Authors/Aristotle/de anima/L3

Greek	Latin	English
ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Α' 424b 22 –425b 10		BOOK III, CHAPTER I
424b22 Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἑτέρα παρὰ τὰς πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν, γεῦσιν, ἁφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις.	[p98/115] Quod autem non sit sensus alius, praeter quinque (Dico autem hos, visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum,) ex his credet aliquis.	That there is no other sense besides the five enumerated—I mean, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—is tenable for the following reasons:
Not in Bekker		(and this is so arranged that (a) if more than one kind of sensible object is perceivable through a single medium, the possessor of a sense-organ homogeneous with that medium has the power of perceiving both kinds of objects; for example, if the sense-organ is made of air, and air is a medium both for sound and for colour; and that (b) if more than one medium can transmit the same kind of sensible objects, as e.g. water as well as air can transmit colour, both being transparent, then the possessor of either alone will be able to perceive the kind of objects transmissible through both);
424b24 εἰ γὰρ παντὸς οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἁφὴ καὶ νῦν αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ᾗ ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη τ', εἴπερ ἐκλείπει τις αἴσθησις, καὶ αἰσθητήριόν τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν,	Si enim ejus omnis, cuius est sensus tactus, et nunc sensum habemus (Omnes enim tangibiles passiones, tactu nobis sensibiles sunt) necesse est, si deficit aliquis sensus, et organum aliquod nobis deficere.	For if we have sensation of all the objects of the sense of touch (all varieties of the tangible being in fact perceptible by us through touch) then, if we lack some [class of] sensation, we must be lacking also in some sense-organ.
424b27 καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν τυγχάνομεν ἔχοντες, ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξὺ καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ' οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι,	Et quaecumque quidem ipsi tangentes sentimus, tactu sensibilia sunt quem habemus. Quaecumque vero per media, et non ipsa tangentes simplicibus intervallis; dico autem, ut aere et aqua;	Now whatever we perceive by contact is perceptible to us through that sense of touch which we do in fact possess. But whatever we perceive through a medium and without contact is perceived through intervening simple elements (I mean such as air and water);
424b31 2. ἔχει δ' οὕτως ὥστ' εἰ μὲν δι' ἑνὸς πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον ἀμφοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι (οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρόας), εἰ δὲ πλείω 425a1 τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ἄμφω γὰρ διαφανῆ), καὶ ὁ τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται τοῦ δι' ἀμφοῖν,	habent autem sic ut si per unum, plura sensibilia existentia altera abinvicem genere, necesse sit habentem huiusmodi sensitivum, utrorumque sensitivum esse, ut si ex aere est sensitivum, et est aer medium soui et coloris. Si vero plura ejusdem sint, ut coloris, et aer et aqua, utraque enim diaphana; et quod alterum ipsorum est habens solum, sentiet id, quod per utraque, aut quod ab ambobus.	and [in this case] things are so disposed that if several sense-objects, differing generically from one another, are perceptible through one medium, then, necessarily, what has a sense-organ of this kind can perceive either object—e.g. if the organ is constituted of air, then air is medium for both colour and sound. But if there are several media for the same sense object, as air and water are for colour (both being transparent), what is possessed of either [medium] alone will perceive what comes through either or both.
425a3 3. τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη ὕδατος, ἡ δ' ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δ' ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων), τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν πάντων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν),	Simplicium autem ex duobus his sensitiva solum sunt, ex aere et aqua. Pupilla quidem enim aquae, auditus vero aeris, olfactus autem horum alterius est. Ignis autem, aut nullius est, aut communis omnibus. Nihil enim sine calore, sensitivum est.	The sense-organs are formed of these two simple bodies only, air and water. For the pupil is of water; the [organ of] hearing, of air; and smell of either. But fire is found in none, or is common to all; for nothing without heat is sensitive.
425a6 γῆ δὲ ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ μάλιστα μέμικται ἰδίως, διὸ λείποιτ' ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος,	Terra vero, aut nullius est, aut in tactu maxime miscetur. Unde relinquitur, nullum esse sensitivum extra aerem et aquam.	Earth either belongs to none, or is especially involved in touch. Whence it remains that there is no sense-organ without air and water.
425a8 4. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια ζῷα—πᾶσαι ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων (φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ ἀσπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς)· ὥστ' εἰ μή τι ἕτερον ἔστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλείποι αἴσθησις.	Haec autem nunc quaedam habent animalia. Omnes igitur sensus habentur a non imperfectis, neque orbatis; videtur enim et talpa sub pelle habens oculos. Quare si non alterum aliquod est corpus, et passio, quae nullius est eorum, quae sunt hic corporum, neque ullius utique deficiet sensus.	Now these organs certain animals do in fact possess. All the senses therefore are found in animals neither incomplete or defective (for even the mole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin). Therefore, if there is no other kind of body, and no qualities other than those of the bodies here present, no sense will be lacking to any [such] animal.
425a13 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ' εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ·	At vero neque communium potest esse sensitivum aliquod proprium, quae unoquoque sensu sentimus, non secundum accidens, ut motus, status, figurae, magnitudinis, numeri, unius.	But there cannot be a sense proper to the common qualities which we perceive by any one sense, yet not incidentally merely: such as movement, rest, shape, size, number, unity.
425a16 ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα [κινήσει] αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει (ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα),	Haec enim omnia motu sentimus, ut magnitudinem motu, quare et figuram. Magnitudo enim quaedam et figura est.	For we know all these by motion: that is, we know size by movement and from size, shape; for shape is itself a kind of size.
425a18 τὸ δ' ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις (ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις)· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁτουοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως·	Quiescens autem ex eo quod non movetur. Numerus vero negatione continui et proprii. Unusquisque enim unum sentit sensus. Quare manifestum est, quod impossibile est cuiusque horum proprium sensum esse.	What is at rest we know as not moving, and number as the negation of continuity and identity. For each sense perceives some one thing, so that it is impossible that there should be a sense specially adapted to any of these.
425a21 οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα· 6. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ᾗ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν.	Sic enim erit, sicut nunc visu dulce sentimus. Hoc autem est, quoniam amborum habentes existimamus sensum quo cum coinciderint, cognoscimus.	The situation would, in that case, be as when we perceive what is sweet by sight. This happens because we take account of the sensation of both these, so that when they coincide we are aware of it.
425a24 εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ᾐσθανόμεθα (οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν οὐχ ὅτι Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ' ὅτι λευκός, τούτῳ δὲ συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι)·	Si vero non, nequaquam utique, sed tantum secundum accidens sentiremus, ut Cleonis filium, non quia Cleonis filius est, sed quoniam albus. Huic autem accidit, filium Cleonis esse.	If it were not so, we should perceive this only incidentally, as when we see the son of Cleon not as the son of Cleon but as something white; with which object there happens to coincide the fact of being the son of Cleon.
425a27 7. τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐκ ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἰδία· οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἂν ᾐσθανόμεθα ἀλλ' ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται [τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν].	Communium autem habemus iam sensum conimunem, non secundum accidens. Non igitur est proprius. Nequaquam enim utique sentiremus, nisi sicut dictum est Cleonis filium nos videre.	But we have a general sense for common qualities, And this not merely incidentally. Hence, there is not a proper sense [for them]. [If there were] we should never perceive them except in the way we have said that we see the son of Cleon.
425a30 τὰ δ' ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθάνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ᾗ αὐταί, ἀλλ' ᾗ μία, ὅταν 425b1 ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χολῆς ὅτι πικρὰ καὶ ξανθή (οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἑτέρας γε τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄμφω ἕν)·	Adinvicem enim propria, secundum accidens sentiunt sensus, non secundum quod ipsi sunt, sed secundum quod unus, cum simul fiat sensus in edem, ut cholera quidem amara et rubicunda. Non enim alterius est dicere, quod ambo sint unum.	The senses perceive incidentally what is proper to one another; [perceiving] not in their specific capacity, but in so far as they form one sense,—as in the perception of bile as both reddish in colour and bitter. It does not pertain to either sense to judge that these are qualities of one thing.
425b3 διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ ἐὰν ᾖ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἶναι.	Propter quod et decipitur, quod si sit rubicundum, choleram opinatur esse.	Hence arises the mistaken view that, if a thing is reddish, it is bile.
425b4 8. ζητήσειε δ' ἄν τις τίνος ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ' οὐ μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἀριθμός;	Inquiret autem aliquis cuius causa plures habemus sensus, sed non solum unum. Aut quatenus minus lateant nos consequentia et communia, ut motus, et magnitudo, et numerus.	One might ask why we have several senses and not one only. Is it in order that the common qualities, which are consequent on the proper, should be less obscure—movement, dimension, number?
425b6 εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, καὶ αὕτη λευκοῦ, ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον κἂν ἐδόκει ταὐτὸν εἶναι πάντα διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἅμα χρῶμα καὶ μέγεθος.	Si enim esset visus solus, et ipse albi, laterent utique magis, et viderentur esse idem omnia, propter id quod consequuntur se adinvicem simul color et lagnitudo.	For if there were no sense but sight alone, and that only of white as an object, these qualities would certainly be very obscure to the apprehension, and all things would appear alike, because colour and dimension always accompany each other.
425b9 νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν.	Nunc autem quoniam in aliquo sensibili communia sunt, manifestum facit quod aliud quiddam unumquodque ipsorum est.	But the fact that there are common qualities attained by various senses, makes it evident that each of them is a distinct object.
425b 11 –426b 8 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Β'		BOOK III, CHAPTER II
425b12 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ.	[p101/118] Quoniam autem sentimus quod videmus et audimus, necesse est aut visu sentire quod videt aut altero.	Since we perceive that we see and hear, we must see that we see either by sight or by another sense.
425b13 ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος, ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς.	Si autem altero, aut ipso erit quo videt, aut altero: sed idem sensus erit visus et subjecti coloris; quare, aut duo ejusdem erunt, aut idem ejusdem.	And if by another sense, then either this is the sense by which we see, or another sense altogether. But [then] the same sense will bear on the coloured object and the sense of sight. Hence, either there will be two senses for one object, or one sense must be its own object.
425b15 2. ἔτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή τις ἔσται αὑτῆς· ὥστ' ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον.	Amplius autem, si et alter sit visus sensus, aut in infinitum procedet, aut aliquis ipse suiipsius erit judex: quare in primo hoc faciendum est.	Further, if the sense perceptive of sight is other, either there is a process to infinity, or there must be some sense which takes account of its own operation: hence it is better to admit this in the first instance.
425b17 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα ἕξει τὸ ὁρῶν πρῶτον.	Habet autem dubitationem. Si enim visu sentire, videre est; videtur autem color, aut habens hune; si videbit aliquis id quod est videns, et colorem habebit primum videns.	Here is a problem: if to perceive by sight is to see, and colour, or what possesses it, is what is seen, then that which first sees must be coloured.
425b20 3. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἓν τὸ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι·	Manifestum igitur, quoniam non est unum omnino, visu sentire.	It is clear, then, that ‘to perceive by sight’ has not only one meaning.
425b21 καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ ὁρῶμεν, τῇ ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως.	Et namque cum non videmus, visu discernimus et tenebras et lumen, sed non similiter.	For even when we are not seeing, it is by sight that we distinguish between light and dark, though not in the same way.
425b22 ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται· τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον·	Amplius autem et videns, tamquam coloratum est. Unumquodque enim sensitivum susceptivum est sensibilis sine materia.	Moreover, that which sees is, in a way, coloured; for each sensitive faculty is receptive of the sense-object without its material concomitant.
425b24 διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις.	Unde et abeuntibus sensibilibus insunt sensus, et phantasiae, quibus sentiunt.	Hence, in the absence of the sense-objects there remain sensations and phantasms in the sense-powers.
425b25 4. ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς·	Sensibilis autem actus et sensus idem est, et unus;	The act of the sense-object and the sensation are one and the same:
425b27 λέγω δ' οἷον ὁ ψόφος ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν·	esse autem ipsorum non idem. Dico autem ut sonus secundum actum, et auditus secundum actum.	but these—I mean, for instance, sound in act or sight in act—are not identical in their being.
425b28 ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ, ὅταν δ' ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν 426a1 ψόφος, ὧν εἴπειεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν.	Contingit enim auditum habentia non audire, et habens sonum non semper sonat. Cum autem operetur potens audire, et sonet potens sonare, tunc secundum actum auditus simul fit, et secundum actum sonus. Quorum dicet aliquis hoc quidem auditionem esse, hoc vero sanationem.	For it happens that what has hearing does not hear all the time, and what has sound is not always sounding. But when that which is able to hear operates, and that which is able to sound sounds, both hearing in act and sound in act arise simultaneously. (of which two, one might call one ‘hearing’, the other ‘sounding’.)
