Authors/Buridan/Quaestiones in analytica priora/Liber 1/Q14

Latin	English
[Quaestio 14a UTRUM VERBO EXSISTENTE PRAESENTIS TEMPORIS PRAEDICATUM POSSIT AMPLIARE SUBIECTUM AD SUPPONENDUM PRO PRAETERITIS VEL FUTURIS]	[Question 14.  Whether, when a verb is in the present tense it can ampliate the subject to suppositing for past or future objects]
Decima quarta quaestio est utrum verbo exsistente praesentis temporis praedicatum possit ampliare subiectum ad supponendum pro praeteritis vel futuris.	The fourteenth question is whether, when a verb is in the present tense it could ampliate the subject to suppositing for past or future objects.
1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia si esset possibilis talis ampliatio, sequeretur quod quartus modus primae figurae non valeret, saltem gratia formae; modo consequens est contra Aristotelem; immo syllogismi in illo modo sunt perfecti, ut vult Aristoteles. Sed ego probo consequentiam: quia instaretur in istis terminis 'nullum mortuum est vivum, quidam equus est mortuus; ergo quidam equus non est vivus'; manifestum est quod conclusio est falsa: quoniam omnis equus est vivus, et non amplius est equus si sit mortuus, et tamen praemissae sunt verae, quoniam maior conceditur ab omnibus, et minor esset vera secundum ampliationem subiecti ad praeterita, scilicet 'quidam equus est mortuus', quia quidam qui erat equus est mortuus; et sic ille syllogismus non valet.	It is argued first that it is not the case.  For if such ampliation were possible, it would follow that the fourth mood of the first figure were not valid, at least, not in virtue of its form.  But the consequent is against Aristotle, indeed, the syllogisms in that mood are perfect, as Aristotle would have it.  But I prove the consequence, for there is a counterexample in the terms 'no dead thing is living, some horse is dead, therefore some horse is not living'.  It is manifest that the conclusion is false, for every horse is living, and it is no longer a horse if it is dead, and yet the premisses are true, since the major is conceded by all, and the minor (namely 'some horse is dead') would be true by ampliation of the subject to past objects, for something which was a horse is dead.  And thus the syllogism is not valid.
2. Item, modo consimili, sequeretur quod primus modus secundae figurae non valeret, quod est inconveniens. Et probatur consequentia: quia instaretur in istis terminis 'nullum mortuum est vivum et omnis equus est vivus'; illae praemissae sunt verae, et conclusio erit 'ergo nullus equus est mortuus', quae esset falsa si subiectum supponeret non solum pro praesentibus sed etiam pro praeteritis.	Likewise, in a similar mode, it would follow that the first mood fo the second figure would not be valid, which is absurd.  And the consequence is proved, for the is a counterexample in the terms 'nothing dead is living, and every horse is living'.  These premisses are true, and the conclusion will be 'therefore no horse is dead', which would be false if the subject supposited not only for present objects but also for past objects.
Consimiliter etiam argueretur de tempore futuro: quia nullum generandum est animal et omnis equus est animal, ergo nullus equus est generandus; praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa si suppositio subiecti ampliatur ad futura.	Similarly it would also be argued about the future, for nothing to be generated is an animal, and every horse is an animal, therefore no horse is to be generated. The premisses are true and the conclusion false if the supposition of the subject is ampliated to future objects
3. Item, subiectum, quamvis sit praeteriti vel futuri temporis, non ampliat suppositionem praedicati; ergo nec praedicatum ampliat suppositionem subiecti. Consequentia videtur esse nota: quia non est magis ratio de uno quam de alio. Sed antecedens patet: quia nullus concedit istam 'quoddam mortuum est equus', et tamen concedenda esset si subiectum ampliaret ad praeterita.	Likewise the subject, although of a past or future time, does not ampliate the supposition of the predicate, therefore neither does the predicate ampliate the supposition of the subject. The consequence appears to be known, for there is no more reason for one than for the other.  But the antecedent is clear, for no one concedes 'something dead is a horse', and yet it would have to be conceded if the subject were to ampliate for past things.
