Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D9

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem nonam quaero utrum generatio Filii in divinis sit aeterna. Quod non, arguitur: Quia ubi idem est esse et duratio, si aliquid est principium esse, et durationis; sed Pater est principium esse Filii, quia principium ((totius deitatis)), secundum Augustinum IV De Trinitate 17 cap.; ergo est principium durationis Filii.	1. About the ninth distinction I ask whether the generation of the Son in divine reality is eternal. Argument that it is not: Because where being and duration are the same thing, if anything is principle of the being it is also principle of the duration; but the Father is principle of the being of the Son, because he is principle "of the whole deity" according to Augustine On the Trinity IV ch.20 n.29; therefore he is principle of the duration of the Son.
2 Praeterea, Augustinus XV De Trinitate cap. 14 et 15: 'imperfectionis est in verbo nostro, quod est formabile antequam formetur', ergo imperfectionis videtur in verbo quod est in 'formari'; hoc igitur non competit Verbo divino.	2. Further, Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.15 n.25: "it is a mark of imperfection in our word that it is formable before it is formed," therefore it seems a mark of imperfection in a word that it is in a state of 'being formed'; therefore this does not belong to the divine Word.
3 Praeterea, si generatio Filii semper est, aeterna, ergo Filius semper generatur: ergo numquam genitus est, et ita numquam est Filius. - Hae consequentiae probantur per Augustinum 83 Quaeƿstionum quaestione 37: ((Quod semper nascitur, numquam natum est)), - ultra, ((quod numquam natum est, numquam est filius)); ergo si Filius semper nascitur, numquam est Filius. Oppositum:	3. Further, if the generation of the Son is always, or eternal, then the Son is always being generated; therefore he has never been generated, and so he is never Son. -These consequences are proved through Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.37: "What is always being born has never been born," - further, "what has never been born is never son;" therefore if the Son is always being born, he is never Son.
4 Ambrosius I De Trinitate cap. 6, et ponitur in littera: ((Si prius erat Deus et postea genuit, generationis accessione mutatus est; avertat Deus hanc amentiam)). Semper ergo habuit Filium.	4. To the opposite: Ambrose On the Faith I ch.9 nn.59-60, and it is in the text [of Lombard's Sentences]: "If God first existed and afterwards generated, he was, by the accession of generation, changed; may God avert this madness." Therefore he always had the Son.
5 Similiter, auctoritas Hilarii in littera: 'inter gignere et gigni nullum est medium', scilicet durationis. Si ergo proprium est Patri semper genuisse, proprium est Filio quod semper genitus est.	5. Likewise the authority of Hilary [On the Trinity XII n.21] in the text: "between being generated and having been generated there is no intermediate," namely of duration. If therefore it is proper to the Father to have always generated, it is proper to the Son that he has always been generated.
6 Ad quaestionem dico quod sic, quia generatio non est ibi sub ratione mutationis (sicut dictum est supra distinctione 5 quaestione 2), et ideo non habet terminos correspondentes terminis generationis mutationis, scilicet esse post non esse (id est, nunc se habere aliter quam prius, propter quos terminos repugnat geneƿrationi mutationi aeternitas, quia non possunt simul esse; ergo alter ante alterum, ergo non aeternitas), sed tantum est ibi generatio productio in esse substantiae per modum naturae.	6. To the question I say yes, because generation is there not under the idea of change (as was said above in distinction 5 question 2 [d.5 n.87]), and therefore it does not have terms corresponding to the terms of generation-change, namely existence after nonexistence (that is, being differently disposed now than before, and, because of these terms, eternity is repugnant to generation-change, because they cannot be at the same time; so there is one thing after another, and so no eternity); but there is there only generation-production in the being of substance by way of nature.
7 Ex hoc ostendo quod sit aeterna, quia agens sufficiens (hoc est, a nullo dependens) et producens per modum naturae, habet productionem sibi coaevam - et etiam productum perfectum - si non agit per motum; Pater generans est tale agens; ergo habet generationem sibi coaevam, et etiam genitum.	7. From this I show that it is eternal, because a sufficient agent (that is, dependent on nothing), and one producing by way of nature, has a production coeval with it - and also a perfect product - if it does not act by motion; the Father generating is such an agent; therefore he has a production coeval with him, and also a thing generated.