426a2 5. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις (καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος) ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται·	Si igitur est motus et actio et passio in eo, quod agitur, necesse est et sonum et auditum, qui secundum actum, in eo quod est secundum potentiam esse. Activi enim et motivi actus, in patiente fit:	If then movement and action and passion are in that which is acted upon, it follows that sound and hearing in act reside in that which is these potentially. For the act of what moves or causes is realised in the recipient;
426a5 διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέργειά ἐστι ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις·	unde non necesse est movens moveri. Sonativi igitur actus, aut sonus, aut sonatio est. Auditivi autem, aut auditus, aut auditio est. Dupliciter enim auditus, et dupliciter sonus.	hence it is not necessary that what moves be itself in motion. The act of the sound-producing is therefore sound or a sounding; and of the hearing faculty, is hearing or audition.
426a7 διττὸν γὰρ ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν ὁ ψόφος. 6. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ.	Eadem autem ratio est et in aliis sensibus et sensibilibus. Sicut enim actio et passio in patiente, sed non in agente, sic et sensibili actus et sensitivi in sensitivo est.	For ‘hearing’ ‘and ‘sounding’ are both twofold. And the same reasoning applies to the other senses and their objects. For as the action and the reception are in the recipient, not in the agent, so the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty are in the sensitive recipient.
426a11 ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις καὶ ἡ ἄκουσις, ἐπ' ἐνίων δ' ἀνώνυμον θάτερον·	Sed in quibusdam quidem et nominatum est, ut sonatio, et auditio. In quibusdam autem non nominatum est alterum.	However, whereas both are named in some cases (as sounding and audition) in others one or the other is nameless.
426a13 ὅρασις γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρώματος ἀνώνυμος, καὶ γεῦσις ἡ τοῦ γευστικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀνώνυμος.	Visio enim dicitur visus actus; quae vero est coloris, non nominata est. Et gustativi gustatio est, humoris autem non nominata est.	Vision is the act of seeing, but that of colour has no name; and tasting is the act of the tasting faculty, but the act of savour has no name.
426a15 7. ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χυμὸν δὴ καὶ γεῦσιν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως·	Quoniam autem unus quidem est actus sensibilis et sensitivi, esse autem alterum est, necesse est simul corrumpi, et salvari, sicut dictum, auditum, et sonum: et humorem igitur, et gustum, et alia similiter.	Since the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty is one and the same (though each has its own being) it is necessary that they pass away or remain simultaneously, as in the above-mentioned case of hearing and sounding; and, therefore, of taste and flavour and the rest.
426a19 τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη·	Dicta autem secundum potentiam, non necesse est.	It is not, however, necessary to hold this of the potency.
426a20 8. ἀλλ' οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς·	Sed priores philosophi, hoc non bene dicebant, nihil opinantes neque album neque nigrum esse sine visu, neque humorem sine gustu. Sic quidem enim dicebant recte, si autem non recte.	But on this point the earlier natural philosophers spoke erroneously, holding that there was no black or white without sight, no flavour without taste. In one way what they said was right, in another wrong.
426a23 διχῶς γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει.	Dupliciter enim dicto sensu et sensibili, his quidem secundum potentiam, illis vero secundum actum, in his quidem accidit quod dictum est, sed in alteris non accidit.	Inasmuch as both the sense-object and the sense-faculty exist in two ways, one in potency the other in act, what they alleged applies to the latter, but not to the former.
426a26 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.	Sed illi simpliciter dicebant, de dictis non simpliciter.	But they made bald assertions about matters which call for distinctions.
426a27 9. εἰ δ' ἡ φωνὴ συμφωνία τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι [καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐχ ἓν τὸ αὐτό], λόγος δ' ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι.	Si autem symphonia vox quaedam est, vox autem et auditus est sicut unum et est sicut non unum aut idem, pros portio autem est symphonia, necesse est, et auditum, rationem quamdam esse.	Now, if voice is a harmony of some sort, and voice and the hearing of it are somehow one, and also, somehow, not one and the same; and if harmony is a proportion; then the hearing must be a kind of proportion.
426a30 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, καὶ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ βαρύ, τὴν ἀκοήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὴν 426b1 γεῦσιν, καὶ ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ ζοφερόν, καὶ ἐν ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμή, καὶ γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς αἰσθήσεως.	Et propter id, corrumpit unumquodque excellens acutum et grave, auditum, et in humoribus gustum, et in coloribus visum, fortiter fulgidum, et opacum, et in olfactu fortis odor, et dulcis et amarus, tamquam ratio quaedam sit sensus.	For this reason anything excessively shrill or deep destroys the hearing; and the same in flavours destroys the taste; and in colours, the sight, whether the excessively brilliant or the dark; and in smell, a strong odour, whether sweet or bitter; as if the sense were a certain proportion.
426b3 διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἄμικτα ὄντα ἄγηται εἰς τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ ἢ ἁλμυρόν, ἡδέα γὰρ τότε·	Unde et delectabilia quidem sunt, dum dicuntur sincera et impermista existentia ad rationem, ut acutum, aut dulce, aut salitum. Delectabilia enim tunc.	Hence, too, those [savours] become delectable which, from having been pure and unmixed (e.g. the bitter or sweet or saline) are brought into a proportion. Then indeed t hey give pleasure.
426b5 ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ μικτόν, συμφωνία, ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν·	Omnino autem magis, quod mistum est, symphonia est, quam acutum et grave. Tactus autem calefactibile et frigefactibile,	And in general what is compounded is more of a harmony than the sharp or low [sounds] alone; or in the case of touch, what can be both heated and chilled.
426b7 ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος· ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λύει ἢ φθείρει.	sed sensus ratio est. Excellentia autem contristant aut corrumpunt.	Sense is a ‘proportion’ which is hurt or destroyed by extremes.
426b 8 –421a 15
426b8 10. ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.	[p104/121] Unusquisque igitur sensus, subjecti sensibilis est, et est in sensitivo, inquantum sensitivum, et discernit subjecti sensibilis differentias: ut album quidem et nigrum visus: dulce vero et amarum, gustus. Similiter autem se habet et hoc in aliis.	Each of the senses, then, is of a sensible object and in a sense-organ, precisely as such, and it discerns the differences within its object—for example sight, black and white; taste, sweet and bitter; and likewise with the other senses.
426b12 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τινὶ καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει. ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν.	Quoniam autem album et dulce, et unumquodque sensibilium ad unumquodque comparando, discernimus et sentimus quod differunt, necesse igitur sensu. Sensibilia enim sunt.	Since we distinguish, however, between black and sweet, and any other of the sense-objects, comparing them and perceiving that they differ, there must be some sense for this operation too; for these objects are all in the sense-order.
426b15 11. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἁπτόμενον αὐτὸ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον.	Quare et manifestum quoniam caro non est ultimum sensitivum. Necesse enim esset, ut discernens ipsum tangendo discerneret.	Hence it is also clear that flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ; for, in that case, this discrimination would have to be effected by touching.
426b17 οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἑνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι —οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἴσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ· λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό· ὥστε ὡς λέγει, οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται—	Neque utique separatis contingit discernere, quod alterum sit dulce ab albo; sed oportet aliquo uno utraque manifesta esse. Sic se haberet etiam si hoc quidem ego, illud autem tu sentires; manifestum utique esset quod altera abinvicem sunt. Oportet autem unum dicere, quoniam alterum: alterum enim dulce ab albo. Dicit ergo idem. Quare sicut dicit, sic et intelligit et sentit.	Nor could it be by divided [powers] that the sweet is discerned as other than the white: but both must be presented to some one faculty. For [otherwise] it would be like my perceiving one thing and you another: it would then certainly be evident that the two were different; but some one single [power] must say that they differ—i.e. sweet from white. Therefore it is one single power that asserts this; and as it asserts, so it understands and senses.
426b22 12. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα, δῆλον·	Quod quidem igitur non possibile, separatis judicare separata, palam est. Quod autem neque in separato tempore, hinc habitum est.	It is patent that it is not possible to distinguish separate objects by faculties themselves separate.
426b23 ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ ὅτε θάτερον λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον καὶ θάτερον (οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὅτε, λέγω δ', οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι νῦν ἕτερον, ἀλλ' οὕτω λέγει, καὶ νῦν καὶ ὅτι νῦν)·	Sicut enim idem dicit, quod alterum est bonum et malum, sic et quando alterum dicit esse alterum, tunc et alterum non secundum accidens, ipsum quando. Dico autem veluti nunc dico esse alterum: non tamen dico illud nunc alterum quoniam; sed sic dicit et nunc, et quod nunc.	And the same holds with regard to separate points of time, as the following considerations show. For the faculty that says that good and bad differ says that they differ now, and this now is not extrinsic to the statement (I mean, as in saying now that they are different, but not that there is now a difference; whereas this [faculty] both says now and that the difference is now).
426b28 ἅμα ἄρα. ὥστε ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ χρόνῳ.	Simul ergo. Quare inseparabile, et in inseparabili tempore, utrumque discernit.	Therefore they are discerned simultaneously; an undifferentiated principle distinguishes the two in an indivisible time.
426b29 13. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ γλυκύ, ὡδὶ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν 427a1 ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑτέρως.	At vero impossibile est, simul secundum contrarios motus moveri idem, ut indivisibile est, et in indivisibili tempore. Si enim dulce sit, sic movet sensum aut intellectum, amarum autem contrarie, et album aliter.	But it is impossible for one and the same thing, if indivisible, to be moved by contrary movements in an indivisible point of time. For if the object be sweet, it so affects the sense or the mind, but if bitter, contrariwise, and if white, in another way.
427a2 ἆρ' οὖν ἅμα μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον τὸ κρῖνον, τῷ εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον; ἔστι δὴ [πως] ὡς τὸ διαιρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δ' ὡς ᾗ ἀδιαίρετον·	Ergo simul quidem et numero indivisibile, et inseparabile, quod judicat; secundum esse autem separatum: igitur quodammodo divisibile, divisa sentit; est autem quodammodo ut indivisibile.	Therefore [perhaps] what discriminates is, numerically indivisible and inseparable, yet in essence distinct. For it is in one way capable of multiplicity because it perceives things divided off from one another: but in another way, it is indivisible.
427a4 τῷ εἶναι μὲν γὰρ διαιρετόν, τόπῳ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον.	Secundum esse quidem enim divisibile; loco autem et numero, indivisibile.	Thus in its essence indeed it is divisible, but it is indivisible locally and numerically.
427a5 ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε; δυνάμει μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία, τῷ δ' εἶναι οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὰ εἴδη πάσχειν αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις.	Aut non possibile. Potentia enim idem et indivisibile est contraria; secundum esse autem non; sed in operari divisibile est. Et impossibile est et album et nigrum esse simul. Quare neque species pati ipsorum, si huiusmodi est sensus et intelligentia.	But this is not possible; one and the same indivisible thing can be in contrary states potentially, but not in its very essence. It can divide in its activities indeed; but it cannot be black and white at the same time; and therefore neither can it receive the forms of both—if this is how sensation and understanding occur.
427a9 15. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν, ᾗ μία καὶ δύο, ταύτῃ <καὶ ἀδιαίρετος> καὶ διαιρετή. ᾗ μὲν οὖν ἀδιαίρετον, ἓν τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ ἅμα, ᾗ δὲ διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει, δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ ἅμα·	Sed, sicut, quod vocant quidam punctum, aut unum, aut duo, sic et divisibile. Secundum quod quidem igitur indivisibile, unum discernens est et simul. Secundum vero quod divisibile, non est unum: Bis enim utitur eodem signo simul.	But it is just as some speak of a point as one or as two, and in this sense as divisible. As indivisible [this faculty] is a unity making an instantaneous act of discernment. But as divisible, it is not a unity; for it uses the same point twice.
427a13 ᾗ μὲν οὖν δὶς χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο κρίνει καὶ κεχωρισμένα, ἔστιν ὡς κεχωρισμένως· ᾗ δὲ ἑνί, ἓν καὶ ἅμα.	Inquantum quidem igitur pro duobus utitur tertio, duo iudicat, et separata sunt, ut in separato. Inquantum vero unum, uno et simul.	In so far as it takes a third, as two, it takes account of two objects which are distinct, as in a separate principle. Yet in so far as it is one, it acts instantaneously and by a single act.
