Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D10

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem decimam quaero utrum Spiritus Sanctus producitur per actum et modum voluntatis. Quod non: Quia natura est ((vis insita rebus, de similibus similia procreans)), secundum illam communem descriptionem naturae; Spiritus Sanctus est similis producenti; ergo producitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.	1. About the tenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the act and mode of the will. That he is not: Because nature is "a force implanted in things, procreating similars from similars" [John the German, Gloss on the Decretum p.1 d.1 ch.7], according to the common description of nature; the Holy Spirit is like what produces him; therefore he is produced by nature, not by will.
2 Item, Averroes VIII Physicorum commento 44 vel 46, vult quod unius naturae est tantum unus modus communicandi; ergo si narura divina communicatur per actum naturae, non communicabitur per actum voluntatis.	2. Again, Averroes Physics VIII com.46 means there to be for one nature only one mode of communicating; therefore if the divine nature is communicated by act of nature, it will not be communicated by act of will.
3 Praeterea, voluntas est potentia activa in creaturis, non ergo factiva; a simili in Deo - si est potentia operativa, non videtur esse productiva. - Probatio consequentiae, quia sicut in creaturis se habent activa et factiva, ita in Deo operativa et productiva. Sicut ƿenim activa habet actum immanentem et obiectum praesuppositum, et factiva habet obiectum productum et actum transeuntem, ita in divinis actus operativae immanet, actus productivae non immanet, - operativa autem praesupponit obiectum, productiva autem non praesupponit terminum.	3. Further, the will is a power of acting in creatures, so it is not a power of making; therefore similarly in God: if the will is an operative power it does not seem to be a productive power. - The proof of the consequence is that as the acting and making powers are disposed in creatures, so the operative and productive powers are disposed in God. For just as the acting power has an immanent act and presupposes its object, and just as the making power has a produced object and an act that passes beyond the maker, so in divine reality the act of operative power is immanent, and the act of the productive power is not immanent, - but the operative power presupposes its object, while the productive power does not presuppose its term.
4 Item, nihil producitur actu voluntatis nisi praecognitum, ex XV De Trinitate cap. 2. Ergo si Spiritus Sanctus sic producatur, erit praecognitus antequam producatur, et tunc cognosceretur a Patre et Filio cognitione non intuitiva, quia cognitio quae est eius in quantum cognoscitur ante 'produci', non videtur esse intuitiva, quia cognitio intuitiva non est rei nisi ut est in se praesens et exsistens: igitur inconveniens est Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio cognosci non intuitive.	4. Again, nothing is produced by an act of will unless it is first known, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.27 n.50. Therefore if the Holy Spirit is produced in this way, he will be known before he is produced, and then he would be known by the Father and the Son in a non-intuitive cognition, because the knowledge had of him insofar as he is known before he is produced does not seem to be intuitive, because intuitive knowledge is only of a thing as it is present in itself and existent; therefore it is discordant for the Holy Spirit to be known non-intuitively by the Father and the Son.
5 Contra: Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 17: Spiritus Sanctus exivit a Patre et Filio ((non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus)); 'exire' per modum dati vel doni competit producenti per actum voluntatis, cuius est ex liberalitate sua dare vel donare. ƿ	5. On the contrary: Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15: the Holy Spirit exited from the Father and the Son "not as in some way born but as in some way given;" to exit by way of given and gift belongs to the producer by act of will, whose property it is to give, or donate, of its liberality.
6 Ad quaestionem dico quod sic. Probatio, quia in Deo est voluntas, - sicut apparuit ex quaestione 1 secundae distinctionis, et etiam ex quaestione 'De attributis' distinctione 8.	6. I say yes to the question. The proof is that there is will in God, - as was evident from question 1 of distinction 2, and also from the question about attributes in distinction 8 [I d.2 nn.75-88, d.8 nn.177-217].
7 Patet etiam ex hoc quod Deus ex natura sua est beatus: beatitudo autem non est sine voluntate, vel sine actu voluntatis.	7. For it is plain from this that God is blessed from his nature; but beatitude is not without the will, or without an act of will.
8 Est etiam voluntas in eo sub ratione principii productivi, quia principia productiva ex quo non dicunt de se imperfectionem, reducuntur ad aliquid unum perfectum, vel ad aliqua perfecta in tanta paucitate ad quantam possunt reduci; non possunt autem omnia reduci ad unum principium - productivum vel activum quia illud unicum haberet modum determinatum agendi alterius istorum, scilicet naturae vel voluntatis, quia inter modos istos producendi non est aliquis modus medius; ergo non possunt haec reduci ad maiorem paucitatem quam ad dualitatem, principii scilicet productivi per modum naturae et per modum voluntatis. Et cum illa, ad quae tamquam ad perfecta stat tota ista reductio principiorum, sint simpliciter perfecta, ambo ista principia sub ratione sua propria ponentur in Deo ut est principium producens.	8. Also the will exists in him under the idea of productive principle, because productive principles, from the fact that they do not of themselves state an imperfection, are reduced to some single perfect thing, or to as small a number of perfect things as they can be reduced to; but they cannot all be reduced to a single principle - whether productive or active - because that single thing would have the determinate mode of acting of one or other of them, namely of nature or of will, because between these modes of producing there is no intermediate mode; therefore these principles cannot be reduced to a fewer number than two, namely of principles productive by way of nature and by way of will. And since the things at which, as at things perfect, this whole reduction of principles stops are simply perfect, both of these principles are posited in their proper idea in God as he is a producing principle [I d.2 nn.305-309].
9 Et ex his ultra. In quocumque est principium aliquod quod ex ratione sua est principium productivum, illud erit in eo principium producendi si est in eo sine imperfectione et non intelligatur praeƿhabere aliquod productum simpliciter adaequatum; in Deo, ut probatum est, est formaliter voluntas 'ex natura rei' et hoc sub ratione principii productivi liberi respectu amoris, et patet quod est ibi sine imperfectione; ergo erit in Deo principium producendi amorem, et hoc secundum proportionem perfectionis suae, ita quod sicut voluntas creata est principium producendi amorem tantum quanto amore ipsa potest amare obiectum (qui dicitur amor adaequatus), ita ista voluntas est principium producendi amorem tantum quanto ipsa nata est amare obiectum infinitum: nata est autem amare obiectum infinitum infinito amore, ergo nata est esse principium producendi amorem infinitum, - nihil autem est infinitum nisi sit ipsa essentia divina, igitur ille amor est essentia divina. Ille autem amor productus non est natus esse forma inhaerens, quia nihil est tale in divinis; ergo est per se subsistens, - et non idem subsistens cum producente, quia nihil producit se, I De Trinitate cap. 1; ergo est personaliter distinctum: hanc personam dico 'Spiritum Sanctum', quia Filius non sic producitur (ut patet distinctione 6), sed per actum naturae sive intellectus, - ergo etc. ƿ	9. And from these further. In whatever there is some principle which, of its idea, is a productive principle, in that thing the principle, if it is in it without imperfection and is not understood to have already some product simply adequate to it, will be a productive principle; in God, as has been proved [d.8 nn.177-217], there is will formally from the nature of the thing, and this under the idea of a productive principle free in respect of love, and it is plain it is there without imperfection; therefore in God there will be a principle of producing love, and this in proportion to his perfection, such that, just as a created will is as great a principle of producing love as is the love it can love the object with (which is called adequate love), so this [divine] will is as great a principle of producing love as it is of a nature to love an infinite object; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is of a nature to be a principle of producing infinite love, - but nothing is infinite save the divine essence itself, therefore that love is the divine essence. Now the love produced is not of a nature to be an inherent form, because there is nothing such in divine reality; therefore it is per se subsistent, - and not the same subsistent thing as the producer, because nothing produces itself, Augustine On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; therefore it is distinct in person; this person I call 'the Holy Spirit', because the Son (as is plain from d.6 nn.16, 20, 27) is not produced in this way but by act of nature or of intellect, - therefore etc.
10 Hic tamen sunt tria dubia. Primum, quomodo voluntas potest esse hic principium communicandi naturam, cum ita non sit in creaturis. ƿ	10. Here, however, there are three doubts. The first about how the will can be this principle of communicating nature, since it is not so in creatures.
11 Secundum, quomodo voluntas possit esse principium etiam necessario producendi, et quae necessitas necessario requiritur in ista productione.	11. The second about how the will might be a principle also of producing necessarily, and what necessity is necessarily required in this production.
12 Tertio, si productio est necessaria, quomodo non est per modum naturae, sed distincta contra illam et libera.	12. Third about how, if the production is necessary, it is not by way of nature but is distinct from nature and free.
13 Quantum ad primum, dicitur quod ((natura dicitur in divinis quadrupliciter: Uno modo natura appellatur ipsa essentia divina, in qua tres personae consistunt, - et dicitur natura sic, pure essentialiter.	13. [To the first doubt] - As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry] that "nature in divine reality is said in four ways: In one way nature is called the divine essence itself, in which the three persons consist, - and in this way nature is said purely essentially.
14 Secundo modo dicitur natura principium activum naturale, et natura sic, est vis productiva 'similis ex simili': et sic potentia ƿgenerandi active in Patre, est natura, et sic est essentiale contractum ad notionale, quia est ipsa natura divina dicta primo modo; natura enim, quae est ipsa divina essentia ut est sub proprietate paterna determinata ad actum generandi, est potentia generandi activa, in solo Patre exsistens. - Et istos duos modos naturae tangit Hilarius V De Trinitate cap. 17, dicens de Filio quod "ex virtute naturae in eandem naturam, nativitate, subsistit".	14. In a second way nature is called the active natural principle, - and in this way nature is the productive force 'of similar from similar'; and thus the power in the Father of generating actively is nature, and thus it is an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself as said in the first way; for nature, which is the divine essence itself as it exists under the property of the Father determined to an act of generation, is the active power of generating, existing in the Father alone. - And these two modes of nature are touched on by Hilary On the Trinity V n.37 when he says of the Son 'from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist.'