8 Maior apparet, quia quod producens praecederet suam productionem, hoc non posset esse - ut videtur - nisi quia vel in potestate eius esset agere et non agere, vel quia etsi ex se determinaretur ad agendum, tamen posset impediri, propter defectum alicuius a quo dependeret in agendo. Haec omnia excludunt ea quae posita sunt in maiore, esse scilicet agens sufficiens et producere naturaliter; si etiam istis non positis praecederet productum, hoc esset quia productum producitur per motum: ergo istis amotis et motu, non tantum productio est sibi coaeva (scilicet producenti), sed etiam productum.	8. The major is plain, because that a producer should precede its production is -as it seems - not possible except because either the acting and not acting is in its power, or because, although it is of itself determined to act, yet it can be impeded through lack of something on which it would depend in its acting. All these conditions exclude what was posited in the major, namely being a sufficient agent and producing naturally; also if, with these conditions not posited, the producer should precede its product, this would be because the product is produced through motion; therefore, with these conditions and motion removed, not only is the production coeval with it (namely with the producer), but the product too.
9 Minor apparet quantum ad omnes condiciones, quia Pater generans naturaliter generat, et est primum producens omnino, ergo a nullo dependens in producendo; et naturam suam nullo modo communicat per motum, quia non potest esse motus in natura illa. ƿ	9. The minor is clear as to all the conditions, because the Father generating generates naturally, and he is altogether the first producer, - therefore dependent on nothing in producing; and he in no way communicates his nature through motion, because there can be no motion in that nature.
10 Per istam rationem tenet illud exemplum Augustini VI De Trinitate cap. 1, de igne et splendore, quod 'si ignis esset aeternus, haberet splendorem sibi coaevum et coaeternum'. Istud exemplum declaro sic: quando in aliquo concurrunt ratio communioris et minus communis, quidquid in illo sequitur per se rationem communioris, sequitur etiam ipsum ubi invenitur absque ratione minus communis (hoc apparet de omnibus communibus habentibus proprias passiones, et eorum inferioribus); ergo si in creatura concurrant ratio causantis naturaliter et ratio producentis naturaliter, quidquid consequitur creaturam ratione huius communioris quod est 'producere naturaliter', sequitur etiam eam ubi invenitur sine causatione naturaliter. Sed quod ignis splendorem habeat coaevum, hoc non sequitur eum praecise per hoc quod est causans naturaliter sed per hoc quod est producens naturaliter, quia si, per impossibile, non causaret illum sed produceret, ita quod splendor esset eiusdem naturae cum igne, adhuc non minus sequeretur coaevitas. Ergo ubi vere est ratio producentis naturaliter sine ratione causantis naturaliter, sicut in divinis, ibi vere sequetur producens habere productum naturaliter sibi coaevum.	10. On this reason [n.7] stands the example of Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.1 n.1, about fire and brightness, that 'if fire were eternal, it would have a brightness coeval and coeternal with it'. I make this example clear as follows: when the natures of the more common and the less common come together in something, whatever in it follows per se the nature of the more common also follows when it is found without the nature of the less common (this is clear about all common things that have their own properties, and about all that is inferior to them); therefore, if the nature of what causes naturally and the nature of what produces naturally come together in a creature, whatever follows the creature by nature of the more common, which is the 'to produce naturally', follows it also when it is found without the causing naturally. But that fire have a brightness coeval with it does not follow it precisely for the fact that it causes naturally but for the fact that it produces naturally, because if, per impossibile, it did not cause but did produce, such that there would, along with the fire, be a brightness of the same nature, the brightness would be no less coeval. Therefore, where there is truly the nature of what produces naturally without the nature of what causes naturally, as is the case in divine reality, there it truly follows that the producer has a product naturally coeval with it.
