Authors/Buridan/Quaestiones in analytica priora/Liber 1/Q26

Latin	English
Quaestio 26a UTRUM HAEC SIT VERA 'OMNIS HOMO DE NECESSITATE EST ANIMAL'	Question 26. Whether 'every man of necessity is an animal' is true.
Vicesima sexta quaestio est utrum haec sit vera 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal'.	The twenty-sixth question is whether 'every man of necessity is an animal' is true.
Arguitur primo quod sic: quia semper in isto libro Aristoteles reputat eam esse necessariam et veram, et similiter istam 'omnis cygnus de necessitate est albus', et sic de consimilibus.	It is argued first that it is, because in that book Aristotle always reckons it to be necessary and true, and similarly 'every swan of necessity is white', and so for similar [propositions].
Oppositum arguitur: quia ex ea et ex alia vera sequitur conclusio falsa; ergo ipsa est falsa. Consequentia est manifesta, quia non sequitur ex veris falsum. Et probo antecedens per talem syllogismum 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal, iste abauus est homo; ergo iste abauus de necessitate est animal'. Apparet quod conclusio est falsa; quia ille abauus potest non esse, et quando non erit, non erit animal; ergo ipse potest non esse animal; ergo non est verum quod ille abauus de necessitate est animal; et tamen minor erat vera; igitur maior erat falsa; igitur patet propositum.	The opposite [side] is argued, for from these and from other truths a false conclusion follows, therefore they are false. The consequence is manifest, for a falsehood does not follow from truths. And I prove the antecedent by the following syllogism: 'every man of necessity is an animal, this great-great-grandfather is a man, therefore this great-great-grandfather of necessity is an animal'. It seems that the conclusion is false, because it is possible the great-great-grandfather does not exist, and when he does not, he is not an animal, therefore it is not true that that great-great-grandfather of necessity is an animal, and yet the minor was true. Accordingly the major was false, therefore what we proposed is clear.
Notandum est quod magna est differentia inter dicere "haec est necessaria 'omnis homo est animal'" et dicere 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal', vel etiam, in alio modo loquendi, revertente in idem, magna est differentia inter dicere 'necesse est omnem hominem esse animal' et dicere 'omnem hominem necesse est esse animal'; quoniam prima propositio concederetur ab Aristotele et communiter ab omnibus qui ponerent aeternitatem mundi, sicut posuit Aristoteles, et tamen plures eorum negarent quod omnis homo de necessitate sit animal. Et patet in simili: quia haec est necessaria 'omnis substantia est', et tamen haec est falsa 'omnis substantia de necessitate est'. Et modo loquendi logicali prima solet vocari 'composita' et secunda 'divisa'.	It must be noted that there is a great difference between saying 'the proposition 'every man is an animal' is necessary', and saying 'every man of necessity is an animal', and also, in another way of speaking, amounting to the same thing, there is a great difference between saying 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal' and saying 'for every man, it is necessary that he is an animal', since the first proposition would be conceded by Aristotle, and generally by all who supposed the eternity of the world, just as Aristotle supposed, and yet several of them would deny that every man of necessity is an animal. And it is clear in a similar case, for 'every substance exists' is necessary, and yet 'every substance of necessity exists' is false. And in a logical way of speaking the first ought to be called 'composite' and the second 'divided'.
Et ego credo quod tanta est differentia inter illas propositiones quod illa quae solet vocari 'composita' est simpliciter loquendo de inesse, et illa quae vocatur 'divisa' est simpliciter loquendo modalis. Quia in illa quae vocatur 'composita', scilicet 'necessarium est omnem hominem esse animal', ibi hoc verbum 'est' est totalis copula, et modus est subiectum, et dictum est praedicatum; et ideo debet dici de inesse, eo quod a copula, qua [quae?] est formale propositionis debet fieri tota denominatio propositionis; sed copula in ea non est modificata; igitur ... et caetera.	And I believe that the difference between those propositions is so great that that which is accustomed to be called 'composite' is absolutely speaking de inesse, and that which is called 'divided' is absolutely speaking modal. For in that which is called 'composite', namely 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal', the word 'is' is the whole copula there, and the mode is the subject, and what is said is the predicate, and for that reason it ought to be called de inesse, in that from the copula, from which the formality [formale] of the proposition [arises], the whole denomination of the proposition ought to arise. But the copula in it is not modified, therefore ... et cetera.