4. Item, nomen significat sine tempore, ita quod nullum tempus sibi determinat de suo modo significandi; ideo videtur quod indifferenter debeat supponere tam pro praeteritis et futuris quam pro praesentibus; ideo numquam ampliatur suppositio naturalis, quamvis ponatur supponere pro praeteritis et futuris.	Likewise, a name 'signifies without time', so that it determines no time to itself concerning its mode of signifying.  Therefore it seems that it ought to supposit indifferently for things past and future as well as present.  Therefore natural supposition is never ampliated, although it ought to supposit for things past and future.
Oppositum arguitur per differentiam inter istas propositiones 'aliquis homo est albus', 'aliquis homo est mortuus', vel etiam 'aliquis homo est generandus': quoniam si nullus homo qui nunc est esset albus, ista reputaretur falsa 'quidam homo est albus', licet ante fuerint multi homines albi et postea multi erunt albi; sed quamvis nullus homo qui nunc est sit mortuus aut generandus, tamen istae conceduntur 'multi homines sunt mortui', 'multi homines sunt generandi'; videtur enim quod omnes communiter concedunt tales propositiones 'rex est mortuus', 'antichristus est generandus', quae non concederentur nisi suppositio subiecti amplieretur ad praeterita vel futura, quia nullus qui est est mortuus et nullus qui est est generandus.	The opposite is argued through the difference between the propositions 'some man is white' and 'some man is dead', or even 'some man is to be generated'.  For if no man who now exists were white, 'some man is white' would be reputed false, although there were many white men before, and though afterwards many will be white.  But although no man who now exists is dead, or to be generated, still the propositions 'many men are dead', 'many men are to be generated' are conceded, for it seems that all commonly conceded such propositions as 'the king is dead', 'the antichrist is to be generated', which would not be conceded unless the supposition of the subject were ampliated to things past or future, for no one who exists is dead, and no one who exists is to be generated.
Debetis scire quod, propter rationes quae fiebant, aliqui* negaverunt tales ampliationes, dicentes quod licet verbum praeteriti aut futuri temporis amplient suppositionem subiecti ad praeterita vel ad futura, tamen si verbum sit praesentis temporis, praedicatum non habet potestatem ampliandi ipsum subiectum, ut arguebatur. Quia aliter multi modi syllogistici quos Aristoteles reputavit formales non valerent gratia formae, quia non tenerent in omnibus terminis.	You ought to know that, because of the reasons given above, some persons have denied such ampliations, saying that although a verb of past or a verb of future tense may ampliate the supposition of the subject to past or future objects, still if a verb is present tense, the predicate does not have the power of ampliating the subject, as was argued.  For otherwise, many syllogistic moods which Aristotle deemed formal, would not be valid in virtue of their form, because they would not hold in all terms.
Et ideo illi ultra negant tales propositiones 'aliquis homo est mortuus', 'equus Iohannis est mortuus. Tamen, coacti ex modo loquendi et ex fide, quia Christus est mortuus, "passus et sepultus", concedunt tales 'aliquis homo mortuus est', 'equus Iohannis mortuus est', sed ipsi dicunt quod hoc totum 'mortuus est' est una dictio et est verbum praeteriti temporis, et tunc habet potestatem ampliandi suppositionem subiecti.	And so those persons deny such propositions as 'some man is dead', 'the horse of John is dead'.  Yet, constrained by the mode of speaking, and by faith (for Christ is dead, suffered and buried) they concede such propositions as 'some man is dead', 'the horse of John is dead', but they say that the whole expression 'is dead' is a single expression, and is a verb of the past tense, and then it has the power of ampliating the supposition of the subject.
Sed videtur mihi quod melius est concedere dictam ampliationem subiecti per praedicatum, licet verbum sit praesentis temporis: quia sicut omnes communiter concedunt quod aliqui homines generandi vel mortui sunt, ita etiam concedunt quod aliqui homines sunt generandi vel mortui. Et non est dicendum quod hoc totum 'generandi sunt' sit unum verbum, quia talia verba non ponunt grammatici*.	But it seems to me that it is better to concede the said ampliation of the subject by the predicate, although the verb is of the present tense. For, just as all commonly concede that some men 'are' to be generated, or 'are' dead, so also they concede that some men 'are' to-be-generated-or-dead.  And it should not be said that the whole expression 'are to be generated' is one verb, for such verbs are not given by grammarians.