11 Ista solutio etiam confirmatur, accipendo illud quod est vel quod reperitur perfectionis sparsim in generationibus diversarum ƿcreaturarum, et relinquendo ea quae sunt imperfectionis: in generationibus successivorum, hoc est perfectionis in eis quod dum fiunt, sunt, imperfectionis est in eis quod non manent sed tantum habent esse in fluxu partis post partem; in generatione permanentium, hoc est perfectionis quod manent, et imperfectionis quod non sunt dum fiunt (quia hoc ponit imperfectionem in faciente, quod non est perfectum faciens, - similiter in facto, quod necessario habet esse post non esse); in indivisibilibus successivorum, hoc est perfectionis quod dum fiunt, sunt et tota simul sunt, sed imperfectionis quod raptim transeunt. Aggregando perfectiones, habebitur 'genitum' quod simul 'generabitur' et 'erit' et 'permanenter erit', hoc est: genitum generari, et esse perfecte in 'nunc' perfecto stante (quod est 'nunc' aeternitatis), et hoc est propositum.	11. There is also a confirmation of this solution [nn.6-10], if one takes whatever of perfection is, or is found, scattered about in the generations of diverse creatures, and if one leaves out what there is of imperfection; in the generations of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and a matter of imperfection that they do not abide but have only an existence in the flow of one part after another; in the generation of permanent things, it is matter of perfection that they abide, and of imperfection that they are not when they are coming to be (because this posits imperfection in the maker, that it is not a maker of what is perfect, - likewise in the thing made, that it necessarily has existence after non-existence); in the indivisible parts of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and that they are all at the same time, but of imperfection that they rapidly pass away. Adding together the perfections, one will have 'a generated' that at the same time 'will be generated' and 'will be' and 'will permanently be', that is: the generated is generated and exists perfectly in a perfect stationary 'now' (which is the 'now' of eternity), and this is the intended proposition.
12 Ad primum argumentum dico quod principium dicitur multipliciter (sicut apparet V Metaphysicae cap. 'De principio'), et si accipiatur eodem modo, bene potest concedi quod si sit principium alicuius, quod sit principium illius quod est idem sibi. Sed 'principium' non consuevit construi cum hoc quod est 'durationis', pro principio originis, sed tantum pro principio quod sit quasi terminus illius durationis 'a quo', sicut instans dicitur principium temporis: ƿet sive hoc sit ex usu sermonis sive ex virtute sermonis, non concederetur ista 'Pater est principium durationis Filii', sine determinatione, - sed bene concederetur ista 'Pater est principium originativum aeternitatis Filii'.	12. To the first argument [n.1] I say that 'principle' is said in many ways (as is clear in Metaphysics 5.1.1012b34-1013a23), and, if it be taken in the same way, one can well concede that, if it is the principle of anything, it is the principle of what is the same as it. But 'principle' is not wont to be construed with the 'of duration' in the sense of a principle of origin, but only in the sense of a principle that is as it were the term of the 'from which' of the duration, just as an instant is said to be the principle of time; and, whether this comes from the use or from the power of the words, one should not concede this proposition 'the Father is the principle of the duration of the Son' without further determination - but one could well concede this proposition 'the Father is the originative principle of the eternity of the Son'.
13 Quando igitur arguis per identitatem esse et durationis, quia 'quidquid est principium unius, et alterius', - concedo, si principium uniformiter accipiatur respectu esse et durationis. Sed 'principium' non construitur cum ly 'durationis' in ratione talis principii in ratione qualis principii construitur cum ly 'esse', quia respectu esse est principium originativum, et ideo non sequitur, sed est fallacia aequivocationis vel amphiboliae; sed ad hoc ut consequentia teneat, oportet determinare principium in consequente, per hoc quod est 'originans' et 'originale', - sic: 'Pater est principium originale durationis Filii', quod concedo, ut dictum est.	13. When, therefore, you argue on the basis of the identity of being and duration, because 'whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other' [n.1], - I concede it if 'principle' is taken uniformly with respect to being and duration. But 'principle' is not construed with the 'of duration' under the idea of such a principle as that under the idea of which principle is construed with 'being', because in respect of being it is an originative principle, and so the consequence does not follow, but there is a fallacy of equivocation or of amphiboly; but in order for the consequence to hold, one must determine principle in the consequent by the terms 'originating' and 'original', - in this way: 'the Father is the original principle of the duration of the Son', which I concede, as has been said [n.12].