427a14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾗ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.	De principio igitur, secundum quod dicimus posse sentire animal, determinatum sit hoc modo.	So much then by way of defining the principle by which we call any animal sentient.
427a 17 –427b 26 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Γ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER III
427a17 1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι,	[p107/124] Quoniam autem duabus differentiis definiunt maxime animam, motu qui secundum locum, et in eo quod est intelligere et discernere et sentire.	Now, if the soul is defined principally by two differences, by motion in place and by what it is to understand, discern and sense,
427a19 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων),	Videtur autem et intelligere et sapere, tamquam quoddam sentire esse: In utrisque enim his, anima judicat aliquid et cognoscit eorum quae sunt.	it would seem that both to understand and to judge are a kind of sense-perception,—for in either case the soul discerns and knows reality.
427a21 καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν-ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε "πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν" καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις "ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται", τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὁμήρου "τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν",	Et antiqui sapere et sentire, idem esse aiunt, sicut Empedocles dixit “Ad praesens voluntas augetur”, et in hominibus et in aliis, unde “eis semper sapere altera praestat”. Idem autem his vult et id, quod est Homeri “Talis enim intellectus est in terrenis hominibus, qualem ducit in diem pater virorumque deorumque”.	The early philosophers, indeed, said that rational judgement and sensation were the same thing, as when Empedocles says: ‘The will is increased in man in the present moment’, and in another place: ‘Whence it always affords them new objects of knowledge.’ To the same purport is that line of Homer: ‘The mind of mortals is such as the father of gods and men brings into light’.
427a26 2. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν	Omnes enim hi intelligere corporeum, sicut sentire opinantur. Et sentire et sapere simile simili, sicut secundum principium in rationibus determinavimus.	All these suppose the intellect to be something corporeal, like sensation, and that both sensing and judging are of ‘like by like’, as we explained at the beginning of this treatise.
427a29 2. (καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ 427b1 τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή·	Et tamen oportuit simul ipsos de deceptione dicere. Magis proprium enim est animalibus, et plurimum tempus in hoc permanet anima:	But they ought at the same time to have treated of error, which is a state more natural to animals [than truth], and in which the soul spends the greater part of its time.
427b2 διὸ ἀνάγκη ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι,	unde necesse est, aut, ut quidam dicunt, omnia, quae videntur, esse vera, aut dissimilis tactum deceptionem esse.	So it must follow, either that all that seems to be really is (as some maintain) or that error is a contact with what is unlike
427b4 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν·	Hoc enim contrarium ei, quod simile simili cognoscere. esse.	this being the contrary of knowing like by like.
427b5 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι)	Videtur autem et deceptio et scientia contrariorum eadem.	It would appear, however, that error and knowledge are the same with respect to contraries.
427b6 3. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων.	Quod quidem igitur non idem sit sapere et sentire, manifestum est. Hoc quidem enim in omnibus est, illud autem in paucis animalium.	Now it should be evident that rational judgement and sensation are not the same. The latter is in all animals, the former in but few.
427b8 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων-οὐδὲ τοῦτό ἐστι ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι·	Sed neque intelligere, in quo est et recte et non recte. Recte quidem, prudentia, et scientia, et opinio vera: non recte autem contraria horum. Neque hoe est idem cum ipso sentire.	Nor again is understanding [the same as sensation]. It may be correct or incorrect,—correct as prudence, science and sound opinion; incorrect as the opposite of these. This is not the same as sensation.
427b11 ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι δ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ μὴ καὶ λόγος·	Sensus quidem enim propriorum semper verus est, et in omnibus inest animalibus. Intelligere autem contingit et falso, et nulli inest cui non et ratio.	For sensation is always true of its own proper objects, and is found in all animals, whereas intelligence is sometimes accompanied by error, and is found in no species that lack reason.
427b14 4. φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις.	Phantasia enim alterum est et a sensu et ab intellectu. Et haec non fit sine sensu, et sine hac non est opinio.	For imagination is other than both sensation and intellect. Yet it cannot occur without sensation, and without it there is no opinion.
427b16 ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες),	Quod autem non est eadem phantasia et opinio, manifestum est. Haec enim passio in nobis est cum volumus. Prae oculis enim est facere, sicut in recordativis positi, et idolum sunt facientes.	It is evident that opinion and imagination are not identical. The latter state arises in us at will, as a picture before our eyes, like the imagery employed by those who cultivate memory training.
427b20 δοξάζειν δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν.	Opinari autem non in nobis est. Necesse enim est falsum aut verum dicere.	But opinion is not within our power in this way; it must express the true or the false, of necessity.
427b21 ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.	Amplius autem cum opinamur difficile aliquid, aut terribile, statim compatimur. Similiter autem est et si sit confidendum. Secundum phantasiam autem similiter nos habemus, sicut si essemus considerantes in pictura, difficilia et confidenda.	Further, when we think that anything is arduous or fearful, we are at once emotionally affected; and likewise, if there be occasion for confidence. But in imagining, it is as though we were regarding in a picture things arduous or encouraging.
427b24 5. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος.	Sunt autem et ipsius existimationis differentiae, scientia, et opinio, et prudentia, et contraria horum. De quorum differentia, altera sit ratio.	These are, besides, the various modes of making a judgement: speculative science, opinion and prudence; with their contraries. Let the question of their differences be discussed elsewhere.
427b 27 –428b 9
427b27 περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον.	[p110/127] De eo autem quod est intelligere, quoniam alterum est ab eo quod sentire: huius autem aliud phantasia esse videtur, aliud opinio: de phantasia determinantes sic et de altero dicendum est.	Concerning understanding [νοεῖν], since it is one thing and sensation [αἰσθάνεσθαι] another, while imagination [φαντασία] seems to differ from both of these and from opinion also, let us settle first what imagination is, and then speak of the other matter [opinion].
428a1 6. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, <ἆρα> μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ' ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα;	Si igitur phantasia est, secundum quam phantasma aliquod nobis fieri dicimus, et si non aliquid secundum metaphoram dicimus, una quaedam potentia est harum aut habitus, secundum quem discernimus, aut verum aut falsum dicimus.	If, then, imagination [φαντασία] is that by which we say that some phantasm [φάντασμά] arises within us, it follows (if we are not speaking metaphorically) that it is one of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we perceive and pronounce either falsely or truly.
428a4 τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς.	Huiusmodi autem sunt sensus, opinio, scientia, et intellectus.	Such faculties are sensation [sensus] opinion[opinio], knowledge[scientia], understanding [intellectus]. .
428a5 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.	Quod igitur non sit sensus, manifestum est ex his: sensus enim aut potentia aut actus est, ut visus, et visio. Apparet autem aliquid, et neutro horum existente, ut ea quae in somnis.	That it is not sensation is evident. For sensation is either in potency or in act: the faculty of sight, or the actual seeing. But appearances occur when neither of these is present; as when we dream.
428a8 εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία δ' οὔ.	Postea secundum potentiam sensus quidem semper adest viventibus et non orbatis, phantasia autem non.	Further, sensation is always to be found, in potency in all animals that are not defective. Not so imagination.
428a9 εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ' οὔ.	Si vero ei quod actu idem, omnibus utique contingeret bestiis phantasiam inesse. Videtur autem non, ut formicae, aut api, aut vermi.	But if they were the same in act, it would happen that imagination was present in all animals. But this apparently is not so—e.g. in the ant, the bee, the worm.
428a11 εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς.	Postea hi quidem veri semper, phantasiae autem plures falsae.	Again, sensations are always true: but many phantasms [φαντασίαι] are false.
428a12 ἔπειτα οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα πότερον ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής.	Amplius autem non dicimus cum operemur certe circa sensibile, quoniam videtur hoc nobis homo, sed magis cum non manifeste sentimus, tunc est aut verus, aut falsus.	Again, we do not say, when we are functioning accurately with regard to sense-objects: ‘that seems to us a man; we say this rather when our sensation is indistinct; in which case it may be true or false.
428a15 καὶ ὅπερ δὴ ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα.	Et (quod quidem et antea diximus) apparent et dormientibus visiones.	And, as we said before, such appearances come to men in their sleep.
428a16 8. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευουσῶν οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς·	At vero neque semper vera dicentium, habitus ullus erit, ut scientia, aut intellectus.	And it is certainly not one of the qualities which are always truthful, such as knowledge or understanding:
428a18 ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής.	Est enim phantasia et vera et falsa.	[f]or imagination can be true or false.
428a18 λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα·	Relinquitur igitur videre si opinio sit.	It remains therefore to consider whether it is opinion.
428a19 γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς.	Fit enim opinio et vera et falsa. Sed opinioni quidem inhaeret fides. Non enim contingit opinionem iis, quae sibi videntur, non credere. Bestiarum autem nulli inest fides, phantasia autem multis.	For opinion can be either true or false. But belief follows immediately on opinion, for one never finds a man not believing the opinion that seems to him to be true. But there is no such thing as belief amongst animals, although there is imagination in many.
428a22 [ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ' οὔ.]	Amplius omnem opinionem consequitur fides, fidem autem suasum esse, suasionem autem ratio. Bestiarum autem quibusdam phantasia inest, ratio vero non.	Further: belief attaches to all opinion, and is due to conviction, which in turn is due to reasoning. Now imagination is found in some beasts; but reason in none.
428a24 9. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία ἂν εἴη,	Manifestum igitur quod neque opinio cum sensu, neque per sensum, neque complexio opinionis et sensus erit phantasia, propter haec.	It is therefore evident, on these grounds, that neither opinion accompanying sensation, nor through sensation, nor a combination of opinion and sensation, will constitute imagination.
428a26 διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσται ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἔστιν, οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις·	Et manifestum quod non alia quaedam est opinio, sed ejus est, cuius est et sensus.	And it is clear that opinion would have simply the same objects as sensation.
428a28 λέγω δ', ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἔσται·	Dico autem ex albi opinione et sensu complexio phantasia est.	I mean, that an imagining of ‘white’ would be a combination of the sensed ‘white’ and the opinion that it is ‘white’.
428a29 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῆς τοῦ 428b1 λευκοῦ.	Non enim ex opinione quidem est albi, ex sensu autem boni.	For it would not be produced by an opinion of ‘white’ and a sensation of ‘good’.
428b1 τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαι ἔσται τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	Apparere igitur est opinari, quod quidem sentitur non secundum accidens.	To imagine, then, would be having an opinion of the same thing as what one senses—the same absolutely speaking.
428b2 10. φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δ' εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης·	Apparent autem et falsa, de quibus simul opinionem veram habent, et videtur Sol unius pedis, sed creditur etiam major esse tota habitatione.	False appearances, however, are possible about which at the same time one holds a true opinion: and indeed the sun seems to be a foot across, yet is believed to be greater than the inhabited world.
428b4 συμβαίνει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπεισθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ.	Accidit igitur, aut abiicere suiipsius veram opinionem, quam habebat, salva re non oblitum, neque decredentem; aut si adhuc habet, eamdem necesse est veram et falsam esse.	Therefore it comes about, either that one discards the true opinion which one had formed, the thing itself remaining, and one neither forgets nor ceases to hold [that opinion]: or, if one still retains it, the same must be both true and false.
428b8 ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγένετο ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα.	Sed falsa facta est, cum lateat transcendens res.	But a false [opinion] is produced if there is an unnoticed transformation in the facts.
428b9 οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.	Non ergo unum aliquod horum est, neque ex his phantasia.	Imagination therefore is neither one of these, nor constituted from these.
428b 10 –429a 9
428b10 11. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἔστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἔστιν,	[p112/129] Sed quoniam accidit moto hoc, moveri alterum ab hoc: phantasia autem motus quidam videtur esse, et non sine sepsu fieri, sed in bis quae sentiunt, et eorum quorum sensus est;	But since it can happen that, one thing moving, another is moved by it; and imagination seems to be a movement, and to arise only with sensation, and in sentient beings, and to be of such objects as are sensed;
428b13 ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.	est autem motum fieri ab actu sensus; et hunc similem necesse est esse sensui, erit utique phantasia ipsa motus, qui non sine sensu contingens esse, neque non sentientibus inesse potest, et multa est secundum ipsam facere et pati habens, et esse veram et falsam.	and since a motion may be caused by actual sensation, and such necessarily resembles sensation, – then imagination will be just this movement, never originated apart from sensation, incapable of existing in non-sentient beings, and enabling its possessor to act and to be affected in many ways, and being itself both true and false.
428b17 12. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε· ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα <ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς>· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχετα διαψεύδεσθαι·	Hoc autem accidit propter hoc, quod sensus quidem propriorum est verus, aut quam paucissimum habet falsum. Secundo autem est ejus, cui et haec accidunt; et hic iam contingit mentiri.	This happens because sense-perception is true of its own proper objects, or has the least possible amount of falsehood; but secondarily it bears on that in which these qualities inhere, and here it can be deceived.
