a2 καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἴ τίς <τι> περὶ τὴν σάρκα περιτείνειεν οἷον ὑμένα ποιήσας, ὁμοίως τὴν αἴσθησιν εὐθέως ἁψάμενος ἐνσημανεῖ· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον (εἰ δὲ καὶ συμφυὲς γένοιτο, θᾶττον ἔτι διικνοῖτ' ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις)·	Etenim nunc si aliquid circa carnem extenderit, ut pellem, faciens similiter sensum mox tactum insinuat; et ta men constat, quod non est in hoc sensitivum. Si autem et connaturale fuerit, citius utique pertinget sensus.	For if, as things are, one were to stretch a covering or membrane over the skin, a sensation would still arise immediately on making contact; yet it is obvious that the sense-organ was not in this membrane. And if it were ingrown the sensation would reach the sensorium even sooner.
423a6 4. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κύκλῳ ἡμῖν περιεπεφύκει ὁ ἀήρ·	Propter quod talis pars corporis videtur sic se habere, sicut si circulariter nobis adnatus esset aer.	Therefore it appears that the relation of this part of the body [to the whole] is comparable to that which air would have if it formed a natural covering that grew all round our bodies.
423a8 ἐδοκοῦμεν γὰρ ἂν ἑνί τινι αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρώματος καὶ ὀσμῆς, καὶ μία τις αἴσθησις εἶναι ὄψις ἀκοὴ ὄσφρησις.	Videremur enim uno quodam sentire, et sonum, et odorem, et colorem; et unus quidem sensus, esse auditus, et visus et olfactus.	For then it would appear that we perceived sound and odour and colour through some one common medium, and even that there were but one sense for hearing, seeing and smelling.
423a10 νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαι δι' οὗ γίνονται αἱ κινήσεις, φανερὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθητήρια ἕτερα ὄντα.	Nunc autem quoniam determinatum est per quod fiunt motus, manifesta sunt praedicta sensitiva altera esse.	Since in fact, however, there exists something definite through which the motions [of these senses] are produced, it is evident that each of these senses is diverse.
423a11 ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς τοῦτο νῦν ἄδηλον· ἐξ ἀέρος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα· δεῖ γάρ τι στερεὸν εἶναι·	In tactu autem hoc quidem nunc immanifestum est. Ex aere quidem enim aut aqua impossibile est constare animatum corpus. Oportet enim firmum esse.	But in the case of touch, this is still far from clear. It is impossible that an animated body be constituted from air or water, for it must be solid.
423a13 λείπεται δὴ μικτὸν ἐκ τῆς καὶ τούτων εἶναι, οἷον βούλεται εἶναι ἡ σὰρξ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ προσπεφυκός, δι' οὗ γίνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πλείους οὖσαι.	Relinquitur autem mixtum ex terra, et ex his esse, ut vult caro, et proportionale. Quare necessarium est, et corpus esse, quod medium est tactui, adnatum, per quod fiant sensus, cum sunt plures,	It can, then, only be a mixture from earth and the other elements, as flesh (or its counterpart) requires. Wherefore it is necessary that the medium of touch be a body conjoined [to the organism] through which its sensations, which are several, may come about.
423a17 5. δηλοῖ δ' ὅτι πλείους ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης ἁφή· ἁπάντων γὰρ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον καὶ χυμοῦ.	Demonstrat autem quod plures sint, is qui in lingua est tactus. Omnia enim tangibilia sentit, secundum eamdem partem, et humorem.	That they are several is proved by the fact that there is touch in the tongue; for that same member feels all kinds of tangible objects, as well as savours.
423a19 εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σὰρξ ᾐσθάνετο τοῦ χυμοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία εἶναι αἴσθησις ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἀφή· νῦν δὲ δύο διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν.	Siquidem igitur et alia caro sentir et humorem, videretur unus et idem esse sensus gustus et tactus. Nunc autem sunt duo, propter id quod non convertitur.	If every part of the flesh perceived savours it would seem that touch and taste were one and the same. But we know that the are two, in that one organ cannot be substituted for the other.