14 Ad secundum dico quod verbum nostrum est dupliciter in fieri: uno modo, in fieri quod est propria gignitio ipsius verbi, alio modo est in fieri quod est inquisitio praecedens illam gignitionem (quam inquisitionem Augustinus vocat 'volubilem cogitationem'). Quod verbum nostrum sit in fieri hoc secundo modo, est imperfectionis ex parte verbi, quia ponit novitatem, et ex parte intellectus nostri, quia ponit imperfectam causalitatem, - et hoc ƿmodo Verbum divinum non est in fieri; et ideo concedit Augustinus verbum nostrum cogitatione formari, ita quod prius sit formabile quam formatum, in illa inquisitione praevia. Sed quod verbum nostrum sit in fieri quantum ad gignitionem, non est imperfectionis in eo, immo est necessarium ad per se rationem verbi (et erit etiam in patria), et ita non est imperfectionis in Verbo aeterno semper esse in fieri, id est gigni absque inquisitione praevia.	14. To the second [n.2] I say that our word is in a state of becoming in two ways; in one way it is in the becoming which is the proper generation of the word itself, in another way it is in the becoming which is the investigation preceding the generation (which investigation Augustine calls 'flowing cogitation'). But that our word is in a state of becoming in this second way is a matter of imperfection both on the part of the word, because it posits novelty, and on the part of our intellect, because it posits imperfect causality, - and in this way the divine Word is not in a state of becoming; and therefore Augustine concedes that our word is formed by cogitation, so that it is, in the preceding investigation, formable before it is formed. But that our word is in a state of becoming as to generation is not a matter of imperfection in it; nay this is necessary for the per se idea of a word (and it will also exist in the fatherland), and so it is not a matter of imperfection in the eternal Word that it is always in a state of becoming, that is, of being begotten without investigation preceding.
15 Ad tertium dico quod Augustinus videtur negare Filium semper nasci (in quaestione praeallegata), cum tamen Origenes dicat oppositum (sicut allegat Magister in littera) super illud Ier. 10 Inventa est etc., et Gregorius Moralium XXIX, super illud Iob 38 Sciebas quando nasciturus etc. - Numquid ergo contradicunt? - Respondeo. Gregorius Moralium XXIX videtur dicere aliqua, quibus possunt ista dicta concordari: ((Non)) - inquit ((possumus dicere quod semper nascitur, ne imperfectum aliquid videatur)). 'Ne (inquit) aliquid videatur imperfectum': non dixit ƿ'imperfectio est si dicatur semper nasci', sed 'videtur significari imperfectio', - hoc est, iste sermo non significat generationem ita esse perfectam, sicut ista significat eam esse perfectam 'semper est natus'; ista enim 'semper est natus' magis exprimit veritatem quam illa 'semper nascitur', licet utraque sit vera.	15. To the third [n.3] I say that Augustine seems to deny that the Son is always being born (in the aforementioned question [n.3]), although however Origen says the opposite (as the Master [Lombard] says in the text) on the verse of Jeremiah 11.9-10: "There is found..." [Origen Homilies on Jeremiah IX n.4], and also Gregory Moralia XXIX ch.19 n.36 on the verse of Job 38.21: "Did you know when you would be born...?" - Can it be that they are contradicting themselves? - I reply. Gregory in the Moralia passage seems to be saying things with which what has been said can be made to agree: "We cannot," he says, "assert that he is always being born, lest he seem to be something imperfect." He says 'lest he seem to be something imperfect'; he did not say 'it is an imperfection if he is said to be always being born', but he said 'imperfection seems to be signified', - that is, this way of speaking does not signify that the generation is as perfect as is signified by this statement 'he is always born'; for this 'he is always born' is more expressive of the truth than is 'he is always being born', although both are true.