15 Tertio modo dicitur natura quaelibet vis naturaliter exsistens in natura primo modo dicta, quae, etiamsi vis illa sit libera, tamen hoc modo potest dici natura, - et sic voluntas in Deo dicitur natura, quia scilicet est naturalis potentia exsistens in divina natura naturaliter.	15. In a third way nature is said to be any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way, which yet, although the force is free, can in this way be called nature, - and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing naturally in the divine nature.
16 Quarto modo dicitur natura incommutabilis necessitas circa aliquem actum)).	16. In a fourth way nature is said to be unchangeable necessity about some act."
17 $a Ad propositum dicitur quod natura tertio modo dicitur principium spirandi, quia voluntas est vis elicitiva spirationis ((ut est libera et liberaliter agens)). Quarto modo concurrit cum voƿluntate, primo modo concurrit ((non elicitive sed subiective tantum)), secundo modo non concurrit omnino. a$	17. As to the intended proposition, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting "as it is free and freely acting." In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs "not elicitively but only subjectively," in the second way it does not concur at all.
18 Ex his ad propositum dicitur quod ((neque intellectus neque voluntas, ratione qua simpliciter intellectus et voluntas, sunt principia elicitiva actuum notionalium (per quos producitur simile in forma naturali ipsi producenti), quia tunc in quocumque essent, essent principia elicitiva actuum, per quos produceretur simile in forma naturali ipsi producenti, quod falsum est in creaturis. Sunt enim solummodo ibi principia elicitiva actuum naturalium ut sunt in natura divina, et ut sic, habent in se naturalitatem quamdam ad productiones notionales.	18. From these it is, as to the intended proposition, said that "neither the intellect nor the will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a thing similar in natural form to the very producer), because then, in whatever they would exist, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a similar thing in natural form to the very producer, and this is false in the case of creatures. For in divine reality they are only elicitive principles of natural acts as these exist in the divine nature, and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturality for notional productions.
19 Secundum hoc ergo diximus in quaestione quadam 'De emanationibus in generali' quod intellectus et voluntas ut sunt simpliciter intellectus et voluntas - modo scilicet intellectuali et voluntario agentes - tantum sunt principia elicitiva actuum essentialium (qui sunt intelligere et velle), licet hoc sit passive ex parte intellectus et active ex parte voluntatis; ut sunt autem natura et principia activa naturaliter elicitiva actus, sunt principia elicitiva actuum ƿnotionalium (qui sunt generare et spirare), et hoc "necessitate naturalitatis, qua impossibile est Deum, per principia quae sunt natura in ipso, huiusmodi actus non elicere".	19. It was according to this, then, that we [sc. Henry] said in a certain question 'About emanations in general' that the intellect and will, as they are simply intellect and will - namely as acting in an intellectual and voluntary way - are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are those of to understand and to will), although this is passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are those of to generate and to inspirit), and this 'by the necessity of naturality, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.'
20 Ad cuius declarationem sciendum quod huiusmodi naturalitatem habent a natura divina (in qua sunt intellectus et voluntas), sed aliter et aliter, - quoniam intellectus divinus habet ipsam coincidendo in rationem naturae, quae est ratio principalis elicitiva actus notionalis (et hoc iuxta secundum modum naturae praedictum), ut omnino naturalitas ista sit prima et ratio intellectus sit concomitans, vel quasi; propter quod non nisi modo naturae et naturali impetu actum suum notionalem elicit, ut magis proprie Pater dicatur generare natura intellectuali quam intellectu naturali, ut intellectus potius intelligatur quasi determinare naturam quam e converso: et secundum hoc ratio qua productus est Filius natura eliciente sit prima, et ratio qua dicitur Verbum sit respectu illius quasi secunda.	20. To make this clear, one must know that the principles have this naturality from the divine nature (in which intellect and will are), but in different ways, - since the divine intellect has naturality by being coincident with divine nature in idea of nature, which is the principal elicitive idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturality is altogether first, and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi-concomitant; for which reason it elicits its notional act only by way of nature and natural impulse, so that the Father is more properly said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is understood to quasi-determine nature rather than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of it, as it were second.
21 Voluntas autem habet naturalitatem ipsam, non ut coincidendo in rationem naturae secundo modo dictae sed habendo annexam sibi quamdam vim naturae primo modo dictae, ex hoc quod fundatur in illa, ut naturalitas ista in voluntate nullo modo sit praeveniens ƿeius libertatem (nec ratio elicitiva actus notionalis, penes secundum modum naturae, - hoc enim esset omnino contra ipsam libertatem), sed potius ut sit consecutiva et annexa libertati: et hoc non ut aliquid quo voluntas suum actum notionalem eliciat principiative, sed ut aliquid, quo assistente voluntati, voluntas ipsa - ex vi quam habet ex eo quod est voluntas et libera - potest elicere suum actum notionalem, quem sine illo assistente omnino elicere non posset)).	21. But the will has its naturality, not by being coincident in idea of nature as said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature as said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in that nature, so that this naturality in the will in no way precedes its liberty (nor does the elicitive idea of the notional act precede, in the sense of according to nature, - for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it is consecutive to and annexed to liberty; and this not as something by which the will elicits, by way of principle, its notional act, but as something by which, with the assistance of the will, the will itself - from the force which it has from the fact it is will and free - can elicit its notional act, which, without that assistance, it could in no way elicit."
22 Ad secundum dubium dicitur quod ((triplex est actio voluntatis: Prima quae est elicita a voluntate ut est voluntas simpliciter absque omni naturalitate et necessitate, ut est illa quae procedit ex arbitrio libertatis (sive in Deo sive in creatura intellectuali), et in nobis tendit solummodo in bonum amatum quod est citra summum bonum.	22. [To the second doubt] - To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that "there is a triple action of the will: The first is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will without any naturality or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from a choice of freedom (whether in God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.
23 Secunda est quae est elicita a voluntate ut simpliciter voluntas est cum sola naturalitate necessitatis immutabilis, annexa illi actioni, ut est illa quae procedit a libertatis arbitrio et tendit in summum bonum amatum et aperte visum.	23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will along with the sole naturality of immutable necessity, annexed to that action, as it is what proceeds from a choice of freedom, and as it tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.
24 Tertia quae est elicita a voluntate non ut est voluntas simpliciter sed ut est natura, naturalitate sibi annexa secundo modo dicta, ƿut est illa quae procedit a libertate voluntatis vel ab arbitrio voluntatis in solo Deo et tendit non solum in summum bonum amatum et visum sed etiam in ipsum amorem procedentem (quo incentive amatur), licet diversimode tendat in utrumque, et hoc secundum aliam et aliam necessitatem immutabilitatis, annexam ipsi actioni: in quantum enim actio ordinatur in amatum summum, ab ipsa voluntate sola - ratione qua est libera - procedit immutabilitas necessitatis in actione eius secunda et in actione eius tertia; in quantum vero actio ordinatur in amorem productum tendentem in amatum terminatum, sic ab illa naturalitate annexa voluntati procedit necessitas immutabilitatis circa solum actum notionalem elicitum a voluntate, vel potius ab ipsa libertate voluntatis ut ei talis naturalitas est annexa)).	24. The third is that which is elicited by the will not as it is simply will but as it is nature, with naturality said in the second way [n.21] annexed to it, as it is that which proceeds from freedom of will or from choice of will in God alone, and as it tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to that good proceeding into love itself (by which it is incentively loved), although it tends in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone itself -by the idea by which it is free - an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love that tends to the terminal loved thing, there thus proceeds from the naturality annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturality is annexed."
25 Contra ista. Primo: quantum ad hoc quod ponit de assistentia illa naturae ipsi voluntati, ut voluntas vi istius assistentiae possit communicare naturam,quaero quid est ista assistentia? Videtur quod non sit necessaria ad illam communicationem, quia habito supposito agente perfecto et conveniente actioni, et principio 'quo' agendi perfecto, non videtur esse aliquid aliud necessarium ad agendum; sed per te ƿvoluntas sola est principium 'quo' respectu actus notionalis, et constat quod suppositum est perfectum et conveniens actioni; ergo non videtur illa assistentia esse necessaria ad talem productionem.	25. Against these remarks. First: as to what he posits about the assistance of nature for the will, so that the will, by force of that assistance, can communicate nature [n.21], I ask what is that assistance? It seems that it is not necessary for the communication, because, once there is in place a perfect agent supposit and one that is appropriate to the action, and a perfect 'by which' principle for the acting, it does not seem that anything else is necessary for acting; but for you the will alone is the 'by which' principle in respect of the notional act, and it is clear that the supposit is perfect and appropriate to the action; therefore the assistance does not seem necessary for such production.
26 Praeterea, quod ponitur unica necessitas in volitione et duplex in spiratione, videtur esse contra ipsum et contra veritatem, quia ipse ponit actus notionales fundari in essentialibus et omnes concedunt communiter quod actus essentiales aliquo modo praecedunt actus notionales. Non videtur autem quod in fundato possit esse aliqua necessitas formaliter maior quam in eo in quo fundatur, vel quod duplex necessitas erit in fundato et unica in fundamento: probatio, quia tunc per impossibile vel per incompossibile, separata una necessitate ab alia (scilicet illa quam fundatum habuit a fundamento), adhuc remanebit illud fundatum necessarium; non autem remanebit illud in quo fundatur necessarium, quia non habuit nisi illam unicam necessitatem, quae circumscribitur in fundamento; ergo posset - illa positione posita - necessitas esse in fundato et non in illo in quo fundatur. Hoc ad propositum, quia si actus spirandi habet necessitatem ex libertate voluntatis et - praeter ƿhoc - ex illa necessitate naturalitatis annexa voluntati, et actus dilectionis simplicis non habet nisi tantum primam necessitatem, igitur circumscripta prima necessitate circumscribetur tota illa necessitas quae erat in fundamento, et tamen adhuc remanebit alia necessitas in productione illa, videlicet illa quae est ex naturalitate.	26. Further, that a single necessity is posited in the will and a double one in the inspiriting [n.24] seems to be against both him and the truth, because he himself posits that the notional acts are founded on the essential ones, and everyone commonly concedes that the essential acts in some way precede the notional ones. But it does not seem that in something founded there can be any necessity formally greater than the necessity in that on which it is founded, or it does not seem that a double necessity will exist in the thing founded and a single one in the foundation; the proof is that then, when, per impossibile or per incompossibile, one necessity is separated from the other (namely the necessity which the founded thing had from the foundation), the founded thing will remain necessary, because only one of the necessities it had will, in the foundation, be removed; therefore - once this position [of a double necessity] is supposed - necessity could exist in the founded thing and not in that on which it is founded. This to the proposal, because if the act of inspiriting has necessity from the freedom of the will and -besides this - from the necessity of naturality annexed to the will, and if the act of simple love has only the one first necessity, then, with the first necessity removed, all the necessity will be removed that there was in the foundation, and yet there will still remain the other necessity in the production, namely that which is from the naturality.