423a 21 –424a 15]
423a21 6. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα βάθος ἔχει, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος, ὧν δ' ἐστὶ δύο σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι, τὸ δ' ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ σώματος, οὐδὲ τὸ διερόν,	[p92/109] Dubitabit autem aliquis, si omne corpus profunditatem habet. Haec autem est tertia magnitudo; quorum autem corporum medium est aliquod corpus, non contingit ipsa adinvicem se tangere. Humidum autem non est sine corpore, neque humectatum,	A problem arises, on the assumption that every body has depth, that is, the third dimension. Bodies having [between them] a medium which is a body cannot touch one another. Now every liquid involves body, and so does everything moistened;
423a25 ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν ὕδωρ, τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα,	sed necesse est aquam esse, aut habere aquam. Quae vero tanguntur adinvicem in aqua, nisi sicca extrema sint, necesse est aquam habere mediam qua repleta sint ultima.	it must either be water or contain water. But things in contact with one another in water must necessarily have water as a medium covering their extremities, unless these last be dry.
423a28 εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου ἐν ὕδατι, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι (ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει ὁ ἀὴρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι, λανθάνει δὲ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα 423b1 εἰ διερὸν διεροῦ ἅπτεται)	Si autem hoc verum, impossibile est aliquod corpus tangere aliud in aqua. Eodem autem modo est et in aere. Similiter enim se habet aer ad ea quae sunt in ipso, et aqua ad ea quae sunt in aqua. Latet autem magis nos, sicut et ea quae sunt in aqua, animalia, si humectatum tangit humectatum.	If this is true, it is impossible for one body to touch another in water. The same holds good of air (for air is to the things that are in it as water to things in water) although this fact is less evident to us, just as animals that live in water are unaware that bodies that touch in water are all wet.
423b1 —πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ ἡ μὲν γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἄποθεν.	Utrum igitur omnium similiter sit sensus, an aliorum aliter, sicut nunc videtur, gustus quidem et tactus in tangendo, alii autem a longe.	The question then is, whether there is one way of sensing for all objects of sense, or different ways for diverse objects. The latter at first sight seems to be the case,—taste and touch being effected by contact, the others from a distance.
423b3 τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν·	Hoc autem non est; sed durum et molle per altera sentimus, sicut et sonabile, et visibile, et odorabile.	But this is not so: we perceive the hard and the soft through something intervening, just as we do the audible and the visible and the odorous.
423b6 ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν, διὸ λανθάνει·	Sed alia quidem a longe, alia vero a prope: propter quod latet:	But of these objects, some operate at a distance, others close at hand. That is why the fact escapes us:
423b7 ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούτων λανθάνει. καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, κἂν εἰ δι' ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων λανθάνοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι·	quod omnia quidem sentimus per medium, sed in his latet. Et quidem, sicut diximus prius, et si per pellem sentiremus omnia tangibilia, ignorantes quod prohibet, similiter utique haberemus, sicut et nunc et in aqua, et in aere:	we do perceive everything through a medium, but the fact is not evident in the latter cases. Indeed, as we said before, if we were to perceive all tangible objects through a membrane, not knowing what was interpolated, we should think we touched the objects themselves, as we now do in air and water:
423b11 δοκοῦμεν γὰρ νῦν αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου.	Putamus enim nos nunc ipsa tangere, et nibil esse medium.	for in these cases we think we touch the objects and that there is no medium.
423b12 8. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπτὸν τῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ, ὥσπερ ὁ δι' ἀσπίδος πληγείς·	Sed differt tangibile a visibilibus et sonativis: quoniam illa quidem sentimus ex eo, quod medium movet aliquid nos, tangibilia vero non a medio, sed simul cum medio, sicut per clypeum percussus.	But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible; for we perceive the latter in that the medium itself produces some effect in us; whereas the tangible does not affect us through the medium so much as with the medium, simultaneously, as when one is struck on a shield.
423b16 οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀσπὶς πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ' ἅμ' ἄμφω συνέβη πληγῆναι.	Non enim clypeus percussus prius percussit, sed simul accidit utraque percuti.	For the shield does not strike its holder after it is itself struck; but the two are struck at once.
423b17 9. ὅλως δ' ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον.	Omnino autem videtur caro, et lingua, sicut aqua et aer ad visum et auditum et olfactum se habent, sic se habere ad sensitivum, sicut illorum unumquodque.	It would seem in general that flesh and the tongue stand to the sense-organ precisely as water and air to sight and hearing and smell, each to its respective sense.
423b20 αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου οὔτ' ἐκεῖ οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα γένοιτ' ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις σῶμά τι λευκὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον.	Ipso autem sensitivo tacto, neque ibi neque hic fiet utique sensus: ut si quis ponat corpus album in oculo ultimum.	When the sense organ is touched (as when one places a white object on the surface of the eye), no sensation is produced in either case.