428b21 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται.	Quod enim album, non mentitur. Si autem hoc aliud et aliud, mentitur.	Sensation is reliable as to whether a thing is white or not, but not as to whether it is this or that.
428b22 τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (λέγω δ' οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος) [ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς]· περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.	Tertio autem communium, consequentium accidentia, quibus insunt propria. Dico autem ut motus, et magnitudo, accidunt sensibilibus, circa quae est maxime iam decipi secundum sensum.	Thirdly, there are the common qualities consequent on the accidents in which the proper qualities inhere. I mean, such as movement and dimension, which belong to sense-objects—and about these deception very easily arises in sensing.
428b25 13. ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως γινομένη διοίσει, ἡ ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων, καὶ ἡ μὲν πρώτη παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ' ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης καὶ ἀπούσης εἶεν ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ.	Motus autem ab actu factus, differt a sensu qui ab his tribus sensibus. Et primus quidem praesente sensu verus, alii autem et praesente et absente, erunt utique falsi, et maxime cum procul sit sensibile.	The movement derived from actual sensation differs from the sensations by which these three objects are perceived. Although the first [movement] is true, the sensation itself being present, the others can easily be false, whether sensation be present or not, and especially when the sense-object is distant.
428b30 εἰ οὖν μηθὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ 429a1 φαντασία (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν), ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη.	Si igitur nihil aliud habet ea quae dicta sunt, nisi phantasia, hoc autem est quod dictum est, phantasia utique erit motus a sensu secundum actum factus.	If, therefore, nothing except imagination possesses what has been described, then the statement is true, namely that imagination is a movement produced by sensation actuated.
429a2 14. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.	Quoniam autem visus maxime sensus est, et nomen a lumine accepit, quoniam sine lumine non est videre.	Since sight is the most prominent sense, [imagination] has taken its name from light, as there is no seeing without light.
429a4 15. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσῳ ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι.	Et quoniam immanent, et similes sunt sensibus, multa secundum ipsas operantur animalia. Alia quidem, quia non habent intellectum, ut bestiae. Alia vero ex velamento intel. lectus, aliquando passione, aut aegritudine, aut somno, ut homines.	And since these images [?] dwell within, and resemble sense experiences, animals do many things in accordance with them; some animals, as lacking reason, namely beasts; but some, i.e. men, when their intellect is veiled either by passion, or by sickness, or by sleep.
429a8 περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.	De phantasia igitur quid est, et propter quid est, dictum sit in tantum.	Let so much suffice, therefore, on imagination, its nature and its function.
429a 10 –429b 4 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Δ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER, IV
429a10 1. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.	[p114/131] (1) De parte autem animae, qua cognoscit anima et sapit, sive separabili existente, sive non separabili secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum rationem, considerandum quam habet differentiam, et quomodo tamdem sit ipsum intelligere.	As to the part of the soul by which it knows and is wise (whether separate spatially or only in idea) we must consider how it is differentiated and, further, how the operation of understanding arises.
429a13 2. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον.	Si igitur est intelligere sicut sentire, aut pati quoddam erit ab intelligibili, aut aliquid huiusmodi alterum.	For if understanding is like sensing, it will be some kind of reception from an intelligible object, or some thing of that nature.
429a15 3. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.	Impassibilem ergo oportet esse, susceptivum autem speciei, et potentia tale, sed non hoc; et similiter se habet sicut sensitivum ad sensibilia, sic intellectivum ad intelligibilia.	It must then be impassible and yet receptive of a species, which it must already be potentially but not actually: And as the sense faculty stands to the sense-object, so will the intellective to the intelligible.
429a18 ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ (παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει)·	Necesse est itaque, quoniam omnia intelligit, immixtum esse, sicut ait Anaxagoras, ut imperet. Hoc autem est, ut cognoscat. Intus apparens enim prohibebit extraneum, et obstruet.	It is also necessary, since its understanding extends to everything, that, as Anaxagoras says, it be uncompounded with anything so that it may command, i.e. know. For what appeared inwardly would prevent and impede what was without.
429a21 ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατός.	Quare neque ipsius esse naturam neque unam, nisi hanc quod possibilis sit.	Hence it has no nature and is not one, except in being potential.
429a22 ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν·	Vocatus itaque animae intellectus, dico autem intellectum, quo opinatur et intelligit anima, nihil est actu eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere.	What then is called the ‘intellect’ [νοῦς] of the soul (I mean that mind by which the soul forms opinions and understands) is not, before it understands, in act of any reality.
429a24 4. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι·	Unde neque misceri, est rationabile, ipsum corpori.	Hence, it is a reasonable inference that it is not involved in the body.
429a25 ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός, κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἔστιν.	Qualis enim aliquis, utique et esset, aut calefactus aut frigidus, et erit organum aliquod, sicut sensitivo; nunc autem nullum est.	Were it so, it would also have some quality either hot or cold, and it would have an organ, like the sensitive faculties; but there is in fact none such.
429a27 καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη.	Et bene iam dicentes sunt, animam esse locum specierum, nisi quod non tota, sed intellectiva; neque actu, sed potentia, species.	And they spoke to the point who said, that the soul was the place of forms — yet not the whole soul, but the intellectual part; nor actually, but only potentially, is it any form.
429a29 5. ὅτι δ' οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.	Quod autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est ex organis et sensu.	That the impassibility of the sensitive faculty is not like that of the intellective faculty, is evident from the organs and from sensation itself.
429a31 ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται 429b1 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι·	Sensus enim non potest sentire ex valde sensibili, ut sonum ex magnis sonis neque furtibus odoribus, et coloribus, neque videre, neque odorare.	For the sense cannot receive an impression from too violent a sense-object—e.g. a sound from very great sounds, whilst from over-powerful odours there comes no smell, nor from over-strong colour any seeing.
429b3 ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός.	Sed intellectus cum intelligit aliquod valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit infima, sed et magis. Sensitivum enim non sine corpore est. Intellectus autem separatus.	But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate.
429b 5 –429b 22
429b5 6. ὅταν δ' οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι' αὑτοῦ),	[p118/135] Cum autem sic singula fiant, ut sciens; dicitur intellectus, qui secundum actum. Hoc autem confestim accidit cum possit operari per seipsum.	But when it becomes particular objects, as in a man, of science, the intellect is said to be in act. (This comes about as soon as such a one is able to operate of himself.)
429b8 ἔστι μὲν [ὁμοίως] καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν· καὶ αὐτὸς δι' αὑτοῦ τότε δύναται νοεῖν.	Est igitur et tunc potentia quodammodo; non tamen similiter atque ante addiscere, aut invenire; et ipse autem seipsum tunc potest intelligere.	It is, then, in a way still in potency, but not in the way it was before it learned or discovered. And then, too, it is able to think itself.
429b10 7. ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι, καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι (οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι), τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει·	Quoniam autem aliud est magnitudo, et magnitudini esse, et aqua, et aquae esse, et sic in multis aliis, non autem in omnibus (In quibusdam enim idem est esse carni, et carnem esse). Aut alio ergo, aut aliter habente discernit.	Now, as dimension is one thing and the being of dimension another, and as water is one thing and the being water another, and so with many other things (but not all things, for in certain things ‘flesh’ is the same as ‘being flesh’) accordingly it discriminates either by some other [faculty] or by the same faculty differently disposed.
429b13 ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷδε.	Caro enim non est sine materia, sed sicut simum, hoc in hoc.	For flesh is not separable from matter; it is like the snub of a nose, one, [thing] existing in the other.
429b14 τῷ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει, καὶ ὧν λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ·	Sensitivo quid igitur calidum et frigidum iudicat, et quorum ratio quaedam caro est.	There is discerned therefore by the sensitive faculty what is hot, what is cold, and anything else of which the flesh is a certain ratio.
429b16 ἄλλῳ δέ, ἤτοι χωριστῷ ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ, τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει.	Alio autem aut separato, aut sicut circumflexa se habet ad seipsam, cum extensa sit, carni esse discernit.	But either by another and separate faculty, or as if it were bent back upon itself (whereas it was previously straight), does it perceive the being of flesh.
429b18 8. πάλιν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ σιμόν· μετὰ συνεχοῦς γάρ· τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὐθύ, ἄλλο· ἔστω γὰρ δυάς. ἑτέρῳ ἄρα ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. ὅλως ἄρα ὡς χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν νοῦν.	Iterum autem in his, quae in abstractione sunt, rectum est sicut simum. Cum continuo enim est. Quod autem quid erat esse, si est et alterum recto esse, et rectum alio. Sit enim dualitas. Altero itaque, aut aliter habente se iudicat. Omnino ergo sicut separabiles res a materia, sic et quae circa intellectum sunt.	Again, in the abstract sphere the straight line is as the snub-nose; for it goes with the continuum. But its essence, if being [straight] is other than a straight line, is different. Let it be, for instance, Duality. Then [the mind] discerns either by another faculty or by the same differently disposed. In general, then, as things are separable from matter, so are intellectual operations.
429b 22 -430a 9
429b22 9. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν (ᾗ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν),	[p20/137] Dubitabit autem utique aliquis, si intellectas simplex est et impassibilis, et nulli aliquid habet commune, sicut dixit Anaxagoras, quomodo intelliget, si intelligere pati aliquid est. Inquantum enim aliquid commune utrisque est, hoc quidem agere, illud vero pati videtur.	One might well enquire (if the intellect is simple and impassible, having nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras said) how it understands, if understanding is a receiving. For it seems that one thing acts and another is acted on, only in so far as there is a factor common to the two.
429b26 10. ἔτι δ' εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός; ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἓν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τἆλλα.	Amplius autem, si intelligibilis et ipse: aut enim aliis inerit intellectus, si non secundum aliud ipse intelligibilis est, unum autem quoddam secundum speciem est intelligibile. Aut mistum aliquid habebit, quod facit intelligibilem ipsum, sicut alia.	Again, if it is itself an intelligible: then either there is intellect in other intelligible things—(unless it is intelligible by virtue of some extrinsic principle) the intelligible being specifically one; or it will have, mixed with itself, something that makes it intelligible, as other things have.
429b29 11. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διῄρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ· δυνάμει δ' οὕτως 430a1 ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.	Aut pati secundum commune aliquid divisum est prius. Potentia quodammodo est intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nihil antequam intelligat. Oportet autem sic, sicut in tabula nihil est scriptum actu, quod quidem accidit in intellectu.	Or what about the receptivity in a general sense, already alluded to in making distinctions on this point? Before it makes an act of understanding, the intellect is its intelligible objects potentially, but not actually. It must be as with a tablet on which there is nothing actually written; and so indeed it is in the case of intellect.
430a2 12. καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν	Et ipse autem intelligibilis est, sicut intelligibilia. In his enim quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus, et quod intelligitur. Scientia namque speculativa, et sic scibile idem est.	And it is itself an intelligible like other intelligible objects. For in things separated from the material, intellect and what is understood by it are identical. Speculative knowledge is the same as what is knowable in this way.
430a5 (τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον)· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ' ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει	Non autem semper intelligendi causa consideranda. In habentibus autem materiam, potentia unumquodque intelligibilium. Quare quidem illis non inerit intellectus; sine materia enim potentia est intellectus talium. Illud autem intelligibile inerit.	The reason why there is not always understanding must be considered. In material things, each intelligible object exists only potentially. Hence in them is no intellect, for the mind that understands such things is an immaterial potency. The intelligible exists, however [in them].
430a 10 –430a 25 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ε'		BOOK III, CHAPTER V
430a10 1. Ἐπεὶ δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ [τι] τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς·	[p122/139] Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem materia unicuique generi, hoc autem est potentia omnia illa, alterum autem causa et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia, ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse et in anima has esse differentias.	Now since in all nature there is a factor that is as matter in the genus, and is potentially all that is in the genus, and something else which is as cause and agent as making everything in it (thus art is related to its material): so there must be these differences in the soul.
430a14 καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς·	Et est intellectus hic quidem talis in omnia fieri, ille vero in omnia facere, sicut habitus quidam, et sicut lumen.	There is that intellect, which is such as being able to become everything; and there is that which acts upon everything, as a sort of state, like light;
430a16 τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα.	Quodam enim modo, et lumen facit potentia existentes colores, actu colores.	for light too, in a way, makes potential colours actual.