27 Praeterea, videtur quod tota naturalitas non consequatur actum voluntatis, quia illa competit voluntati - per ipsum - ex hoc quod fundatur in essentia divina; ergo cum prior sit ratio essentiae divinae ratione voluntatis, quidquid consequitur rationem essentiae vel voluntatem ratione essentiae, consequetur illam per prius quam illud quod consequitur voluntatem ut voluntas est: et ita videtur quod naturalitas illa praecedat aliquo modo ipsam libertatem, et per consequens impediet libertatem.	27. Further, it seems that the whole of the naturality is not consequent to the act of will, because - for him [Henry] - it belongs to the will from the fact that it is founded in the divine essence [n.21]; therefore, since the idea of the divine essence is prior to the idea of the will, whatever is consequent to the idea of the essence, or to the will by reason of the essence, will be consequent to the essence before that which is consequent to the will, as it is will, will be; and so it seems that the naturality in some way precedes the liberty, and as a result it will impede the liberty.
28 Praeterea, contra opinantem. Quod argumentum esset illud quod ipse facit 'si intellectus et voluntas essent principia communicandi naturam unde tales potentiae, ergo in creaturis essent tales potentiae principia communicandi naturam', Si omnino esset alia ratio formalis intellectus et voluntatis in Deo et in creaturis?	28. Further, against the opinion. What would that argument be which he himself makes, 'if the intellect and the will were principles of communicating the nature whereby they are such principles, then such powers in creatures would be principles of communicating nature' [n.18], if there were an altogether different formal idea of intellect and will in God and in creatures?
29 Praeterea, quae necessitas distinguendi inter voluntatem quam ponit principium eliciendi actum, et naturam quam ponit coassistere voluntati elicienti, Si tantum est inter ista distinctio rationis, sicut videtur alibi sentire de distinctione attributorum in divinis? ƿ	29. Further, what necessity is there for distinguishing between the will, which he posits as the principle of eliciting the act, and the nature, which he posits as co-assistant of the eliciting will [n.21], if there is between them only a distinction of reason, as he seems elsewhere to think about the distinction of attributes in divine reality?
30 Aliter dico quod voluntas potest esse principium communicandi naturam, - et non voluntas ut communiter sumpta ad voluntatem creatam et increatam, sed voluntas unde infinita est; est enim infinitas proprius modus voluntatis divinae, sicut et cuiuslibet alterius essentialis perfectionis.	30. [To the first doubt] [n.10] - I say in another way that the will can be a principle of communicating nature, - and not the will as commonly taken for created and uncreated will, but will whereby it is infinite; for infinity is the proper mode of the divine will, just as it is of any other essential perfection.
31 Hoc patet ex ratione prius posita, ad solutionem quaestionis, quia voluntas est principium amoris sibi adaequati, hoc est tanti amoris quanto ipsa nata est amare obiectum; nata est autem amare obiectum infinitum infinito amore, igitur est etiam productiva infiniti amoris: quidquid est infinitum formaliter, est essentia divina, - igitur ipsa voluntas est principium communicandi essentiam divinam amori producto.	31. This is plain from the reason posited above, to the solution of the question [n.9], that the will is a principle of a love adequate to itself, that is, of as much love as the will is of a nature to love the object with; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is also productive of infinite love; anything that is infinite formally is the divine essence, - therefore the will itself is a principle of communicating the divine essence to the produced love.
32 Et si quaeras a me de coassistentia naturae aliquo modo, dico quod non oportet voluntati, ut est principium communicandi naturam, aliquo speciali modo assistendi ponere naturam coassistere (si natura posset esse principium communicandi naturam), nisi poneretur aliqua minor perfectio voluntatis quam naturae; nulla autem est talis imperfectio, quia simpliciter ita perfecta est voluntas infinita sicut natura infinita. ƿ	32. And if you ask me about the co-assistance in any way of nature, I say that for the will, as it is a principle of communicating nature, there is no need to posit that nature co-assists it in some special mode of assistance (supposing nature could be the principle of communicating nature), unless some lesser perfection were posited for the will than for nature; but there is no such imperfection, because an infinite will is simply as perfect as an infinite nature.
33 $a Contra istud arguitur tripliciter. Primo sic: infinitas est de se eiusdem rationis in intellectu et voluntate; ergo non est formalis ratio distinctarum productionum, quae habent distingui ex principiis formalibus.	33. There is a threefold argument against this answer [n.30]. First as follows: infinity is, of itself, of the same idea in the intellect and in the will; therefore there is no formal idea of distinct products, but they have to be distinguished by the formal principles.
34 Item, arguo sic: quod non competit alicui - sive quod repugnat alicui - secundum rationem absolutam, nec sibi competit si est infinitum; infinitas.enim non dat virtuti activae rationem alterius virtutis activae, sed dat sibi intensionem, et in se et in actione sua; iungatur ista minor: sed actioni voluntatis, ut est tale principium activum, non competit - sed repugnat sibi - communicare naturam; ergo etc.	34. Again, I argue thus: what does not belong to something - or what is repugnant to something - in its absolute idea, does not belong to it if it is infinite either; for infinity does not give to an active virtue the idea of another active virtue, but gives it intensity, both in itself and in its action; to this add this minor: but to the action of the will, as it is such an active principle, there does not belong - but there is repugnant to it - the communicating of nature; therefore etc.
35 Praeterea, unde habet voluntas infinitatem? Si ex se, ergo ubiƿque, - si ab essentia, ergo voluntas infinita est ut habens assistentiam naturae sive essentiae, quod dicit alia opinio.	35. Further, whence does the will get infinity? If from itself, then it is infinite everywhere, - if from the essence, then the will is infinite as having the assistance of nature or of essence, which is what the other opinion says [Henry's opinion, n.21].
36 Ad primum dico quod duo in actu, scilicet libertas et infinitas (quae est modus intrinsecus rei), habent duo correspondentia in principio 'quo', scilicet libertatem et infinitatem, ut modum eius (quaere in ultima collatione Parisiensi); unde non dico infinitatem esse formalem rationem spirandi, sed voluntatem infinitam, nec in hoc dico duo principia formalia, quia 'infinitum' est modus intrinsecus utrique principio, scilicet libero et non libero. - Aliter potest dici, quod voluntas unde voluntas, omnino simplex (hoc est, non componibilis naturae cuius est potentia, nec actui suo): nam ex hoc sequitur quod est productiva actus, quia hoc competit sibi ut est voluntas, - et ultra, actus est idem naturae, et hoc unde simplex est omnino; ergo est communicativa naturae.	36. To the first [n.33] I say that the two things in the act, namely liberty and infinity (which is a mode intrinsic to a thing), have two things corresponding to them in the principle 'by which', namely liberty and infinity, as the mode of that principle (look in the final Parisian collation); whence I do not say that infinity is the formal idea of inspiriting, but that infinite will is, - nor do I say in this respect that there are two formal principles, because 'infinite' is a mode intrinsic to both principles, namely the free and the non-free. - In another way it can be said that the will, whereby it is will, is altogether simple (that is, not combinable with the nature of which it is the power, nor with its act); for from this it follows that it is productive of an act, because this belongs to it as it is will, - and further, the act is the same as the nature, and this because it is altogether simple; therefore it is communicative of nature.
37 Ad aliud. Si pro medio accipiatur 'repugnantia', maior vera est et minor falsa, nam illa ratio voluntatis transcendens (quae ƿabstrahit a finita et infinita), non est ratio repugnantiae, sed limitatio superveniens illi. Sed si accipitur pro medio 'non competere', dico quod principio activo infinito non competit actio nisi infinita, talis qualis transcendens competit sibi transcendenti; nunc autem voluntati transcendenti competit transcendenter sicut velle, sic et producere 'velle': ergo infinitae voluntati competit producere infinitum velle, non plus per se sed concomitanter (infinitum velle est deitas, sed finitum velle angeli non est essentia angeli). - Tunc ad minorem dico quod communicare naturam non est actio transcendens voluntatis in communi, sed producere 'velle' sibi proportionatum et obiecto, - et ideo infinita voluntas producit infinitum, et ex consequenti naturam.	37. To the other [n.34]. If 'repugnance' is taken for the middle term, the major is true and the minor is false, for the transcendent idea of the will (which idea abstracts from finite and infinite) is not a reason for repugnance, but the limitation supervening on it. But if 'does not belong' is taken for the middle term, I say that to an active infinite principle there only belongs an infinite action, of the transcendent sort that belongs to something transcendent; but now, just as a 'to will' belongs transcendentally to a transcendent will, so also belongs to it the producing of a 'to will'; therefore to an infinite will there belongs the producing of an infinite 'to will', not so much per se but concomitantly (the deity is an infinite 'to will', but the finite 'to will' of an angel is not the essence of the angel). - Then to the minor I say that to communicate nature is not the transcendent action of the will generally, but that the producing of a 'to will' is that is proportionate to itself and to the object, - and therefore an infinite will produces something infinite, and consequently it produces nature.
38 Ad tertium patet distinctione 8, a quo fundamentaliter, - quia ab essentia, et ex se formaliter; concedo illam essentiam requiri ut fundamentum et ut realiter idem, sed istud in suo signo naturae - in quo est formaliter infinitum - est principium 'quo' praecisum (cum obiecto) sicut operandi, sic producendi. a$	38. To the third [n.35] the answer is plain in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.209-222], that it gets it from what it is fundamentally - because it gets it from the essence, from which it formally is; I concede that the essence is required as foundation and as really the same, but it is in its own moment of nature - in which it is formally infinite - a precise 'by which' principle (along with the object) of thus producing as it is also of operating.