Item, concedimus quod antichristus est venturus et praedicaturus, quam tenemus per fidem nostram, et tamen non potest dici quod hoc totum 'venturus est' sit unum verbum.	Likewise, we concede that the antichrist is going to come, and going to be predicated, which we hold by our faith, and yet it cannot be said that 'is going to come' is one verb.
Item, omnes vulgares*, in idiomatibus suis, loquuntur dicendo sic 'amicus meus est mortuus', 'talis homo est interfectus', immo raro vulgares loquuntur dicendo 'mortuus est' vel 'interfectus est'.	Likewise, all the vulgar, in their idiom, speak saying 'my friend is dead', 'such and such a man is killed'. But rarely do they speak saying 'dead-is' or 'killed-is'.
Item, ista communiter conceditur 'multa sunt futura quae nondum sunt', et hoc non esset verum nisi iste terminus 'multa' ampliaretur per istum terminum 'futura'.	Likewise, it is commonly conceded that 'many are in the future who do not yet exist', and this would not be true unless the term 'many' were ampliated by the term 'in the future'.
Item, ista conceditur 'multa quae non sunt sunt generabilia', et sic est ibi ampliatio subiecti per praedicatum, quamvis non posset dici quod hoc totum 'generabilia sunt' sit unum verbum.	Likewise, it is commonly conceded that 'many who do not exist are able to be generated', and so in that case there is ampliation of the subject by the predicate, although it cannot be said that 'are able to be generated' is a single verb.
Item, si modo nullae essent rosae, tamen ista concederetur 'rosae sunt intelligibiles', quod non esset verum nisi subiectum supponeret pro aliis quam pro praesentibus. Unde apparet quod aliter supponit subiectum in ista propositione 'rosa est intelligibilis' et aliter in ista 'rosa est in hoc mundo'. Quia si modo nulla sit rosa, ista negaretur 'rosa est in hoc mundo' et ista concederetur 'rosa est intelligibilis', quod non posset esse nisi iste terminus 'rosa' pro aliquibus supponeret in una propositione pro quibus non supponit in alia propositione, quod non provenit sibi nisi propter ampliationem subiecti per praedicatum. Ergo concedimus ampliationem dicto modo esse possibilem.	Likewise, if now there were no roses, still the proposition 'roses are understandable' would be conceded, which would not be true unless the subject supposited for things other than in the present.  Hence it appears that the subject supposits in one way in the proposition 'a rose is understandable' and in another in 'a rose is in this world'.  For if now nothing is a rose, 'a rose is in this world' would be denied, and 'a rose is understandable' would be conceded, which could not be the case unless 'rose' supposited for some things in one proposition for which it did not supposit in the other proposition, which could not happen unless because of the ampliation of the subject by the predicate.  Therefore we concede that ampliation in the above sense is possible.
Et solvamus breviter rationes.	And we briefly resolve the arguments.
1, 2. Ad primam et secundam, concedo quod dicti modi, Ferio et Cesare, et multi aliorum modorum, non sunt simpliciter formales sub isto modo loquendi 'B est A' vel 'B non est A', sed sunt formales ex suppositione quod propositiones non sint ex terminis ampliativis. Vel etiam potest dici quod sunt formales ex suppositione quod talis propositio 'B est A' sumatur in hoc sensu 'quod est B est A' et similiter 'B non est A' in hoc sensu 'quod est B non est A'; et sic suo modo de aliis, sive universalibus sive particularibus, quoniam sic valent Ferio, Cesare et alii modi. Verbi gratia, in argumento tuo concedo quod nullum mortuum est vivum, quia nullum quod est mortuum est vivum, sed in dicto sensu nego istam 'quidam homo est mortuus', quia haec est falsa 'quidam qui est homo est mortuus'.	To the first and second, I concede that the above moods (Ferio and Cesare),and many other moods, are not formal simpliciter under the mode of speaking 'B is a' or 'B is not A', but are formal from the supposition that the propositions are not made from ampliative terms.  Or it could be said otherwise that they are formal from the supposition that such a proposition as 'B is A' is understood in the sense 'what is B is A', and similarly 'B is not A' in the sense 'what is B is not A', and thus in their mood of others, whether universals or particulars, for thus Ferio Cesare and other moods are valid.  For example, in your argument I concede that nothing dead is living, for nothing which is dead is living, but in the said sense I deny 'some man is dead', for 'someone who is a man is dead'.