430a17 καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνέργεια·	Et hic intellectus separabilis, et impassibilis, et immixtus, substantia actu ens.	And this is intellect separable, uncompounded and incapable of being acted on, a thing essentially in act.
430a18 2. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.	Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, et principium materia.	For the agent is always more excellent than the recipient, and the principle than its material.
430a19 [τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι·	Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei;	Knowledge in act is the same as the thing itself.
430a20 ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ' οὐ νοεῖ.]	quae vero secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno est. Omnino autem neque tempore. Sed non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando autem non intelligit.	But what is potential has temporal priority in the individual; yet this, is not true universally, even with respect to time. Mind does not know at one time and not know at another time.
430a22 χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον	Separatus autem est solum hoc, quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est.	Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual.
430a23 (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.	Non reminiscitur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile est; passivus vero intellectus, est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit anima.	It does not remember, because it is impassible; the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul understands nothing apart from this latter.
430a 26 –431b 4 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ς'		BOOK III, CHAPTER VI
430a26 1. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων,	[p124/141] Indivisibilium igitur intelligentia in his est, circa quae non est falsum. In quibus autem et falsum iam et verum est, compositio quaedam iam intellectuum est, sicut eorum quae unum fiunt.	Intelligence of what is not complex is in a sphere where there can be no deception. But in matters where there is false or true, there is also some composition of things understood as of many brought to a unity.
430a28 καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη "ᾗ πολλῶν μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν", ἔπειτα συντίθεσθαι τῇ φιλίᾳ, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος -	Sicut Empedocles dixit, multorum quidem capita sine cervice germinaverunt, postea composita sunt concordia. Sic, et haec separata composita sunt, ut asymmetron et diametros.	As Empedocles said, ‘The heads of many grew with no neck’, [but] concord afterwards brought them to unity; so in the same way these disjunct terms are combined, like ‘the diagonal’ and ‘the incommensurate’.
430a31 2. ἂν δὲ 430b1 γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν [καὶ] συντίθησι. τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκὸν <φῇ, τὸ λευκὸν καὶ> τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα.	Si autem factorum aut futurorum sit compositio, tempus cointelligens est, et componens. Falsum enim in compositione semper est. Et namque si album non albo, aut si non album albo componit. Contingit autem, et dividentem dicere omnia.	If the composition be of things done, or of future events, time also is taken into the reckoning, as one of the component elements. Falsity is always in a combination, as for instance when one brings together ‘white’ and a not-white object, or ‘not-white’ with a white one. All these statements can also be divisions.
430b4 ἀλλ' οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθὲς ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται.	Sic ergo est non solum falsum aut verum, quod albus Cleon est, sed et quod erat aut erit.	It is not only, then, false or true that Cleon is white, but that this fact was true or will be true.
430b5 τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν ἕκαστον, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς.	Unum autem faciens unumquodque, hoc intellectus est.	It is the intellect which imposes a unity in each case.
430b6 3. τὸ δ' ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ <διαιρετὸν ᾗ> ἀδιαίρετον, <οἷον> ὅταν νοῇ τὸ μῆκος	Indivisibile autem, quoniam dupliciter, potentia, aut actu est, nihil prohibet intelligere indivisibile, cum longitudinem intelligat.	As the indivisible is twofold, the actual and the potential, there is nothing to prevent the intellect from apprehending an indivisible when it apprehends an extended length.
430b8 (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ), καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει.	Indivisibilis enim actu est, et in tempore indivisibili. Similiter enim tempus est divisibile, et indivisibile longitudini.	For this length is actually undivided, and is [understood] in an undivided space of time: for time is divided or undivided like the length.
430b10 οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐνόει ἑκατέρῳ·	Non enim est dicere, quod in utroque dimidio intelligat ;	It is not right to say that [the mind] understands both by halving both;
430b10 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλ' ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς δ' ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα, τότε δ' οἱονεὶ μήκη·	non enim est, nisi dividatur, nisi in potentia. Seorsum autem utrumque intelligens dimidiorum, dividit et tempus simul. Tunc autem ut in longitudine.	There is no half, save potentially, unless an actual division has been made. However, in apprehending separately each of the halves, it divides the time also, which is then [divided] like the length.
430b13 εἰ δ' ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν.	Si vero est sicut ex utrisque, et in tempore est quod in utrisque.	But if this is considered as a whole made up of two halves, then there is something corresponding to each in the time also.
430b14 4. [τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.]	Quod autem non secundum quantitatem indivisibile est, sed specie, intelligit et indivisibili tempore, et indivisibili animae.	But whatever is not indivisible quantitatively, but specifically, the mind apprehends both in an instant of time and by a single act of the soul;
430b16 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἐκεῖνα, διαιρετὰ ὃ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ᾗ <ἐκεῖνα> ἀδιαίρετα·	Secundum accidens autem, et non inquantum illa divisibilia, quod intelligit, et in quo tempore, sed inquantum indivisibilia.	incidentally, however, [it apprehends division] not in so far as what the mind understands and the time in which it understands are divisible, but as they are indivisible;
430b17 ἔνεστι γὰρ κἀν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν,	Inest enim et in his aliquid indivisibile, sed forte non separabile,	for there is in these something indivisible, but perhaps not separable,
430b18 ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μῆκος.	quod facit tempus unum et longitudinem.	which gives unity to time and extension;
430b19 καὶ τοῦθ' ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει.	Et hoc similiter in omni est, et continuo, et tempore, et longitudine.	and this holds of all that is continuous, whether by time or extension.
430b20 5. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις.	Punctum autem, et omnis divisio, et sic indivisibile, nonstratur, sicut privatio.	A point, and anything separated out and thus incapable of further analysis, is shown as a privation.
430b21 καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ τὸ μέλαν·	Et similis ratio in aliis est, ut quomodo malum cognoscit, aut nigrum.	A similar principle holds in other matters, as in the way we know air or blackness.
430b23 τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. 6. δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ.	Contrario enim aliquo modo cognoscit. Oportet autem potentia esse cognoscens, et unum esse in ipso.	For in some way the knowledge is by contrariety; but the knowing faculty must be in potency, and one [of the contraries] be in it.
430b24 εἰ δέ τινι μηδὲν ἔστιν ἐναντίον [τῶν αἰτίων], αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ χωριστόν.	Si vero alicui causarum non inest contrarium, ipsa cognoscit seipsam, et actu est, et separabilis.	But if there is some cause that includes no contrary, it is self-knowing, and in act, and separate.
430b26 7. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα·	Est autem dictio quidem aliquid de aliquo, sicut aflirmatio, et vera aut falsa omnis.	Now every utterance, e.g. an affirmation, is of something, about some subject; and is always either true or false.
430b27 ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος·	Intellectus autem non omnis, sed qui est ipsius quid est, secundum hoc quod aliquid erat esse, verus est, et non aliquid de aliquo,	Yet not all understanding is thus; understanding is true about what anything is, in the sense of the quiddity of it; not as to every fact about a subject,
430b29 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα ἄνευ ὕλης.	sed sicut videre proprii verum est. Si autem homo album, aut non, non verum semper. Sic autem se habent quaecumque sine materia sunt.	but, as sight is always true about its proper object, yet it is not always true about a white thing being a man or not. So it stands with whatever is immaterial.
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ζ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER VII
[431a 1. Τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι.	Idem autem est secundum actum scientia, rei;	Knowledge in act is identical with the thing.
430a2 ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ· ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα.	quae vero secundum potentiam, tempore prior est in uno, omnino, neque tempore : fiunt enim ex actu ente, omnia quae fiunt.	But what is potential is prior in time in the individual; though universally it is not prior, even in time; for all that comes into existence comes from an actual existent.
431a 4 –43lb19
431a4 —φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦται. διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως·	[p127/144] Videtur autem sensibile ex potentia existente sensitivo agens: non enim patitur, neque alteratur. Unde alia haec species motus.	And it seems that the sense-object [simply] brings the sense-faculty from a state of potency to one of act; for [the latter] is not affected or altered. Hence it is a specifically distinct kind of movement.
431a6 ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου.	Motus enim imperfecti actus ; simpliciter autem actus alter est, qui perfecti.	For movement is the actuality of the incomplete; whereas in its plain meaning act is different, as being of the thing completed.
431a8 2. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει·	Sentire igitur simile est ipsi dicere solum, et intelligere. Cum autem delectabile aut triste, ut affirmans aut negans, prosequitur aut fugit.	Sensation therefore is like mere uttering and understanding; but, given a pleasant or painful object, the soul pursues or avoids with, so to say, affirmation or negation.
431a10 καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα.	Et est delectari et tristari, agere sensitiva medietate, ad bonum aut malum inquantum talia, et fuga et appetitus, qui secundum actum hoc sunt.	To be ‘pleased’ or to feel pain is to act in the sensitive mean in relation to the good or the bad as such; and pursuit or avoidance are this operation in act.
431a12 καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ' ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.	Et non est alterum, appetitivum et fugitivum, neque abinvicem, neque a sensitivo; sed esse alterum est.	And the faculties of desire and avoidance are not distinct,—nor distinct from the sensitive faculty; though in essence they differ.
431a14 3. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει·	Intellectivae autem animae, phantasmata, ut sensibilia sunt. Cum autem bonum aut malum affirmat aut negat, et fugit aut prosequitur.	Imaginative phantasms [φαντάσματα] are to the intellective soul as sense-objects. But when it affirms or denies good or evil it pursues or avoids.
431a16 διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή.	Propter quod nunquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima.	Hence the soul never understands apart from phantasms [φαντάσματος].
431a17 —ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ' ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡςαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία <ἡ> μεσότης, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω.	Sicut enim aer pupillam talem facit, ipsa autem alterum, et auditus similiter. Sed ultimum, unum est, et una medietas; esse autem ipsi plura.	This is comparable to the way that air affects the pupil with such and such a quality, and this in turn affects another part with the same quality: and the hearing operates likewise. The ultimate is one, a single common mean whose essence, however, is various.
431a20 4. -τίνι δ' ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε.	Quo autem discernit, quo differt dulce et calidum, dictum est quidem et prius, dicendum autem et nunc.	With what it discerns how the sweet differs from the hot has been stated already and must be reaffirmed here.
431a21 ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ ὡς ὁ ὅρος, καὶ ταῦτα, ἓν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄντα, ἔχει <ἑκάτερον> πρὸς ἑκάτερον ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα·	Est enim aliquid unum, sic autern ut terminus. Et hoc in proportionali, aut numero ens unum habet se ad utrumque, sicut illa adinvicem.	For it is a unity in the sense of a terminus; and this unity—according to analogy and number—is related to distinct objects as they to one another.
431a24 τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν;	Quid enim differt, non homogenea judicare, aut contraria: ut album et nigrum?	(What difference indeed does it make whether the comparison be of qualities not homogeneous, or of contraries, like black and white?).
431a25 ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ [ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα]· ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΑ ἑνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἕξει, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ΔΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό-κἀκεῖνα ὁμοίως.	Sit igitur sicut A album, ad B nigrum, C ad D sicut illa adinvicem, quare et permutatim. Sicut igitur cC D uni insunt, sic se habebunt, sicut et A B, idem quidem, esse autem non idem; et illud similiter.	Thus, as A (white) is to B (black) so is C to D; hence therefore, also, alternating the proportions. If then C and D pertain to one uniting principle, they are to each other as A and B: identical though distinct in essence; so too is the aforesaid [principle].
431a29 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς [431b] λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.	Eadem autem ratio est, et si quidem dulce sit, vero album.	The same relation holds if A be the sweet and B the white.
431b2 5. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται·	Species quidem igitur intellectivum in phantasmatibus intelligit. Et sicut in illis determinatum est ipsi imitabile et fugiendum, sic et extra sensum, cum in phantasmatibus fuerint, movetur.	The intellectual faculty therefore understands forms in phantasms [φαντάσμασι]. And as in these [forms] what is to be pursued by it, or avoided, is marked out for it, so too when these are in the imagination [φαντασμάτων] apart from sensation, is it moved.
431b5 οἷον, αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ ὁρῶν κινούμενον γνωρίζει ὅτι πολέμιος·	Et sentiens quod fugibile est, quia ignis communi cognoscit, videns id, quod movetur, quoniam impugnans est.	[For instance] when one sees something fearful [e.g. fire], seeing the fire move one knows in general that someone is fighting.
431b6 6. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει.	Aliquando autem iis quae sunt in anima phantasmatibus, aut intellectibus, tamquam videns ratiocinatur, et deliberat futura aut praesentia. Et cum dixerit esse ibi laetum aut triste, tunc fugit, aut imitatur.	Sometimes, however, it is by means of the phantasms or concepts in the soul that one calculates as if seeing, and that one deliberates on future or present matters; and when one has said that the pleasing or the disagreeable is present, then one pursues or avoids.