39 Ad secundum dubium 'de necessitate', patet per idem, quia principium productivum perfectum potest ƿdare perfecto producto omnem perfectionem quae sibi non repugnat; voluntas infinita est principium productivum perfectum, ergo potest dare producto suo perfectionem sibi competentem: non autem repugnat sibi necessitas (immo necessario competit sibi, quia nullum infinitum potest esse possibile, non necessarium), igitur istud principium, quod est voluntas infinita, erit sufficiens principium dandi necessitatem huic producto. Si est principium quo potest dari necessitas producto, igitur datur, quia nulli quod non est necessarium, potest dari necessitas ex se, - et ulterius, si est principium quo datur necessitas producto, ergo et productioni: productum enim capit esse productione, - non potest aliquid capere esse necessarium per productionem non necessariam. ƿ	39. [To the second doubt] - To the second doubt 'about necessity' [n.11], the answer is plain through the same fact [through the will whereby it is infinite, n.30], that a perfect productive principle can give to a perfect product all the perfection which is not repugnant to itself; and an infinite will is a perfect productive principle, therefore it can give to its perfect product the perfection that is fitting to itself; but necessity is not repugnant to it (nay necessity necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite can be a possible, a non-necessary, thing), therefore that principle, which is infinite will, will be a sufficient principle of giving necessity to this product. If it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then necessity is given, because to nothing which is not necessary can necessity of itself be given, - and further, if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, therefore also to the production; for the product gets being by the production, - nothing can get necessary existence through a non-necessary production.
40 Istud argumentum quasi a posteriori videtur concludere necessitatem productionis ex necessitate producti. Si quaeratur ratio a priori sive a causa, quid sit per quod voluntas ista dat necessitatem isti productioni, respondeo quod nec voluntas infinita ex se sola dat necessitatem amori producto, comparando ipsam ad quodcumque obiectum, nec solum obiectum amatum - quod est finis - comparatum ad quamcumque voluntatem, dat necessitatem actui volendi vel productioni amoris.	40. This as it were a posteriori argument [n.39] seems to deduce the necessity of the production from the necessity of the product. If an a priori reason, or a reason from the cause, is sought, what it is by which the will gives necessity to the production, I reply that neither does a will infinite of itself alone give necessity to the produced love, comparing it to any object whatever, nor does the loved object alone - which is the end -, compared to any will whatever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of love.
41 Primum probo, quia voluntas non est necessarium principium producendi amorem alicuius obiecti nisi sit necessarium principium amandi illud obiectum; voluntas autem infinita non est necessarium principium amandi obiectum nisi infinitum, quia tunc Deus necessario amaret quamlibet creaturam, immo et omne amabile; ergo nec est necessarium principium producendi amorem suum, comparando illud ad quodcumque obiectum.	41. I prove the first point [n.40] by the fact that the will is not a necessary principle of producing love of any object unless it is a necessary principle of loving that object; but an infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving an object save an infinite one, because then God would necessarily love any creature at all, nay also any lovable thing at all; therefore it is not a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatever.
42 Secundum probatum est 'De frui' distinctione, quod voluntas ex ratione voluntatis in communi non necessario tendit in finem.	42. The second point [n.40] was proved in distinction 1 'On enjoying', that the will, by reason of will in general, does not tend necessarily to the end [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140].
43 Et si respondeas quod voluntas potest considerari ut volunƿtas vel ut natura, vel ut comparando ad finem vel ad ea quae sunt ad finem: ut autem comparatur ad finem, est natura, et sic est mere necessitas, - istud improbatur et auctoritate et ratione.	43. And if you reply that the will can be considered as will or as nature [nn.19, 22-24], or as by comparing it to the end or to what is for the end; but as it is compared to the end it is nature, and thus there is merely necessity, - this is refuted by both authority and reason.
44 Ratio est, quia non sunt eiusdem potentiae activae oppositi modi agendi, et maxime isti 'naturaliter' et 'libere', qui primo distinguunt potentiam activam; quia si voluntas comparatur ad finem per modum naturae et ad 'entia ad finem' per modum libertatis, ipsa non erit potentia activa una respectu istorum, et tunc nulla potentia erit quae eligat 'ens ad finem' propter finem: nulla enim potentia eligit hoc propter illud nisi velit utrumque extremum, sicut nulla potentia cognitiva conclusionem cognoscit propter principium, nisi eadem cognitione cognoscat principia et conclusiones, sicut arguit Philosophus II De anima 'De sensu communi'.	44. The reason is that there are not opposite modes of acting of the same active power, and especially not these modes 'naturally' and 'freely', which first distinguish active power; because if the will is compared to the end by way of nature and to 'things for the end' by way of freedom, it will not be one active power with respect to them, and then there will be no power that chooses 'a thing for the end' for the sake of the end; for no power chooses this because of that save by willing both extremes, just as no cognitive power knows a conclusion because of the principles unless it knows in the same cognition both the principles and the conclusion, as the Philosopher argued about the common sense in On the Soul 3.2.426b15-29.
45 Auctoritas est Augustini, in Enchiridion cap . 73 vel cap. 86 (et ponitur a Magistro libro II distinctione 25 cap. 5): ((Neque voluntas non est - aut libera dicenda non est - qua sic beati esse volumus ut non solum miseri esse nolimus sed nec omnino velle possimus)); ergo vult dicere quod voluntas illa qua volumus beatitudinem, est libera: nullum finem magis necessario respicit voluntas ƿquam beatitudinem in communi, igitur nullum finem necessario respicit.	45. The authority is from Augustine, Handbook of the Faith ch.105 n.28 (and it is placed by Master Lombard in II d.25 ch.4 n.218): "Nor must it not be called will - nor said not to be free - because we so wish ourselves to be blessed that not only do we not wish to be miserable but we altogether cannot wish to be miserable;" therefore he intends to say that the will whereby we wish for beatitude is free; the will has a respect for no end more necessarily than for beatitude in general, therefore it has a respect for no end necessarily.
46 $a Item, ista responsio poneret Spiritum Sanctum spirari non libere sed per modum naturae, quia eius principium esset voluntas non ut libera sed ut natura. a$	46. Again, this response [n.43] would posit that the Holy Spirit is not inspirited freely but by way of nature, because his principle would be will not as free but as nature.
47 Itaque dico quod necessitas huius productionis amoris adaequati - sicut et necessitas dilectionis qua formaliter habens voluntatem diligit - est ex infinitate voluntatis et ex infinitate bonitatis obiecti, quia neutrum sine alio sufficit ad necessitatem.	47. Therefore I say [n.40] that the necessity of this production of adequate love -just as also the necessity of the love by which what possesses the will formally loves - is from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither suffices for necessity without the other.
48 Ista autem duo sufficiunt hoc modo, quia voluntas infinita non potest esse non recta; nec potest non esse in actu, quia tunc esset potentialis: igitur necessario est in actu recto. Non autem omne 'velle' est praecise rectum quia est ab illa voluntate solum, quasi nihil sit volendum ex se sed tantum quia est volitum ab illa voluntate; essentia enim divina, quae est primum obiectum illius voluntatis, est ex se volenda: igitur voluntas illa de necessitate est in actu recto volendi illud obiectum quod est ex se recte volendum, et sicut ex necessitate est principium volendi, ita ex necessitate est principium producendi amorem illius.	48. Now these two [n.47] suffice in this way, that an infinite will cannot not be right; nor can it not be in act, because then it would be potential; therefore necessarily it is in right act. But not every 'to will' is right precisely because it is from that will only, as if nothing is to be willed of itself but only because it is willed by that will; for the divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is to be willed of itself; therefore that will is of necessity in right act of willing the object which is of itself to be rightly willed, and just as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love of that object.
49 Et tunc dico quod nec sola voluntas infinita praecise (non determinando obiectum cuius sit), nec solum bonum infinitum (non determinando quam voluntatem respiciat ut est obiectum), est totalis causa necessario diligendi, nec etiam necessario producendi ƿamorem adaequatum, sed infinita voluntas - habens tale obiectum, quod est ex se recte amandum, perfecte praesens - est ratio necessaria tam volendi illud bonum quam spirandi amorem illius boni: et talis voluntas, habens tale obiectum praesens, est principium communicandi naturam divinam, quia principium producendi amorem productum infinitum; talis enim amor productus proportioƿnatur tam potentiae quam obiecto, - non ita quando voluntas infinita respicit bonum amabile finitum, quia licet ibi actus sit infinitus quantum est ex parte voluntatis divinae, non tamen est infinitus quantum est ex parte obiecti.	49. And then I say that neither precisely the infinite will alone (not determining the object it has), nor the infinite good alone (not determining which will it has, as object, a respect to), is the total cause of necessarily loving, nor even of necessarily producing adequate love; but the infinite will - having such an object, which is of itself to be rightly loved, perfectly present to it - is the necessary reason both for loving that good and for inspiriting love of that good; and such a will, having such an object present to it, is a principle of communicating divine nature, because it is a principle of producing a produced infinite love; for such a produced love is proportionate both to the power and to the object, - it is not thus when an infinite will has a respect to a finite lovable good, because although there the act is infinite as concerns the part of the divine will, yet it is not infinite as concerns the part of the object.
50 Sed utrum voluntas sit principium non tantum amandi bonum infinitum sed finitum, et producendi amorem talis boni, - et hoc vel eadem productione secundum rem, qua producitur Spiritus Sanctus, alia tamen secundum rationem, vel omnino alia vel nulla, de hoc alias, quia similem habet difficultatem cum productione Verbi, utrum intellectus divinus sit principium producendi Verbum essentiae divinae vel verbum alicuius alterius intelligibilis, et tunc vel productione eadem secundum rem cum productione Verbi divini, alia tamen secundum rationem, vel alia tam secundum rem quam secundum rationem.	50. But whether the will is a principle not only of loving an infinite but also a finite good, and of producing love of such a good, - and this either with the same production in fact, though different in idea, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, or with an altogether different one, or with none, - of this matter elsewhere [I dd.18, 27], because it has a similar difficulty to the production of the Word, whether the divine intellect is the principle of producing a Word of the same essence or a word of any other intelligible thing, and then either by a production the same in fact, though different in idea, as the production of the divine Word, or by one different both in fact and in idea.