423b22 ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν.	Quare et manifestum quod intus sit, tangibilis sensitivum;	Hence the organ of the tangible is internal;
423b23 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν συμβαίνοι ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐπιτιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται· ὥστε τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.	sic enim utique accidit, quod et in aliis. Apposita enim super sensorium non sentiunt, super autem carnem posita sentiunt; quare medium tactus est caro.	for the same thing happens in this sense as in the others; what is placed on the organ they do not perceive. What, however, is placed on the flesh they do perceive; flesh, then, is the medium of touch.
423b26 10. ἁπταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ᾗ σῶμα· λέγω δὲ διαφορὰς αἳ τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν στοιχείων.	Tangibiles quidem igitur sunt differentiae corporis, secundum quod corpus. Dico autem differentias, quibus elementa determinantur, calidum, frigidum, humidum, et siccum, de quibus dictum est in his quae de elementis.	Tangible objects vary therefore with differences, of body as is such—I mean the differences by which the elements are distinguished, as hot and cold, wet and dry, as is stated in our work on the elements.
423b29 11. τὸ δὲ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη ἁφὴ ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι μόριον· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι 424a1 πάσχειν τι ἐστίν·	Sensorium autem ipsaruin, quod tactivum, et in quo sensus vocatus tactus, est primo, quod potentia huiusmodi pars est. Sentire enim pati quoddam est.	The sense organ for these, the tactile, in which the sense called touch is principally lodged, is the part in potency to these qualities. For to perceive is to receive an impression.
424a1 ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν, οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο ποιεῖ, δυνάμει ὄν.	Quare faciens quale ipsum actu, tale illud facit, cum sit potentia.	Hence whatever makes the organ to be such as itself is actually, does so, the organ being in potency thereto.
424a2 διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως.	Unde similiter calidum et frigidum, aut durum et molle non sentimus, sed excellentias, tamquam sensu velut medietate quadam existente ejus, quae in sensibilibus, contrarietatis.	Hence we do not perceive what has heat, or cold or hardness or softness to an exact similitude of our own heat, and so forth, but rather the extremes of these: the sense being, as it were, in a mean state between the contrary extremes in the objects perceived;
424a5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν· γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων·	Et propter hoc discernit sensibilia. Medium enim discretivum est. Fit enim ad utrumque ipsorum, alterum ultimorum.	which is how it discriminates between them. For a mean is discriminative; in the presence of either extreme it becomes the contrary one.
424a7 καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον αἰσθήσεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μηδέτερον αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δ' ἄμφω (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁφῆς μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρόν.	Et oportet, sicut debens sentire album et nigrum neutrum ipsorum habere actu, potentia vero utrumque, sic autem et in aliis, et in actu, neque calidum neque frigidum.	Hence, as whatever is to perceive black or white must have neither of these in itself actually, but both potentially (and so with the other sense-objects), so touch must be actually neither hot nor cold.
424a10 12. ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου ἦν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου·	Amplius autem sicut visibilis et invisibilis erat quodammodo visus, similiter autem et reliqui oppositorum, sic et tactus, et tangibilis et intangibilis.	Further: as sight is, in a way, of the visible and the invisible (and similarly with the rest of such opposites), so touch is of both the tangible and the intangible.
424a12 ἄναπτον δ' ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν διαφορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά.	Intangibile autem, parvam omnino habens differentiam tangibilium, ut passus est aer. Et tangibilium excellentiae sicut corruptiva.	The intangible is that which has the distinguishing quality of tangibles to a very small extent, as air is affected; and also the excessively tangible, such as things destructive.
424a15 καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τύπῳ.	Secundum quidem igitur unumquemque sensum, dictum est figuraliter.	We have now said in outline something about each of the senses.
424a 17 –424b 20 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒ'		BOOK II, CHAPTER XII
424a17 1. Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός·	[p95/112] Oportet autem universaliter de omni sensu accipere, quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut cera, anuli sine ferro et auro, recipit signum. Accipit autem aureum aut aeneum signum, sed non inquantum aurum aut aes.	It must be taken as a general rule that all sensation is the receiving of forms without matter, as wax receives a seal without the iron or gold of the signet-ring. It receives an imprint of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze.
424a21 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.	Similiter autem et sensus uniuscuiusque, ab habente colorem aut humorem aut sonum patitur, sed non inquantum unumquodque illorum dicitur, sed. inquantum tale est, et secundum rationem.	Similarly the sense of any sense-object is acted upon by a thing having colour or flavour or sound; not, however, in respect of what each, is called as a particular thing, but in so far as each has a certain quality and according to its informing principle.