431b10 καὶ ὅλως ἓν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ· ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί.	Et omnino in actione, et quod sine actione est verum et falsum, in eodem genere est cum bono et malo. Sed in eo quod simpliciter differt, et quodam.	And generally in practical affairs, and apart from action, true and false are in the same category, whether good or evil. But they differ in being absolute and relative.
431b12 7. -τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα <νοεῖ> ὥσπερ, εἴ <τις> τὸ σιμὸν ᾗ μὲν σιμὸν οὔ, κεχωρισμένως δὲ ᾗ κοῖλον [εἴ τις] ἐνόει [ἐνεργείᾳ], ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον-	Abstractione autem dicta intelligit, sicut simum, quatenus simum non separate, inquantum autem curvum, si intellexit actu, sine carne intellexit, in qua curvum est:	The mind understands by abstraction, so called, as one might understand a snub-nose: as snub-nose, not in separation; but as curved, then, if the understanding be actual, the mind thinks of the curve apart from the flesh in which it exists.
431b15 οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά, οὐ κεχωρισμένα <ὄντα>, ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ <ᾗ> ἐκεῖνα.	sic mathematica, non separata tamquam si separata sint intelligit, cum intelligat illa.	Thus, understanding mathematical objects, the mind understands things not separated as separated.
431b16 8. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν, ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὰ πράγματα.	Omnino autem intellectus secundum actum intelligens res est ipse.	And in general, the mind in the act of understanding is the thing itself.
431b17 ἆρα δ' ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.	Utrum autem contingat aliquod separatum intelligere ipsum existentem non separatum a maenitudine, an non, considerandum posterius.	Whether it is possible for a mind that is not itself separated from extension to understand anything separated or no, is to be considered later.
431b 20 – 432a 14 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Η'		BOOK III, CHAPTER VIII
431b20 1. Νῦν δέ, περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα·	[p130/147] Nunc autem de anima dicta recapitulantes dicamus iterum quod omnia ea, quae sunt, quodammodo est anima.	Now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is somehow all that exists;
431b22 ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά·	Aut enim sensibilia quae sunt, aut intelligibilia. Est autem scientia quidem scibilia quodammodo, sensus autem sensibilia.	for things are either sensible or intelligible; and knowledge is in some way the knowable, and sensation is the sense object.
431b23 2. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν.	Qualiter autem haec sint oportet inquirere.	But how this is so we must enquire.
431b24 τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ·	Secatur enim scientia et sensus in res : quae quidem potentia est, in ea quae sunt potentia; quae vero actu, in ea quae sunt actu.	For knowledge and sensation are divided into realities: the potential answers to things that are really in potency, the actual to things really in act.
431b26 τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν <τὸ> ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ <τὸ> αἰσθητόν.	Animae autem sensitivum, et quod scire potest, potentia haec sunt : hoc quidem scibile, illud vero sensibile.	In the soul the sensitive faculty and that which can know are these [things] in potency; the latter [faculty] the understandable, the former the sensible.
431b28 ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι.	Necesse est autem aut ipsa, aut species esse.	Now they must be the things themselves or their forms.
431b28 αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ [432a] εἶδος·	Ipsa quidem igitur non sunt: non enim lapis in anima est, sed species.	But they are certainly not the things themselves: no stone is in the soul, but only its form.
432a1 ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν.	Quare anima sicut manus est. Manus enim organum organorum, et intellectus species specierum, et sensus species sensibilium.	Thus the soul is like a hand: the hand is the instrument that includes other instruments, and the intellect is the form that includes other forms, and sense the form that includes sensible things.
432a3 3. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθὲν ἔστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον,	Quoniam autem neque res nulla est praeter magnitudines, sicut videtur sensibilia separata,	But since there are no real things apart from things sensible and extended (so it would seem),
432a4 ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη.	in speciebus sensibilibus intelligibilia sunt, et quae abstractione dicuntur et quaecumque sensibilium habitus sunt et passiones.	then in the sensible species are the intelligible, both what are predicated as a result of abstraction and whatever qualities and habits are found in sensible things.
432a7 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι οὐδὲ ξυνείη,	Et ob hoc nihil sentiens, nihil utique addiscet, neque intelliget.	And on this account, what does not perceive by sensation acquires no knowledge or understanding at all;
432a8 ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν·	Sed cum speculetur, necesse simul phantasma aliquod speculari.	and when thinking occurs there must be at the same time a phantasm [φάντασμά] as its object; [=be observed]
432a9 τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης.	Phantasmata enim sicut sensibilia sunt praeterquam quod sunt sine materia.	for phantasms [φαντάσματα] are as sense objects save that they are without matter.
432a10 ἔστι δ' ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως·	Est autem phantasia alterum a dictione et negatione.	Imagination is other than affirmation and negation:
432a11 συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος.	Complexio enim intellectuum est verum aut falsum.	for the true and the false are a combining of intellectual concepts.
432a12 τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τί διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα [τἄλλα] φαντάσματα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.	Primi autem intellectus, quo differrent, ut non phantasmata sint? At neque aliis phantasmata, sed non sine phantasmatibus.	What difference have the primary concepts that they should not be phantasms [φαντάσματα]? But neither are the others phantasms [φαντάσματα], though they do not exist apart from phantasms [φαντασμάτων].
432a 15 –433a 8 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Θ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER IX
432a15 1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν,	[p132/149] Quoniam autem anima secundum duas definita est potentias, quae animalium est, et discretio, quod intelligentiae opus est, et sensus, et adhuc in movendo secundum locum motum;	Since the soul is defined by two powers found in animate beings, the one, discernment, the work of intellect and sensation, the other, movement by local motion;
432a17 περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοῦ διωρίσθω τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον ἕν τι μόριον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὂν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή,	de sensu quidem et intellectu determinata sint tanta: de movente autem quid forte sit animae, speculandum est, utrum una quaedam pars ipsius, sic separabilis aut magnitu dine, aut ratione, aut omnis anima.	and as a certain amount has been decided about sensation and understanding, we must now consider what can be the moving factor in the soul: whether this is a single part of it, separate either spatially or by definition, or the whole soul;
432a21 καὶ εἰ μόριόν τι, πότερον ἴδιόν τι παρὰ τὰ εἰωθότα λέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι.	Et si pars aliqua, utrum propria quaedam sit praeter consuetas dici, et dictas, aut harum una aliqua sit.	and, if it is a part of the soul, whether it is a special part other than those generally acknowledged and already dealt with, or some one among these.
432a22 2. ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα.	Habet autem dubitationem mox, quomodo oportet partes animae dicere, et quot.	A difficulty at once arises as to how it is possible to speak at all of parts of the soul, or to say how many they are.
432a24 τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον·	Modo enim quodam infinitae videntur, et non solum quas dicunt quidam, determinantes ratiocinativam, et irascibilem et appetitivam, hi autem rationem habentem, et irrationabilem.	For in one way their number seems to be infinite and not merely, as some say, the reasoning, the irascible and the concupiscible [parts]; or as others say, the rational and irrational.
432a26 κατὰ γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς δι' ἃς ταῦτα χωρίζουσι, καὶ ἄλλα φαίνεται μόρια μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται,	Secundum enim differentias, per quas has separant, et aliae videntur partes majorem his differentiam habentes, de quibus et nunc dictum est.	For according to the differences by which these are distinguished, other parts seem to show greater diversity than [we see] in those just mentioned. In particular:
432a29 τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις ῥᾳδίως·	Vegetativa nimirum quae et plantis inest et omnibus viventibus, et sensitiva, quam neque sicut irrationalem, neque sicut rationem habentem ponet quis utique facile.	the vegetative part, which is in plants and all living things; and the sensitive, which one cannot easily place among either the irrational or the rational elements.
432a31 3. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, 432b1 ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς·	Adhuc autem, et phantastica, quae secundum esse quidem ab omnibus altera est; cui autem harum eadem, vel altera sit, habet multam dubitationem, si aliquis ponat separatas partes animae.	Further, there is the imaginative power, which seems in essence to be quite different from any other. With which of these others it is identical, or from which it differs, are difficult problems: if one is to suppose that parts of the soul are separate.
432b3 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν· ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός· εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.	Adhuc autem et appetitiva, quae et ratione et potentia altera videtur utique esse ab omnibus, et inconveniens utique hanc sequestrare. In ratiocinativa enim voluntas fit, et in irrationabili concupiscentia et ira. Si autem tria in anima, in unoquoque erit appetitus.	Furthermore, there is the appetitive faculty, which, both by its notion and as a capacity, seems to be diverse from all others; and it would be unreasonable to split this up. For will operates in the rational part, desire and anger in the irrational; and if the soul is in three parts, appetition will be in each.
432b7 4. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν; τὴν μὲν γὰρ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπάρχουσαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν, τὸ γεννητικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν·	Sed iam de quo nunc sermo instat agamus, quid movens secundum locum animal est? Motum enim secundum augmentum et decrementum qui omnibus inest, videbitur utique movere, generativum et vegetativum.	But to come to the matter that is now before us: what is it that moves the animal by local motion? For the movement which is in all animals, by which they grow and decay, would certainly seem to be due to the principle of generation and nutrition.
432b11 περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἐκπνοῆς, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἀπορίαν.	De respiratione autem et expiratione et somno et vigilia posterius perficiendum. Habent enim dubitationem multam haec quoque.	Of respiration and exhalation, sleep and waking, we must treat later on: these also raise many difficulties.
432b13 5. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον.	Sed de motu secundum locum, quid sit movens animal secundum processivum motum, considerandum.	But of local motion: what, we must consider, is it that moves an animal from place to place?
432b14 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον·	Quod igitur non vegetativa potentia, manifestum.	It is obviously not the vegetative power.
432b15 ἀεί τε γὰρ ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας καὶ ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν·	Semper enim propter aliquid motus hic, et aut cum phantasia aut appetitu est.	For a movement of this sort is always directed towards an end, and is accompanied by phantasm or desire.
432b16 οὐθὲν γὰρ μὴ ὀρεγόμενον ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ' ἢ βίᾳ·	Nihil enim non appetens aut fugiens, movetur nisi violentia.	For nothing moves unless, with desire or dislike, except under compulsion.
432b17 ἔτι κἂν τὰ φυτὰ κινητικὰ ἦν, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν ταύτην.	Amplius, et plantae utique motae essent, et utique haberent aliquam partem organicam ad motum hunc.	Further: plants would also move about, and would possess some organic part suitable for such movement.
432b19 6. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχει, μόνιμα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκίνητα διὰ τέλους.	Similiter autem neque sensitivum. Multa enim sunt animalium, quae sensum quidem habent, manentia autem et immobilia sunt per finem.	Likewise, it is not. the sensitive power. Many animals endowed with sensation are fixed and motionless all their lives.
432b21 εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε ἀπολείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν (σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἐστὶ γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν) -ὥστ' εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς πορείας.	Si igitur natura nihil facit frustra, neque deficit in necessariis nisi in orbatis, et imperfectis: huiusmodi autem animalia perfecta, et non orbata sunt: signum autem est, quia generativa sunt, et augmentum habent, et decrementum, quare et haberent utique partes organicas processionis.	Yet if Nature does nothing in vain and is never deficient in what is necessary (save in imperfect or injured specimens; but such animals are complete and not defective, and there is proof of this in that they reproduce, grow and decay), it follows that they should also have the parts requisite for moving about.
432b26 7. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν θεωρεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἡ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστιν.	At vero neque ratiocinativa potentia, et vocatus intellectus est movens. Speculativus enim nihil speculatur agibile, neque dicit de fugibili et persequibili. Semper autem motus aut fugientis aut persequentis aliquid est.	Nor is the reasoning faculty or what is called intellect the moving power; for the speculative function does not consider in view of action, and has nothing to say about the avoidable or the desirable. But movement is always the avoidance or the pursuit of something.
432b29 ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία 433a1 κινεῖται, ἂν δ' ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον.	Sed neque cum speculatus fuerit aliquid huiusmodi, iam praecipit aut persequi aut fugere, puta cum multoties intelligit terribile aliquid, aut delectabile, non iubet auten timere, sed cor movetur. Si autem delectabile, altera aliqua pars.	Nor, even when it does consider something of this kind, does it at once command pursuit or avoidance—for instance, it often thinks about some object of terror or delight, but without enjoining fear; though the heart moves, or, in the case of something pleasant, some other part.