51 $a Restat tertium dubium. Ubi dicitur sic, quod natura agit per impressionem (sicut intellectus), non voluntas . - Quaere Henricum. ƿ	51. [To the third doubt] - There remains the third doubt [n.12]. Here the statement is made in this way, that nature acts through impression (as does the intellect), not the will. - See Henry.
52 Contra. Hoc falsum est, et improbatum distinctione 2 et 5; item, non est ad propositum, quia quaeritur de distinctione principii activi in modo agendi (sive eliciendi actionem), sive in aliquid agat sive non.	52. On the contrary. This is false, and was rejected in distinctions 2 and 5 [I d.2 nn.283-289; d.5 nn.52-92]; again, it is not to the purpose, because it is asking about a distinction of the active principle in its mode of acting (or of eliciting an action), whether it acts on something or not.
53 Alia responsio. Verbum est formaliter notitiae memoriae; voluntas eliciens dat obiecto primum donum (quia amorem et in hoc se), nec ex ista ratione est donum, - unde nec aliud simile obiecto praesentato; ideo amor non gignitur, nec est imago Spiritus Sanctus sicut Filius.	53. Another response [to the same doubt, n.12]. The word is formally of the knowledge of memory; the will, when eliciting, gives to the object the first gift (because it gives love and, in this, gives itself), nor is it gift for this reason, - hence neither is it something similar to the object presented; therefore love is not generated, nor is the Holy Spirit an image as the Son is.
54 Hoc quidem verum est, et bene de imagine, sed non salvatur quomodo haec principia possunt elicere, quamvis ponatur aliqua distinctio in terminis, comparatis ad principia in assimilari.	54. This [n.53] indeed is true, and well said about the image, but the point about how these principles can elicit is not saved, although some distinction is posited in the terms, compared to the principles in act of assimilation.
55 Tertia via. Quod si est aliqua necessitas ut actus tendit in obiectum, non tamen ut elicitur a potentia; vel aliter: si ut est in actu quasi iam elicito, firmatur, non tamen ut quasi prior actu elicit illum. ƿ	55. Third way [to solve the doubt, n.12]. That if there exists some necessity as the act tends to the object, yet not as it is elicited by the power; or in another way: if, as it is in an act already as it were elicited, it is confirmed, yet it does not as quasi-prior in act elicit that object.
56 Aliter. Ex parte principii, ut quasi praecedit actum, est necessitas ad eliciendum, nec voluntas repugnat necessario, quia voluntas perfecta potest habere condicionem perfecti principii elicitivi.	56. In another way. On the part of the principle, as it quasi-precedes the act, there is a necessity to elicit, nor is will repugnant to the necessary, because a perfect will can have the condition of a perfect elicitive principle.
57 Item, e converso, necessitas non tollit libertatem (propter nunc dictum).	57. Again, conversely, necessity does not take away liberty (because of what has just been said [n.56]).
58 Item, necessario agere est condicio modi operandi, ergo non repugnat alteri dividentium principium activum, sicut nec modus illi cuius est modus ponendi; sicut duplex principium - nec est alia ratio distinctionis nisi hoc, hoc - ita duplex necessitas conveniens, quia haec et haec: non ergo omnis necessitas est naturalis. - Stricte accipiendo 'naturale', quomodo voluntas est natura? Alia difficultas: si hoc est 'libere', propter identitatem producentis ad productum? a$	58. Again, to act necessarily is a condition of a way of acting, therefore it is not repugnant to one of the things that divide active principle, just as neither is the mode repugnant to that whose mode of positing it is; just as there is a double principle - nor is there any other reason for distinction than that this is this [sc. that the will is will, the intellect is intellect] - so there is a double fitting necessity, because this and this [sc. this is the necessity of nature, this the necessity of will]; not every necessity, then, is natural necessity. - Taking 'natural' strictly, how is will nature? Another difficulty: whether this is what 'freely' is, because of an identity between producer and the product?
59 Ad argumenta. - Ad primum dico quod illa definitio naturae probat quod Spiritus Sanctus non producitur ut 'similis' ex prima ƿregula et ex vi productionis suae, et verum est quod non est imago Patris sicut Filius, qui ex vi productionis suae procedit ut similis Patri.	59. To the arguments. To the first [n.1] I say that that definition of nature proves that the Holy Spirit is not produced as a 'similar' by the first rule and by the force of his production, and it is true that he is not the image of the Father as the Son is, who by force of his production proceeds as a similar to the Father.
60 Ad secundum responsum est alias diffuse, distinctione quaestione 4, in illa quaestione in qua quaerebatur 'utrum possent esse productiones plures in divinis'.	60. To the second [n.2] a response has been made diffusely elsewhere, in distinction 2 question 4, and in the question where the question is asked 'whether there can be several productions in divine reality' [I d.2 nn.327-344].
61 Ad tertium dicendum est - sicut dictum est distinctione 2 quaestione 'De productionibus' - quod differentiae accidentales potentiae, scilicet activum et passivum, non sunt potentiae productivae. Generaliter enim tali principio producitur illud cuius est tale principium productivum vel in eo in quo est (si natum est illud reciƿpere), vel in alio, vel in nullo. Si in nullo, quia nihil natum est illud recipere, tunc producitur per se subsistens, si potentia productiva sit perfecta respectu per se subsistentis; ita est in proposito: voluntas qua producens producit neque agit in supposito in quo est producendo, neque facit producendo in alio, sed producit terminum per se stantem, ut personam, quae in nullo recipitur subiective. - Aliter autem responsum est distinctione, ubi dictum est quod productio non est intellectio formaliter et quomodo intellectus potest esse principium non tantum intelligendi sed etiam et dicendi.	61. To the third [n.3] one should say - as was said in distinction 2 in the question 'On productions' [ibid.] - that the accidental differences of power, namely active and passive, are not differences of productive power. For. generally, what is produced by such a principle is that of which such a principle is productive, whether in that in which it is (if it is of a nature to receive it), or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, because nothing is of a nature to receive it, then it is produced as per se subsistent, if the productive power is perfect with respect to something per se subsistent; so it is in the intended proposition: the will by which the producer produces neither acts by producing in the supposit in which it is, nor does it by producing make something in another, but it produces a term that stands in itself, as a person, which is not received in anything subjectively. - But there is a response in another way in distinction 6 [I d.6 nn.10-15], where it is said that production is not formally intellect, and where it is said how the intellect can be a principle not only of understanding but even of saying as well.
62 Ad ultimum dico quod necesse est ad actum amandi - sive ad actum amoris - amatum esse praecognitum (hoc dicit beatus Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 27), sed non oportet ipsam dilectionem esse praecognitam, - puta si offertur mihi aliquod bonum honestum, non oportet quod antequam possim habere illum actum, scilicet actum amandi circa illud, quod scilicet praecognoscam illum actum; ita in proposito: oportet essentiam divinam - cuius amor spiratur - esse praecognitam Patri et Filio ad hoc ut spirent, sed non oportet in illo instanti originis concedere Spiritum Sanctum qui est amor spiratus - esse praecognitum Patri et Filio, licet in instanti aeternitatis semper sit tota Trinitas nota cuilibet personae in Trinitate, quia distinguendo inter instantia originis, non distinguitur inter durationem et durationem, sed tantum a quo quis sit. ƿAliter posset dici quod in illo signo priore originis, antequam intelligatur Spiritus Sanctus spirari, Pater et Filius cognoscunt Spiritum Sanctum, et intuitive, licet ut non exsistentem in se, quia cognoscunt essentiam divinam, quae est ratio cognoscendi intuitive quodcumque obiectum intelligibile, - sicut Trinitas cognoscit creaturam, et intuitive, antequam producatur, quia essentia sua, quam intuetur, est ratio perfectissime cognoscendi omnia alia, et per consequens est ratio cognoscendi intuitive quodlibet cognoscibile, licet nullum exsisteret in se.	62. To the final argument [n.4] I say that for an act of loving - or for an act of love - the loved thing must be pre-known (this is said by blessed Augustine On the Trinity [n.4]), but it is not necessary that the love itself be pre-known, - to wit, if some honorable good is offered to me, it is not necessary that before I am able to have the act, namely the act of loving that good, I should, to be sure, pre-know the act; so in the intended proposition: the divine essence - the love of which is inspirited - must be pre-known to the Father and to the Son so that they might inspirit, but there is no need to concede that, in the instant of origin, the Holy Spirit - who is inspirited love - should be pre-known to the Father and to the Son, although in the instant of eternity the whole Trinity is always known to any person in the Trinity, because, in distinguishing between instants of origin, one is not distinguishing between duration and duration, but only distinguishing what origin which person is from. It could in another way be said that, in the prior moment of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be inspirited, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit, and do so intuitively, although not as existing in himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively any intelligible object whatever, - just as the Trinity knows the creature, and intuitively, before it is produced, because the Trinity's own essence, which the Trinity intuits, is the reason for most perfectly knowing everything else, and, as a result, it is the reason for knowing intuitively anything knowable, even if none were in itself existent.