424a24 2. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον· μέγεθος μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οὐ μὴν τό γε αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.	Sensitivum autem primum est in quo huiusmodi potentia. Et quidem igitur idem, sed esse alterum est. Magnitudo quidem enim quaedam erit, quod sensum patitur. Non tamen sensitivo esse, neque sensus magnitudo est, sed ratio quae. dam et potentia illius.	The primary sensitive part is that in which a power of this sort resides. They [part and power] are indeed the same thing, but differ in mode of being. What receives sensation will be an extended magnitude, but neither being sensitive nor sensation is a magnitude. Each is, rather, a certain ratio and power of a magnitude.
424a28 3. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λόγος-τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις-ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα τῶν χορδῶν),	Manifestum autem ex his, et propter quid sensibilium excellentiae corrumpunt sensitiva. Si namque sit fortior sensitivo motus, solvitur ratio: hoc autem erat sensus. Sicut et symphonia, et tonus, percussis fortiter chordis.	It is clear from these facts why the excess of sensible qualities destroys the sense-organs. For if the change is too violent for the sense-organ, the ratio [of the latter] is lost,—which [ratio] is the sense. It is as with tone and harmony when the strings are violently struck.
424a32 4. καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν (καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται 424b1 καὶ θερμαίνεται)· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.	Et propter quid plantae non sentiunt, habentes quamdam partem animalem, et patientes a tangibilibus. Et namque frigescunt, et calescunt. Causa enim est non habere medietatem, neque huiusmodi principium possibile recipere species sensibilium, sed pati cum materia.	Also it is plain why plants have no sensation, though they have some share in soul, and are affected by tangible objects to become hot or cold. The reason is that they lack a mean or principle of this kind, able to receive the forms of sense-objects; they are acted upon materially.
424b3 5. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ πάθοι ἄν τι ὑπ' ὀσμῆς τὸ ἀδύνατον ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον ἰδεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	Dubitabit autem aliquis, si patiatur aliquid ab odore quod impossibile est olfactum habere: aut a colore non possibile videre. Similiter autem et in aliis.	It might be asked, is anything affected by odour if it cannot have the sense of smell—or by colour, if it is unable to see? An d so in the other cases.
424b5 εἰ δὲ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ, τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ποιεῖ· ὥστε τῶν ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ' ὀσμῆς (ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων)· οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλ' <ἢ> ᾗ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον.	Si autem olfactibile est odor, si aliquid facit olfactum, odor facit. Quare quae nequeunt olfactum habere, non possunt pati ab odore. Eadem autem est ratio et in aliis, neque possibilium, nisi inquantum unumquodque sensitivum est.	But if what can be smelt is odour, whatever causes smell is odour.]. Hence things incapable of smelling cannot be affected by odour. The same argument holds for the other senses. And of subjects that can perceive, the ability belongs to them only in virtue of each being sensitive.
424b9 ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ οὕτως· οὔτε γὰρ φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ βροντῆς διίστησι τὸ ξύλον.	Simul autem manifestum est et sic. Neque enim lumen et tenebra, neque sonus, neque odor quicquam facit in corpora; sed ea in quibus sunt, ut aer, qui est cum tonitruo, scindit lignum.	The same is evident thus: neither light or darkness or sound or odour affect bodies; but only what they occur in does so; e.g. it is the air which accompanies thunder that smashes trees.
424b12 6. ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ μή, ὑπὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο;	Sed tangibilia et humores faciunt. Si enim non, a quo utique paterentur inanimata, et alterarentur ? Ergo ne et illa faciunt?	But things tangible and savours do so affect things. If not, what is it that inanimate things are affected and changed by?
424b14 ἆρ' οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιήσει; ἢ οὐ πᾶν σῶμα παθητικὸν ὑπ' ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου, καὶ τὰ πάσχοντα ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον ἀήρ (ὄζει γὰρ ὥσπερ παθών τι);	Aut non omne corpus passivum ab odore et sono, et patientia indeterminata, et quae non manent, ut aer. Foetet sicut patiens aliquid.	Therefore, do not also the other sense-objects have a like effect? But not every body is affected by odour or sound, such recipients being only things indefinite and unstable like air: which may smell as though affected somehow.
424b16 τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται;	Quid igitur est odorare, praeter pati aliquid? At odorare sentire est. Aer autem est patiens hoc mox sensibilis fit.	What then is to smell, save to be ‘affected somehow’? But to smell is to sense. Air, however, being so affected, becomes rapidly sensible.