16 Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est quod verba cuiuscumque temporis dicuntur de Deo vere, sive significent actus personales sive essentiales. Quod patet per Augustinum super Ioan. 16, Non enim loquetur a semetipso, sed quaecumque audiet loquetur: 'Audiet', inquit Augustinus de Spiritu, quod utique audivit et audit, quia Spiritum Sanctum audire, est a Patre Filioque procedere; et per consequens, quod 'audiet' audivit et audit, sicut scit et scivit et sciet. Ergo vult ipse dicere quod verba omnium temporum vere dicuntur de Deo, et illud apparet per illa quae adducit Magister distinctione 8 cap. 2.	16. To understand this one must know that verbs of any tense are said truly of God, whether they signify personal or essential acts. The fact is plain from Augustine [On the Gospel of John tr.99 nn.4-5] on John 16.13: "For he will not speak of himself but whatever he will hear that will he speak." Augustine says about the Spirit 'whatever he will hear', because indeed the Spirit has heard and hears, because the hearing of the Holy Spirit is his proceeding from the Father and the Son; and, consequently, that 'he will hear', has heard, and hears, just as he knows and has known and will know. Therefore Augustine himself wants the verbs of all tenses to be truly said of God, and the thing is clear from what the Master [Lombard] adduces [I d.8 ch.1 n.80].
17 Sed quid significant ista verba diversorum temporum, cum dicuntur de Deo? - Respondeo. Magis proprie possunt dici consignificare 'nunc' aeternitatis quam differentias temporis; nec tamen illud 'nunc' absolute, quia non esset tunc variatio modorum diversorum temporis significandi, sed in quantum coexsistit partibus temporis, ut cum dicitur: 'Deus genuit', consignificatur 'nunc' aeternitatis, ut sit sensus, Deus habet actum generationis in 'nunc' ƿaeternitatis in quantum illud 'nunc' coexsistebat praeterito, - 'Deus generat', hoc est habet actum generationis in 'nunc' aeternitatis in quantum coexsistit praesenti. Ex hoc patet quod cum illud 'nunc' vere coexsistat cuilibet differentiae temporis, vere dicimus de Deo differentias omnium temporum.	17. But what do these verbs of diverse tenses signify when they are said of God? - I reply. They can more properly be said to co-signify the 'now' of eternity than differences of time; and yet they do not signify the 'now' absolutely, because then there would be no variation of diverse modes of signifying time, but they signify it insofar as it coexists with the parts of time, as when one says, 'God has generated', the 'now' of eternity is co-signified, so that the sense is that God has an act of generation in the 'now' of eternity insofar as that 'now' was co-existent with the past, - when one says, 'God generates', this means he has an act of generation in the 'now' of eternity insofar as it coexists with the present. From this is plain that, since the 'now' truly coexists with any difference of time, we assert truly of God the differences of all the tenses.
18 Expressius tamen - secundum beatum Gregorium - significatur divinae generationis veritas per hunc sermonem 'semper natus est', quam per istum sermonem 'semper nascitur': quia per ly 'natus' significatur nativitas ut perfecta, per ly 'semper' significatur ut perfecta cum omni differentia vel parte temporis, et ita non tantum significatur omni parti temporis coexsistere (sicut significatur per istam 'semper gignitur'), sed significatur etiam omni parti temporis coexsistere sub ratione perfecti, et in hoc videtur expressissime significari veritas huius processionis.	18. More expressly however - according to blessed Gregory - is the truth of divine generation signified by this statement 'he is always born' than by the statement 'he is always being born'; because by the 'is born' is the nativity signified as perfect, by the 'always' is it signified as perfect with every difference or part of time, and thus it is not only signified to coexist with every part of time (as is signified by this statement 'he is always being generated'), but it is also signified to coexist with every part of time under the idea of being perfect, and in this way does the truth of this procession seem to be most truly signified.