Adnotatio: $a Contra. Idem est principium 'producendi' et 'necessario producendi'; ergo si infinitas voluntatis - vel magis, voluntas infinita - non est ex se principium necessario producendi, ergo nec absolute producendi, nec communicandi naturam, quia ipsa non potest communicari nisi necessario: igitur in solutione quaestionis, et in solutione primi dubii, ita oportet exprimere de obiecto sicut hic in solutione secundi dubii; confirmatur, quia voluntas etiam infinita non est principium producendi amorem obiecti finiti, - alioquin vel multi Spiritus Sancti, vel unus erit amor productus omnis creaturae (quod negas), ƿquia tunc necessario amarentur. Concedo ergo quod ratio ad principalem solutionem hic et similiter de Verbo quantum ad intellectum, et tota illa ratio quae ponitur supra distinctione 2 quaestione 6, non concludit nisi accipiendo cum voluntate hic et cum intellectu ibi, principium productivum, scilicet obiectum, sine quo non producit, sicut nec operatur. Aliter et melius (statim post, extra, a 'Non videtur'), quia nihil omnino addendo ad rationem voluntatis infinitae, concluditur quod habet obiectum primum infinitum et semper praesens, immo semper actu volitum, et nullum aliud necessario requisitum ad actum suum: et ideo nullum actum habet contingentem, licet contingenter transeat super aliquod obiectum, a quo actus non dependet (de hoc distinctione 38 et 39).	On the contrary. The same thing is principle of 'producing' and of 'producing necessarily'; therefore if there is infinity of will - or rather, an infinite will - it is not of itself a principle of producing necessarily, therefore not of producing absolutely, nor of communicating nature, because the nature cannot be communicated except necessarily; therefore in the solution of the question [n.9], and in the solution of the first doubt [n.31], one ought to speak about the object as here in the second doubt [sc. that the object does not give necessity to the act of willing, n.40]; there is confirmation because even an infinite will is not a principle of producing love of a finite object, - otherwise there will either be many Holy Spirits, or there will be one love produced for every creature (which you deny, n.41), because then they would be necessarily loved. I concede, then, that the reason for the solution here [n.9], and likewise about the Word as concerns the intellect, and the whole reason set down above in distinction 2 question 6 [I d.2 nn.221, 226], only conclude by taking, along with the will here [about the Holy Spirit] and along with the intellect there [about the Word], the productive principle, namely the object, without which it does not produce, just as it does not operate either. In another way and better (immediately after 'It does not seem' footnote to n.49), because, by absolutely adding nothing to the idea of infinite will, the conclusion follows that it has a first object infinite and always present, nay always actually willed, and nothing else is necessarily required for its act; and therefore it has no contingent act, although it contingently passes to some object on which its act does not depend (about this in distinctions 38 and 39).
Si dicatur ad illud 'Concedo quod ratio' etc., quod voluntas non est principium producendi nisi ut habens obiectum sibi praesens (quod est comprincipium producendi), et non potest esse 'principium' habens quodcumque obiectum sed praecise ut habens obiectum primum sibi praesens et cum illo (et hoc, vel quia ante praesentiam obiecti secundarii habet productionem adaequatam, quia cum primo obiecto: ultra autem adaequatam, non potest in aliam; vel secundo, quia principium infinitum non requirit aliquod finitum comproducens: obiectum autem secundarium est finitum; vel tertio, quia principium necessario ƿproductivum non habet comproductivum illud ad quod non habet necessariam habitudinem: voluntas divina non necessario respicit obiectum secundarium; vel quarto, quia in istis generale suppositum verum est, scilicet quod voluntas est principium producendi, necessario requirens obiectum comproductivum, sicut et intellectus), - unde dictum est distinctione 2 quod memoria perfecta, quae est completum principium dicendi, est intellectus habens obiectum actu intelligibile sibi praesens: ita voluntas perfecta, est voluntas habens obiectum diligibile actu praesentatum per intelligentiam.	If it be said to the 'I concede that the reason, etc.' [above, in the first paragraph of this annotation] that the will is not the principle of producing unless it has the object present to it (which object is the co-principle of producing), and that it cannot be the 'principle' when it has any object whatever but precisely when it has the first object present to it and along with that one (and this either because, before the presence of the secondary object, it has an adequate production, because it has it with the first object, but it has no power for another production beyond the adequate one; or, secondly, because an infinite principle does not require any finite principle producing along with it, but the secondary object is finite; or, thirdly, because a necessarily productive principle does not have as co-productive principle that to which it has no necessary relation, but the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to a secondary object; or, fourthly, because in these cases the general supposition is true, namely that the will is a principle of producing that necessarily requires the object as co-productive, just as does also the intellect [this is valid in d.7 n.42]), - hence it was said in distinction 2 that perfect memory, which is the complete principle of the speaking, is the intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself [I d.1 n.221]; so perfect will is a will possessing the lovable object actually presented to it through intelligence [I d.1 n.226].
Sed quod additur de differentia obiecti primi (quod ipsum est comproductivum) et secundi (quod ipsum non est comproductivum), hoc dubium est tam in intellectu quam in voluntate, - nec aliqua causa quae assignatur, videtur sufficere: prima non, quia aut intelligitur de adaequata extensive et petitur principium, aut intensive et falsa est illa 'ultra autem' etc. (sicut patet in operatione, quia ultra sic adaequatam operationem quae est circa primum obiectum, potest in operationem circa secundum obiectum). Nec secunda, quia volo quod obiectum secundum non sit comproductivum, sed primum sit comproƿductivum, non tantum notitiae sui - quae est praesens formaliter - sed obiecti secundi, quod est praesens in ipsa virtualiter: ita quod sicut memoria divina continet praecise primum obiectum formaliter et secundum obiectum non est in memoria nisi virtualiter (quia in primo), et tamen memoria est ratio intelligentiae operandi circa utrumque, ita sit ratio producendi notitiam declarativam utriusque, - non quidem procedentem de utroque sed de infinito tantum, tamen declarantem utrumque per obiectum quod est primum formaliter et habet in se secundum virtualiter (ita de spiratione); item, haec voluntas in prima productione non requirit comproductivum nisi infinitum: unde ergo probatur imperfectio eius, si in secunda productione eius requireret comproductivum finitum? (responsio: licet quandoque coagat creaturae, numquam tamen illam necessario requirit, - esset enim imperfecta principiatio; sed prima instantia stat, quod 'solum primum obiectum est comproductivum duplicis verbi vel amoris'). Tertia non probat, quia sicut voluntas operatur circa obiectum ad quod contingenter se habet - tamen respectu illius operationis quasi principium est solummodo primum obiectum quod contingenter respicit secundum - quare non potest ita esse de productione?	But as to what is added [in the previous paragraph] about the difference between the first object (that it is co-productive) and the second (that is not co-productive), this is doubtful both in the case of the intellect and in the case of the will - nor do any of the causes assigned [in the previous paragraph] seem sufficient; not the first, because either it is understood of production adequate in extension, and then the question is begged, or adequate in intension, and then the 'but.. .beyond the adequate one' is false (as is plain in the case of operation, because it has, beyond a thus adequate operation about the first object, power for operation about a second object). Nor the second reason, because I want the second object not to be co-productive but the first object to be co-productive, not only of knowledge of itself - which is present formally - but of knowledge of the second object, which is present in it virtually; so that, just as the divine memory precisely contains the first object formally and the second object is only in the memory virtually (because it is in the first object), and yet the memory is the reason for understanding the operation about both objects, so also is it the idea for producing declarative knowledge of both objects - not indeed a knowledge proceeding from both objects but from the infinite one only, yet making both objects clear through the object which is first formally and has the second in itself virtually (so also about inspiriting); again, [the second seems insufficient because] the will in its first production does not require a co-productive principle save an infinite one; whence, then, is its imperfection proved if in the second production it were to require a finite co-productive principle? (response: although sometimes it co-acts with the creature, yet it never necessarily requires it, - for its being as principle would be imperfect; but the first instance stands, that 'only the first object is co-productive of double word and love' [sc. word and love of God and of creature]). The third reason is not probative, because just as will operates about an object to which it is related contingently - yet in respect of that operation the quasi-principle is only the first object which has a respect contingently to the second - why cannot it be so about production?
Item, de verbo non concludit; item, complacentia est necessaria. Nota. In quocumque est principium productivum perfectum, non impedibile nec dependens aliunde, potest illo producere terminum nisi termino repuƿgnet ab ipso produci, - et similiter, non potest illo producere si termino repugnet ab ipso produci; utraque istarum videtur maior immediata. Vel sic in quocumque est principium perfectum prius quam terminus producatur, non repugnat termino ab ipso produci, - et similiter, non potest ab illo produci si non est in ipso prius quam terminus producatur; utraque videtur minor immediata. Conclusio prima: in quocumque est principium productivum perfectum prius quam terminus producatur, illud potest tali principio producere terminum; conclusio secunda: in quocumque non est principium prius quam terminus producatur, illud non potest producere terminum.	Again, it is not conclusive about the word; again, the being well-pleased is necessary. Note: in anything in which there is a perfect productive principle, unpreventable and not dependent on anything else, the principle can produce a term in that thing unless it is repugnant to the term to be produced by it, - and likewise it cannot produce a term in it if it is repugnant to that term to be produced by it; for each of these the major seems immediate. Or thus: in anything in which there is a perfect principle before the term is produced, it is not repugnant to the term to be produced by it, - and likewise, it cannot be produced by it if it is not in it before the term is produced; each minor seems immediate. First conclusion: anything in which there is a productive perfect principle before the term is produced can by such a principle produce the term; second conclusion: anything in which there is no principle before the term is produced cannot produce the term.
ƿUltra sic. Sit prima conclusio pro maiore, et minor talis: 'memoria perfecta est principium productivum perfectum notitiae declarativae obiecti, tam relucentis formaliter in memoria quam virtualiter in illo obiecto formali'; ergo habens memoriam perfectam potest producere notitiam sive huius sive illius, si prius habeat quam alterius notitia sit producta. Similiter syllogiza de voluntate perfecta et dilectione. Tertius syllogismus (quia duo primi computantur pro uno et duo secundi pro uno) fiat sic: ultima conclusio sit pro maiore; minor sit haec: 'tota Trinitas habet memoriam perfectam prius quam notitia declarativa creaturae sit producta', ex prima quaestione secundi, quia in primo instanti naturae completur tota origo simpliciter personarum et notitia creaturae est in secundo signo naturae; ergo tota Trinitas producit notitiam declarativam obiecti secundarii.	Further in this way. Let the first conclusion be the major and let the minor be thus: 'perfect memory is a perfect productive principle of a knowledge declarative of the object, a knowledge reducing it both formally in the memory and virtually in the object'; therefore what has a perfect memory can produce knowledge of this or of that, if it has it before knowledge of another is produced. Make a similar syllogism about perfect will and love.Let the third syllogism (because the two first are counted as one and the two second as one) be as follows: let the last conclusion be the major; let the minor be this: 'the whole Trinity has perfect memory before declarative knowledge of the creature is produced', from the first question of the second book [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15], because in the first instant of nature there is completed the whole origin simply of the persons, and the knowledge of the creature is in the second moment of nature; therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative knowledge of the secondary object.