Sed in ista 'omnem hominem necessarium est esse animal' hoc totum 'necessarium est esse' est copula: quia ibi haec dictio 'necessarium', vel hoc totum 'necessarium esse', ponitur tamquam determinatio, non subiecti, neque praedicati, sed huius verbi 'est', quod est principalis copula. Ideo hoc totum coniunctum debet poni tamquam totalis copula; et copula est modalis; ideo illa propositio dicenda est 'modalis', cuius subiectum est pars dicti, scilicet 'homo', vel 'hominem', et praedicatum alia pars dicti, scilicet 'animal'.	But in the proposition 'for every man it is necessary to be an animal', the whole [expression] 'it is necessary to be' is the copula, for there the expression 'necessary', or the whole expression 'necessarily to be', is given as if a determination, not of the subject, nor of the predicate, but of the verb 'is', which is the principal copula. For that reason the whole conjunction ought to be given as if the whole copula, and the copula is modal. For that reason, that proposition should be called 'modal', whose subject is part of the what-is-said, namely 'man', or 'for man', and the predicate the other part, namely 'animal'.
Et istis notatis, propter sequentia, dicam, sicut dixi in quaestione praecedenti, quod de necessitate condicionali haec est vera 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal'. Et sic haec etiam est vera 'omne uacuum de necessitate est locus', quamvis ponamus quod impossibile sit uacuum esse. Quia est sensus quod omnis homo de necessitate est animal si est, et sic de uacuo et loco.	And having noted these things, on account of the sequence, let me say, just as I have said in the preceding question, that concerning conditional necessity the proposition 'every man of necessity is an animal' is true. And thus also the proposition 'every vacuum of necessity is a place', although we suppose that it is impossible for a vacuum to exist. Because its sense is that every man of necessity is an animal, if he exists (and likewise for vacuum and place).
Secundo dico quod etiam ipsa est vera de necessitate quando, quia est sensus quod omnis homo de necessitate quandocumque est, fuit vel erit, tunc est, fuit vel erit animal. Sed sic non esset illa vera de loco et de uacuo, posito ut dixi quod impossibile est esse uacuum.	Second, I say that also it is true from necessity 'of time', because its sense is that every man of necessity whenever he is, was or will be, then is was, or will be an animal. But that would not thus be true of place and time, given, as we said, that it is impossible for there to be a vacuum.
Tertio dico quod ista non est necessaria de necessitate simpliciter, quia hoc bene improbabat ratio quae prius posita fuit de abauo. Sed de necessitate simpliciter haec est vera 'deus de necessitate est iustus', et ista 'creans de necessitate est deus', quamvis haec non sit necessaria 'deus est creans'. Et hoc magis videbitur in sequentibus.	Third, I say that it is not necessary by absolute necessity, because the argument which was given before about the great-great-grandfather disproved this well. But 'God of necessity is just' is true by absolute necessity, and also 'the creating being of necessity is God', although 'God is creating' is not necessary. And this will be seen clearer in the following [parts].
Ad auctoritatem Aristotelis potest dici quod si posuit istam tamquam veram 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal', hoc ipse posuit pro exemplo, et exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut dicit primo huius, vel posuit eam pro una in sensu composito. Vel etiam potest dici quod ipsa est vera de necessitate quando, qua bene utimur in scientiis naturalibus et mathematicis; et sufficit sibi quod possint fieri syllogismi formales de necessitate quando sive de necessitate simpliciter si praemissae ad debitum sensum intelligantur. Verbi gratia, iste est syllogismus formalis 'omnis homo de necessitate quando est est animal, iste abauus est homo; ergo ille abauus de necessitate quando est est animal'. Et sic terminetur quaestio.	Ad 1. To the authoritative passage of Aristotle it can be said that if he gave 'every man of necesssity is an animal' as if it were true, he gave this as an example, and verification is not needed for examples, as he says in the first [book]. Or he gave it as one in a composite sense. Or it could also be said that it is true by necessity of time, which we also use in the natural sciences and mathematics. And it suffices to them that they could be made into formal syllogisms of necessity of time, or absolute necessity, if they were understood as prefixed in the required sense. For example, 'every man by necessity of time is an animal, this great-great-grandfather is a man, therefore this great-great-grandfather by necessity of time is an animal' is a formal syllogism. And thus we finish the question.