Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c5

Chapter 5

Greek	Latin	English
ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, καὶ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι: εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (πολλοὶ γὰρ [10] τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν: ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), καὶ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ (τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες: εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ [15] ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες).	Est autem et ab eadem opinione Protagore ratio, et necesse similiter ipsas ambas aut esse aut non esse. Nam si quae videntur omnia sunt vera et apparentia, necesse omnia simul vera * et falsa esse. Multi namque contraria * invicem 1009a10 existimant, et non eadem opinantes sibi ipsis mentiri putant; quare necesse idem esse et non esse. Et si hoc est, necesse putata esse omnia vera. Opposita namque * invicem opinantur mentientes et verum dicentes; ergo entia si sic se habent, ↵ verum dicunt omnes.	Chapter 5. From the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of Protagoras, and both doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. For on the one hand, if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false. For many men hold beliefs in which they conflict with one another, and think those mistaken who have not the same opinions as themselves; so that the same thing must both be and not be. And on the other hand, if this is so, all opinions must be true; for those who are mistaken and those who are right are opposed to one another in their opinions; if, then, reality is such as the view in question supposes, all will be right in their beliefs.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶ διανοίας ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι, δῆλον:	Quod quidem igitur ab eodem sunt intellectu utreque rationes, palam.	Evidently, then, both doctrines proceed from the same way of thinking.
ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς ἅπαντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως: οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται οἱ δὲ βίας. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπορῆσαι ὑπέλαβον οὕτως, τούτων εὐΐατος ἡ ἄγνοια (οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν [20] λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ἀπάντησις αὐτῶν): ὅσοι δὲ λόγου χάριν λέγουσι, τούτων δ᾽ ἔλεγχος ἴασις τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν.	Est autem non idem ƿ modus <intercessionis> ad omnes; hii namque persuasione egent illi vi. Quicumque enim ex dubitasse existimaverunt ita, ↵ horum * bene curabilis ignorantia; non enim ad orationem sed ad mentem * obviatio ipsorum. Quicumque vero orationis causa dicunt, horum arguitio * curatio et eius quae in voce orationis et eius quae in nominibus.	But the same method of discussion must not be used with all opponents; for some need persuasion, and others compulsion. Those who have been driven to this position by difficulties in their thinking can easily be cured of their ignorance; for it is not their expressed argument but their thought that one has to meet. But those who argue for the sake of argument can be cured only by refuting the argument as expressed in speech and in words.
ἐλήλυθε δὲ τοῖς διαποροῦσιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἅμα τὰς ἀντιφάσεις καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ὁρῶσιν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ [25] γιγνόμενα τἀναντία: εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, προϋπῆρχεν ὁμοίως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἄμφω ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μεμῖχθαι πᾶν ἐν παντί φησι καὶ Δημόκριτος: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχειν μέρος, καίτοι τὸ μὲν ὂν τούτων εἶναι τὸ δὲ [30] μὴ ὄν.	Venit autem dubitantibus haec opinio ex sensibilibus, quae quidem * eius quod simul contradictiones et contraria exis↵tere videntibus ex eodem facta contraria. Ergo si non contingit fieri non ens, preextitit similiter res ambo ens, ut et Anaxagoras misceri omne in omni ait et Democritus; et enim hic inane et plenum similiter secundum quamcumque existere partem, ↵ quamvis hoc quidem horum esse ens illud vero non ens.	Those who really feel the difficulties have been led to this opinion by observation of the sensible world. (1) They think that contradictories or contraries are true at the same time, because they see contraries coming into existence out of the same thing. If, then, that which is not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before as both contraries alike, as Anaxagoras says all is mixed in all, and Democritus too; for he says the void and the full exist alike in every part, and yet one of these is being, and the other non-being.
πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντας ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ὀρθῶς λέγουσι τρόπον δέ τινα ἀγνοοῦσιν: τὸ γὰρ ὂν λέγεται διχῶς, ὥστ᾽ ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὃν οὔ, καὶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ [ὄν]: δυνάμει [35] μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ.	Ad eos quidem igitur qui ex hiis existimant dicemus quia modo quodam recte dicunt et modo quodam ignorant. Ens enim dupliciter dicitur; est ergo quomodo contingit fieri aliquid ex non ente, est autem quomodo non, et simul idem esse ens ↵ et non ens, sed non secundum idem ens. Potestate namque contingit simul idem esse contraria, actu vero non.	To those, then, whose belief rests on these grounds, we shall say that in a sense they speak rightly and in a sense they err. For 'that which is' has two meanings, so that in some sense a thing can come to be out of that which is not, while in some sense it cannot, and the same thing can at the same time be in being and not in being – but not in the same respect. For the same thing can be potentially at the same time two contraries, but it cannot actually.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν.	Amplius autem dignificemus ipsos existimare et aliam substantiam esse entium cui nec motus existit nec corruptio nec generatio omnino.	And again we shall ask them to believe that among existing things there is also another kind of substance to which neither movement nor destruction nor generation at all belongs.
[1009β] [1] —ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γευομένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον [5] ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ᾽ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οὔ:	↵ Similiter autem et quae * circa apparentia veritas quibusdam ex sensibilibus venit. Verum enim non pluralitate iudicari ƿ putant oportere nec paucitate, idem vero hiis quidem dulce gustantibus esse videtur illis vero amarum, quare si omnes laboraverint aut omnes desipuerint, duo autem vel tres sani sint ↵ aut intellectum habeant, hos quidem videri laborare et desipere alios vero non.	[09b] And (2) similarly some have inferred from observation of the sensible world the truth of appearances. For they think that the truth should not be determined by the large or small number of those who hold a belief, and that the same thing is thought sweet by some when they taste it, and bitter by others, so that if all were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were well or sane, these would be thought ill and mad, and not the others.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τἀναντία [περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν. ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ [10] ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον: οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ ἄδηλον.	Amplius autem multis aliorum animalium contraria videri et nobis, et ipsi autem unicuique ad se ipsum non eadem secundum sensum semper videri. Quae igitur horum vera * aut falsa, non manifestum *; nihil enim magis haec quam ↵ illa vera, sed similiter. Propter quod Democritus ait aut nihil esse verum aut nobis non manifestum.	And again, they say that many of the other animals receive impressions contrary to ours; and that even to the senses of each individual, things do not always seem the same. Which, then, of these impressions are true and which are false is not obvious; for the one set is no more true than the other, but both are alike. And this is why Democritus, at any rate, says that either there is no truth or to us at least it is not evident.
ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί [15] φασιν:	Omnino vero propter existimare prudentiam quidem sensum, hunc autem esse alterationem, quod videtur secundum sensum ex necessitate verum esse dicunt.	And in general it is because these thinkers suppose knowledge to be sensation, and this to be a physical alteration, that they say that what appears to our senses must be true;
ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν: πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν. καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει [20] ὅτι ὅσσον <δ᾽> ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο. καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνεται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον: ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχει κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυκάμπτων, τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν [25] καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί: τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.	Ex hiis enim Empedo↵cles et Democritus et aliorum ut consequens dicere unusquisque talibus opinionibus facti sunt rei. Et enim Empedocles permutantes habitum permutare dicit * prudentiam: “Ad presens enim consilium augetur hominibus”. Et in aliis dicit quia ↵ “quantum alteri transformati sunt, tantum ipsis et semper sapere altera affuit”. Parmenides vero enuntiat eodem modo: “ut enim quandocumque habuerint membrorum complexionem multe flexionis, * intellectus hominibus adest; idem enim est quod quidem sapit, membrorum natura hominiƿ↵bus et omnibus et omni; quod enim plus est intelligentia”.	for it is for these reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus and, one may almost say, all the others have fallen victims to opinions of this sort. For Empedocles says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge; For wisdom increases in men according to what is before them. And elsewhere he says that: So far as their nature changed, so far to them always Came changed thoughts into mind. And Parmenides also expresses himself in the same way:For as at each time the much-bent limbs are composed, So is the mind of men; for in each and all men'Tis one thing thinks-the substance of their limbs: For that of which there is more is thought.
Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταίρων τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολάβωσιν. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ [30] τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ ἀμφότεραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.	Anaxagore quoque pronuntium recordatur ad quosdam sociorum, quia talia ipsis erunt entia qualia utique existimaverunt. Dicunt autem et Homerum videri hanc habentem opinionem, ↵ quia fecit hectorem, tamquam in extasi fuerit a * plaga, iacere aliud sapientem; tamquam sapientes quidem et desipientes, sed non eadem. Palam ergo quod, si utreque prudentie, et entia simul sic * et non sic se habent.	A saying of Anaxagoras to some of his friends is also related,– that things would be for them such as they supposed them to be. And they say that Homer also evidently had this opinion, because he made Hector, when he was unconscious from the blow, lie 'thinking other thoughts',– which implies that even those who are bereft of thought have thoughts, though not the same thoughts. Evidently, then, if both are forms of knowledge, the real things also are at the same time both so and not so.
ᾗ καὶ χαλεπώτατον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστιν: εἰ γὰρ οἱ μάλιστα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς ἑωρακότες—οὗτοι [35] δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ μάλιστα ζητοῦντες αὐτὸ καὶ φιλοῦντες—οὗτοι τοιαύτας ἔχουσι τὰς δόξας καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφαίνονται περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγχειροῦντας; τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.	Qua et gravissimum accidens est. Nam si qui maxime contingens verum viderunt ↵ (hii autem sunt maxime quaerentes ipsum et amantes), hii tales habent opiniones et talia enuntiant de veritate, quomodo non est dignum respuere philosophari conantes? Nam volantia ↵ persequi erit utique veritatem inquirere.	And it is in this direction that the consequences are most difficult. For if those who have seen most of such truth as is possible for us (and these are those who seek and love it most)-if these have such opinions and express these views about the truth, is it not natural that beginners in philosophy should lose heart? For to seek the truth would be to follow flying game.
[1010α] [1] —αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον: ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴπομεν: [5] διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην).	Hiis autem opinionis causa quia de entibus quidem veritatem intendebant, entia autem putaverunt esse sensibilia solum; in hiis vero multa quae * indeterminati natura existit et quae ↵ * entis sic ut diximus. Propter quod decenter quidem dicunt, non vera autem dicunt (sic enim congruit magis dicere quam sicut Epicharmus ad Xenophanem).	[10a] But the reason why these thinkers held this opinion is that while they were inquiring into the truth of that which is, they thought, that which is was identical with the sensible world; in this, however, there is largely present the nature of the indeterminate-of that which exists in the peculiar sense which we have explained; and therefore, while they speak plausibly, they do not say what is true (for it is fitting to put the matter so rather than as Epicharmus put it against Xenophanes).
ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περί γε τὸ πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλλον οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. [10] ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι: αὐτὸς [15] γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ.	Amplius autem omnem videntes hanc motam naturam, de permutante autem nihil verum dicimus, circa vero omnino semper permutans non con↵tingere verum dicere. Nam ex hac existimatione pullulavit dictorum summa opinio quae est dicentium eraclizare et qualem cratylus habuit, qui tandem nihil opinatus est oportere dicere sed digitum movebat solum, et Eraclitum increpuit ƿ dicentem * bis in eodem flumine non est intrare; ipse enim ↵ existimavit nec semel.	And again, because they saw that all this world of nature is in movement and that about that which changes no true statement can be made, they said that of course, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing, nothing could truly be affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for he thought one could not do it even once.
ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλον ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἔχει τινὰ αὐτοῖς λόγον μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι,	Nos autem et ad hanc rationem dicemus quia permutans quando permutat habet quandam ipsis veram rationem non existimari esse,	But we shall say in answer to this argument also that while there is some justification for their thinking that the changing, when it is changing, does not exist,
καίτοι ἔστι γε ἀμφισβητήσιμον: τό τε γὰρ ἀποβάλλον ἔχει τι τοῦ ἀποβαλλομένου, καὶ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἤδη ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι, ὅλως [20] τε εἰ φθείρεται, ὑπάρξει τι ὄν, καὶ εἰ γίγνεται, ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ γεννᾶται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον.	equidem est dubitabilissimum; abiciens enim habet aliquid eius quod abicitur, et eius quod fit iam necesse aliquid esse. Omninoque si corrumpitur, existet aliquid ens; ↵ et si fit, ex quo fit et a quo generatur necesse esse, et hoc non esse in infinitum.	yet it is after all disputable; for that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to be, something must already be. And in general if a thing is perishing, will be present something that exists; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it is generated, and this process cannot go on ad infinitum.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παρέντες ἐκεῖνα λέγωμεν, ὅτι οὐ ταὐτό ἐστι τὸ μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον, [25] ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γιγνώσκομεν.	Sed haec praetermittentes illa dicamus, quia non idem est permutare secundum quantitatem et secundum qualitatem; secundum quantitatem quidem igitur sit non manens, sed secundum speciem omnia cognoscimus.	-But, leaving these arguments, let us insist on this, that it is not the same thing to change in quantity and in quality. Grant that in quantity a thing is not constant; still it is in respect of its form that we know each thing.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἄξιον ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὕτως ἔχοντα περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπεφήναντο: ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διατελεῖ [30] μόνος ὤν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν, ὥστε δικαιότερον ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνα τούτων ἀπεψηφίσαντο ἢ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων κατεψηφίσαντο.	↵ amplius autem dignum * increpare sic existimantes, quod sensibilium in minoribus numerum scientes * sic habentem de toto celo similiter enuntiaverunt. Nam circa nos sensibilis locus in generatione et corruptione perseuerat solus ens; sed ↵ iste ut * dicatur nulla pars est omnis, quare iustius utique propter illa haec reueriti fuissent quam propter haec de illis erraverunt.	-And again, it would be fair to criticize those who hold this view for asserting about the whole material universe what they saw only in a minority even of sensible things. For only that region of the sensible world which immediately surrounds us is always in process of destruction and generation; but this is-so to speak-not even a fraction of the whole, so that it would have been juster to acquit this part of the world because of the other part, than to condemn the other because of this.
ἔτι δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τούτους ταὐτὰ τοῖς πάλαι λεχθεῖσιν ἐροῦμεν: ὅτι [34] γὰρ ἔστιν ἀκίνητός τις φύσις δεικτέον αὐτοῖς καὶ πειστέον [35] αὐτούς.	Amplius autem palam quia et ad hos eadem olim dictis dicemus; quod enim est immobilis natura quaedam * ostendendum ipsis et credendum est eis.	And again, obviously we shall make to them also the same reply that we made long ago; we must show them and persuade them that there is something whose nature is changeless.
καίτοι γε συμβαίνει τοῖς ἅμα φάσκουσιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἠρεμεῖν μᾶλλον φάναι πάντα ἢ κινεῖσθαι: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι μεταβαλεῖ: ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν.	Equidem contingit ↵ simul dicentibus esse et non esse quiescere magis dicere omnia quam moveri; non enim est in quod aliquid permutetur, nam omnia insunt omnibus.	Indeed, those who say that things at the same time are and are not, should in consequence say that all things are at rest rather than that they are in movement; for there is nothing into which they can change, since all attributes belong already to all subjects.
[1010β] [1] —περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ <εἰ> ἡ αἴσθησις <μὴ> ψευδὴς τοῦ γε ἰδίου ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταὐτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει.	↵ De veritate vero, quod non omne apparens verum; primum quidem quia neque sensus falsus proprii est, sed phantasia * non idem * sensui.	[10b] Regarding the nature of truth, we must maintain that not everything which appears is true; firstly, because even if sensation-at least of the object peculiar to the sense in question-is not false, still appearance is not the same as sensation.
εἶτ᾽ ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποροῦσι, πότερον τηλικαῦτά ἐστι [5] τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ χρώματα τοιαῦτα οἷα τοῖς ἄπωθεν φαίνεται ἢ οἷα τοῖς ἐγγύθεν, καὶ πότερον οἷα τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἢ οἷα τοῖς κάμνουσιν, καὶ βαρύτερα πότερον ἃ τοῖς ἀσθενοῦσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν, καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί [10] γε, φανερόν: οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον.	Deinde dignum mirari si hoc dubitant, utrum tante sunt magnitudines et colores tales quales a remotis ↵ videntur aut quales de prope, et utrum qualia sanis aut qualia laborantibus, et graviora utrum qualia debilibus aut qualia ƿ robustis, et vera utrum qualia dormientibus aut qualia vigilanti↵bus. Quod quidem enim non putant, palam; nullus ergo, si putaverit de nocte Athenis esse ens in Libia, uadit ad Odium.	Again, it is fair to express surprise at our opponents raising the question whether magnitudes are as great, and colours are of such a nature, as they appear to people at a distance, or as they appear to those close at hand, and whether they are such as they appear to the healthy or to the sick, and whether those things are heavy which appear so to the weak or those which appear so to the strong, and those things true which appear to the slee ing or to the waking. For obviously they do not think these to be open questions; no one, at least, if when he is in Libya he has fancied one night that he is in Athens, starts for the concert hall.
ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος.	Amplius autem de futuro, ut et Plato dicit, nequaquam similiter propria medici opinio et ignorantis, velut de futuro ↵ fore sanos aut non futuro.	And again with regard to the future, as Plato says, surely the opinion of the physician and that of the ignorant man are not equally weighty, for instance, on the question whether a man will get well or not.
ἔτι δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν [15] τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐχ ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἰδίου ἢ τοῦ πλησίον καὶ τοῦ αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν χρώματος ὄψις, οὐ γεῦσις, περὶ δὲ χυμοῦ γεῦσις, οὐκ ὄψις:	Amplius autem et in sensibus non similiter propria alieni et proprii aut propinqui et eius quod ipsius, sed de coloribus quidem visus, non gustus, de saporibus vero gustus, non visus;	-And again, among sensations themselves the sensation of a foreign object and that of the appropriate object, or that of a kindred object and that of the object of the sense in question, are not equally authoritative, but in the case of colour sight, not taste, has the authority, and in the case of flavour taste, not sight;
ὧν ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδέποτε φησιν ἅμα οὕτω καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ [20] χρόνῳ περί γε τὸ πάθος ἠμφισβήτησεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ πάθος. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς οἶνος δόξειεν ἂν ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ γλυκύς: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τό γε γλυκύ, οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ᾖ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἀληθεύει [25] περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον γλυκὺ τοιοῦτον.	quorum unusquisque in eodem tempore circa idem numquam dicit simul ita et non ↵ ita habere. Sed nec in altero tempore circa passionem * dubitavit, sed circa id cui accidit passio. Dico autem puta idem quidem vinum videbitur utique, aut mutatum aut corpore mutato, quandoque quidem esse dulce quandoque autem non dulce. Sed non quod dulce, quale est quando fuerit, num↵quam mutavit, sed semper de ipso verum dicit, et est ex necessitate futurum dulce tale.	each of which senses never says at the same time of the same object that it simultaneously is so and not so. But not even at different times does one sense disagree about the quality, but only about that to which the quality belongs. I mean, for instance, that the same wine might seem, if either it or one's body changed, at one time sweet and at another time not sweet; but at least the sweet, such as it is when it exists, has never yet changed, but one is always right about it, and that which is to be sweet is of necessity of such and such a nature.
καίτοι τοῦτο ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἅπαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ οὐσίαν μὴ εἶναι μηθενός, οὕτω μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μηθέν: τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἴ τι ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐχ ἕξει οὕτω τε καὶ [30] οὐχ οὕτως.	Quamvis hoc hae rationes omnes destruant, quemadmodum et substantiam non esse nullius, ita nec ex necessitate nihil; necessarium enim non contingit aliter et aliter se habere, quare si quid est ex necessitate, non habebit ↵ ita et non ita.	Yet all these views destroy this necessity, leaving nothing to be of necessity, as they leave no essence of anything; for the necessary cannot be in this way and also in that, so that if anything is of necessity, it will not be both so and not so.
ὅλως τ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν μόνον, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων: αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, [35] ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ᾽ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι καὶ ἕτερον παρὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως: [1011α] [1] τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, οὐθὲν ἧττον.	Totaliterque si est sensibile solum, nihil utique erit solum non existentibus * animatis; sensus enim non erit. Neque quidem igitur sensibilia esse neque sensiones forsan verum *; sentientis enim passio hoc est. Subiecta vero non ↵ esse quae sensum faciunt et sine sensu, impossibile. Non enim sensus suimet est, sed est aliquid alterum praeter sensum, quod ionai prius esse sensu est necesse; movens enim moto prius est ƿ natura, et utique si ad invicem dicuntur haec ipsa, nihil minus.	And, in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no faculty of sense. Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that [11a] which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case.