Consimiliter de voluntate et amore. Consequens videtur falsum, quia vel producit in qualibet persona, et tunc in Patre erit aliquid productum, - vel in determinatis, productis, quarum productionibus consonant istae productiones (puta notitiam creaturae esse in Filio et dilectionem in Spiritu Sancto), et sequitur quod in Filio sit aliquid a Spiritu Sancto, et etiam Filius producet aliquid in se et Spiritus Sanctus in se. Itaque vitando conclusionem illatam, aliqua trium minorum neganda est. Si prima, negetur de 'prius' natura, quia illa stat in eodem gradu originis (ubi tamen non ƿest productio), vel glossetur quod vera est si 'prius quam primus terminus producibilis producatur' sit principium productivum in isto, non si prius quam secundus, et ratio est quia secundus terminus est in eodem gradu originis cum primo: utraque responsio videtur eadem (saltem conceditur Verbum esse creaturae notitiam declarativam et Spiritum Sanctum esse dilectionem creaturae, licet non a Trinitate produci: contra distinctione 18 'De dono' et 27 'De Verbo').	Similarly about will and love. The consequent seems false, because either the Trinity produces it [declarative knowledge of the creature] in any person at all, and then in the Father there will be something produced, - or in determinate, produced persons, with whose productions these productions are consonant (to wit, knowledge of the creature in the Son and love and of the creature in the Holy Spirit), and it follows that there is in the Son something from the Holy Spirit, and also that the Son will produce something in himself and the Holy Spirit something in himself. Therefore, by avoiding the inferred conclusion, one or other of the three minors must be denied. If the first is denied, the denial is about the 'before in nature', because that stands in the same degree of origin (where however there is no production), or a gloss is made to the effect that it is true if, 'before the first producible term is produced', the productive principle exists in it, not if it is before the second is produced, and the reason is that the second term is in the same degree of origin as the first; both responses seem to be the same (at least it is conceded that the Word is declarative knowledge of the creature and the Holy Spirit is love of the creature, although not produced by the Trinity; the contrary is in distinction 18 'About gift' and 27 'About the Word' [I d.27 qq.1-3 n.24; d.18 was left blank in the Ordinatio]).
Si negetur secunda minor de obiecto secundario, redit difficultas hic tractata ubi supra 'Si dicatur' etc. - et tunc oportet aliter dicere de voluntate quam de memoria 'quia voluntati per intelligentiam praesentatur actualiter obiectum secundarium' (responsio: non habet ex se rationem diligibilis, sicut primum). Tertia minor non habet vim nisi de 'prius' (sicut prima minor): patet enim quod non est vera de 'prius' origine; de 'natura' est dubium si tantum est differentia rationis inter productionem Verbi declarantis primum obiectum et declarantis secundum, quia differentia rationis non est pro ordine naturae sufficiens. ƿNotandum pro tribus syllogismis superius positis, quod licet minor primi negetur de 'priore alio quam originis' in divinis, et a per hoc videtur excludi omnis via arguendi 'quis de quo' (quia 'prius origine' est idem cum conclusione), adhuc tamen restat difficultas de principio productivo, quae tangitur hic supra, in principio, - videlicet de obiecto secundario, - quia vel maior (cui omnino inniteris in quaestione de productionibus) erit falsa vel difficile erit quod non extendatur ad obiectum secundarium: b concesso vero quod extendatur ad illud, perit illud c prima distinctione secundi 'de creatura in esse intelligibili, quod sit a tota Trinitate' (quia a quo est productive notitia creaturae, ab ipso producitur creatura ut intellecta), d perit 'de relatione obiecti secundarii ad scire Dei' in quaestione de ideis, e perit 'de relatione Verbi et Spiritus Sancti ad creaturas' distinctione 18 et 27 primi, perit f quod 'Spiritus Sanctus non sit necessario amor creaturae' (et oportebit dicere quod sit necessario amor complacentiae, licet non volitio exsistendi), et tunc perit illud g distinctione 8 'contra philosophos, de non necessitate creaturae', - et tunc redit illud h ibi 'de complacenƿtia', stat primum argumentum quaestione prima secundi, non valet illud de respectu primi obiecti, et Spiritus Sanctus non ita libere amabit creaturam ut Pater (quia ex productione est amor), nec Verbum virtute memoriae ut in ipso, intelliget, sed ut in Patre. Ad ista. - Primo ad a: principium quod ex ratione sui natum est exire prius in actum realiter producendi, in subsistentia reali, concludit suum productivum esse prius origine, id est 'sine quo non alius', et ex hoc concluditur quod ab ipso est alius (ita de Spiritu Sancto, quod est a Patre et Filio, distinctione 11); similiter, productum quod natum est in reali subsistentia prius produci alio, est 'sine quo non est aliud', - ergo 'a quo aliud' (sic tres personae, ad creaturas in esse extra).	If the second minor about the secondary object is denied, the difficulty here treated of returns - above at 'If it be said to the 'I concede that the reason,' etc.' - and then one must speak differently about will than about memory 'because to the will the secondary object is actually presented through intelligence' (response: the second object does not have of itself, as does the first object, a reason for being lovable). The third minor only has force about the 'before' (just as does the first minor): for it is plain that it is not true of the 'before' in origin; about 'nature' it is doubtful if there is only a difference of reason between the production of the Word declaring the first object and of the Word declaring the second object, because a difference of reason is not sufficient for the order of nature. One should note for the three syllogisms posited above that, although the minor of the first syllogism is denied of 'before in a way other than in origin' in the case of divine reality, and by this, a, seems to be excluded all force of arguing 'whom about what' (because 'before in origin' is the same as the conclusion), yet there still remains the difficulty about the productive principle, which was touched on here above, at the beginning - namely about the secondary object - because either the major (on which you altogether rely in the question about productions) will be false or it will be difficult for it not to be extended to the secondary object; but once, b, it is conceded that it is extended to it, then there is lost, c, the point in the first distinction of the second book 'about the creature in intelligible being, that it is from the whole Trinity' [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15] (because from that which knowledge of the creature productively is, from that the creature as understood is produced), there is lost, d, the point 'about the relation of the secondary object to God's knowing' in the question about ideas [I d.35 q. un n.10], there is lost, e, the point 'about the relation of the Word and the Holy Spirit to creatures' in distinctions 18 and 27 of the first book [same reference as before], there is lost, f, the fact that 'the Holy Spirit is not necessarily love of the creature' [I d.32 qq.1-2 n.14] (and it will be necessary to say that it is necessarily love of being well-pleased, although not love of existing), and then there will be lost, g, the point in distinction 8 'against the philosophers, about the non-necessity of the creature' [I d.8 n.274], - and then returns, h, the point there 'about being well-pleased' [ibid.], and the first argument in the first question of the second book stands [that if there were only one person, it could produce everything possible, II d.1 q.1 n.1], the point about the respect of the first object is not valid [ibid. n.9], and the Holy Spirit will not as freely love the creature as the Father does (because love is from production), nor will the Word understand by virtue of memory as it is in himself but as it is in the Father. To these remarks. First to a: the principle which of its idea is of a nature to exit first in act of really producing, in real subsistence, proves that its productive principle is before in origin, that is 'without which there is no other', and from this is proved that from him there is another (so about the Holy Spirit, because he is from the Father and the Son, distinction 11 of the first book); likewise, the product, which is of a nature to be produced in real subsistence before in another, is that 'without which there is no other product', - therefore 'from which there is another product' (thus the three persons, in relation to creatures in outward existence).
Concedo ergo quod persona accepta in subsistentia reali (ut habet omnia, qualemcumque ordinem in ipsa habentia), est realiter productiva personae secundae (similiter acceptae secundum omnia in ipsa), tamen in utraque est distinguere quid primum est in ipsa - quo scilicet est persona divina - et quid quasi adventicium personae quasi iam constitutae, quale est omne comparans ad obiectum secundum. b concedo, et c similiter, nisi quod (iuxta praedicta in a) tres personae, in esse simpliciter personae divinae, praecedunt ordine naturae intellectionem creaturae, et per consequens creaturam in esse intelligibili; hoc quidem antecedens est verum (ibi, distinctione prima II), sed negatur consequens 'ergo ƿcreaturae producuntur a Trinitate in esse intellecto': ratio negationis est ista, quia sicut operatio circa obiectum secundum non potest esse alia realiter (quomodocumque hoc est, essentialiter vel subsistenter) ab operatione circa obiectum primum, ita nec productio circa istud a productione circa illud; igitur non potest esse alterius, sic vel sic realiter producentis; ergo solus Pater dicit verbum creaturae, sicut et Verbum essentiae suae. Confirmatur, quia sicut hoc principium operativum habet unam operationem adaequatam sibi non tantum intensive sed etiam extensive, hoc est, circa omnia quae virtualiter sunt in ipsa, ita in quantum est productivum habet unam productionem adaequatam utroque modo, quia neutrum repugnat uni producto.	I concede therefore that the person taken in real subsistence (as he has everything, whatever order they possess in him) is really productive of the second person (likewise taken in the way that everything is in him), yet in each there is a distinction between what is first in him - namely that by which he is a divine person - and what is as it were adventitious to the person as already quasi-constituted, of which sort is everything in comparison with the second object. I concede b and likewise c, save that (according to what was said before in a) the three persons, in existence simply of divine person, precede in order of nature the understanding of the creature, and precede, as a result, the creature in its intelligible existence; this antecedent indeed is true (there, in the first distinction of the second book [same reference as before]), but the consequent is denied, 'therefore creatures are produced by the Trinity in understood existence'; the reason for the denial is this, that, just as operation about the second object is really different (however it is so, whether essentially or subsistently) from the operation about the first object, not so production about the latter from production about the former; therefore it cannot be of another that is really producing in this way and in that; therefore only the Father speaks the word of the creature, just as only he speaks the Word of his essence. A confirmation is that, just as this operative principle has one operation adequate to itself not only intensively but also extensively, that is, about everything that is virtually in it, so it has, insofar as it is productive, one production adequate in both ways, because neither is repugnant to one product.