Similiter in Cesare concedo quod nullum mortuum est vivum et quod omnis equus est vivus, vel etiam concedo quod nullum mortuum est animal et quod omnis equus est animal; quoniam si resolvas eas, adhuc erunt verae, et tunc, ad sensum dictum, concedo etiam conclusionem, scilicet quod nullus equus est mortuus, quia nullus qui est equus est mortuus; tamen bene verum est quod ad aliud sensum, scilicet prout subiectum, propter ampliationem, staret pro praeteritis, dicta conclusio negaretur. Et ideo dictum est quod illi modi non sunt simpliciter et universaliter formales, quia non tenent in praedicatis ampliativis nisi restringendo ad sensum praedictum; vel si dicatur quod tenent universaliter, oportet dicere quod quicumque terminus est ampliatus in una etiam est ampliativus in alia.	Similarly, in Cesare I concede that nothing dead is living, and that every horse is living, or I also concede that nothing dead is an animal, and that every horse is an animal, for if you resolve them, still they will be true, and then in that sense I concede also the conclusion, namely that no horse is dead, for nothing which is a horse is dead.  Yet it is certainly true that in the other sense, namely so as the subject, because of ampliation, stood for things in the past, the said conclusion would be denied.  And therefore it was said that these moods are not absolutely and universally formal, for they do not hold in ampliative predicates, unless by restricting in the previous sense, or if it were said that they hold formally, one would have to say that whatever term is ampliated in one is ampliated in the other.
3. Ad aliam rationem, concedo quod subiectum non habet potestatem ampliandi praedicatum; immo praedicatum sequitur formam verbi ita quod restringitur ad supponendum praecise pro tempore verbi. Unde si dico 'Socrates cras erit albus', propositio non erit vera nisi ratione albedinis quae cras erit in Socrate, et si non erit cras albedo in Socrate, propositio esset falsa, licet nunc Socrates sit albus; ideo subiectum non potest ampliare praedicatum. Sed subiectum non sic restringitur per verbum; unde licet verbum sit futuri temporis, tamen subiectum bene supponit pro praesentibus. Unde si Socrates nunc est albus, tunc haec est vera 'album cras erit Socrates', licet cras non erit albus. Et si quaeris causam quare verbum magis restringit ad se praedicatum quam restringit subiectum, forte poterit responderi quod hoc est quia praedicatum sequitur verbum et verbum potest magis operari super illud quod sequitur, sicut etiam negatio, quam super illud quod praecedit.	To the third argument, I concede that the subject does not have the power of ampliating the predicate. On the contrary, the predicate follows the form of the verb so that it is restricted to suppositing precisely for the time of the verb.  Hence, if I say 'Socrates will be white tomorrow', the proposition will not be true except by reason of the whiteness which will be in Socrates tomorrow, and if whiteness will not be in Socrates tomorrow, the proposition would be false, although Socrates is now white. Therefore the subject cannot ampliate the predicate.  But the subject is not thus restricted by the verb, hence although the verb is of a future tense, still the subject correctly supposits for things in the present. Hence, if Socrates is now white, then 'soemthing white will be Socrates tomorrow', although he will not be white tomorrow.  And if you ask the cause why the verb restricts the predicate to itself than it restricts the subject, perhaps it could be replied that this is because the predicate follows the verb and the verb can operate more over what follows, just as negation can also, than over what precedes it.
4. Ad ultimam, concedo quod suppositio naturalis est amplissima et non potest ultra ampliari. Tamen in proposito vocamus 'ampliationem' quia est ultra tempus verbi, non quia sit ultra suppositionem naturalem.	To the final argument, I concede that natural supposition is completely ampliated, and cannot be further ampliated. Yet in the case in hand we call it 'ampliation', because it is beyond the time of the verb, not because it is beyond natural supposition.