433a1 8. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής.	Amplius et praecipiente intellectu et intelligentia fugere aliquid aut persequi, non movetur, sed secundum concupi scentiam agit, ut incontinens.	Further; when the mind and the understanding do command avoidance or pursuit, the soul does not move [accordingly] but acts according to desire, as in the case of the incontinent.
433a4 καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης.	Et totaliter videmus, quod habens medicativam nou sanat, tamquam alterius proprium sit agere secundum scientiam, sed non scientiae.	And in general we observe that one who knows the art of medicine does not [necessarily] heal,—as though it were the function of some power other than science to act according to science.
433a6 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς κινήσεως· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πράττουσιν ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ.	At vero neque appetitus huiusmodi motus dominus est. Abstinentes enim appetentes et concupiscentes, non operantur ea quorum appetitum habent, sed consequuntur intellectum.	But not even appetition imperates such movement as this. For the self-restrained do not act according to their desires even while they are actually wanting and desiring; instead they obey reason.
433a 9 –433b 27 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Ι'		BOOK III, CHAPTER X
433a9 1. Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα·	[p135/152] Videntur autem duo haec moventia, aut appetitus aut intellectus, si aliquis phantasiam posuerit sicut intellectum quemdam.	It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind.
433a11 πολλοὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις,	Multa enim praeter scientiam sequuntur phantasiam. Et in aliis animalibus, non intellectivum neque ratio est, sed phantasia. Utraque haec ergo motiva sunt secundum locum; intellectus et appetitus.	For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency.
433a14 2. νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις <δ'> ἕνεκά του πᾶσα·	Intellectus autem qui propter aliquid ratiocinatur, et qui practicus est, differt a speculativo secundum finem.	Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative.
433a15 οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.	Et appetitus propter aliquod omnis est. Cuius enim appetitus, hoc principium practici intellectus. Ultimum autem, principium actionis est.	Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of action.
433a17 ὥστε εὐλόγως δύο ταῦτα φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κι- νεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν.	Quare rationabiliter haec duo videntur moventia, appetitus et ratio practica. Appetibile enim movet; et propter hoc ratio movet, quia principium ejus est appetibile.	Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle.
433a20 3. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος·	Et phantasia autem cum moveat, non movet sine appetitu. Unum igitur est movens; nempe id, quod appetimus. Si enim duo, intellectus et appetitus, moverent, secundum communem utique aliquam speciem moverent.	And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle.
433a22 νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως (ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις,	Nunc autem intellectus non videtur movens sine appetitu.	Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency.
433a24 ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται), ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν·	Voluntas enim appetitus est. Cum autem secundum rationem movetur, et secundum voluntatem movetur. Appetitus autem moveri praeter rationem.	When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason,
433a25 ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν.	Concupiscentia enim appetitus quidam est.	for concupiscence is a sort of appetition.
433a26 4. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός ἐστιν· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν·	Intellectus quidem igitur omnis, rectus est. Appetitus autem et phantasia, recta et non recta. Unde semper quidem movet appetibile. Sed hoc est bonum, aut apparens bonum.	All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good.
433a29 οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.	Non omne autem, sed agibile bonum. Agibile autem est contingens et aliter se habere.	Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite.
433a30 5. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν.	Quod igitur huiusmodi potentia movet animae, quae vocatur appetitus, manifestum.
433a31 τοῖς δὲ 433b1 διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν·	Dividentibus autem animae partes, si secundum potentias dividant et separent, valde multae fiunt; vegetativum, sensitivum, intellectivum, consiliativum, adhuc appetitivum.	For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive.
433b3 ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν.	Haec enim plus differunt abinvicem, quam concupiscibile et irascibile.	These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible.
433b5 6. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη·	Quoniam autem appetitus fiunt contrarii adinvicem, hoc autem accidit, cum ratio et concupiscentia contrariae fuerint. Fit autem in ipsis temporis sensum habentibus. Intellectus enim propter futurum retrahere jubet, concupiscentia autem propter ipsum iam.	Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present.
433b8 φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον),	Videtur enim quod iam delectabile, et simpliciter delectabile, et bonum simpliciter, propterea quod non videtur futurum.	For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent).
433b10 εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν-πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν·	Species quidem igitur unum erit movens, appetibile aut appetitivum. Primum autem omnium appetibile.	The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable,
433b11 τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον, τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι-ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα.	Hoc enim movet et non movetur, eo quod sit intellectum aut imaginatur. Numero autem plura moventia.	for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors.
433b13 7. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τρία, ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δ' ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον,	Quoniam autem tria sunt, unum quidem movens, secundum autem quo movet, et tertium, quod movetur. Movens autem duplex, aliud quidem immobile, aliud autem, quod movet ac movetur.	Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved)
433b15 ἔστι δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν	Est autem immobile, agibile bonum, movens autem et quod movetur, appetitivum.	the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite.
433b17 (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν, ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον·	Movetur enim quod appetit, secundum quod appetit, et appetitus actus aut motus quidam est. Quod autem movetur, animal est.	For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal.
433b19 ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν — διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ.	Quo vero movet organo appetitus, iam hoc corporeum. Unde in communibus animae et corporis operibus, considerandum est de ipsis.	But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul.
433b21 8. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό	Nunc autem ut in summa dicatur, movens organice ubi principium et finis idem;	Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same:
433b22 - οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή (διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται), λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα.	veluti in circulatione, hoc est gib. bosum, et concavum. Hoc quidem finis, illud vero principium. Unde aliud quidem quiescit, aliud vero movetur. Ratione quidem altera, magnitudine vero inseparabilia sunt.	as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially.
433b25 πάντα γὰρ ὤσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται· διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ, μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.	Omnia enim pulsu et tractu moventur. Propter quod oportet, sicut in circulo, manere aliquid, et hinc incipere motum.	All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins.
433b 27 –434a 21
433b27 9. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.	[p138/155] Omnino igitur, sicut praedictum est, inquantum appetitivum animal, sic suiipsius motivum est. Appetitivum autem non sine phantasia. Phantasia autem omnis aut rationalis, aut sensibilis est. Hac igitur et alia animalia participant.	Generally, then an animal is self-moving inasmuch as it is appetitive, as we have said. But there is never appetition apart from imagination; and all imagination is either rational or sensitive. It is in the latter, then, that other animals also participate.
ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΑ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER XI
433b31 1. Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστιν, 434a1 οἷς ἁφῇ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν.	Considerandum autem et de imperfectis quid movens est quibus sensus tactus solum inest, utrum contingat phantasiam el concupiscentiam inesse his, an non.	Now we must consider the motive force in those imperfect animals in which there exists no sense but touch; and whether or no they have imagination and desire.
434a2 φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ' ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως δ' ἔνεστιν.	Videtur enim laetitia et tristitia inesse. Si autem haec, et concupiscentiam necesse. Phantasia autem quomodo utique inerit? An sient movetur indeterminate, et haec insunt quidem, indeterminate autem insunt.	Pain and pleasure do seem to be present in them; and if these, then, necessarily, desire as well. But how can there be imagination in them? It may be that as they are moved indeterminately, so these qualities are present indeed in them, but only indeterminately.
434a5 2. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρ- χει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον·	Sensibilis igitur phantasia, sicut dictum est, et in aliis animalibus inest. Deliberativa autem rationalibus inest. Utrum enim aget hoc aut hoc, iam rationis est opus	Sensitive imagination, then, is found in other animals, as we have said; but the deliberative only in rational beings. For [to deliberate] whether to do this or that is the work of reason,
434a8 καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν·	et necesse est uno mensurare.	and there must be a single standard to measure by;
434a9 τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει·	Majus enim imitatur.	for the agent follows the more excellent.
434a9 ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν).	Quare potest unum ex pluribus phantasmatibus facere.	Hence [reason] is able to make one phantasm [φαντασμάτων] out of several.
434a10 καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ κινεῖ· 3. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις·	Et causa haec est, cur opinionem non putatur habere, quoniam eam quae ex syllogismo non habet. Haec autem illam. Propter quod deliberativum non habet appetitus.	And this is why the [irrational animals] are thought not to have opinion; they lack that which derives from reasoning; which, indeed, involves opinion. For this reason [the lower] appetite is without deliberation. ,
434a12 νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην, ὁτὲ δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα <σφαῖραν>, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι.	Vincit autem et movet aliquando appetitus deliberationem. Aliquando autem movet et hunc illa, sicut sphaera, appetitus appetitum, cum in continentia fuerit. Natura autem semper quae sursum, principalior est, et movet ut tribus lationibus iam moveatur.	Appetite sometimes overcomes and moves deliberation. But sometimes the latter moves the former, like a heavenly sphere; one appetition governing another, as in continence. Naturally the higher principle always holds priority, and originates motion, so that movement occurs on three courses.
434a16 4. τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον	Scientificum autem non movet, sed manet. Quoniam autem haec quidem universalis existimatio et ratio, alia vero particularis.	The cognitive faculty does not move, but remains at rest. But since one judgement or conception is universal, while the other is particular,
434a17 (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), ἢ δὴ αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ.	Haec quidem enim dicit, quod oportet talem tale agere, hoc autem quod hoc quidem est tale, et ego talis. Iam haec movet opinio, non quae universalis, aut utraque; sed haec quidem quiescens magis, haec autem non.	it is the former that dictates that such and such a man should perform such and such an action; whilst the latter says that this is such an action and I am such and, such a man. It is this opinion, not the universal, that causes movement; or both together; but the one as being more at rest, the other less so.
434a 22 –435a 10 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΒ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER XII
434a22 1. Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἔχειν ὅτι περ ἂν ζῇ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχῃ, ἀπὸ γενέσεως καὶ μέχρι φθορᾶς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν καὶ φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ' ἄνευ τροφῆς ἀδύνατον·	[p140/157] Vegetabilem igitur animam necesse habere omne, quodcumque vivit, et habet animam, a generatione usque ad corruptionem. Necesse est enim quod generatur, augmentum habere, et statum, et decrementum: hoc autem sine alimento esse, impossibile est.	All living things have the vegetative soul; and this from generation to corruption. For everything generated must grow, maintain itself and then decay; and this is impossible without nutriment.
434a25 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐνεῖναι τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν·	Necesse est igitur, inesse vegetabilem potentiam in omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus.	Of necessity, then, a vegetative power is found in all that is born and dies.
434a27 2. αἴσθησιν δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν ἐνδέχεται αὐτὴν ἔχειν, [οὔτε ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον] οὔτε ὅσα μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.	Sensum autem non necesse est omnibus viventibus inesse. Neque enim ea, quorum simplex corpus, contingit habere tactum. Neque sine hoc possibile est esse ullum animal, neque quaecumque non susceptiva specierum sine materia.	Sensation, however, is not necessarily found in everything that lives. Beings whose bodies are uncompounded even lack touch, without which no animal can exist at all; nor can those be animals which are unable to receive forms without matter.
434a30 3. τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, [434a.30α <οὐδὲ ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον,> εἰ μηθὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις.	Animal autem necesse est sensum habere, si nihil frustra facit natura.	But if Nature does nothing in vain, animals must have sensation.
434a31 ἕνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά του.	Propter aliquid enim omnia, quae sunt natura, subsistunt, aut coincidentia sunt eorum, quae sunt propter aliquid.	For all things in Nature exist for a purpose, or accompany that which exists for a purpose.
434a32 εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ 434b1 εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον (πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται; τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ὅθεν πεφύκασιν,	Si igitur omne processivum corpus non habet sensum, corrumpetur utique, et ad finem non utique veniet, qui est naturae opus. Quomodo enim aletur? Manentibus quidem enim existit, unde nutriri nata sunt.	Every body that is able to move about, if it lacked sensation, would soon be destroyed, and would never attain its end, which is the purpose of Nature. For how would it be nourished? Immobile animals indeed find nourishment in that out of which they are produced.
434b3 4. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γενητὸν δέ-ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον·	Non potest autem corpus habere quidem animam, et intellectum discretivum, sensum autem non habere, non mansivum existens, generabile autem. At vero neque ingenerabile. Quare enim non habebit?	But a body, generated, not stationary, cannot possess a soul and intellectual discernment and yet not have sensation, (nor indeed can an ungenerated one). For why should it not have it?
434b5 διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει; ἢ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι, νῦν δ' οὐδέτερον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, τῷ δ' οὐθὲν ἔσται μᾶλλον δι' ἐκεῖνο) -οὐθὲν ἄρα ἔχει ψυχὴν σῶμα μὴ μόνιμον <ὂν> ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.	Aut enim animae melius, aut corpori. Nunc autem neutrum est. Hoc quidem non magis intelligit. Hoc autem nihil erit magis propter illud. Nullum ergo habet animal corpus non manens sine sensu.	For the good [presumably] of either the soul or the body. But neither, surely. The soul would not thin better nor the body benefit on that account. No animal then, whose body is mobile, lacks sensation.