Confirmatur etiam, quia notitia sive ut operatio sive ut producta, non potest esse nisi eiusdem termini primi, - aliorum non, nisi ut secundariorum; ergo nulla potest esse producta quae sit immediate alicuius obiecti ut termini (de hoc distinctione 36, extra). Aliter. Concedo b et non perit c, quia productio obiecti secundi in esse cognito non est productio realis, sicut nec terminus accipit esse reale, - ergo est productio deminuta, sicut productum est ens deminutum; talis productio potest esse, quae non est productio sed quasi productio; huiusmodi est cognitio. Ergo Pater in se, per cognitionem in qua est virtualiter obiectum secundum, quasi producit in se obiectum illud dum actu cognoscit, et communicans cognitionem communicat eam ut quasi producentem idem obiectum, quia posterius est ƿpersona cui communicatur; ergo Trinitas quasi producit obiectum, et ita producit in esse cognito (quia in illo produci est quasi produci), licet solus Pater realiter producat in Filio, ex vi generationis, et Pater et Filius in Spiritu Sancto communicant cognitionem huiusmodi obiecti, - quae cognitio (in omnibus communicata) est quasi productio, et ita productio deminuta. –	Another confirmation is that the knowledge, whether as operation or as product, can only be of the same first term, - not of others, save as they are secondary; therefore no knowledge can be produced which is immediately of another object as term (about this in distinction 36 [I d.36 q. un n.9]). In another way. I concede b and c is not lost, because the production of the second object in known existence is not real production, just as neither does the term receive real existence, - therefore it is a diminished production, just as the product is a diminished being; such production can exist, because it is not production but quasi-production; of this sort is knowledge. Therefore the Father in himself, through the knowledge in which the second object is virtually, quasi-produces in himself that object while he actually knows it and, when communicating the knowledge, communicates it as quasi-producing the same object, because it is posterior to the person to whom it is communicated; therefore the Trinity quasi-produces the object, and so produces it in known existence (because to be produced in that is to be quasi-produced), although only the Father really produces in the Son, by force of generation, and the Father and Son in the Holy Spirit communicate knowledge of this sort of object, - which knowledge (communicated in all of them) is a quasi-production, and so a diminished production.
Aliter, planius: cognitionem esse obiecti secundi est ipsum producere in esse cognito, sicut ipsam esse obiecti primi est esse eius ut quasi producentis cognitionem, quia primum obiectum quasi praesupponitur et secundum quasi producitur per hoc - in actu - quod cognitio est eius; ergo realiter communicans cognitionem ut obiecti secundarii, realiter communicat illam ut producentem obiectum secundarium, productione quae ibi potest esse, quae non est nisi deminuta. Sive Pater sive Trinitas producat obiectum secundum in esse cognito, non perit d, quia idea est obiectum secundum, sive productum sic vel sic, vel non productum sed 'quasi'.	In another way, more plainly: to be knowledge of the second object is to produce it in known being, just as to be knowledge of the first object is to be of it as of quasi-producing knowledge, because the first object is quasi-presupposed and the second is quasi-produced by it - in act -because it is knowledge of it; therefore, as really communicating knowledge as of the second object, it really communicates it as producing the secondary object, by the production which there is possible, which is only a diminished production. Whether the Father or the Trinity produces the second object in known existence, d is not lost, because the idea is a second object, whether produced in this way or in that, or it is not produced but quasi-produced.
- Et si quis dicat ideam sic non referri realiter ad scire Dei, quia idea sic nihil est, - pari ratione nec e converso scire habet aliquam relationem rationis ad obiectum secundum, quia omnino nihil sicut nec fundat ita nec terminat aliquam relationem. Non perit e, quia undecumque producatur (vel quasi producatur) obiectum secundum, persona divina habet perfectum esse, comparando intellectum et voluntatem ad primum obiectum; tamen concedo quod Verbum ex productione quasi secundaria est notitia creaturae producta realiter, sicut Pater quasi secundario est notitia eius improducta, et ita necessario Filius sicut Pater est notitia ƿeius, - sed ista relatio nec cum ingeneratione constituit Patrem, nec cum generatione Filium. De hoc f; - vel potest dici de complacentia: in quantum illud 'ostensum' ostenditur habere bonitatem participatam a Primo; vel aliter: sicut persona Patris necessario habet operationem voluntatis, quae operatio est alicuius obiecti necessario, alicuius contingenter, - ita producit quasi operationem subsistentem, quae operatio, necessario producta, est alicuius necessario, alicuius contingenter; et sicut non sequitur 'volitio creaturae est eadem personae Patris, ergo Pater habet necessario volitionem creaturae' (sed tantum sequitur 'ergo necessario habet volitionem quae est creaturae'), ita non sequitur 'Pater necessario spirat volitionem creaturae' (in sensu compositionis), licet necessario spiret 'volitionem' quae est creaturae.	And if someone says that the idea is not thus really referred to God's knowing, because thus the idea is nothing, - by parity of reasoning neither conversely does knowing have any relation of reason to the second object, because the second object is altogether nothing, just as it neither founds nor terminates any relation.Nor is e lost, because from whatever source the second object is produced (or quasi-produced), the divine person has perfect existence, comparing the intellect and will to the first object; however I do concede that the Word, from the quasi-secondary production, is really produced knowledge of the creature, just as the Father is quasi-secondarily unproduced knowledge of it, and so necessarily the Son, like the Father, is knowledge of it - but this relation neither with non-generation constitutes the Father, nor with generation the Son. From this f [is not lost - i.e. repeat of the Holy Spirit what has just been said of the Son]; - or it can be asserted of being well-pleased; insofar as the 'shown thing' is shown to have goodness participated from the First thing; or in another way; just as the person of the Father necessarily has the operation of the will, which operation is of some object necessarily and of another contingently, - so he produces a subsistent quasi-operation, which operation, necessarily produced, is of some object necessarily and of another contingently; and just as this does not follow 'the volition of the creature is the same as the person of the Father, therefore the Father necessarily has volition of the creature' (but only this follows 'therefore he necessarily has a volition that is of the creature'), so this does not follow 'the Father necessarily inspirits volition of the creature' (in the composite sense), although he necessarily inspirits a 'voition' which is of the creature.
Nota quod supra, ubi dicitur 'Contra. Idem est principium', videntur contradictoriae responsiones: una, quod cum voluntate infinita oportet accipere quod habeat obiectum infinitum praesens, - alia, post, quod nihil oportet addere de obiecto, sed ex infinita voluntate concluditur obiectum infinitum semper actu praesens, necessario (et quomodo concluditur, habetur extra, ibi 'Ideo sic'). Sed ista contradictio sic tollitur: ex ratione potentiae concluditur condicio obiecti primi et praesentia eius, non 'propter quid' sed 'quia'; ratio enim potentiae requirit obiectum quasi comprincipium respectu operationis, ideo ad habendum completum 'propter quid' necessariae dilectionis oportet accipere ƿsic 'infinita voluntas, habens infinitum obiectum, actu praesentatum per intellectum', - et sic intelligitur prima responsio; sed istius totius 'propter quid', includentis duo comprincipia (necessario comprincipiantia actum), altera pars concludit alteram 'quia', - et sic intelligitur secunda responsio.	Note that above, when it is said [at the beginning of this annotation]: 'On the contrary. The same thing is principle', contradictory responses are seen; one, that together with infinite will one must take the fact that it has a present infinite object, - the other, afterwards, that one should add nothing to the object, but from infinite will is deduced an infinite object always actually present, necessarily (and how it is deduced is contained here [footnote to n.49]). But this contradiction is thus removed: from the idea of power is deduced the condition of the first object and of its presence, not by a 'proof-why' but by a 'proof-that'; for the idea of power requires an object that is a quasi-co-principle with respect to the operation, and so, in order to have a complete 'proof-why' of necessary love, one must take it thus, 'infinite will possessing an infinite object actually presented to it through the intellect', -and the first response is understood in this way; but of this whole 'proof-why', including the two co-principles (necessarily being co-principles of the act) the one part proves the other part by a 'proof-that', - and the second response is understood in this way.
Nec illa probatio 'Ideo sic' plus concludit: primae enim propositionis subiectum non dicit totum 'propter quid' respectu praedicati, sed alterum principium, - ex cuius tamen ratione concluditur reliquum comprincipium concurrere non 'propter quid', sed natura sic requirit quod tali voluntati correspondeat comprincipium proportionatum, ideo infinitum, et modo proportionato, ideo semper praesens; verbi gratia, secundum Aristotelem 'aliqua causa simpliciter necessario movet caelum': hic in subiecto est 'propter quid' partiale praedicati, sed natura requirit ut sibi correspondeat comprincipium proportionatum, et modo proportionato, - ut caelum necessarium et necessario praesens et mobile; ideo totale 'propter quid' huius effectus - scilicet motus necessarii - includit causam activam et mobile, sed ex ratione propria unius eorum concluditur 'quia' aliud concurrere, et ita effectus, sed deminute 'propter quid'. a$	Nor does the proof 'So in this way' [footnote to n.49] conclude more: for the subject of the first proposition does not state the whole 'proof-why' with respect to the predicate, but the other principle does - from whose idea, however, is deduced that the remaining co-principle concurs not as to 'proof-why', but nature thus requires that to such a will there correspond a proportionate co-principle, therefore an infinite one, and in a proportionate way, therefore always present; for example, according to Aristotle 'some cause simply necessary moves the heavens' [I d.8 n.251]; here in the subject there is a partial 'proof-why' of the predicate, but nature requires that to it there correspond a proportionate co-principle and in a proportionate way, - as a necessary heavens and necessarily present and movable; therefore the total 'proof-why' of this effect - namely of the necessary motion - includes the active cause and the movable thing, but from the proper idea of one of these there is concluded, by a 'proof-that', that the other concurs, and so the effect is proved, but by a diminished 'proof-that'.