434b8 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ μικτόν. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν· ἁφὴν γὰρ οὐχ ἕξει, ἔστι δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.	At vero si habet sensum, necesse est corpus esse aut simplex, aut mistum. Impossibile autem est esse simplex. Tactum enim non haberet. Est autem necesse hunc habere.	But having sensation, a body must needs be either simple or compound. It cannot, however, be simple; for then it would lack touch, and it must have this sense.
434b11 6. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, [ἁπτὸν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ,] ἀνάγκη [καὶ] τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.	Hoc autem ex his manifestum. Quoniam enim animal corpus animatum est, corpus autem omne tangibile, tangibile autem quod sensibile tactu: necesse et animalis corpus tactivum esse, si debet salvari animal.	Which is evident from these considerations. Since an animal is an animate body, and every body is tangible, and the tangible is what is perceptible by touch, the animal’s body must be able to touch if it is to survive.
434b14 αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή· ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ ἕξει αἴσθησιν, οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.	Alii enim sensus per altera sentiunt, ut olfactus, visus, auditus. Tactivum autem nisi habeat sensum, non haec quidem poterit fugere, illa autem accipere. Si vero haec, impossibile est salvari animal.	For the other senses perceive through an extraneous medium; e.g. smell, sight, hearing. But if the animal that comes into contact [with other things] had no sense of touch it could not avoid certain things and seize upon others; and thus it could not preserve its existence.
434b18 7. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις· τροφῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα ἁπτόν. ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ οὔτ' αὔξησιν οὔτε φθίσιν·	Propter quod et gustus, est sicut tactus quidam; alimentum autem, corpus tangi possibile. Sonus autem et color et odor non alunt, neque faciunt augmentum, neque decrementum.	This is why taste is a kind of touch; for food is a tangible body. But sound and colour and smell do not nourish, or contribute to growth or, decay.
434b21 ὥστε καὶ τὴν γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη ἁφὴν εἶναί τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι· αὗται μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον,	Quare et gustum necesse est tactum esse quemdam, quia tangibilis et vegetativi sensus est. Hi quidem igitur necessarii sunt animali. Quo et manifestum quod non possibile sine tactu animal esse.	Taste must then be a kind of touch, being a sense of the tangible and the nutritive. These senses then are necessary to the animal. Hence it is plain that no animal can exist without touch.
434b24 8. αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει ζῴων ἤδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι· ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν·	Alii autem propter bonum, et generi animalium iam non cuiusque, sed quibusdam, ut processivo necesse inesse.	The others exist for its greater good; and then not in every kind of animal, but in some, namely in those that need to move from place to place.
434b26 εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου.	Si enim debet salvari, non solum oportet tactum sentire, sed et de longe. Hoc autem erit, si per medium sensitivum fuerit, eo quod illud quidem a sensibili patiatur, et moveatur, ipsum autem ab illo.	For if [such] an animal is to survive it must perceive not only what is in contact with it, but also what is afar; and this will happen, if it perceives through a medium, this being affected and moved by the sense object, and the animal itself by the medium.
434b29 9. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι διὰ μέσου ἡ κίνησις, καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινοῦν ὠθεῖ οὐκ ὠθούμενον, τὸ δ' ἔσχατον μόνον ὠθεῖται οὐκ ὦσαν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἄμφω, 435a1 πολλὰ δὲ τὰ μέσα,	Sicut enim movens secundum locum, usque ad permutationem facit, et pellens alterum facit ut pellatur, et est per medium motus. Et primum quidem movens depellit et non depellitur, ultimum antem solum depellitur non pellens, medium autem utraque, multa autem media,	It is [as when] a thing is moving locally: it operates till it affects a change and, impelling something else, causes another impulsion, so that movement traverses a medium. The first mover causes motion and is unmoved: the last is moved, moving nothing else; but the intermediary is both; or the many intermediaries.
435a1 οὕτω καὶ ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον εἰ εἰς κηρὸν βάψειέ τις, μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἕως ἔβαψεν·	et sic in alteratione, praeter quam quod manet in eodem loco id quod alterat. Ut si in ceram tinxerit aliquis usque ad id mota est, usquequo tinxit.	So it is with the alteration in question, except that what is changed remains in the same place. If one clips an object into wax, the wax moves to the extent that the object enters it;
435a3 λίθος δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω· ὁ δ' ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον κινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς ᾖ.	Lapis autem nihil. Sed aqua usque procul. Aer autem ad plurimun movetur, et facit et patitur, si maneat, et unus sit.	whereas a stone is not moved at all; but water a long way, and air most of all, giving and receiving motion, so long as it remains a unity.
435a5 διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνακλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν ἐξιοῦσαν ἀνακλᾶσθαι τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ ἂν ᾖ εἷς.	Unde et de repercussione, est melius, quam visum egredientem repercuti, aerem pati a figura et colore usquequo sit unus.	Hence, as regards reflection, it is better to say that the air is affected by shape and colour, so long as it retains unity, than to say that the sight proceeds out and is reflected back.
435a8 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς· διὸ πάλιν οὗτος τὴν ὄψιν κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον διεδίδοτο μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος.	In leni autem est unus, propter quod hic iterum visum movebit, sicut utique si in ceram sigillum ingrederetur usque ad finem,	On a smooth surface [air] has unity, and so in turn, moves the sight; as if a seal were to sink into and right through wax.
435a 11 - 435b 25 ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΙΓ'		BOOK III, CHAPTER XIII
435a11 1. Ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ ζῴου σῶμα, φανερόν, λέγω δ' οἷον πύρινον ἢ ἀέρινον.	[p143/160] Quod autem impossibile sit, simplex esse animalis corpus, manifestum est: dico autem, puta igneum, aut aereum.	It is clearly impossible for the body of an animal to be a simple element: to be, I mean, fire or air.
435a12 ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν (τὸ γὰρ σῶμα ἁπτικὸν τὸ ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται)·	Sine tactu enim nullum alium sensum esse possibile est. Corpus enim tactivum animatum omne, sicut dictum est.	For no other sense can exist without touch; since every animate body, as we have seen, is tactual.
435a14 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἔξω γῆς αἰσθητήρια μὲν ἂν γένοιτο, πάντα δὲ τῷ δι' ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ διὰ τῶν μετα- ξύ, ἡ δ' ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχει.	Alia autem, praeter terram, sensoria quidem utique fient; omnia autem per alterum scutiendo faciunt sensum, et per medium. Tactus autem est in tangendo ipsa: propter quod et habet hoc nomen.	The sense organs, indeed, can be constituted of other elements (except earth) for they effect sensation by perceiving through some other thing, i.e. through a medium. But touch occurs by immediate contact with things; that is why it has this name.
435a18 καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητήρια ἁφῇ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑτέρου· αὕτη δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη δι' αὑτῆς. ὥστε τῶν μὲν τοιούτων στοιχείων οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου.	Et tamen alii sensus tactu sentiunt, sed per altera. Hic autem videtur solus per seipsum. Quare huiusmodi elementorum nullum utique erit corpus animalis. Neque itaque terrenum.	Other senses no doubt also perceive by contact, but through something else; touch alone, it would seem, through itself. Hence the body of an animal will not be of such elements as these; nor yet be earthy.
435a20 οὐδὲ δὴ γήϊνον. πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ μεσότης, καὶ δεκτικὸν τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐ μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ γῆς εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων.	Omnium enim tangibilium tactus est sicut medietas, et susceptivus sensus, non solum quaecumque differentiae sunt, sed calidi, et frigidi, et aliorum omnium tangi possibilium.	For touch is a kind of mean between all tangible objects, and is receptive, not only of all the differences that characterise earth, but also heat and cold and all other tangible qualities.
435a24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀστοῖς καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μορίοις οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι γῆς ἐστιν, 435b1 καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμίαν ἔχει αἴσθησιν, ὅτι γῆς ἐστιν·	Et propter hoc ossibus, et capillis et huiusmodi partibus non sentimus, quia terreae sunt. Et plantae etiam ob hoc nullum habent sensum, quia terreae sunt;	This is why we do not feel with the bones or hair or other such parts,—because they are earthy. Plants, too, have no sensation, for the same reason,—they are of earth;
435b2 ἄνευ δὲ ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε ἄλλην ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε γῆς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν στοιχείων οὐδενός.	sine autem tactu, nullum possibile est alium esse. Hic autem sensus non est, neque terrae, neque ullius alius elementorum.	and without touch there can be no other sense; and this sense does not consist either of earth or of any other [single] element.
435b4 2. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης στερισκόμενα τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀποθνήσκειν· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτην ἔχειν οἷόν τε μὴ ζῷον ὄν, οὔτε ζῷον ὂν ἄλλην ἔχειν ἀνάγκη πλὴν ταύτην.	Manifestum igitur, quod necesse hoc solo privata sensu animalia mori. Neque enim hunc possibile est habere non animal existens, neque cum sit animal, alium necesse est habere, praeter hunc.	It is then evident that animals must perish if they are deprived of this sense alone. For it is neither possible for what is not an animal to possess this, nor, to be an animal, is any other necessary.
435b7 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον, οἷον χρῶμα καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητήρια (ἂν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,	Et propter hoc quidem alia sensibilia excellentiis non corrumpunt animal, ut color et odor, et sonus, sed solum sensus ; nisi secundum accidens;	And this again is why no other sense-object (e.g. colour, smell and sound) will destroy the animal by excessive intensity, but only the [corresponding] faculty of sense;—except incidentally,
435b10 οἷον ἂν ἅμα τῷ ψόφῳ ὦσις γένηται καὶ πληγή), καὶ ὑπὸ ὁραμάτων καὶ ὀσμῆς ἕτερα κινεῖται, ἃ τῇ ἁφῇ φθείρει (καὶ ὁ χυμὸς δὲ ᾗ ἅμα συμβαίνει ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, ταύτῃ φθείρει),	puta si simul cum sono depulsio fiat et ictus, et a visis et odore alia moventur, quae tactu corrumpunt: et humor autem, secundum quod accidit simul tactivum esse, sic corrumpit.	as when, for example, together with a sound, a thrust and a blow take place; or when other [things] are set in motion, by objects seen or smelled, which destroy by contact; and flavour too, in so far as it happens also to be tangible, may destroy thus.
435b13 3. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολή, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ζῷον· παντὸς μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ αἰσθητοῦ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν τὴν ἁφήν, ταύτῃ δὲ ὥρισται τὸ ζῷον·	Tangibilium autem excellentia, ut calidorum, et frigidorum, et durorum, corrumpit animal. Omnis enim sensibilis superfluitas corrumpit sensum. Quare et quod tangi potest, tactum. Hoc autem tactu, determinatum est vivere.	But an excess of tangible qualities, of heat or cold or hardness, destroys the animal itself. For as every excess in a sense-object is destructive of the sense, so may the tangible destroy touch; and by touch life itself is defined.
435b17 ἄνευ γὰρ ἁφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. διὸ ἡ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολὴ οὐ μόνον τὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῷον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην.	Sine enim taclu monstratum est quod impossibile est animal esse. Unde tangibilium excellentia non solum corrumpunt sensum, sed et animal, quia necesse solum habere hunc animalia.	For it has been shown that without touch, no animal can exist. Hence an excess in the tangible destroys not the sense only, but the whole animal; for only this one sense is necessary to animals.
435b19 τὰς δ' ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ' ἐπεὶ ἐν διαφανεῖ,	Alios autem sensus habet animal, sicut dictum est, non propter esse, sed propter bene, ut visum, quia in aere et aqua, ut videat, omnino autem quoniam in diaphano.	As we have said, the animal has other senses, not for being, but for well-being. Thus [it has] sight so that [living] in, air, water, or generally in what is transparent, it may see.
435b22 γεῦσιν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, ἵνα αἰσθάνηται τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηταί τι αὐτῷ [γλῶτταν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι ἑτέρῳ].	Gustum autem habet propter delectabile et triste, ut sentiat quod in alimento, et concupiscat, et moveatur. Auditum autem ut significetur aliquid ipsi. Linguam autem habet quatenus significet aliquid alteri.	Taste it has on account of the pleasant or unpleasant, that it may perceive what it desires in food, and, be moved towards it. Hearing it has that it may receive signs, and a tongue to signify something to another.